Finding Common Ground

U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment

Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls

Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy

National Academy of Sciences

National Academy of Engineering

Institute of Medicine

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C. 1991



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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Finding Common Ground U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy National Academy of Sciences National Academy of Engineering Institute of Medicine NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C. 1991

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20418 NOTICE: The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is a private, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and their use for the general welfare. Under the authority of its congressional charter of 1863, the Academy has a working mandate that calls upon it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. The Academy carries out this mandate primarily through the National Research Council, which it jointly administers with the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Frank Press is President of the NAS. The National Academy of Engineering (NAE) was established in 1964, under the charter of the NAS, as a parallel organization of distinguished engineers, autonomous in its administration and in the selection of members, sharing with the NAS its responsibilities for advising the federal government. Dr. Robert M. White is President of the NAE. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) was chartered in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to enlist distinguished members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. In this, the Institute acts under both the Academy’s 1863 congressional charter responsibility to be an adviser to the federal government and its own initiative in identifying issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Samuel O. Thier is President of the IOM. The Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP) is a joint committee of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. It includes members of the councils of all three bodies. This report is the result of the work of an independent panel appointed by COSEPUP, which has authorized its release to the public. SPONSORS: Three agencies of the federal government provided principal support for the study: the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. A limited amount of additional funding was provided by the Industry Coalition on Technology Transfer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Finding common ground : U.S. export controls in a changed global environment / Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls, Committee on  Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of  Engineering, Institute of Medicine.  p. cm.  Includes index.  ISBN 0-309-04392-1 : $34.95  1. Export controls—United States. 2. United States—Commercial policy. I. Committee on  Science, Engineering, and Public Policy  (U.S.). Panel on the Future Design and Implementation  of U.S. National Security Export Controls.  HF1414.5.F56 1991  382'.64'0973—dc20 90-26801 CIP Copyright © 1991 by the National Academy of Sciences No part of this book may be reproduced by any mechanical, photographic, or electronic process, or in the form of a phonographic recording, nor may it be stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or otherwise copied for public or private use, without written permission from the publisher, except for the purposes of official use by the United States Government. Printed in the United States of America

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls ROLAND W. SCHMITT (Chairman), President, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; member, National Science Board of the National Science Foundation (former Chairman [1984–1988]) WILLIAM F. BURNS (Vice Chairman), Major General (retired), U.S. Army (former Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [1988]; former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs [1986–1988]) ARDEN L. BEMENT, JR., Vice President, Technical Resources, TRW; member, National Science Board of the National Science Foundation (former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering [1979–1981]) ASHTON B. CARTER, Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University KENNETH W. DAM, Vice President, Law and External Relations, IBM Corporation (former Deputy Secretary of State [1982–1985]) HERBERT M. DWIGHT, JR.,* President, Superconductor Technologies, Inc. JOHN L. ELLIOTT, ESQ., Chairman, Management Committee, Covington & Burling LINCOLN D. FAURER, Lieutenant General (retired), U.S. Air Force; President and Chief Executive Officer, Corporation for Open Systems (former Director, National Security Agency [1981–1985] CHARLES GATI, Professor of Political Science, Union College SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN,† Professor of Management Information Systems and Policy, College of Business and Public Administration, The University of Arizona RUTH L. GREENSTEIN,* Vice President, Administration and Finance, Institute for Defense Analyses (until May 1990, Vice President and General Counsel, Genex Corporation) (former Associate/Deputy General Counsel, National Science Foundation [1981–1984]) BENJAMIN HUBERMAN, President, Consultants International Group, Inc. (former Deputy Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy [1978–1981]; former Senior Staff member, National Security Council [1978–1981]) *   Former member of the National Academies' Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer (also known as the Allen panel) [1986–1987] †   Former chairman, NRC Computer Science and Technology Board study on Global Trends in Computer Technology and Their Impact on Export Control, 1988

