States also had stated publicly its misgivings about the economic and security implications of Western participation in and dependence on the Soviet-European gas pipeline. These tensions were, in turn, reflected in the 1979 revision of the EAA, which authorized the control of exports of commercial goods and technologies that would make a significant contribution to U.S. military adversaries. The act also authorized the continuation of controls to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives and reaffirmed continuing concerns about the short supply of certain strategic materials. In the act Congress also explicitly endorsed and incorporated the recommendations of the 1976 Bucy task force report to the Defense Science Board,8 which called for a shift in the focus of controls away from end products to arrays of know-how, keystone equipment, and turnkey manufacturing facilities. Also in 1979, the Battle Act was repealed and the authority for multilateral export controls was shifted to the EAA.

From the standpoint of export controls, the period of détente clearly ended in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the mounting evidence that the Soviets had used Western dual use technology, obtained both legally and illegally as a result of relaxed trade controls, to modernize its conventional and strategic forces.* As a result, President Carter acted under the provisions of the EAA to restrict the sale of U.S. grain and to deny all pending and future validated export licenses for technology exports to the Soviet Union. These unilateral U.S. actions subsequently were reinforced by the adoption of a ''no exceptions" policy within CoCom, wherein the allied nations agreed not to propose individual export case exceptions for the Soviet Union while it continued its occupation of Afghanistan.

A CHANGE IN POLICY APPROACH: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The Reagan administration entered office at a time of rising U.S.-Soviet tension and with a distinctly different view of the Soviet Union and its potential threat to U.S. and Western seurity interests. In congressional hearings and in other public statements, administration officials and members of Congress made repeated assertions that the Soviets had moved systematically, through both legal and illegal means, during the period of détente to gain expanded access both to the results of basic research and to embodied

*  

Evidence was brought to light at this time that the Soviets had used trucks manufactured at the Kama River truck factory, a turnkey facility built by Western companies, to support the invasion of Afghanistan.

†  

The principal administration spokesman on the need to modify and tighten U.S. export control policy was Richard N. Perle, who by this time had been appointed assistant secretary of defense for international security policy.



The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement