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OCR for page 126
Appendix E
Previous Research on
Shipboard Task Analysis
A number of shipboard task analyses have been conducted in recent
years, some developed to identify optimal manning levels (Denny, 1987;
Stanwick Corporation, 1971) and some to identify fruitful applications
of technology in ships, in addition to optimal manning levels (Larsen,
1988; Liverpool Polytechnic, 1986~. All of these analyses used similar
methodologies: detailed, bottom-up approaches to cataloging shipboard
jobs and times required to complete them, qualified by expert interviews
with shipboard and shore-based experts.
The Stanwick Corporation (1971) study was an early effort to determine
the manpower and skills required to operate and maintain modern (early
1970s) and advanced (early 1980s) technology cargo vessels. The study
identified the skills and numbers of personnel required to operate five
different ship types (container, RO/RO, LASH, OBO, and bulk oil carriers)
and three different propulsion plants (steam, diesel, and gas turbine). The
results showed that upgrading crew skills and cross-utilization of personnel
could allow safe, efficient operation of present and future ships, at 50
percent of present manning levels (Table E-1~. Stanwick also concluded
that many shipboard functions could be performed more efficiently and
economically by shoreside personnel.
The Stanwick Corporation (1971) used task lists, operations sequence
charts and multiple activity tables, qualified by ships' visits and shipboard
interviews to validate their findings. Some empirical data were used in the
study, primarily preliminary Navy preventive maintenance system (PMS)
data that was used to corroborate some of the engineering task estimates.
126
OCR for page 127
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SHOPBOY TASK THESIS
TABLE E-1 Recommended Manrung for Baseline Ships and Systems
127
PRESENT TECHNOLOGY
ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY
Present Upgraded Upgraded
Type of Ship, Plant Skill Skill Skill
and Hotel Services Levels Levels Levels
Conta~nership, Steam,
Full Hotel Services
Conta~nership, Diesel or Gas
Turbine, Full Hotel
19 18 14
16 16 14
Containership, Diesel or Gas
Turbine, Minimum Hotel 13 13 11
Ro Ro/Lo Lo, Steam, Full Hotel 20 19 15
LASH, Steam, Full Hotel 20 19 15
OBO, Steam, Full Hotel 20 (+5)* 19 (+5)* 15 (+4)*
Bulk Oil Camer, Steam,
Full Hotel Services
20 19 15
.
* Additional personnel required when performing hold changeover and cleaning underway.
Williams (1983) documented manning requirements for diesel liner
vessels built after 1960 which were operated by companies receiving federal
operating differential subsidies. Williams used two vessels the SS Ameri-
can Lancer and the MV Sugar Islander as baseline vessels, and performed
task analyses using multiple activity charts to determine deck engine and
steward department manning levels. Williams calibrated his engine depart-
ment findings with preventive maintenance system (PMS) data from the
Sugar Islander, and adjusted the data upward 33 percent to compensate for
lost man-hours (coffee breaks, etc.~. In addition to supporting a manning
reduction from 26 to 22 men (Table E-2), Williams was also suggesting
transferring deck preventive maintenance duties and purser/administrative
duties shoreside.
Williams performed task analyses for best case and worst case naviga-
tion scenarios (good visibility, open waters versus poor visibility, restricted
waters, dense traffic), as well as for mooring, cargo, deck and engine PMS
operations. Williams was one of the few studies to analyze and recommend
manning levels for emergency situations, recommending an emergency
crew of nine, Amble E-3) with an auxiliary stand-by team of six in a central
emergency response area. Williams also recommended a realignment of
OCR for page 128
128
APPENDIX E
TABLE E-2 Reduced Manning*
1 Master
1 Chief Mate
1 2nd Mate
1 3rd Mate
1 Radio Officer
. Boatswain
3 ABs
2 OSs
1 Chief Engineer
2 Assistant Engineers
2 QMEDs
1 Wiper
1 Chief Steward
1 Chief Cook
1 Cook/Baker
3 Messmen
2 Utility Men
TOTAL
11
6
8
25
*Additional manning reductions (to 22 people) through smaller
steward's department.
deck and engineering responsibilities within the new organizational frame-
work. However, the Williams results were not validated with empirical
data. Liverpool Polytechnic (1986) used a similar research design to de-
termine manning requirements for the UK fleet of the l990s. A literature
search, research observation voyages on foreign and domestic (UK) ships,
and interviews with shipping officials were used to produce 16 variations to
conventional manning, thought to be more responsive to needs for the UK
merchant fleet heading into the l990s. Liverpool also performed a detailed
technology analysis to assess the impact of automation and advanced com-
puting systems on the merchant fleet. Liverpool steered away from specific
crew size estimates or recommendations, and instead concentrated on the
issues thought to be most significant in producing efficient, safe UK ship's
complements (role flexibility and flexibility in trading areas). As with the
Stanwick Corporation and Williams studies, the Liverpool study was also
not validated with empirical data.
Denny (1987) reported on a reappraisal and reorganization of ship-
board and shoreside operations at Pacific Gulf Marine (PGM), which was
OCR for page 129
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SHIPBOARD TASK ANALYS S
TABLE E-3 Recommended Emergency Manning*
1 Chief Mate
1 3d Mate
3 Seamen (ABs or OSs)
1 1st Assistant Engineer
1 Q!IED
2 Messmen
TOTAL
9
*Additional manning recommended of 6 people in central
emergency location.
129
driven by a need for more efficient shipping operations. This coopera-
tive program between the government and PGM used organizational and
work assessment techniques- interviews, meetings, questionnaires, organi-
zational analyses, time and motion analyses, daily activity logs, and "day in
the life of" sessions to determine PGMs shipboard and shoreside work
planning, work distribution, equipment maintenance, and requisite man-
ning. Denny recommended maintenance of the present ship's complements
of 20 personnel, and recommended institution of an onboard maintenance
department, development of a shipboard management team, a combined
navigation/communications watch (eliminating the need for a radio officer
in the future), and institution of participative management techniques for
both shoreside and shipboard operations.