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment RAYMOND KLINE, President, National Academy of Public Administration (former Associate Administrator for Management Operations, NASA [1977–1979]) ROBERT LEGVOLD, Director, W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, Columbia University BOYD J. MCKELVAIN, Manager, Corporate Export Administration Operation, General Electric Company; Chairman, Technical Advisory Committee on Implementation of the Militarily Critical Technologies List, Department of Commerce JOHN L. MCLUCAS,* Aerospace Consultant (former Secretary of the Air Force [1972–1975]) M. GRANGER MORGAN, Head, Department of Engineering and Public Policy and Professor, Engineering and Public Policy/Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon WILLIAM J. PERRY, Chairman, Technology Strategies & Alliances; Co-director, The Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University; member, Defense Science Board (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering [1977–1981]) O. M. ROETMAN, Vice President, Government and International Affairs, The Boeing Company GASTON J. SIGUR, Distinguished Professor of East Asian Studies, School of International Affairs, The George Washington University (former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs [1986–1989]; former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs [1982–1984]) JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution PAULA STERN, President, The Stern Group (former Chair, U.S. International Trade Commission [1984–1986]) Staff MITCHEL B. WALLERSTEIN, Project Director and Deputy Executive Officer, National Research Council KARIN D. BERRY, Senior Consultant JOHN R. B. CLEMENT, Staff Officer DEBORAH J. MACGUFFIE, Project Assistant EDWARD P. MOSER, Staff Consultant JEAN M. SHIRHALL, Editor THOMAS H. SNITCH, Staff Officer *   Former member of the National Academies' Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer (also known as the Allen panel) [1986–1987]

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Subpanel on Advanced Industrial Materials ARDEN L. BEMENT, JR. (Chairman), Vice President, Technical Resources, TRW NEIL AULT, Chairman, Technical Advisory Committee on Materials, Department of Commerce PETER CANNON, President, Conductus Corporation JAMES ECONOMY, Director, Materials Science and Engineering School, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign RICHARD REYNOLDS, Technical Director, Hughes Research Laboratories M. E. SHANK, Aeronautics Consultant WILLIAM YEE, Manager, Materials and Processing Technology Division, General Dynamics Staff KARIN D. BERRY, Senior Consultant Subpanel on Commercial Aircraft and Jet Engines O. M. ROETMAN (Chairman), Vice President, Government and International Affairs, The Boeing Company NEAL FRAZIER, Aerospace Management Consultant RONALD KERBER, Vice President, Technology and Business Development, McDonnell Douglas Corporation KENT MCCORMICK, Senior Manager, International Trade and Government Relations, The Boeing Company FRANK PICKERING, Vice President and General Manager, Aircraft Engines, Engineering Division, General Electric Aircraft Engines ROGER SCHAUFELE, Vice President, Engineering, McDonnell Douglas Corporation Staff EDWARD P. MOSER, Staff Consultant

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Subpanel on Computer Technology SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN (Chairman), Professor of Management Information Systems and Policy, College of Business and Public Administration, The University of Arizona THOMAS F. GANNON, Director, Technology Planning and Development, Digital Equipment Corporation ANTHONY C. HEARN, Corporate Research Staff, The Rand Corporation WILLIAM K. MCHENRY, Assistant Professor, Management Information Systems, Georgetown University THEODORE J. RALSTON, Acting Director, International Liaison Office, Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation CLARK WEISSMAN, Director of Advanced Projects, Unisys Corporation TROY L. WILSON, Manager, Numerically Intensive Computing Systems Management, IBM Corporation Staff JOHN R. B. CLEMENT, Staff Officer MARJORY BLUMENTHAL, Staff Director, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board EMILIO MILLÁN, Consultant

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy CORNELIUS J. PINGS (Chairman), Provost and Senior Vice President of Academic Affairs, University of Southern California NORMAN H. ABRAMSON, Executive Vice President, South West Research Institute* LAWRENCE BOGORAD, Maria Moors Cabot Professor of Biology, Harvard University STUART BONDURANT, M.D., Professor of Medicine and Dean, School of Medicine, University of North Carolina MARY-DELL CHILTON, CIBA-Geigy Biotechnology* ALBERT M. CLOGSTON, Member, Center for Materials Science, Los Alamos National Laboratory RALPH E. GOMORY, President, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation HARRY B. GRAY, Arnold O. Beckman Professor of Chemistry, California Institute of Technology WILLIAM G. HOWARD, JR., Senior Fellow. National Academy of Engineering RICHARD J. JOHNS, M.D., Massey Professor and Director, Department of Biomedical Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University FRANCIS E. LOW, Institute Professor, Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology JOHN L. MCLUCAS, Aerospace Consultant C. KUMAR N. PATEL, Executive Director of Research, Materials Science, Engineering, and Academic Affairs Division, AT&T Bell Laboratories FRANK PRESS, President, National Academy of Sciences (Ex Officio) HERBERT A. SIMON, Richard King Mellon University Professor, Department of Computer Science and Psychology, Carnegie Mellon* MAXINE F. SINGER, President, Carnegie Institution of Washington ROBERT M. SOLOW, Institute Professor, Department of Economics. Massachusetts Institute of Technology H. GUYFORD STEVER, Science Advisor SAMUEL O. THIER, President, Institute of Medicine (Ex Officio) ROBERT M. WHITE, President, National Academy of Engineering (Ex Officio) Staff LAWRENCE E. MCCRAY, Executive Director BARBARA A. CANDLAND, Administrative Coordinator *   Term expired June 30, 1990

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Preface The work of this panel has spanned a period of turbulent changes in the circumstances surrounding export controls. The study began in August 1989, when the transformations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had just begun. The study was commissioned by a provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act and we were asked to examine all aspects of the U.S. national security export regime. The panel went beyond the scope of its predecessor, the Allen report, which concentrated "on national security export controls imposed on dual use technology." That report also "focused primarily on the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies due to their central importance to the problem." During the course of our study, we found that we could not address the most important issues of export controls today if we confined ourselves to that same scope. The reason is twofold. First, the different laws and regulations governing export controls now impinge strongly on one another. making it difficult to consider any one in isolation. Second, the structure of these laws and regulations was established in a world dramatically different from that of today. At that time, the principal targets of export controls were the Soviet Union, the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the People's Republic of China. And the principal issue was to balance the military advantage to be gained from export controls against their damage to U.S. economic and industrial strength. Today, both the nature of the threat and the balance of interests have changed while other threats of comparable if not greater importance have moved to center stage, i.e., the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as regional conflicts have taken on a more urgent cast.

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Changes in the world today—not just in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but also in Western Europe with the impending economic and political unification of 1992, and in Japan with its enormous economic power—are so dramatic and profound that they outstrip traditional thinking. Many of our policies are still rooted in the rubric of the 1970s and 1980s; the deep-seated views that have served us well for several decades are difficult to give up or change. But change they must if we are to respond to, and even lead in forming, the economic and political realities of the new world. And yet, in the midst of these changes, some of the old apprehensions remain: There continues to be an ominous array of weapons in the hands of forces that could once again become threatening. And new apprehensions grow: The spread of high-tech weapons, as well as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and missile capabilities, change the calculus of national security. One may ask if national security export controls haven't become moot. Can export controls still contribute significantly to our national security? We have answered this question, emphatically, "Yes"—not only in their continuing albeit dramatically altered role in East-West relations, but also in the realm of proliferation controls. The latter regimes, we conclude, must be brought fully under the rubric of national security. Export controls should neither be discarded in the glow of the moment nor retain the rigidity of the past. As our panel has addressed these problems and tried to anticipate the future, we have constantly found that it was upon us. The changes have been so rapid that we have found it challenging to keep up with the present, let alone anticipate the future. Moreover, our conclusions and recommendations must fit into a future that will continue to change in directions that we cannot fully anticipate. The report will be criticized by those who don't think we have gone far enough in abolishing export controls on East-West trade and, conversely, by those who think we have "caved in" to industrial interests. What we have attempted to do is to recommend not only policies and procedures appropriate for the circumstances at the time of writing but also processes that allow these policies and procedures to be changed to meet future circumstances. Thus, our goal has been to devise a system that can be responsive to the leadership of the President and Cabinet, a system more flexible and responsive than the present one has been and yet a system that is politically feasible both internationally and domestically. Export controls have been a particularly troublesome corner of federal policy, as evidenced by the number of commissioned studies of them. The lineage of the present report traces back through the Allen and the Corson reports of the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering to the Bucy report of the Defense Science Board. The complexity of export control problems arises not only from the importance and intricacy of the competing

