addressed through export controls outlined in the Export Administration Act. Chapter 6 reviewed the international regimes designed to deal with nuclear proliferation, the proliferation of missile technologies, and the proliferation of chemical weapons. That analysis leads to four general observations:
There are at present insufficient linkages between the CoCom regime and the various other multilateral arrangements established to address nuclear, missile, or chemical exports and CoCom. The reasons for this lack of coordination include the varying memberships, targets, and associations with broad treaties. The structure of the regimes and the accountability of each member to the regime itself also vary.
There is insufficient high-level leadership and policy coordination for a collective approach to proliferation problems. If the various potential supplier states are pursuing uncoordinated policies—at one moment supplying potential proliferators for reasons of short-term foreign policy or commercial interests, at others, imposing bans or staking out strong moral positions against proliferation—determined proliferators will generally be able to "play the field" and continue to achieve their goals.
The three proliferation control regimes do not cover all the proliferation issues of greatest security concern. For example, it is easy to imagine military situations in which smart targeting technology, advanced reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering capabilities, or sophisticated command and control systems could have military significance comparable to the availability of some weapons covered under the current proliferation regimes.
The three proliferation regimes are not well coordinated at the operational level either internationally or within the U.S. government . The same countries or groups are often involved in more than one type of proliferation control activity. The same intermediaries are often involved in obtaining needed goods for several destinations or several different kinds of proliferation projects. In limited cases, the same technologies can be useful in several different types of proliferation activity. Although there are a number of dissimilarities among the proliferation regimes as well, the facts still suggest a need for much closer national and international coordination at the operational level.
The 12 members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are also members of CoCom, the Zangger Committee,* and the Australia Group. Most of the projects targeted by the MTCR are in countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both the Zangger Committee