the exception. Approval would be presumed for all transactions for which end-use conditions ensured an acceptable level of risk. The extensiveness of end-use conditions and the need for physical verification would depend on the nature of the item and the security risk inherent in the proposed transfer. Although assurances against military use or unauthorized retransfer would be uniform, physical verification of the end use would not be necessary for all transactions. Further, certain items would not be immediately amenable to end-use conditions at an acceptable level of risk, but the level of risk would be adjusted over time on the basis of demonstrated end-use reliability and political factors.
An administrative effect of this change in focus would be the requirement to monitor and ensure compliance with end-use conditions and deter diversions. License review would still be necessary, but once standard and uniform end-use conditions for the approval of the remaining Industrial List items were established, the focus of the control program would be to ascertain compliance with those conditions.
Although CoCom partners have always been opposed to extraterritorial application of export controls, the end-use verification practices envisioned in this proposal would not be universally applied to all transactions and need not be adversarial. Instead, end-use assurances against military use or unauthorized retransfer would be characterized as standard conditions of sale, and potential verification as a standard inspection or audit. Also, the inspections or audits of limited, selected transactions need not be performed by enforcement agents of the exporting country. There are a number of alternatives, including CoCom inspection teams; certified, private inspection companies; and a contractual arrangement between the trading parties. Although not directly applicable, lessons can be drawn from several existing audit or inspection arrangements, including the periodic governmental review of transaction records for U.S. distribution licenses,* the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection practices, the inspection regimes established under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, or the confidence-building measures of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Whatever mechanism is employed, the end-use verification effort will undoubtedly be aided by the increasing openness of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
In addition to the shift in focus from denial of Industrial List items to approval with end-use conditions, CoCom should review its traditional objective of controlling East-West arms transfers under the International Munitions List and International Atomic Energy List. Beyond maintaining these