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Summary and Recommendations The rapid globalization of technology during the past two decades has given new meaning to the concept of interdependence for the United States. To compete effectively at home or abroad, many U.S. companies and uni- versities and the nation's technical work force as a whole are becoming increasingly integrated into global networks of research, development, pro- duction, and marketing through the expansion of international trade, foreign direct investment, and corporate alliances. These developments have chal- lenged long-standing assumptions regarding the autonomy and supremacy of the U.S. technical enterprise and, in so doing, have fundamentally altered the terms of the traditional competitiveness debate. Since the mid-1970s, there has been an acceleration of two mutually reinforcing trends the convergence in technical capabilities of indus- trialized nations and the global integration of formerly discrete national technical enterprises. The technologically unipolar world of the l950s and 1960s, dominated by the United States, has given way in the past decade and a half to a world in which technical competence and resources are much more dispersed among a number of industrialized and industrializing coun- tries. International comparisons of patenting, R&D spending and personnel, high-tech trade and production, and foreign direct investment since the mid- 1970s all evidence this trend (see Chapter 1, pp. 1~231. In concert with this profound change in the global distribution of techni- cal capabilities, the organization of the advanced technical activities of cor- porations has become increasingly transnational. From the end of World War II to the early 1970s, the internationalization of production was driven primarily by U.S. foreign direct investment. During this period, production

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2 NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY in many industries became increasingly multinational or global, but advanced technical activities such as research and development remained predominantly "national," that is, concentrated in the major corporations' home countries. During the last decade and a half, however, a new model of internationalization has emerged, characterized by the rapid growth of non-U.S. foreign direct investment and a proliferation of transnational corporate alliances. The globalization of production in the 1980s and beyond encompasses the full spectrum of corporate tech- nical activities (see Chapter 1, pp. 23-25~. Responding to the challenges and opportunities of increased global com- petition, shorter product cycles, national "managed trade" policies of vary- ing scope, wider markets, and a growing number of globally dispersed sources of new technology and technical competence, transnational compa- nies in many industries have reorganized their technical activities on a glob- al basis. U.S.-based corporations have taken the lead in decentralizing and dispersing their own advanced technical activities internationally, develop- ing and acquiring more of their technology abroad. During the 1980s, trans- national corporate alliances, a majority of them involving U.S. corporations, emerged as a major vehicle for gaining access to foreign markets and tech- nology. Although U.S.-based multinationals have been forerunners of a trend, they are not alone. As their technical prowess and foreign direct investments have expanded, a growing number of foreign corporations have also begun to reorganize their advanced technical activities more internationally and to assume a more active role in the creation of trans- national technical alliances (see Chapter 1, pp. 25-35~. The convergence of national technical capabilities and the globalization of advanced technical activities at the hands of multinational corporations underline the growing economic and technical interdependence of nations. The committee is convinced that the globalization of R&D, production, investment, markets, and technology is a positive trend for both the United States and the rest of the world, although it is not without its problems. To be sure, the economic, technical, and political imperatives of globalization have created an international environment in which technical capabilities that many deem essential to a nation's continued prosperity and security can be eroded swiftly by intense competition from abroad. Nevertheless, the committee agrees that the benefits and opportunities pro- vided by the globalization trend outweigh any adjustment costs that follow in its wake. Not only does the globalization process accelerate transnational integration and cross-fertilization in engineering, technology, and manage- ment, it also promises to enhance the diversity and depth of world engineer- ing and scientific resources and thereby stimulate economic growth and technology development. Most important, the globalization of technical activities cannot be reversed or significantly impeded by national govern

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS meets without inflicting high costs on their citizens (see Chapter 2, pp. 45_47, 52). As the past decade has made clear, however, increased international inter- dependence has not diminished the competitive pursuit of economic and technical advantage by nations. Nor have the benefits (real and potential) of globalization dissuaded governments from pursuing policies that run counter to the larger trends. Governments worldwide have long intervened in their domestic economies to increase the productivity and international competitiveness of firms operating, if not originating, within their borders. However, as more countries have recognized the importance of technical advance for economic growth and competitiveness, governments have focused more on creating a domestic environment conducive to developing, applying, and diffusing advanced technology for commercial advantage. In this quest for economic advantage, nations rely on a range of policy instru- ments. Some of these are more interventionist, such as "managed trade," domestic content legislation, or "closed" national technology development initiatives; others are more market-oriented, such as deregulation or invest- ments in education and economic infrastructure (see Chapter 2, pp. 47-52; Chapter 4, pp. 72-731. This new technology-oriented competition among nations is greatly com- plicated by the blurring of corporate nationalities and the lack of internationally accepted rules of behavior for companies and their home and host governments. As private corporations, which have long been viewed as the mainstays of a nation's commercial technical enterprise, have become more cosmopolitan in outlook and conduct, the relationship between corpo- rate interests and national interests has grown increasingly complex. It is a relationship that requires more deliberate and careful examination. Indeed, the definition of what constitutes a "domestic" or a "foreign" corporation and the nature of "corporate citizenship" more generally have become more and more vexing issues for public policymakers as the technical activities and resource base of a growing number of corporations become increasingly distributed internationally. Similarly, the emerging global economic and technical enterprise chal- lenges long-standing assumptions regarding the relatively neat dichotomy of domestic and international policy areas related to national competitiveness. To deal effectively with the domestic and international political friction that accompanies the globalization trend, national governments are being called upon to negotiate internationally areas of public policy traditionally viewed as exclusively matters of domestic concern (see Chapter 4, pp. 73-744. The changing character of competition among corporations and the com- petitive pursuit of economic advantage among nations in an age of increas- ing international technical interdependence pose several major challenges for the United States. More than any other advanced industrialized country,

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4 NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY the United States has long considered itself technologically self-sufficient and has relied heavily on the technical superiority of its indigenous compa- nies to sustain an advantageous position in the world economy. Although the United States remains the world's most technologically self-sufficient country, its economic prosperity and technical dynamism have already become highly dependent on foreign technology, capital, and markets and are likely to become more so in the coming decades. Indeed, the technical and economic vitality of the United States depends increasingly on the ability of companies operating within its borders to harness and exploit globally dispersed resources and technical capabilities rapidly and effectively (see Chapter 1, pp. 25-26~. In addition, the rapid growth of technical competence beyond U.S. borders has made it increasingly difficult for U.S.-based companies to derive sustained competitive advantages from superior research capa- bilities alone. As foreign nations and companies have acquired greater tech- nical capabilities, new knowledge or basic research increasingly has become a "global public good," impossible to bottle up within any one nation's bor- ders, and easily accessible to any and all takers. To prosper in this environ- ment, it is becoming imperative that U.S.-based corporations compete effec- tively at every step along the way in the conversion of scientific discoveries into commercial services or products. Although the United States is renowned for the strength and breadth of its research enterprise, a growing number of U.S.-based companies appear to be at a disadvantage in relation to their Japanese and other foreign competitors in the downstream technical activities critical to leveraging technology for commercial advantage tech- nology development, acquisition, adaptation, and diffusion (see Chapter 1, pp. 29-35; Chapter 3; Appendix A, pp. 89-1351. Drawing on a series of industry case studies, the proceedings of commit- tee meetings and a major symposium, 1 and the views of many knowledge- able representatives from government, industry, and academe in North America, Western Europe, and Asia, this study argues for more explicit recognition of the emerging global technical enterprise and its profound implications for private strategies and public policies. In the judgment of the committee, the national and international policy debate must be recast to square with the realities of global technical convergence and interdepen- dence. CAPTURING THE BENEFITS OF GLOBAL TECHNICAL ADVANCE The highest priority for strengthening the technical foundations and thereby the long-term wealth-generating capacity of the U.S. economy must be to make the United States a more attractive and advantageous place for individuals, companies, and other institutional entities,

