will also be furthered. The respective structures of the U.S. and international control lists should also be harmonized.
Building on progress made so far in the policy process, the United States should continue to make the appropriate shift of administrative resources from traditional East-West export controls to controls directed at proliferation concerns and the end-use verification of more narrowly targeted East-West controls, as suggested by the panel.
An interagency task group should regularly review the Munitions and Commodity Control Lists to eliminate duplication and ensure coordination with the CoCom Industrial List. The U.S. dual use list should be compatible with other multilateral control arrangements.
Deadlines for the resolution of differences among the export control agencies have been imposed in the past by Congress. For example, according to Section 10(e) of the Export Administration Act, an agency to which a Commerce Department export license application is referred must submit its recommendation within 20 days,3 thereby preventing the equivalent of an agency pocket veto. Deadlines have had some benefit in spurring decision making on case processing, jurisdictional determinations, and list review. Shorter, legislatively mandated deadlines in themselves could be ineffective, however, because if pressed for a decision, the "fast response" from the administering agency would likely be a recommendation of denial.
Clear policy guidance, including guidance on timely procedures for resolving interagency disputes, should be provided to obviate most of the need for legislated deadlines.
The statutory exemption (Section 13(a) of the EAA) from the application of certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), including the appropriate level of administrative due process and judicial review of Commerce Department actions, should be removed.
The application of the administrative due process and judicial review provisions of the APA is not inconsistent with the protection of national security or foreign policy interests. Classified information or other national-security-sensitive information can be safeguarded within the framework of the APA. When required, licenses may be revoked or new