complete their economic recovery than on the potential for trade with the East European countries.
It also had become apparent by this time that, for political and economic reasons, it was neither possible nor even desirable for the West to attempt to maintain numerical equality with the mobilized troop strength or fielded conventional weaponry of the Warsaw Pact countries. This reality led the NATO countries in evolutionary fashion to the so-called "force multiplier" strategy, which sought to capitalize on Western technological superiority in order to maintain strategic parity through the development of more advanced and effective weapons than those possessed by the Warsaw Pact countries. The decision to rely on technology lead was confirmed indirectly by former NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, who recalled that
the following December (1952) the [NATO] Council directed that, while the build-up should continue, primary emphasis should be placed for the future on improving the quality rather than the quantity of the NATO forces.6
Two inevitable implications of a strategy that depends on the maintenance of technology lead are, however, (1) a continuing need to prevent the potential adversary from gaining access to the technology, which would neutralize the strategic advantage, and (2) a continuing need to produce new "generational" technological advances in order to maintain lead times. Thus, the NATO decision in the early 1950s to rely on a strategy emphasizing technology lead also inevitably locked the alliance into a parallel policy of technology denial, a situation that has continued to the present day.
The Export Control Act subsequently was extended several times, in most cases without amendment, through 1965.* The 1962 renewal, however, did contain an important amendment that restricted the export of materials that could "contribute to the military or economic potential of . . . nations which would prove detrimental to the national security" of the United States.7 This provision appeared to enable the President to engage in a more direct economic warfare strategy in the denial of trade to a particular country, if he deemed it to be in the U.S. national security interest.
With the advent of the era of détente and the emphasis on "linkage" between trade and other foreign policy issues, U.S. export control policy underwent its first serious congressional reexamination and revision in 20 years. In the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1969, Congress sought