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS s regardless of national origin, to conduct the full complement of techni- cal activities critical to the nation's long-term prosperity and security. To accomplish this, the United States must develop the necessary human, financial, physical, regulatory, and institutional infrastructures to compare more advantageously with other nations in attracting the technical, managerial, and financial resources of globally active private corporations or individuals. This is the single most important conclusion of the study. Clearly, all sectors of U.S. society-industry, government, and both basic and higher education- have important roles to play in this effort. The com- mittee has focused primarily on public policy implications, but it does not believe that public policies are the only or even the most important determi- nants of national or corporate technical strength and competitiveness.2 Rather, the study's public policy focus has been shaped by the fact that the public sector is groping to formulate and implement a national agenda that can address the imperatives of a highly integrated global economic and technical order. The government must take action on many fronts to strengthen the foun- dations of the U.S. technical enterprise- the nation's work force, its social capital (i.e., educational system and public infrastructure), as well as its fiscal and regulatory environment. Above all, state and federal policymakers must work together with corporate and academic leaders to develop a broad national consensus regarding the need to improve technology development, adoption, adaptation, and diffusion throughout the U.S. industrial economy. This consensus, in concert with other national poli- cies, can provide the necessary impetus, coherence, and operational guidelines for the many diverse private and public policy actions required to meet the challenges of globalization. DOMESTIC POLICY DIRECTIONS Among the greatest comparative strengths of the nation's technical enter- prise are its research capabilities, its system of advanced technical educa- tion, its large pool of elite technical talent, and its extensive, sophisticated information technology infrastructure. These comparative advantages find expression in continuing U.S. commercial leadership in highly science- intensive industries or industries in the infancy of their technology life cycle. Moreover, the nation's extensive research enterprise provides the human and intellectual resources for much of U.S. high-technology industry, attracts foreign talent and investment to the country, and benefits U.S. citi- zens in many other ways. In the opinion of the committee, it is imperative that the United States continue to build on these comparative strengths (see Chapter 3, pp. 54~1; Chapter 4, pp. 77-781.

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6 NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY The recent intensity of global competition and the pace of technical advance have underlined the growing importance of synergies between basic research and downstream technical activities such as product and process design, development, and production in many industries. Nevertheless, the past two decades have also demonstrated that as new knowledge flows more freely across national borders, the ability of a nation or a firm to exploit research results for commercial advantage depends increasingly on mastery of those downstream technical activities. This trend is particularly troublesome for the United States, which con- tinues to harbor the world's most extensive and productive basic research enterprise even as the ability of many U.S.-based industries to adopt and adapt technology for commercial gain appears to have declined relative to other nations. The inability of many U.S.-based industries to derive what many consider a fair share of commercial benefits from an increasingly global technology base underlines the need for U.S. educators, industrialists, and policymakers to direct greater attention and resources toward "relearn- ing" these vital activities-competencies closely associated with the produc- tion of goods and services in which the United States excelled from the late 1800s well into the mid-19OOs (see Chapter 1, pp. 29-35; Chapter 3, pp. 61~7; Appendix A, pp. 89-1351. The committee views the following domestic policy directions as essen- tial elements of a more comprehensive technology strategy for the United States. Policymakers should expand support for initiatives at the federal, regional, and state levels to enhance the adoption, adaptation, and dif- fusion of technology and related know-how. Current federal science and technology policies are targeted primarily on basic research and "mission- oriented" technology development related to national defense, public health, and space exploration. While reinforcing the current U.S. comparative advantage in certain highly science-intensive or "emerging technology" industries, this policy orientation essentially neglects national vulnerabilities in technology adoption, adaptation, and diffusion, which are equally critical to national economic growth and industrial competitiveness. Recent U.S. experience has demonstrated that low-cost, pragmatic initia- tives at the state, regional, or federal level can effectively support private- sector progress in these areas. The National Science Foundation's Engineering Research Centers, the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Centers for Manufacturing Technology, Ohio's Thomas Edison Program, Pennsylvania's Ben Franklin Partnership Program, the Southern Technology Council, and the Industrial Technology Institute are promising means for providing public support for a diverse set of initiatives and selectively broadening the application of those that prove most success

