Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 15
Safety Experience with Smaller Crews
Recent reductions in crew sizes aboard Asian and northern European
vessels have been preceded by extensive government sponsored programs
to define, through careful step-by-step experimentation, the potential op-
erational impacts. In the United States, less significant reductions in crew
sizes and discussions of further reductions have been met with legitimate
concern about their impact on maritime safety. However, the United States
has not seen a comparable effort by government, industry, and labor to
address this concern through comprehensive analysis and experimentation.
Safety concerns expressed over crew reductions relate primarily to
three operational considerations.
1. Fatigue: Will there be greater demands placed on the remaining
crew members, and if so will there be a reduction in alertness negatively
impacting safety of the ship or its crew? Or, will the overall impact of
changes hold even or reduce working hours and/or fatigue levels for the
remaining crew?
2. Training: With the higher degree of automation (often used to jus-
tify crew reductions), will the remaining crew be able to handle emergencies
if automated systems fail? Are higher or different levels of competence
required? Will the crew be adequately trained for the new conditions?
3. Maintenance: Will crew reductions result in the neglect of essential
maintenance? To what extent will better equipment, more durable coatings,
riding maintenance crews, and other measures compensate by improving
the reliability of equipment?
15
OCR for page 16
16
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
Lack of attention to these problems will raise the risk of injuries and vessel
accidents with attendant social, economic, and environmental costs.
The U.S. Coast Guard, as the regulatory body charged with protecting
the public interest in such matters, has addressed these questions each time
it has been asked to set or revise the minimum manning levels specified
by a vessel's Certificate of Inspection (COI). To make these judgments
requires an objective and stable regulatory framework based on adequate
safety statistics and a clear understanding of the automation technologies
now being installed.
The Coast Guard must also take into account variations from ship to
ship and from operator to operator. The nation's and the world's fleets
are highly varied. Manning practices that are acceptable aboard a well-
managed, well-maintained ship with a well-trained crew and appropriate
automation and safety equipment may be unacceptable aboard a vessel
without these advantages.
These regulatory judgments are especially challenging where the Coast
Guard must carry out its responsibility to prevent unsafe practices by
foreign-hag vessels in U.S. ports. Some flags have much higher casualty
rates than others (Ponce, 1990~. (The United States, despite its aging
fleet, has one of the better safety records in this regard.) Although the
Coast Guard has legal authority to inspect foreign-flag vessels for any and
all safety deficiencies, the agency in practice does not object to manning
practices that conform to vessels' flag state requirements (see Chapter 5~.
Accidents are discrete events that are often highly visible and readily
recounted as evidence of declining safety. Public concerns raised by them
are often valid and may be difficult to respond to. Less evident and certainly
less prone to publicity are the data relating to safety performance over an
extended period of time and across a broad spectrum of operations. Over
the past 20 years, the industry has experienced a general improvement
in its casualty and personnel injury rates. While not perfect in either
comprehensiveness or standardization of reporting format, such data are
currently the best indicator of whether safety regulations and systems to
promote or improve safety are achieving their intended objectives.
Unfortunately, however, the available data bases on casualties, acci-
dents, and oil spills do not readily yield information on crew sizes of the
vessels involved. A clear understanding of the safety record of smaller crews
will require first a substantial data collection effort—an effort that was be-
yond this committee's means. In the future, the proprietors of the data
bases should take steps to ensure that they capture crew size information.
OCR for page 17
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
THE PROBLEM OF QUANTIFYING MARITIME SAFETY
17
The problem of assessing maritime safety goes beyond the lack of
crew size data. Determining the overall safety impacts of moves toward
smaller crews requires estimating not only the associated marginal increase
or decrease in the frequency of casualties, accidents, and environmental
pollution incidents, but also the impacts of those events on people, property,
and the environment. The information on which to base such an assessment
is subject to great uncertainty. It is at present inadequate for development
of sound conclusions.
The most fundamental problem is that the impacts of casualties, per-
sonnel accidents, and environmental pollution incidents are highly varied,
and thus difficult to assess and compare. Property damage, environmental
damage, and human pain or death are very different things. Assessing
and comparing impacts of maritime safety lapses must therefore be largely
subjective. In practice, regulatory priorities of this kind are established by
policy decisions, reflecting the values society places on the various potential
losses involved.
The frequency of such incidents, in contrast, are quantifiable, given
adequate information. Several organizations maintain records of these
events both domestically and worldwide. For example, data on the numbers
of casualties, personnel injuries, and oil spills per year are easily obtained.
However, this information by itself is inadequate for meaningful statistical
estimates of the contributions of vessel manning to the safety record. First,
the available data bases do not include information on vessels' manning in
computer-searchable form.
In addition, they do not generally offer information on the many other
variables and causal factors that interact to determine the safety record of
an individual vessel. Management practices (e.g., maintenance, training,
and schedulingy, extent of compliance with regulatory requirements, the
performance of those entrusted with operating and navigating vessels, and
the service to which the vessel is put (its trade and routes); all must be
known or statistically estimated before the causal role of manning in safety
performance can be assessed.
Finally, there is no general agreement on an appropriate measure of
exposure to hazards. Casualty and accident data must be related to an
exposure variable. One obvious approach might be to compare the per-
centage of a given flag's (or a given fleet's) tankers experiencing accidents
to the corresponding percentage of the worldwide fleet experiencing the
same class of accidents. However, this comparison may be misleading, since
tankers of different flags may have markedly different services and routes,
thereby encountering different hazards. Studies thus far have used at least
three approximations of exposure to hazards: port calls, tons delivered,
OCR for page 18
18
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
and ton-miles. These measures yield very different estimates of accident
frequencies and can yield different rankings of rise For example, as tanker
size increases the rate of accidents and pollution incidents increases when
tabulated by port call, but decreases when tabulated by ton of cargo deliv-
ered (Meade et al., 1981~. Furthermore, collection and analysis of exposure
data is not routine; obtaining and working with it can be time consuming.
Development of maritime exposure data bases is required.
Accurate maritime safety assessments require precise, reliable, and
highly detailed data on vessels, casualties, accidents, and pollution incidents.
In addition, identifying trends requires intimate knowledge of the validity
and variability of data from different sources and complex multivariate
analysis. At present, such a treatment cannot be supported by the available
data and analytic methods.
Lack of Reliable Data
The committee attempted to assess the possible effects of smaller crews
on ship safety by analyzing data gathered and maintained by the U.S. Coast
Guard, Lloyd's Register of Shipping, shipping companies, and industry
organizations. It compiled records of reported ship casualties and personnel
injuries from these sources and tried to relate these to information on
crew size. Unfortunately, it became apparent that no adequate body of
such data is available in the public domain. Neither government nor
industry has collected and maintained accident and casualty data that
can be readily paired with that on crew size, training, or organization.
Developing such data in the future will require a worldwide initiative to
record crew information with every report of a casualty or accident and to
store the information in such a way that researchers can analyze it.
The most important obstacle to this attempt was the fact that none of
the maritime casualty data bases has crew size coded to allow tabulation of
records on this basis. For example, although the Coast Guard's form for
"Report of Marine Accident, Report of Death (CG-2692~" provides for the
entry of the number of persons on board, this information is not recorded
in the ship casualty (CASMAIN) and pollution incident (FIRS) data bases
that the Coast Guard uses to access accident data. (In fact, a manual
review of the raw accident reports revealed that more than one-fourth of
the reports provided no indication of crew numbers.)
Lloyd's Register of Shipping does not collect crew size data in any of
its ship or casualty records. The Marine Index Bureau comes closest to
providing the desired information. Owing to its billing policy, this private
agency has crew size data for each member company's ships. This admin-
istrative feature theoretically would allow the agency to correlate member
companies' reported shipboard accident data with crew size. However,
OCR for page 19
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
19
the requirement of strict anonymity of the reporting companies and crews
precludes follow-up analysis of such data.
