and extent of Soviet and other WTO technology acquisition efforts in the West. Prior to 1990, the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and the other WTO countries acted largely in concert to target, acquire, and pass on to the Soviet military a wide range of specific high-technology products, keystone equipment,* plans, blueprints, and technical data developed and produced in the West.

The determination of specific acquisition requirements under this reportedly massive effort was (and continues to be) directed by the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) in concert with the Soviet intelligence services, principally the Committee on State Security (KGB), the Chief Directorate of Military Intelligence (GRU), the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), and the Ministry of Defense.1 Once a list of acquisition requirements was established, the next steps were to target potential sources of supply, usually in the private sector, and to identify possible channels and methods of acquisition. The latter typically involved a variety of mechanisms, including (a) espionage, (b) illegal sales, (c) diversions from the originating country and via reexport through third countries, and (d) legal acquisition through purchases in third countries.


Espionage in this context was (and is) covert activity intended to obtain information about end products and technologies pertinent to military systems. Espionage has continued to be a major source of concern to the United States and the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), despite the political changes within the Warsaw Pact. There have been a series of well-publicized "spy scandals" since 1986, some of which reportedly did serious damage to U.S. and Western security. While some covert collection was directed at obtaining design plans or technical data—or, in some cases, individual or limited numbers of pieces of militarily critical hardware—the bulk of the effort was targeted directly at obtaining infor-


The term keystone equipment was developed in the 1976 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, also known as the Bucy report after its chairman, J. Fred Bucy.2 The term is used to denote critical technological equipment, such as sophisticated machine tools, necessary to manufacture other products.


The Academies' Allen panel reported that "during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976–1980), the Soviet acquisition program satisfied more than 3,500 specific collection requirements for hardware and documents for the 12 Soviet industrial ministries. Of the items acquired in the West, the Soviets estimated that approximately 70 percent were subject to national security export controls. This proportion was apparently much the same during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1980–1985). . . ."3 Evidence reviewed by this panel suggests that this collection effort continued unabated during the most recent five-year plan (1985–1990) as well.


Third countries are nonproscribed countries that are not part of CoCom.

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