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 ful (see National Academy of Engineering, 1990; National Governors' Association, 1988; National Research Council, l990b; Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, 198813 (Chapter 4, pp. 78-79~. U.S. public policy should acknowledge the need for a stronger public role in support of generic technologies and establish credible mechanisms for translating this commitment in principle into specific actions. There is a need for the United States to develop more focused national or regional infrastructures for supporting the development and dif- fusion of commercially significant generic technologies. Such technologies involve concepts of design, fabrication, and quality control applicable to a class of products, for which (a) the anticipated returns from development and commercialization cannot justify the expense and risk of investment by single firms or joint ventures; and (b) the returns to the economy and society as a whole warrant investment by the federal government. In addition, there may be areas in which national military strategic considerations make loss of U.S. technology position or of market share unacceptable. Promotion of commercially significant generic technologies need not require major investments in research and development programs. Indeed, obstacles to the diffusion of such technologies may be more important than any obstacle to their development. To be sure, significant public and private investment may be required in certain cases, as in the development of a new generation of semiconductors, when the cost of technological advance is so high, the time scale of technology development is very long, and the ability of any one firm to benefit from such large investments is so low or unpre- dictable that no firm is willing to take the risk. For other generic technolo- gies, however, development costs may not be high-or the technology may already be available yet there may be serious economic, regulatory, or societal obstacles to the adoption, adaptation, and diffusion of the tech- nology either within or across industries. For example, "total quality con- trol" methods, computer-aided design, advanced construction techniques, and just-in-time production systems are all generic technologies that might fall into this category. There is, at present, considerable debate regarding the proper government role in support of generic technologies. In the opinion of the committee, the primary roles of government should be as convener and catalyst of such activities undertaken in the private sector and may also involve harnessing the technical resources of the nation's federal laboratories more directly in support of high-cost, high-risk, nonappropriable generic technology devel- opment. In some cases this may involve federal matching of a significant amount of private funding. However, in most instances the government should be prepared to serve as the "pathfinder," providing more indirect fis- cal or regulatory support to private-sector participants.

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8 NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY Ultimately any effort to provide government support for the development and diffusion of generic technology in the United States will depend on the credibility of the public and private institutional mechanisms designated to assess and identify those technologies most in need of attention and to chart an appropriate policy response. The committee notes that there have been several attempts by federal agencies to identify "critical" technologies in recent months, most notably by the departments of Commerce (1990) and Defense (1990~. The mixed reception of these efforts in the U.S. policy community, however, underlines the need for institutions that assume this charge to be perceived as technically expert, responsive to the interests of all U.S. citizens-consumers, producers, and suppliers-and predisposed to operate in a manner consistent with emerging global economic and techno- logical realities (see Chapter 4, pp. 79-811. Public policy initiatives to strengthen the national technology and industry base should be guided by the extent to which a corporation genuinely contributes to the national economy. With rare exception, such policies should not discriminate among corporations on the basis of nationality of ownership or incorporation, provided there is sufB'- cient reciprocity in the large. Public sector assistance to, or collaboration with, private corporations (domestic or foreign) in pursuit of national objec- tives should be governed by common standards for the corporate role in the U.S. economy. It is entirely appropriate that policymakers charged with advancing the interests of all U.S. citizens should develop criteria consistent with that charge regarding corporate participation in any venture involving public funds or legal exemptions. In a global economy with globally active corporations, however, corporate nationality is a poor measure of a firm's real or potential contribution to U.S. national interests. There may be cir- cumstances in which the U.S. government should discriminate against for- eign-owned firms temporarily to achieve reciprocal equitable "national treatment" of U.S. companies doing business overseas or to safeguard national security. However, nondiscrimination with regard to corporate nationality should remain a key principle of U.S. public policy (see Chapter 4, pp. 81-82~. State and federal governments should redouble their efforts to modernize and strengthen the nation's work force and public infra- structure and to encourage continuous modernization of plant and equipment in private industry. The continuing globalization of tech- nology and the resulting intensification of competition among firms and nations impart an increasing sense of urgency to this familiar recommenda- tion (see Council on Competitiveness, 1988; National Academy of Engineering, 1988a, 1988b; President's Commission on Industrial Compet

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 itiveness, 1985~. New technology by itself will not generate the wealth or productivity increases necessary to increase the standard of living of U.S. citizens and strengthen U.S. national competitiveness. These objectives demand that the United States devote greater attention to the social and human capital that supports the technological capabilities and commercial vitality of corporations based or operating in the United States. Public sec- tor investment in the nation's educational system and physical infrastructure is vital. Government should create a fiscal and regulatory environment that will encourage private industry to invest in plant, equipment, and organiza- tional learning that will enable it to develop, adopt, and adapt technology more effectively for commercial gain (see Chapter 3, pp. 61~6; Chapter 4, pp. 82-83~. Government should devote greater attention to the technological dimensions of international trade, investment, competition, and other critical issues not traditionally associated with science and technology concerns. To this end, government should seek to cultivate greater technical expertise in agencies responsible for domestic and interna- tional economic policy, and to improve interagency communication and coordination regarding science and technology issues. The development and commercialization of technology are not a discrete policy issue but an integral part of many broader areas of domestic and foreign policy. Until recently, there has been insufficient appreciation of implications for science and technology policy initiatives across agencies. There has been even less communication and cooperation among those responsible for formulating and implementing domestic and foreign policies that bear on the health of the nation's commercial technology base. This situation argues for expand- ing recruitment of technically competent personnel by agencies that formu- late and implement domestic and international economic policy and also points up the need for greater organizational focus at the national level on the policies affecting commercial development and application of tech- nology. The committee notes with guarded optimism the positive steps by the current administration to provide more organizational focus through the President's Science and Technology Adviser, recently elevated to the posi- tion of Assistant to the President, the President's Council of Advisers on Science and Technology, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the newly created Office of Technology Policy in the Department of Commerce, and Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology. These bodies clearly have the potential for improving intragovernmental commu- nication and coordination across a range of domestic and international poli- cy areas related to technology and economics. Ultimately, it is of secondary importance whether the necessary organizational focus is located in a single

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10 NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY independent agency (existing or to be created) or finds expression in more institutionalized interaction among the many agencies and committees that currently influence the nation's technology base. What is critical is that those seeking to develop greater organizational focus acknowledge the growing synergies between what have traditionally been viewed as discrete policy areas (see Chapter 4, pp. 83-84~. INTERNATIONAL POLICY DIRECTIONS The increasingly global character of corporate technical activities has made it essential that policies aimed at developing and better managing the nation's technical endowments be outward looking consistent with an international policy framework that fosters and structures technological competition, cooperation, and exchange among nations and firms. Ultimately, the nation's ability to capture a fair share of the benefits of the global technical enterprise will depend primarily on the extent to which pri- vate corporations operating within its borders seize the opportunities pre- sented by the emerging global technology base. Their success or failure, however, will be conditioned by the extent to which U.S. policymakers rec- ognize the interdependence of domestic and international policies that influ- ence technology development, diffusion, and commercialization. In foreign relations, there are a number of things the United States can do to complement domestic efforts, promote more reciprocal technical exchange, and attenuate tendencies toward technology-based protectionism. There is an obvious need for continued efforts to liberalize world trade as well as greater public and private involvement in the international stan- dards-setting process, and in the quest for a more effective international intellectual property rights regime. Yet, these high-profile concerns are dis- tracting policymakers from equally important issues raised by the rapid growth of foreign direct investment and transnational corporate alliances and technical networks over the past decade. From the perspective of the U.S. technical enterprise, the most important challenges to U.S. foreign eco- nomic policy relate to national disparities in the treatment of foreign direct investment and competition policy. ~ The United States should seek to forge multilateral consensus regarding the mutual obligations of multinational corporations and their home and host governments. In an effort to improve the nation's trade balance, and to respond more forcefully to a lack of reciprocity over- seas, some recent U.S. legislation raises issues related to the free flow of foreign direct investment and the treatment of subsidiaries of foreign-owned corporations.4 The rapidly increasing foreign penetration of the U.S. econo- my in the past two decades has generated a great deal of concern among