Denny reports that trial periods instituting the changes were moder-
ately successful, and Coast Guard approval for the maintenance department
concept for PGM ships was secured.
Methodologically, Denny used anecdotal assessments, expert opinion
summaries, and a man-hour analysis. However, because of the bridge
watch-standing hours commitment, the man-hour analysis result showed an
overly large requirement for deck personnel. Work hours per task by labor
group were calculated and used to support the manning estimates of 20
people for the existing and proposed new crews. The man-hour analysis
supported the current manning, although the work load was distributed
differently following the study results. Denny recommended more equally
distributed work loads (particularly among deck officers), crew performance
feedback, and crew continuity.
Yamanaka and Gaffney (1988) report on experiments conducted by
a Japanese joint labor-management-government committee, the Japanese
Committee on the Modernization of the Japanese Seafarer's System, which
OCR for page 130
130
APPENDIX E
conducted a multiyear experiment varying shipboard manning levels and
work designs. Six Japanese companies provided pilot vessels for the basic
experiment, and each ship operated under 29 identical experimental condi-
tions, with different manning levels (from 22 to 18~. This base experiment
ran for 8 months in 1979, and found that horizontal and vertical crew
linkages were critical to the success of the new shipboard organization. In
addition, the study found that deck and engineering officers would require
more training to successfully effect the horizontal linkages.
Yamanaka and Gaffney then report on a series of more comprehensive
manning experiments (1979-1986), which encompassed such innovations as
horizontal linkages, dual purpose crews (officers and crew), and integra-
tion of the third officer responsibilities (deck and engine) into a single
watch officer position. These innovations were intended for 16-18 man
operations, and the verification experiments conducted with these vessels
and organizational designs from 1982-1986 laid the groundwork for the
Japanese Pioneer ships with crew of 11, which began operating in 1988.
This study used empirically validated task analyses as the foundation for
the shipboard organizational redesigns.
In experiments at the Netherlands' TNO Institute of Perception,
(Schuffel et al., 1989), bridge manning and a variety of different integrated
bridge designs were investigated:
~ a single-handed conventional bridge,
· a two-handed conventional bridge, and
an integrated bridge design, the "Ship 90" bridge ("Bridge 90")
with a one-man watch.
The Ship 90 bridge was configured based on the results of a func-
tional task analysis, which considered how best to allocate bridge planning,
monitoring, and ship-handling tasks that involved human and machine use
of perceptive, information processing, and motor control processes. Based
on these analyses, a one-officer work station was designed for the Ship 90
bridge, and a second work station was provided as a back-up and also to
serve as a pilot's work station.
Experiments were conducted using the three bridge designs, with an
eye to examining the usefulness and efficiencies for the particular designs
and attendant optimal bridge manning levels. The Bridge 9/one-man watch
navigational performance (measured by deviation from a centerline course)
was found to be superior to the other two bridge designs evaluated; path
width remained within safe limits 95 percent of the time, in contrast to the
two-handed conventional bridge, which resulted in safe path widths only 50
percent of the time. The single-handed conventional bridge fared less well
in the bridge evaluations, with path widths measured within safe limits only
37.5 percent of the time, given identical subjects and conditions. Schuffel
OCR for page 131
PREP70US RESEARCH ON SHIPBOARD TASK ANALYSIS
131
concludes that because of the accuracy and care with which navigational
information Is presented In the integrated bridge design with automated
decision aids, navigational performance Is superior. More importantly, the
studies also indicate that navigation in the Bridge 90 environment with the
automated decision aids does not increase the mental load of the navigation
task
This study performed a detailed functional analysis of one subset
of shipboard tasks bridge operations for advanced bridge designs and
their attendant manning levels. Manning issues were one piece of the
analysis, and were integrally tied to the bridge designs tested. Schuffel
determined that a single-manned, advanced technology bridge was safer
and more efficient (as measured by the trackkeeping and mental workload
parameters) than either of the other nvo bridge configurations.
These studies provide a perspective on different approaches to arriving
at minimum manning levels. Two cautions, however, are important: (1)
much of the previous work was not empirically tested, and (2) many of
the studies failed to consider reduced manning scenarios in emergency
conditions.
REFERENCES
Denny, M. 1987. Shipboard productivity methods. Vols. 1-3. U.S. Department of
Transportation, Maritime Administration, Washington, D.C. February.
Larsen, P. Optimal manning for rational ship operation. Paper 88-P008. Det norske Veritas,
H0vik, Norway. February.
Liverpool Polytechnic and Collaborating Colleges. 1986. Technology and manning for safe
ship operations. Vols. 1-2. Department of Transport. London. November.
Schuffel, H., J. P. A. Boer, and L. van Breda. 1989. The ship's wheelhouse of the nineties:
The navigation performance and mental workload of the officer of the watch. Journal
of Navigation 42~1~:60-72.
Stanwick Corporation. 1971. Merchant marine shipboard crew skills and disciplines study.
U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Merchant Marine
Safety, Washington, D.C. Report no. MA-RD-900-7202701. December.
Williams, V. E. 1983. Crew rationalization study: ODS liner vessels. U.S. Department
of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Office of Research and Development,
Washington D.C. April.
Yamanaka, Keiko, and Michael Gaffney. 1988. Effective manning in the Orient. Report
from American President Lines to U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, Office of Technology Assessment. Cooperative Agreement No. MA-
11727, Report No. MA-RD-770-87052. March 15.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
bridge designs