An adequate analysis of maritime safety, in the committee's view,
requires the direct comparison of safety data for similar ships being manned
at low and higher levels. Such comparisons within an operator's own fleet,
or on the same ships at different times and different levels of manning, seem
most appropriate, since they avoid attributing to manning safety differences
that may be due to other factors, such as management, maintenance
support, or operating conditions. Minimally, comparisons should be sought
that ensure that high- and low-manned ships from different fleets are
matched by size, age, trade, nationality, shore support, and operating costs.
An excellent, albeit limited, example of the kind of comparison to be
desired is the case, discussed more fully below, of a 16-vessel containership
fleet whose operator collected consistent personnel injury data over six
years during which crews were reduced from 34 to 21. During this period,
the annual rate of injuries per crew member remained stable. While this
isolated case demonstrates the possibility of making meaningful statistical
assessments, it is grossly insufficient as a basis for general conclusions.
Comparable data covering a broader range of casualties and accidents and
a larger cross-section of the world's fleets are needed.
Because the vast majority of marine casualty data are incomplete
and unsystematic compared with the previous example, the committee
conducted limited trial investigations of existing data to determine whether
the influence of crew size could be studied in a practical manner. In
one trial, a small sample of vessels known to be operated with crews of
20 or fewer was extracted by name from the U.S. Coast Guard's data
bases (including the Coast Guard's copy of the Lloyd's Register files).
Information was obtained on reported spills and hull or machinery failures
for 20 U.S. tankers and integrated tug-barges (ITBs) between 1975 and
1987.
Although the average incidences of spills and failures per ship were
obtainable, there was no basis of comparison for crew-size effects. It was
impossible to determine the total number of vessels of these types that
entered U.S. waters (thus subject to reporting requirements) and therefore
impossible to estimate the average frequency of spills or failures for all
ships regardless of crew size. As a consequence, there was no baseline
for comparison. In addition, the reliability of the data bases came into
question. The FIRS file data on ITBs, for example, included inconsistent
vessel identification numbers, making it difficult to determine whether the
vessel name search was yielding all data for each vessel.
In a second trial, the committee attempted to derive a broader sample
by searching the data bases by company name, using companies known to
operate with small crews. It was learned, however, that the CASMAIN and
OCR for page 20
20
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
Lloyd's data bases cannot be searched reliably by company name. As an
alternative, a committee task group made . manual search of the Lloyd's
data base by looking up a sample range of ships operated by eight foreign-
flag companies reported to use small crews. All of each operator's ships
between 19,000 and 30,000 gross registered tons were selected (a total of
51 ships), and casualty data was retrieved from the data base by vessel
name. Each vessel's length of service was used to compute the overall
fleet incidence of casualties and accidents. The result, for a total of 448
ship-years, was only 13 reported accidents, an average annual rate of 0.0266
per ship.
Again, as with the results summarized above for ships known to operate
with small crews, there is no basis for comparison with larger crowed vessels.
Furthermore, the result is an order of magnitude smaller than that obtained
from the analysis of individual ships, suggesting that selection by fleet may
introduce vessels that are out of service during some of the reporting period
or that casualty reporting outside U.S. waters is less reliable.
Thus, the committee could not conduct a complete statistical analysis
of the effect of vessel manning on safety performance. Existing U.S. and
international maritime operations data are simply insufficient for deriving
valid statistics about the safety of smaller crews. Further research in this
area, supported by improved record-keeping worldwide, is essential.
Improving the Collection of Data
At present, the most comprehensive and detailed data on the safety of
vessels with smaller crews is in the files of individual companies. All U.S.-
flag operators could be asked to submit, on a confidential basis, whatever
safety-related comparisons they maintain internally on their own vessels.
Comparison and analysis of the safety indices used by different companies
could then be undertaken, which would provide meaningful insights into
current safety trends and additional factors that should be monitored.