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 many segments of the American electorate. Furthermore, the discriminatory treatment of U.S.-owned corporations appears to be a fact of life in Japan and to be increasing in Western Europe as the countries of the European Community search for ways to come to terms with intensifying global com- petition and the consequences of a new round of economic integration with- in the European Community (EC 19921. Nevertheless, discriminatory poli- cies are not consistent with global economic and technological realities and may be counterproductive in the long run. In the committee's judgment, such policies would be detrimental to U.S. national interests. Given the extent of U.S. global technological interdependence, and the many contribu- tions of the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms to the U.S. economy and tech- nical enterprise, it is particularly important that the U.S. market remain open to foreign direct investment and that, as far as possible, such open-market policies be reciprocal. The committee recognizes that there are many troubling issues raised by the recent growth in foreign control over U.S. industrial assets and the extent to which foreign multinationals draw upon the U.S. research enter- prise. It does suggest, however, that it is time for a more multilateral approach to foreign direct investment an approach that acknowledges the pervasive character and positive contributions of foreign direct investment in an effort to arrive at mutually beneficial "rules of the game" for both transnational corporations and their home and host countries. Good corpo- rate citizenship is becoming ever harder to define as the operations of U.S. and foreign-owned firms become increasingly transnational. An aggressive U.S. effort to forge multilateral consensus regarding the mutual obligations of multinational corporations and their host governments would do much to reduce tendencies toward technology-oriented protectionism worldwide as well as expand international technology exchange (see Chapter 1, pp. 25-26; Chapter 2, pp. 48~9; Chapter 4, pp. 8~85~. . U.S. policymakers should strive for greater uniformity in antitrust policy at the international level. There is mounting pressure on policy- makers throughout the industrialized world to reinterpret national antitrust law or competition policy to fit the realities of global competition and avoid disadvantaging their indigenous firms in the global marketplace. Nevertheless, in the context of the current surge of foreign direct investment and the proliferation of transnational corporate alliances and mergers, often in already highly concentrated industries, unilateral approaches to antitrust regulation pose two major hazards. On the one hand, relaxation of antitrust requirements by the world's lead- ing economies may increase opportunities for monopoly abuse in certain industries and actually impede technological advance. Although there is lit- tle evidence of anticompetitive behavior in manufacturing and service

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12 NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY ~ndustnes at the international level, alliances among former competitors in certain ~ndustnes and the rising barriers to market entry as a result of the spiraling cost of technical advance create an environment in which anticom- petitive behavior is increasingly credible. Despite the possible benefits of ~nter~rm collaboration, it is essential to uphold competition as a major dnv- er for technological advance arid structural adjustment. On the other hand, there is some evidence that national competition or antitrust laws may impede cross-border mergers and acquisitions that do not undermine competition. Such policy-induced obstacles to international competition may also impede technological advance and economic growth. Both the danger of anticompetitive abuse by global companies and the costs of "protectionist" antitrust regulation emphasize a growing need for greater international cooperation in antitrust policy. Multilateral discussion of this issue within the General Agreement on Tanffs and Trade and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development warrants greater attention and resolve from all industrialized nations, including the United States (see Chapter 2, pp. 51-52; Chapter 4, pp. 85-861. NOTES 1. "National Interests in an Age of Global Technology," sponsored by the National Academy of Engineering, 05 December 1989, in Irvine, California. 2. For more extensive discussion of the implications of globalization for corporate strategy, see the recent report on the internationalization of U.S. manufacturing issued by the National Research Council (199Oa). 3. The Southern Technology Council is based in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina; the Industrial Technology Institute is based in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 4. Consider, for example, the Exon-Florio amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, or the spate of bills currently pending in Congress, including the American Technology Preeminence Act (H.R. 4329), Technology Corporation Act of 1990, and others that seek to spell out in legislation specific "special" requirements for foreign-owned or foreign-controlled firms' participation in publicly funded research and development initiatives. REFERENCES Council on Competitiveness. 1988. Picking Up the Pace: The Commercial Challenge to American Innovation. Washington, D.C.: Council on Competitiveness. National Academy of Engineering. 1988a. Focus on the Future: A National Action Plan for Career-Long Education for Engineers. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. National Academy of Engineering. 1988b. The Technological Dimensions of International Competitiveness. Committee on Technology Issues That Impact International Compet- itiveness. Washington, D.C. National Academy of Engineering. 1990. Assessment of the National Science Foundation's Engineering Research Centers Program. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. National Governors' Association. 1988. State-Supported SBIR [Small-Business-Innovation Research] Programs and Related State Technology Programs. Marianne K. Clarke, Center

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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 for Policy Research and Analysis. Washington, D.C.: National Governors' Association. National Research Council. 1990a. The Internationalization of U.S. Manufacturing: Causes and Consequences. Manufacturing Studies Board. Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. National Research Council. 1990b. Ohio's Thomas Edison Centers: A 1990 Review. Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Pennsylvania Department of Commerce. 1988. Ben Franklin Partnership: Challenge Grant Program for Technological Innovation- Five Year Report. Board of the Ben Franklin Partnership Fund. Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce. President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness. 1985. Global Competition: The New Reality. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Commerce. 1990. Emerging Technologies: A Survey of Technical and Economic Opportunities. Office of Technology Administration. U.S. Department of Defense. 1990. Critical Technologies Plan. Prepared for the Committees on Armed Services, United States Congress. March 15.