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment interests—national security and industrial competitiveness—but also from the large number of federal agencies with an important and legitimate interest in them. In the past, the administration of the export control laws and regulations has been complex and cumbersome, leading to slow decisions that unduly impaired U.S. international competitiveness. Recently, the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce, under strong presidential guidance, have made great strides in the speed and effectiveness of their administration. They are to be commanded for this. The changes that we recommend do not imply lack of significant progress toward improving the aim and effectiveness of export controls during the very recent past. Nevertheless, we think that even greater strides are possible. Government should present as simple a face as possible to those being governed and regulated. In the case of laws and regulations as complex as export controls, it is especially important to do so. Even though large corporations have the resources and skill to deal with complexity in regulations, small firms and individuals do not. Today, many of our enterprises—for example, in the software industry—must become international at an early stage of their development. Because so much of the job creation and economic development of our nation depends on these small and mid-sized firms, we cannot burden them with excessively complex regulatory processes nor with policies that prejudice their ability to compete in world markets. Moreover, neither large nor small firms should have to bear the burden of jurisdictional overlap and the resulting controversies among executive agencies or congressional committees—or the fact that responsibilities have to be distributed to several different agencies or committees to assure the best expertise. We have tried to address these issues in a way that still preserves the legitimate interests and leading expertise of various federal agencies. We have attempted to keep control of policy where it belongs in the various agencies, while simplifying the routine administration of it. We see this simplified administrative process building on the positive steps already taken—and the potential revealed—by reforms recently initiated in the Department of State and the Department of Commerce. An aspect of the emerging world that played heavily in our deliberations is the changing balance of importance between military and economic power and the changing position of the United States in this balance. Economies of other parts of the world are no longer as heavily tied to the fortunes of the U.S. economy as they once were. And yet for some of the tactics of the past to work, and even more so for others to work in the future, U.S. economic influence must be strong. With the emergence of Japan and Western Europe, and, increasingly, East Asia, as economic powers comparable to the United States, we will not have as much power to force others to follow our lead in imposing sanctions or controls as we have had in the past. We will have to seek much more concurrence with

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment others in order to exercise even the leadership that our present, still-considerable economic strength gives us. We did not go as deeply into problems with the foreign availability process as requested. We made this decision for two reasons. First, the emergence of even more urgent issues that had not been anticipated in the original charge, required that our efforts and resources be focused in other directions. Second, we came to realize that ''foreign availability" was only a facet of the larger issue of "controllability." Foreign availability is exceedingly difficult to ascertain in fact as well as in principle. With trading companies that are often no more than post office boxes, borders and ports that are open sieves, high-tech commodities that fit in pockets, software code that can be transmitted electronically, one would have to intercept and inspect a much higher fraction of world trade and communications than is feasible in order to determine the true extent of foreign availability. Much technology that we might like to control has spread so widely, and is produced so extensively, that its control is no longer feasible. The reality of much of today's high-tech world—especially in computers and microelectronics, somewhat less so in other areas like aircraft and engines—is that once a technology is used substantially in nonmilitary equipment, it may become by nature virtually uncontrollable. It is easier to determine "controllability" than "foreign availability," requires less bureaucratic apparatus to do so, and entails fewer fruitless delays by understanding and using specific criteria for "controllability" than by having to examine detail after detail of foreign manufacture and distribution. And, likely, there will be fewer errors. The main panel and three subpanels assembled to carry out this study consisted of people from highly diverse backgrounds, and that was one of their strengths. Some were scholars with deep knowledge either of fields of technology or of regions of the world: the USSR, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific Rim. Others were industrial people with intimate knowledge of how our system of export controls works and how it affects industry. Still others were people with military or diplomatic backgrounds relevant to the issues we studied. And the legal profession, too, was represented by individuals fully engaged with the systems we studied. Various members of our panel had served in the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, as well as the White House. Moreover, the outlook of various members of the panel was diverse. But, as the study proceeded, the varied sets of views, experience, and knowledge converged on the conclusions given in the report. The fact that this broad base of experience and outlook came to a unanimous report is, we think, significant in itself. We believe that the report is impressively free of ideological taint in any direction and that it represents the best efforts of a group that dedicated itself to a dispassionate examination of the issues.

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment As such, we hope it will be a singularly useful report to those in Congress and the Administration that have to deal with these complex issues. The staff assembled by the National Research Council to support the panel was also outstanding in its knowledge and its dedication to the success of the study. Substantial drafting was performed by Mitchel Wallerstein (Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and executive summary), Karin Berry (Chapters 6, 7, and 8), John Clement (Chapters 1, 2, and 3), Ed Moser (Chapters 6 and 9), and panel member Granger Morgan ( Chapter 10). The staff went through draft after draft after draft of the report in an unending quest to capture the essence of the panel's thinking and make it intelligible to the future reader. They truly have been patient and forbearing heroes in the entire process with substantive contributions of both word and thought throughout the report. We also wish to acknowledge the important contributions of Deborah MacGuffie, who kept both panel and staff well organized and who worked tirelessly to produce the multiple drafts noted above, and Jean Shirhall. who meticulously edited the drafts into proper English. Finally, we should thank the participating government agencies for their assistance and cooperation, and especially the panel's liaison representatives. Many individuals and organizations—both U.S. and foreign—provided briefings and information to the panel and we are indebted to them all. ROLAND W. SCHMITT President-Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Chairman WILLIAM F. BURNS Major General-U.S. Army (Retired) Vice Chairman December 1, 1990