Out of such a review should come recommendations as to how present
Coast Guard reporting requirements should be modified to include factors
that help identify meaningful relationships between casualties and injuries,
on the one hand, and possible causal factors (e.g., vessel age, vessel size,
crew size, crew overtime, crew continuity, and vessel equipment) on the
other.
To make the most of its own data, the Coast Guard should revise its
casualty and oil spill data bases to make them readily accessible for search
information on the sizes and organizations of crews.
OCR for page 21
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
INDUSTRY SAFETY INFORMATION
21
In general, as noted earlier, the broad industry-wide data contain
no direct information on the crew levels of vessels involved in accidents.
However, such data, collected consistently over the past few decades, are
meaningful, since crew sizes have been substantially reduced during this
time. Thus, these data may offer some general insight into the safety
implications of smaller crews. This insight is clouded, however, by other
developments over the same period, such as more stringent requirements
for safety equipment and procedures.
Though there are some variances, the available industry safety statistics
indicate the following:
.
There has been a measurable and substantial improvement in the
rate of both vessel casualties (accidents) and personnel injuries during
the past 20 years. More specifically, there has been a declining rate of
vessel casualties, a declining rate of vessel losses as a result of accidents,
and a declining rate of personnel injuries. These trends are evident on a
nondimensional basis (e.g., percentage of total vessels, percentage of total
gross tonnage, incidents per ship, and injuries per seagoing employee), that
is, as a result of a methodology that eliminates the impact of changes in
fleet size, numbers of employees, and other variables. These trends are
consistent whether one considers statistics published by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) of the United Nations, by Lloyd's Casualty
Reports, by the Marine Index Bureau, or by the U.S. Coast Guard.
· During the same 20-year period, the average crew size has declined
substantially (from the low thirties to the low twenties for U.S.-flag vessels
and to the high teens for many foreign fleets).
While these two trends have occurred during the same time period,
other factors have also changed. Technology has improved, operating
procedures have been refined, and the scrutiny of maritime operations by
government and industry bodies has increased. The safety data available
from the various worldwide sources is not sufficiently detailed to correlate
vessel casualties and personnel injuries with crew size. It is therefore not
possible to isolate the effect of crew size to determine whether any causal
relation, positive or negative, exists between crew size and safety. Neither
is it possible to determine from the available data whether crew size, in
itself, interacts with other variables to enhance or reduce safety.
Lloyd's Vessel Loss Data
Figure 2-1 displays worldwide total vessel loss rates over the past
20 years. During this period, the loss rate has dropped from about 0.65
percent to 0.32 percent per year a 50 percent decline. Although total
OCR for page 22
22
CREW SIZE AND MARrTIME SAFETY
losses worldwide are a gross measure covering large and small vessels
(individual years aside), the figure demonstrates that the combined impact
of all factors including changes in the size and types of vessels sailing,
ship design, manning, and operating practices has been to reduce total
vessel losses substantially. In terms of tonnage (a more accurate indicator
of commercial activity), a down trend is also evident (Figure 2-2~. Although
there was an upturn in the late 1970s, over the past 20 years annual tonnage
losses have declined 20 percent, from about 0.35 percent to 0.28 percent
per year.
Total losses of U.S.-flag vessels have also declined (Figure 2-3~. The
total loss percentage declined from about 0.4 percent in the early 1970s to
about 0.10 percent recently, a figure only one-third the world average given
in Figure 2-1. Figure 2-4 shows no trend in U.S.-flag percent tonnage loss,
but the average, about 0.17 percent, is only about two-thirds of the world
average shown in Figure 2-2. The considerable year-to-year variance in the
U.S. figures is due to the small number of data points and the influence
of large vessels (e.g., the Manhattan in 1987) on tonnage percentages.
