of this perceived responsibility that determines, in large part, whether a particular country becomes a member of a given regime or continues to be identified as a potential target of controls.

Beyond the effectiveness of export controls in terms of security objectives, multilateral cooperation is also important to minimize the economic costs of export controls. So long as controls are imposed multilaterally, in form and practice, the costs of controls are shared equally. The United States, however, has a history of unilateralism in its export control policies.

To be effective, proliferation controls must be focused only on narrowly proscribed military activities or items that are required directly for weapons systems and must include, to the extent practicable, verifiable end-use assurances. Lacking such specificity, efforts to control exports of proliferation-related technologies create a risk similar to that encountered in the case of CoCom controls on dual use technology—namely, imposing significant economic costs that may be disproportionate to their effectiveness.


Serious discontinuities exist between export controls on the commercial sale of munitions under the Arms Export Control Act and the implementing International Traffic in Arms Regulations on the one hand and the transfer of munitions on a government-to-government basis on the other. The problem of how to impose reasonable limitations on foreign military sales extends well beyond the United States, and it is being exacerbated by the overcapacity of arms production worldwide. This is a significant and troubling problem; though not in the panel's mandate, it is urgently in need of study.

A second conceptual problem—and one that lies more squarely within the panel's mandate—concerns the lack of clarity regarding the use of export controls to protect the national security interests of the United States versus their use to pursue broader U.S. foreign policy interests and commitments. In the Export Administration Act (EAA), a legal distinction is drawn between the application of national security export controls,* which are imposed pursuant to Section 5, and foreign policy export controls, which are imposed under Section 6. This distinction has not always been observed in practice. Indeed, proliferation controls, though directly relevant to U.S. national se-


National security export controls are procedures designed to regulate the transfer of items from one country to another in such a way as to protect militarily important technology from acquisition by potential adversaries.


Foreign policy export controls are restrictions imposed on the export of general classes of items to one or more specified countries in order to further the foreign commitments and interests of the United States or to fulfill U.S. international obligations.

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