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Contents     BRIEF OVERVIEW   1 1   INTRODUCTION   5     Mandate and Background of the Study   5     Scope of the Panel's Work   8     Focus of the Study in a Rapidly Changing Environment   9     Organization of the Report   11 2   THE NEED FOR EXPORT CONTROLS IN A CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT   12     Military and Political Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe   13     Growing Economic and Technological Challenges for the United States   14     New Threats to International Security   15     Redefinition of U.S. Policy   15 3   THE IMPACT OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON U.S. INDUSTRY   18     Areas of Concern to U.S. Industry   19     The Effect of Export Controls on Specific U.S. Industrial Sectors   20     Summary   25

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment 4   EVIDENCE ON THE ACQUISITION OF SENSITIVE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY   26     Soviet and WTO Technology Acquisition Efforts Prior to 1990   27     Changes in the Nature and Patterns of Soviet and WTO Technology Acquisition Since the Beginning of 1990   31     Soviet Utilization of Acquired Western Technology   33     Acquisition of Technologies of Proliferation Concern   35     The Role of the Intelligence Community in the Export Control Policy Process   36     Implications of the Intelligence Evidence   36     Recommendations   37 5   THE CHANGING CALCULUS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS   39     Growing Economic and Technological Challenges   40     Changes in the Traditional Sources of Physical Threat   43     The Advent of New Sources of Physical Threat   53 6   THE U.S. AND MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES   61     Development of the Export Control Regimes   61     Specific Characteristics of U.S. Export Controls   72     Basic Problems of the U.S. Export Control Regimes   86 7   ELEMENTS OF A NEW RESPONSE: U.S. POLICY   106     The Need for Export Controls in the New Era   107     A New Approach to East-West Export Controls   111     New Targets for National Security Export Controls   112     Limitations on Certain Types and Uses of Export Controls   114 8   ELEMENTS OF A NEW RESPONSE: MULTILATERAL CONTROL REGIMES   118     CoCom: A New Direction   118     CoCom: A New Environment   120     CoCom: Administration and Management   126     Proliferation Controls: The Need for Collective Security   128

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment 9   ELEMENTS OF A NEW RESPONSE: THE U.S. CONTROL REGIME   138     Policy Process Goals   138     Policy Formulation   139     Policy Execution   143     Other Changes Relating to Proposed Reforms   146     Enhancing Industry Participation   151 10   IMPROVING METHODS FOR LIST CONSTRUCTION AND REVIEW   154     Redesigning List Construction and Review for East-West Controls   156     Generalization to Other Control Regimes   162     Controllability   162 11   KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL   165     The Need for Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment   165     The Impact of Export Controls on U.S. Industry   166     Evidence on the Acquisition of Sensitive Western Technology   167     The Changing Calculus of U.S. National Security Interests   168     The U.S. and Multilateral Export Control Regimes   171     The Need for Export Controls in the New Era   174     New Targets for National Security Export Controls   174     Limitations on Certain Types and Uses of Export Controls   175     CoCom: A New Direction   175     CoCom: A New Environment   175     CoCom: Administration and Management   176     Coordination of Current Nonproliferation Regimes   177     Changes to the U.S. Control Regime   178 12   SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL   181     Reshape U.S. National Security Policy in Response to the Changing Calculus of U.S. National Security Interests   181     Develop New U.S. and Multilateral Export Control Regimes   183

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Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment     APPENDIXES A.   Report of the Subpanel on Advanced Industrial Materials   199 B.   Report of the Subpanel on Commercial Aircraft and Jet Engines   222 C.   Report of the Subpanel on Computer Technology   248 D.   Panel Foreign Fact-Finding Mission Reports   266 E.   Congressional Request for the Study   304 F.   COSEPUP Charge to the Panel   306 G.   The Evolution of U.S. Export Control Policy: 1949–1989 Mitchel B. Wallerstein with William W. Snyder, Jr.   308 H.   Judicial Review Under the Export Administration Act of 1979: Is It Time to Open the Courthouse Doors to U.S. Exporters? Franklin D. Cordell for John L. Ellicott   321 I.   A Proposal for Increased Use of Industry Technical Expertise in the U.S. Export Control Process Paul Freedenberg   336 J.   Some Details on the Proposed Method for List Construction and Review   349 K.   Glossary   356 L.   List of Acronyms   362 M.   List of Briefers, Contributors, and Liaison Representatives   366 N.   Biographies of Panel Members   371     INDEX   379