for the sale of dual use items; others argue that the reliability of such government assurances is suspect. Moreover, investigations and prosecution of end-use violations are difficult to conduct when the top priority is to protect intelligence sources and methods.

The effectiveness of this regime would be improved if conditions for approved exports and sanctions against the importing parties for violations of the export conditions were made standard and public among regime members. It is also important to include other major suppliers in the regime, but this is unlikely to happen, or to lead to greater effectiveness, until existing internal disputes are resolved.

The structure of the MTCR is an impediment to its effectiveness as well. An ad hoc demarche process for export denials and an erratic meeting schedule contribute to licensing discrepancies and engender too many urgent bilateral meetings. If left unresolved, this problem would be complicated further as the number of participants increased.

The primary arguments against a more structured regime and an expanded membership have been the relative standing of existing missile capabilities as either appropriate or inappropriate depending on the military and political alliances to which the end-user countries belong and the sensitive nature of the intelligence that contributes to identifying the regime's targets. As long as the regime continues to focus on inappropriate end users, political-military alliance and shared intelligence will remain the most critical elements of cooperation. Nevertheless, regime partners often disagree on the translation of mutual security and intelligence analysis into trade decisions. The future direction of this regime is clearly a trade-off between (a) attempting to identify and subsequently embargo specific nonpeaceful missile delivery systems in a very closed and limited environment or (b) more broadly and publicly defining regime goals and proscribed end uses in the global context. The nature of the regime will determine the attitude of nonregime countries toward cooperation.

Chemical Export Controls

The Australia Group has been operating as an interim mechanism in anticipation of completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The final details of the convention are still being negotiated, but the broad outlines are clear. The production and possession of chemical weapons will be banned (use is already banned under the Geneva accords). The convention will likely hold signatory governments explicitly responsible for reporting to a secretariat on all international trade in specific chemical precursors. It is unclear what explicit responsibility signatory governments will have in reviewing or constraining trade in identified precursors with nonsignatories. To date, process

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