ations in other areas (e.g., intellectual property rights, import quotas, closed domestic markets). Thus, Singapore and South Korea have reached agreements with the United States on national security export controls, and Taiwan and Indonesia have expressed interest in cooperating with the United States and CoCom (see Table 8-1). But third countries in Asia have taken very few concrete steps to establish export control programs. The notable exception is Hong Kong, which, while it remains a Crown colony, administers an extensive export control program with the United Kingdom. Latin American countries, specifically Brazil and Argentina, tend to link any cooperation on East-West export controls to liberalization of U.S. nuclear export policies.
Since its initiation in 1984, the CoCom TCC initiative has enjoyed only limited success: Few CoCom members have actively pursued such agreements; the agreements negotiated* do not systematically cover all goods reexported from CoCom countries and indigenously controlled by CoCom; and the cooperating countries exhibit uneven will in implementation and enforcement.
The U.S. threat to restrict the export of certain high-technology items to countries that do not cooperate sufficiently with CoCom is hollow. U.S. export licensing statistics show that approval rates and average license processing times for exports to countries that do not cooperate with CoCom are not significantly different from those for cooperating countries (see Table 8-1). More important, many U.S. industries would be economically disadvantaged without these markets, and third countries can easily turn to other foreign suppliers.
Cooperating third countries are not direct participants in CoCom. They have no vote, cannot participate in the list review process, and must forward their general exception cases through a CoCom member for full CoCom review. They also have no vote on the cases of CoCom members. As the quality and sophistication of the goods third countries produce inevitably rise, their willingness to subject high-value exports to the decisions of a group in which they have no vote will decline rapidly.
Given the overall decline in the perception of the security risk posed by the Soviet Union and other WTO countries, combined with the increasing sophistication of goods produced in third countries, the prospects for improving third country cooperation are limited. To maintain current levels of cooperation, as well as to encourage expanded cooperation, it will be necessary to reduce the scope of CoCom-controlled goods and provide political and economic incentives for third country cooperation. To this end, CoCom should take the following actions: