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Appendix C
Information from Labor Unions
COMMI'l'l'L;E ON THE EL'F'L;CTS OF SMALLER CREWS
ON MARITIME SAFETY
September 14, 1989
Maritime Labor Perspective on Safety of Smaller Crews
In 1989, the discussion of how maritime industry practices might affect
mariners' performance became very public. Both the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board and the U.S. Congress turned to issues of crews, extended
work schedules, and the fatigue, stress, and degraded performance that
might result. The attention followed vessel casualties where operator error
attributed to fatigue was considered a possible contributing cause of the
casualty. Public statements, occasionally anecdotal, had been made directly
relating vessel safety to the smaller crews' working situation.
The chairman, after consulting with three committee members who
are labor organization members, extended an open invitation to 19 labor
organizations to participate in a structured discussion of the labor perspec-
tive of the changes brought by shipboard manning reductions. Chairman
Benkert stated that, in his opinion, the work conducted to date on the topic
of vessel automation and reduced crews had been based on studying the
technological advancement involved, with less attention being paid to the
human consequences, other than the numerical changes in crew size.
Nine organizations representing deck officers, marine engineers, ra-
dio electronics officers, sailors, and pilots accepted the invitation to speak
104
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
105
at the meeting or bring information to the attention of the committee.
In addition, guests from the National Transportation Safety Board and
the U.S. Maritime Administration Office of Labor and Gaining submitted
information and attended this session.
Presentors
1. George Quick (GQ), Association of Maryland Pilots; Masters,
Mates and Pilots.
2. Brian Hope (BH), Association of Maryland Pilots; Masters, Mates
and Pilots, and member of the Maryland State Board of Licensing.
3. Don Dishinger (DD), Technical Director, Radio Electronics Offi-
cers' Union.
4. John Hillman (JH), Board of Governors, Exxon Seamen's Union.
5. Angie Tellez (AT), Vice President, Seafarers International Union
of North America, AFL-CIO.
6. Daniel O'Shea (DO), Alliance of Independent Maritime Organi-
zations.
Committee.
7. John Bobb (JB), Academic Director of the Maritime Institute of
Technology and Graduate Studies, International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots.
8. Richard Berger (RB), Director of Research and Development,
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association/National Maritime Union (MEBA
1/NMU, AE7L-CIO).
9. John Pitts (JP), Atlantic Maritime Employees Union.
10. Talmadge Simpkins (TS), Executive Director, AFL-CIO Maritime
Excerpts from Speakers' Points Of Concern
All speakers expressed concerns regarding safety, fatigue, and the
validity of the economic savings attributed to the use of smaller crews.
Additionally, they addressed the substance and methods of the NRC study
itself and offered suggestions for the committee to use in exploring the
unstudied problems of mariners working on reduced crew ships.
Excerpts from the speakers remarks or from their prepared statements
follow.
INADEQUATE LOOKOUT
(GQ) 2-man watches leave nobody to act as lookout. One person
cannot both steer and act as lookout.
(JH) With only two ABs on a watch, you cannot maintain a proper
lookout when you change from lookout to helmsman.
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106
APPENDIX C
POOR HELMSMAN
(GQ) Shoreside managements have cut back on the vessel manning
to the point where vessels are entering our pilotage waters without a
helmsman, with only one AB and one officer on watch.
(BH) Because the wheel is so commonly on autopilot, the helmsman
gets no experience steering by hand, and the person at the wheel may not
know how to steer.
CREW STANDARDS GENERALLY
(AT) We still need "trained and experienced humans who can recog-
nize, act on and solve a problem long before automated devices are capable
of detecting any incipient dangers."
(RB) Crewing standards and vessel maintenance are being too casually
treated.
LANGUAGE DIFFICULTY
(BH) People seem more isolated, especially on the multinational,
multilanguage crews. For example, it is not unusual for an English-speaking
officer to approach a pilot with relief as a fellow English-speaker.
(GQ) Rarely, a crew will speak no English at all, which can be difficult
for the pilot. Occasionally, you find that the officers and the crew have no
common language, or speak only through onboard foremen/interpreters.
COMPLEX AUTOPILOTS
A
(GQ) These captains expect to stay on autopilot during most of the
passage up Chesapeake Bay. Some autopilot units change over quickly and
simply; some of the more sophisticated systems, however, are harder to
operate if you are not familiar with them.
(BH) The reliance on automation, especially autopilots, is excessive.
SHIPBOARD FATIGUE
(GQ) As pilots, we see crew fatigue through the bridge crew, which
of course is also often the cargo crew that just finished operations before
debarkation.
(BH) Fatigue, as shown by the bridge crew, is chronic. In effect, the
master relies entirely on the ability of the pilot.
(JH) Current crew levels create a lot of overtime, for a long period.
Reducing the crew numbers only makes that situation worse and makes the
crew chronically short handed.
(JB) What are the effects of having fatigued mates making decisions?
"It is our strong belief that reductions in manning have had and will have
a direct negative effect on vessel operational safety."
HEALTH/DISABILITY
(JH) Reduced manning and a shortage of unlicensed crew members
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
107
have created health and disability situations that are not tolerable. Unli-
censed personnel have been forced to return to work after injuries while
officially on restricted or light duty, because of a shortage of personnel
in the fleet. The USCG should act on this type of problem, because it
compromises the safety of the vessel. The USCG should only allow 100
percent fit-for-duty personnel to serve on these ships.
SHIPBOARD REPAIR CAPABILITY
(DD) Ships' crews are dangerously dependent on the successful oper-
ation of the automated equipment. Some operators are removing radio-
electronics officers, considering them obsolete, just as other operators are
recognizing the increased need for an "onboard maintainer" who can be
responsible for the upkeep of the increasing electronics on the vessels.
SHIPBOARD CLEANLINESS
(BH) Smaller crowed ships are dirtier generally, because the crew has
too many other things to do and is also expected to do the housework.
Riding gangs are used to do routine maintenance on some ships, but these
people have no interest in keeping the ship clean. Riding gangs can get
away with making a mess in the engine room and leaving it to the crew to
clean up after them.
ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE
(JH) Shipboard maintenance suffers with reduced crews, with regular
maintenance being postponed or neglected. Poor maintenance endangers
the sailors and the vessels.
AUTOMATION RE: SKILL LOSSES
(GQ) The safety problems created by reduced manning are visible
principally on foreign-flag vessels, where the crew numbers are now typically
14-18. The reliance on automation is excessive.
(DD) Seafarers are specialists in their trades. Shifting specialized
duties to other busy crew members is dangerous, since those crew members
will not have the time to learn the necessary skills. An example is the shift
of the radio officers' duties to ship captains.
(JH) Able-bodied seaman is not an entry level job, as it is now being
treated. It is a journeyman-level unlicensed billet and it has traditionally
been attainable by serving time at sea as an ordinary seaman and gaining
enough shipboard experience that you could prove to the USCG that you
were a skilled AB. It is not appropriate to hire an inexperienced licensed
officer to fill a job that should be filled by an experienced unlicensed crew
member.
AUTOMATION RE: TRAINING LOSSES
(AT) Some crew reduction schemes eliminate the entry level or second
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108
APPENDIX C
tier ratings for unlicensed billets. Loss of apprentice crew billets has hurt
our ability to provide the training and experience needed to competently
fill the more senior unlicensed jobs.
AUTOMATION RE: WORK SAVING
(JP) We have also seen that installing automation does not reduce the
crew's workload, because that automation does break and you are forced
to resort to manual methods, without adequate personnel to carry the load.
That burden for physical labor falls heavily on the few remaining unlicensed
seamen on the ships.
(JH) The new automation does not reduce workloads, because it does
not work as reliably as advertised. What that means is that when you have
to go out on deck to take tank readings, you are working on a tanker deck
that is laid out all wrong for a crew member to move around the deck
easily.
(JB) Is present automation sufficiently reliable, redundant, and user
friendly to allow reduced crews on merchant ships? Bridge automation is
designed and manufactured by nonmariners who care more for marketing
the devices than for the seamen who will have to use them at sea. There is
little standardization (for example, among ARPA console configurations),
and that makes the job of the mariner much more difficult.
SMALLER CREWS GENERALLY
(GQ) Crews complain about the small numbers and have said that at
least 20 people are what they should have on board.
(BH) Smaller crews and the practices that crews are forced to use to
deal with working in a smaller crew need to be reversed.
(DD) The problems associated with reduced manning include the high
cost of automation and overreliance on its operation, the stress and fatigue
suffered by the crew, the loss of necessary specialized crew members' skills,
and reduced safety.
(JB) The only practical approach to remove the variable of manning
from the international competitive race is to establish an international con-
vention that sets forth minimum operational manning, not merely minimum
safe manning.
(RB) We are convinced that reduced crew size, reduced maintenance
and increased exhaustion have reduced the margin of error, and that we
run the risk of vastly greater costs if an accident does occur.
SAFETY GENERALLY
(DD) In the interests of protecting maritime safety, we need to have
well-maintained ships and well-rested crews.
(AT) Unsafe ships are being safely navigated across the world's oceans
every day.
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
109
FATIGUE GENERALLY
(JB) The enclosed statements of in-port work routines show how hard
mates are pushing themselves and how they are coping with the fast pace
of today's cargo operations. We are very concerned about this situation.
Nobody can pinpoint the limits of human performance, or pinpoint at what
point the hours of work are going to have a deleterious effect on decision
making, but this is certainly an area that needs attention.
NEED FOR ACCURATE STATISTICS
(DD) Automation is assumed to reduce work, but the phenomenon
of reduced crews is so new that the problems created by working on a
reduced crew ship are not adequately recognized. The result is that the
agencies accept ship owners' proposals for crew structures even where
the agencies cannot account decisively for the consequences of the crew
structure changes.
INADEQUATE REGULATORY (COAST GUARD) RESPONSES
RE: ENFORCEMENT
(JH) The USCG must begin to enforce the laws on manning, instead
of caving into pressure to allow continued demanding.
(DO) Manning statutes are intended to protect the sailor and need to
be enforced as they are written.
(JB) The six-hour rest rule is more often breached than honored.
(RB) Section 8104(d) enforcement of the eight-hour day protection
has been distorted. The current interpretation is that "the presence of an
overtime rate in a collective bargaining agreement implies that there is no
statutory limit to the number of hours a seaman can be required to work
in a day."
(JP) The USCG has not been responsive to our concerns. For example,
there seems to be no agreed to definition of what exactly a "specially trained
ordinary seaman" is, yet it appears on official documents establishing vessel
manning.
RE: DECISIONMAKING
(DD) The regulatory agency personnel have inadequate knowledge of
the way crews work to carry out their duties.
(AT) Manning decisions must change to consider more than raw num-
bers.
(DO) The USCG is too heavily influenced by the companies it is
intended to regulate. Manning is only one area where this is happening, but
it is sad to see the Coast Guard dismissing labor reports of maritime statute
violations as a labor-management issue with which they are forbidden to
become involved.
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110
APPENDIX C
(RB) In this atmosphere, relating crew size to the amount of automa-
tion on a ship is not justified. The reliance on automation to make these
decisions discards the importance of guaranteeing safety through having
adequate numbers of qualified crew members on a ship.
(JP) The Coast Guard personnel themselves need better direction
than they have been given to date. In general, too many things are being
accepted and made apparently permanent, without the authorities being
able to evaluate the effects of their own decisions.
CONFLICT OF STATUTE AND PRACTICE
(JH) Unlicensed crew members have taken the brunt of the manning
reductions and crew structure changes, such as the maintenance department
proposals. We think that the shipping industry should be able to let
managers work to efficiently operate without constantly coming at manning
levels and aiming at manning.
(DO) The maintenance department concept, which has been proposed
by ship owners and accepted by the USCG, has no legal standing in the
current statute and should be declared illegal.
(JP) Crew reductions have taken a disproportionate toll on the unli-
censed seamen, eliminating their billets or converting them to some sort of
maintenance department billet.
ACCURACY OF ECONOMICS, MONETARY SAVINGS
(JB) Are crew cuts cost effective and do they yield any competitive
advantage? Any good innovation has been adopted by our competitors and
crew reduction is the same situation, so any advantage is temporary.
(TS) The committee must address why manning has become such an
international squeeze and should examine the economic advantage claims
that are made for reducing ship crew numbers. The true international
situation is much more extreme than presented here to the committee.
(RB) Foreign sources have conceded that crew reductions will not
solve their competitive cost problems, and the nagging out from traditional
maritime nations will continue.
COMMI,l~lE;E STUDY METHODS
(DD) A truly factual study on reduced manning must examine the
work load of crew members and the distribution of the work load, the
safety of operations, the shifts of operations and management within the
shipping company, the skills and training opportunities for reduced crew
seamen, the increased dependence on shoreside maintenance services, and
the stress and fatigue that result among the members of a smaller crew.
(DO) The Marine Board should rephrase its question to "Is it possible
to ensure the safety of the environment, crew members, vessel, and public
interest by use of highly automated smaller crew vessels?"
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
111
(TS) International Labor Organization (ILO) resolution 147 went into
effect in June 1989. It provides for some port state control authority that
the United States could exercise, but the USCG would need some help
from the Department of Labor. The committee should examine that newly
enacted resolution.
(RB) Seamen work a seven-day week and the committee must examine
the actual workload being carried by smaller crews, so that we can really
know how labor-intensive our current so-called highly automated fleet is.
(JB) The committee should take the following steps:
1. identify all shipboard tasks under normal operations and emer-
gency operations;
tasks;
2. identify all legal obligations and correlate them with the shipboard
3. compare the workload on short versus long voyages, considering
the number of port calls and the length of time between each port call;
4. compare the cost of all shipboard automated systems and their
required redundancies with the cost of current or future manning levels;
and
5. determine the effect that nonstandardization of automated ship-
board systems has on learning, operating, reliability, and cost.
Bibliography
The information offered to the committee took several atypical forms:
oral remarks, prepared written statements, papers prepared for other meet-
ings, letters, raw data on shipboard work hours, unpublished reports from
other organizations, news articles, and personal testimonials. In addition,
some remarks emerged during the question and answer periods. A bibli-
ography of this diverse resource material follows.
Don Dishinger, Technical Director, Radio Electronics Officers Union. Mr.
Dishinger submitted the following documents before the meeting:
Dishinger, D. M. 1989. Letter to Ms. Lissa A. Martinez (Marine Board),
August 21, 1989, with enclosures: California Senate. 1989. Joint Res-
olution No. 32 Relative to Oil Tanker Accidents.
Dishinger, D. M. and H. Strichartz. 1987. Report on the Twentieth Ses-
sion of the International Maritime Organization Sub-Committee on
Standards of Raining and Watchkeeping, January 15, 1987.
Dishinger, D. M. and H. Strichartz. Undated. Report on the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union 1987 World Administrative Radio
Conference in Geneva, Switzerland (undated).
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112
APPENDIX C
International Maritime Organization. 1987. Subcommittee on Radiocom-
munications Document No. COM/34/3/12. Maritime distress and safety
system, at-sea, on-board maintenance: An objective study of contem-
porary radio electronics officer training. Note by the ICFTU, Novem-
ber 18, 1987. London.
International Maritime Organization. 1987. Subcommittee on Radiocom-
munications Document No. COM/34/3/13. Maritime distress and safety
system, training requirement schedule, a guide to the calculation of
time for education in maritime electronics communications and main-
tenance technology under GMDSS. Note by the ICFTU, November
19, 1987. London.
International Maritime Organization. 1987. Subcommittee on Standards
of Training and Watchkeeping Document No. STW20/2. Decisions
of other IMO bodies, Fifty-fourth session of the Maritime Safety
Committee. Note by the Secretariat, August 21, 1987. London.
International Maritime Organization. 1987. Subcommittee on Standards of
Training and Watchkeeping Document No. STW20/6. Fatigue factor in
manning and safety. Note by the ICFTU, November 6, 1987. London.
International Maritime Organization. 1987. Subcommittee on Standards of
Training and Watchkeeping Document No. STW20/6/1. Fatigue factor
in manning and safety. Note by the United States, November 18, 1987.
London.
International Maritime Organization. 1987. Subcommittee on Standards
of Gaining and Watchkeeping Document No. STW20/ Inf. 4 (agenda
item 6~. Fatigue factor in manning and safety. Practical implications
of fatigue. Note by the ICFTU, December 15, 1987. London.
International Maritime Organization. 1987. Subcommittee on Standards of
Training and Watchkeeping Document No. STW20/ Inf. 5 (agenda item
6~. Fatigue factor in manning and safety. Fatigue and stress, manning
and safety on board merchant ships. Note by IFSMA, December 17,
1987. London.
International Maritime Organization. 1988. Maritime Safety Committee.
Document No. MSC 55/3/8. Radiocommunications, maritime distress
and safety system, verification of performance analysis submitted by
India. Note by the ICFTU, February 22, 1988. London.
Dishinger, D. M. 1987. The future global maritime distress and safety
system a trade union response. International Transport Workers Fed-
eration, London. 1987.
Mochrie, George. 1988. Future Looks Promising for the Onboard Main-
tainer. Safety At Sea, #236, pp. 10-12.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Letter to all masters of Exxon Shipping
Company oceangoing vessels. August 7, 1989.
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
113
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Crew list of E'amn Jamestown, October
1962 (indicates 45 men) and August 10, 1989 (indicates 21 men).
Dishinger, D. M. and H. Strichartz. 1989. Manning Reductions and the
loss of essential skills. A prepared statement of the Radio Electronics
Officers Union for the committee. September 14, 1989.
Mr. Dishinger additionally submitted the following documents after the
meeting:
Dishinger, D. M. 1989. Letter, D. Dishinger Radio Electronics Officers
Union to W. M. Benkert, Chairman, Committee on the Effect of
Smaller Crews on Maritime Safety, September 18, 1989.
Coughlin, W. 1989. Ship cutbacks stir safety fears, page 1. Boston Globe,
September 18, 1989.
The Boston Globe. 1989. Forgetting the Valdez, editorial, page 18, Septem-
ber 18, 1989.
Coughlin, W. 1989. Teaching plan assailed at radio-exam school for oil-
tanker captains, page 12. Boston Globe, September 19, 1989.
Cooperman, ~ 1989. Associated Press Radio wire printout. FCC decision
to waive radio operator requirement sparks concern (2 p.), September
19, 1989.
Mr. John Hillman, Board of Governors, Exxon Seamen's Union. Mr.
Hillman submitted the following documents before the meeting:
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1989. Letter, John L. Hillman Exxon Seamen's
Union, to Lissa A. Martinez, Marine Board, July 12, 1989, with
enclosures.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Circular letter M-252-02, minimum man-
ning of vessels in port, Exxon shipping company to masters and chief
engineers Exxon Shipping company oceangoing vessels, June 26, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Circular letter Exxon Shipping Company
M-250-05, Engineers on watch, to masters and chief engineers of Exxon
Shipping Company oceangoing Vessels, May 5, 1989.
Cahill, R. 1985. Chapter IX, Inadequate manning, pages 106 to 109, the case
of the VLCC Esso Cambna. Strandings and their Causes. London.
Fairplay Publications.
Mr. Hillman submitted a prepared statement at the meeting.
Hillman, J.L. 1989. Statement prepared by John L. Hillman to present on
September 14, 1989 to the National Research Council's Committee on
the Effect of Smaller Crews on Maritime Safety, with enclosures:
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114
APPENDIX C
National Transportation Safety Board. 1989. Deposition of John Hillman
before the National Transportation Safety Board in the matter of the
grounding of the tank vessel Exxon Valdez near Thigh Island in Prince
William Sound near Valdez, Alaska on March 24, 1989 at about 0104.
Case No. DCA 89 MM 040. June 1, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1988. Letter H. J. Borgen, Exxon Shipping
Company, to John L. Spencer, Exxon Seamen's Union, regarding
WCF grievance #288 not fit for duty status, March 4, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1988. Letter John Spencer Exxon Seamen's Union,
to H. Borgen, Exxon Shipping Company, February 12, 1988.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1988. Letter D. K Walker, Exxon Shipping
Company to Mr. John Hillman, Exxon Seamen's Union, regarding
grievance # 016-88 limited duty, L. Barrett, May 19, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1988. Memorandum Exxon Long Beach, Exxon
Seamen's Union to Board of Governors, Exxon Seamen's Union, re-
garding urgent USCG investigation, December 18, 1988.
United States Coast Guard. 1989. Vessel file operating details, Exxon
Wilmington, 12 May 1989.
Mills, T. 1988. Letter Thomas L. Mills, attorney for Exxon Shipping Com-
pany (Dyer, Ellis, Joseph and Mills), to Rear Admiral J. W. Kime,
Chief, Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protec-
tion, USCG, April 27, 1988.
Mr. Hillman additionally submitted the following documents after the
meeting:
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1989. Letter, John Hillman for Exxon Seamen's
Union to Charles ~ Bookman, Marine Board, September 21, 1989.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: February 12, 1988 grievance for unfit
for duty AB seaman.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1988. Letter H. J. Borgen, Exxon Shipping
Company, to John L. Spencer, Exxon Seamen's Union, regarding
WCF grievance #288 not fit for duty status, March 4, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1988. Letter John Spencer Exxon Seamen's Union,
to H. Borgen, Exxon Shipping Company, February 12, 1988.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1988. Letter D. K Walker, Exxon Shipping
Company to Mr. John Hillman regarding grievance #016-88 limited
duty, L. Barrett, May 19, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: April 12, 1988 Exxon Attorney's (T.
Mills) letter to Admiral Kime, USCG.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: April 27, 1988 Exxon Attorney's (T
Mills) letter to Admiral Kime USCG.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: Crew concerns for safety during engine
failures on UMS Vessels.
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
115
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: Minimum Manning of vessels in port,
eight required (four with licenses and at least two ABs).
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: two Engineers required on watch.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: Exxon Private Memorandum to elimi-
nate QMED overtime on vessels where crew reductions sought.
Exxon Shipping Company. Memorandum. Exxon Private. Subject: 75k
DWT class UMS and fleet engine department unlicensed demanding,
from S. ~~ McRobbie. 75K DWT class UMS/Demanning Exxon Bay-
town/E'ocon Galveston Demanning.
Exxon Shipping Company. Memorandum. Exxon Private. Subject: UMS/
MOA demanning of 75K DWT class 11/3/88, from S. W. McRobbie.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: November 3, 1988 Exxon Private
Memorandum MOA demanning of 75K
Exxon Shipping Company. Memorandum. Exxon Private. Subject: QMED
Overtime authorized and categorized on UMS Vessels, October 25,
1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: October 25, 1988 Exxon Private mem-
orandum Exxon Baytown QMED overtime.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: May 27, 1988 Captain Janecek letter
to Paul Meyers deleting three oilers on Long Beach and Valdez.
United States Coast Guard. 1988. Letter Captain R. ~ Janecek, Officer in
Charge of Marine Inspection, Los Angeles/Long Beach, to Mr. Paul
Meyers, Exxon Shipping Company, subject Exxon Long Beach, Exxon
Valdez, reduced engine room manning periodically unattended, May
27, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: January 28, 1988 CDR. Larson letter
to Paul Meyers about Valdez and Long Beach manning.
United States Coast Guard. 1988. Letter CDR Paul T. Larson, Chief
Inspection Department, Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection, Los
Angeles/Long Beach, to Mr. Paul Meyers, Exxon Shipping Company,
subject Exxon Long Beach, Exxon Valdez, automation/reduced manning,
January 28, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: QMED's deletion, letter May 16, 1989,
JLH.
United States Coast Guard. 1989. Letter F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant Ves-
sel Personnel Division to Mr. John Hillman, Exxon Seamen's Union,
May 16, 1989.
United States Coast Guard. 1989. Letter F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant
Vessel Personnel Division to Captain George Wood, Exxon Shipping
Company, February 2, 1989
Exxon Shipping Company. 1988. Letter G. N. Wood, Exxon Shipping
Company to Capt. F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant Vessel Personnel,
March 14, 1989.
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116
APPENDIX C
Won Shipping Company. 1988. Letter G. N. Wood, Exxon Shipping
Company to Capt. F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant Vessel Personnel,
August 22, 1988.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1988. Letter G. N. Wood, Exxon Shipping
Company to Capt. F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant Vessel Personnel,
March 17, 1988.
United States Coast Guard. 1989. Letter Capt. F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant
Vessel Personnel, to Mr. Paul B. Meyers Exxon Shipping Company,
March 28, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Letter Mr. Paul B. Meyers, Exxon Ship-
ping Company, to Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection, Portland,
Oregon, February 22, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Memorandum Leonard C. Pittman, Chief
Engineer, Exxon Benicia, to Paul Meyers, Exxon Shipping Company,
February 18, 1989.
United States Coast Guard. 1989. Rapidraft Letter, Officer in Charge of
Marine Inspection, Portland, Oregon, to Commandant (G-MVP-4),
March 2, 1989.
United States Coast Guard. 1989. Letter F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant
Vessel Personnel Division to Captain George Wood, Exxon Shipping
Company, April 25, 1989.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1989. Minutes, May 1989 Safety Meeting, S/S
Eaton Baton Rouge, May 3, 1989, signed Emilio Fernandez-Sierra.
George Blumenthal. 1989. Letter to John Hillman, Exxon Seamen's Union,
March 10, 1989, regarding a near-miss accident on the Exxon Valdez.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Personnel semi-monthly time sum-
mary/seagoing, Exxon Shipping Company deck overtime, May 2, 1989.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Notes Re: a QMED on the Baton Rouge JLH.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1989. Letter John Hillman Exxon Seamen's
Union, to USCG official (undesignated), March 7, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Personnel semi-monthly time sum-
mary/seagoing, Exxon Shipping Company, engine overtime, Exxon
Baton Rouge, for Kenneth .A F~rif`.v Anri] 1A art Mel, ~ Aqua
May 16, 1989, June 4, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Personnel semi-monthly time sum-
mary/seagoing, Exxon Shipping Company, engine overtime, Exxon
Baytown, for Alan B. Cash dated December 31, 1988, January 16,
1989, January 19, 1989, and Exxon Yorktown for February 16, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Personnel semi-monthly time sum-
mary/seagoing, Exxon Shipping Company, engine overtime, Icon
Barytown for Guy C. Picou dated February 1, 1989, February 16, 1989.
~ O'er ~ -rim ^^ ~ in, ~ ~ As, Even ~ A, ~ an,,,
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
117
Exxon Shipping Company. Personnel semi-monthly time summary/seagoing,
Exxon Shipping Company, engine overtime, Exxon Tunisia for John C.
Munich, no date.
Exxon Shipping Company.
1989. Personnel semi-monthly time sum-
mary/seagoing, Exxon Shipping Company, engine overtime, Exxon
Philadelphia for Jeffrey L. Straley dated September 16, 1988, Octo-
ber 5, 1988, October 17, 1988, October 31, 1988, January 18, 1989,
February 1, 1989, February 15, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Overtime report by position code CMS
(note: this is a QMED pumpman), Exxon Shipping Company, Exxon
Valdez, dated February 18, 1989.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Overtime report by position code MOA
(note: this is a QMED oiler), Exxon Shipping Company, Exxon Valdez,
dated February 18, 1989.
Coughlin, W. P. 1989. Exxon managers say company pushes dangerous
seagoing policies. Boston Globe, no date.
Letter Frank J. Iarossi, Exxon Shipping Company to John L Hillman, Exxon
Seamen's Union, regarding grievance # 034-88 Mandatory Overtime
Exxon Yorktown, October 14, 1988.
Exxon Shipping Company. Date unknown. Background information for
masters mandatory overtime and crossing departmental lines, signed
by D. J. Paul, ESC Houston.
DuPont Management Consulting Services. 1988. Excerpt page 3 from a
report to Exxon Shipping Company, with notation that report is dated
June 1988 (incomplete reference).
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1989. Letter (signature illegible) Exxon Valdez
at sea, to the governors of the ESU, January 2, 1989 (incomplete
reference).
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1989. Notes of phone call from Jesse Kyle,
regarding a May 10, 1989 accident on the Exxon Lexington, dated
September 7, 1989.
Letter Melvyn Drayton, Exxon Shipping Company Personnel Administra-
tion Supervisor, to Mr. John Hillman, Esso Seamen's Association,
regarding grievance #317 light duty, October 16, 1984.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1984. Letter John Hillman Esso Seamen's Associa-
tion, to Melvin Drayton Exxon Shipping Company, regarding grievance
#307 sick leave vs. paid leave, Robert Baker, September 19, 1984.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1984. Letter (signature illegible initials SPR)
Exxon Shipping Company to Mr. Millard Stanford, Esso Seamen's As-
sociation, regarding Grievance #307, sick leave vs. paid leave, Robert
Baker, June 25, 1984.
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118
APPENDIX C
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1984. Letter Robert Knight. Esso Seamen's As-
sociation, to Mr. Paul Revere, Exxon Shipping Company, May 21,
1984.
Exxon Seamen's Union. Handwritten notes, unsigned Exxon Seamen's
Union. 1988. Letter John Hillman, to Admiral Paul ~ Yost, USCG,
regarding the Lejano fatality on M/V Galveston, March 30, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1988. Letter John Hillman, to R. ~ Janecek,
USCG Marine Safety Office Long Beach, California, March 30, 1988.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1988. Letter John Hillman, Exxon Seamen's
Union, to R. ~ Janecek, USCG Marine Safety Office Long Beach,
California, March 11, 1988.
United States Coast Guard. Letter R. ~ Janecek Commanding Officer
Marine Safety Office, Los Angeles/Long Beach, to John Hillman,
Exxon Seamen's Union, with enclosure Report of Marine Accident,
Injury, or Death regarding death of Reynaldo Lejano aboard the Exxon
Galveston, February 2, 1984.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1988. Letter John Hillman, Federal Freedom of
Information Act request to USCG Marine Safety Once Long Beach,
California, February 16, 1988.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1984. Letter (signature illegible initials SPR)
Exxon Shipping Company, to Mr. John Hillman, Esso Seamen's Asso-
ciation, regarding Damon L. Wenzel fatality, December 13, 1984.
Exxon Shipping Company. Undated. Exxon Shipping Company Safety
Credo. Exxon Seamen's Union. 1984. Letter John Hillman, Esso
Seamen's Association, to Mr. Paul Revere, Exxon Shipping Company,
October 5, 1984.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1985. Letter John Hillman, Esso Seamen's Asso-
ciation, to Mr. Paul Revere, Exxon Shipping Company, February 21,
1985.
Kopp, Q. 1989. Added staffing on vessels needed to avoid disaster. Half
Moon Bay Review, page 5A, Wednesday, July 12, 1989.
Coughlin, W. P. 1989. Exxon ship ignored hurricane gusts to reach Valdez,
seaman says. The Boston Sunday Globe (page blurred) September 3,
1989.
United States Coast Guard. 1987. USCG 1987 Certificate of Inspection
Exxon Long Beach (page 1 only), dated April 2, 1987.
Exxon Seamen's Union. 1988. Letter, John Hillman, Exxon Seamen's
Union, to Captain F. J. Grady, Chief, Merchant Vessel Personnel,
USCG, October 9, 1988.
Exxon Shipping Company. 1989. Letter, J. F. McDermott, Fleet Manning
Coordinator, to Mr. Donnie R. Murray re: Attendance counseling,
September 25, 1989.
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
119
Mr. Augie Tellez, Vice President, Seafarers International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO.
Tellez, ~ 1989. Statement of the Seafarers International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO before the Committee on the Effect of Smaller
Crews, September 14, 1989. 8 pages.
Daniel O'Shea, Alliance of Independent Maritime Organizations
O'Shea, D. 1989. A prepared statement of the Alliance of Independent
Maritime Organizations. The invasion of the sixty-hour workweek
standard and manning reductions in the U.S. maritime industry. Sub-
mitted to the Marine Board Committee on The Effects of Smaller
Crews on Maritime Safety, September 14, 1989.
Mr. John Bobb, Academic Director of the Maritime Institute of Technology
and Graduate Studies, International Organization of Masters, Mates and
Pilots.
Bobb, J. 1989. Statement of the International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots on Manning, before the Marine Board, September
14, 1989, 29 pages. (Includes 12 signed first-hand duty reports from
mates and masters.)
Mr. Richard Berger, Director of Research and Development, Marine En-
gineers Beneficial Association/National Maritime Union (MEBA 1/NMU)
(AFL'CIO).
Berger, R. 1989. Statement by District No. 1 MEBA/NMU before the
National Research Council, September 14, 1989, presented on behalf
of union president C. E. DeFries.
Mr. ~lmadge Simpkins, AFCCIO Maritime Committee.
Mr. Simpkins provided the following documents after the meeting:
U. S. Congress, House, 1989. A bill to extend the coverage of certain
federal labor laws to foreign flag ships, H.R. 3283, 101st Congress, 1st
Session. September 18, 1989.
U. S. Department of Labor-. 1989. Letter Dennis E. Whitfield, Deputy
Secretary of Labor, to Mr. Talmadge E. Simpkins, Executive Director,
AFL'CIO Maritime Committee, January 25, 1989.
AF~CIO Maritime Committee. 1988. Letter Mr. Talmadge E. Simpkins,
Executive Director, AFI`-CIO Maritime Committee, to Honorable
Ann McLaughlin, Secretary of Labor, November 2, 1988.
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120
APPENDIX C
AFCCIO Maritime Committee. 1987. Letter Mr. Talmadge E. Simpkins,
Executive Director, AFL-CIO Maritime Committee, to Mr. Arthur
Rosenfeld, Special Assistant to the Solicitor, U.S. Department of
Labor, October 7, 1987.
Attachment A, H.R. 3994, 100th Congress, 2d Session. A bill to extend the
coverage of certain federal labor laws to foreign-flag ships, February
24, 1988.
Attachment B. revised language for bill extending coverage of NLRA and
FLSA to foreign-flag ships.
Attachment C, memorandum April 11, 1989, extending the National Labor
Relations Act and the Fkir Labor Standards Act to foreign-flag ships.
U.S. Congress. 1988. Congressional Record, Wednesday, February 24, 1988.
Extending our laws to foreign-flag ships, extension of remarks by Hon.
William (Bill) Clay of Missouri.
Chairman Benkert also asked those attending to continue to forward ma-
terials and information to the committee. Additional material provided to
the committee:
International Transport Workers' Federation. 1990. Submission to the
Eighth session of the ILO/IMO Joint Committee on Raining (JCT8),
Geneva, September 17-21.
Statement of C. E. DeFries, President, National Marine Engineers' Benefi-
cial Association before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate on
the E'onon Valdez oil spill, May 10, 1989.
Meeting guest Bruce Carlton, Director of the Once of Maritime ~ain-
ing and Labor, U.S. Maritime Administration, contributed the following
documents:
White, D. 1989. Ship course stresses teamwork on bridge. Journal of
Commerce, August 29, 1989
United States Merchant Marine Academy. 1989. Bridge management
and teamwork, pilot course, August 21-25, 1989. Department of
Continuing Education, United States Merchant Marine Academy and
Marine Safety International.
Meeting guest Don Sussman, human factors researcher for the United
States Department of Transportation, contributed the following document:
Sussman, E. D. and M. Stearns. 1989. Shipboard crew fatigue, safety
and reduced manning draft report: Fatigue. Prepared by: U.S. DOT
Transportation Systems Center, prepared for MARAD, August 1989.
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INFORMATION FROM LABOR UNIONS
121
Meeting guest Eric Sager, National Transportation Safety Board investiga-
tor, contributed the following references after the meeting:
Woodward, D. and P. Nelson. 1974. A user-oriented review of the literature
on the effects of sleep loss, work rest schedules, and recovery of
performance. Office of Naval Research, U.S. Navy. December 1974.
Physiology Report No. ACR-206. Available from National Technical
Information Service, Document No. AD-A009-778.
Johnson, L. C. and Philip Naitoh. 1974. The operational consequences
of sleep deprivation and sleep deficit, 1974. Scientific and Technical
Information Facility, Box 33, College Park, Maryland 20740, USA
Available from National Technical Information Service, Document
No. AGARD-AG-193.
Mr. Jim Larsen wrote the Marine Board and contributed the following
documents after the meeting:
Larsen, J. 1990. Letter, Jim Larsen to Charles Bookman, Marine Board,
January 27, 1990, with enclosures:
Larsen, J. 1990. Letter, Jim Larsen to Florin Dente, January 20, 1990.
Larsen, J. 1988. Letter, Jim Larsen to Florin Dente, June 6, 1988. Larsen,
J. 1990?. 12-hour day survey (draft).
Representative terms from entire chapter:
exxon shipping