Nonetheless, the lower U.S. loss ratios indicate that some factors are
keeping U.S.-flag vessels ahead of the world in preventing total losses of
vessels. These factors may include the types of vessels under the U.S.
flag, the trade routes served, U.S. Coast Guard and American Bureau of
Shipping requirements, and the quality of American seamen.
Marine Index Bureau Injury Data
Statistical data on injuries are issued annually by the Marine Index
Bureau. Figure 2-5 shows that, over the past 20 years, the aggregate
incidence of injuries per working seaman in U.S. deepwater vessels has
declined by more than 40 percent, from about 0.45 to 0.25 injuries per
year per seagoing employee. While this is a gross aggregation of data, it
supports a conclusion that during the last two decades the net impact of the
aggregate changes in the seagoing environment has been to reduce injury
rates for seamen significantly.
Tanker Casualty Data
A subset of total vessel data is tanker data developed by the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO). These data cover tankers not in
layup or storage and over 6,000 gross tons. Figure 2-6 shows that, after
rising in the late 1970s, worldwide casualty rates of large tank vessels have
declined to about 2.0 per hundred vessels, a level roughly 20 percent below
those of the mid to late 1970s.
The decline in the number of tankers lost (excluding war damage) is
OCR for page 23
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
0.80 -
0.70
co
~ 0.60
an
~ 0.50-
o
C' 0 40 -
A:
Z 0.30-
LL
c: 0.20-
0.10 -
~ 0.60
cn
o
u, 0.50-
O 0 40 -
co
O 030
O 0.20
LU
~ 0.1 0
UJ
C) rl on
0.80
Q % of Ships Lost
0.00- 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' I
70 72 74 76 78 80 82
YEAR
1
84 86 88
Gil
I;
0 % of GRT Lost
~ ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' I ' I ' 1 ' 1
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
YEAR
u, 0.70
~050~ `~ I_ ~~<
, 0.20-
0.10 - 0 % of Ships Lost
0.00- · ' 1 ' 1 ' I I ' ~ I · I · 1
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
YEAR
<,' 0.60-
o
C' 0 50 -
z
o
n
o
is:
C'
LL
o
LL
z
c'
0.40 -
0.30 -
0.20 -
l
78 80 82 84 86 88
YEAR
0 % of GRT Lost
Ad
rid
0.10 ~
0.00 1 I r-
70 72 74 76
23
FIGURE 2-1 Worldwide vessel loss rates
(percentage of ships) for commercial ships,
1970-1988. The decline in the percentage
loss of commercial ships since 1970 has
been linear at a confidence level exceeding
99 percent. Souree: Data from Lloyd's
Casualty Reports.
FIGURE 2-2 Worldwide vessel loss rates
(percentage of gross tonnage) for eommer-
eial ships, 1970-1988. The decline in the rate
of loss of commercial tonnage since 1970 has
been nonlinear (power function) at a con-
fidenee level exceeding 99 percent. Souree:
Data from Lloyd's Casualty Reports.
FIGURE 2-3 Total loss rates of U.S.-flag
vessels, 1970-1988 (percentages of vessels).
The decline in the rate of loss of U.S.-
flag inspected vessels since 1970 has been
nonlinear (power function) at a confidence
level exceeding 90 percent. Souree: Data
from Lloyd's Casualty Reports.
FIGURE 2-4 Total loss rates of U.S.-flag
vessels, 1970-1988 (percentages of gross ton-
nage). The variation in the rate of loss
of tonnage for U.S.-flag inspected vessels
has exhibited a random behavior since 1970,
which is best represented by an average
value. Souree: Data from Lloyd's Casualty
Reports.
OCR for page 24
24
`~> 50-
he
LL
oh
I
o
At:
LL
o
o
L11
a:
I
3 -
CO
I 2.5
en
to
° 2
LU
~ 1.5 -
U}
0.5 -
28 ~
24 -
CO
~ 20
I
LL 1 6 -
UJ 12 -
A) Q
Z V
4 -
. .
O 1 , . . . .
70 72 74 76
0.9 .
~ 0.8 -
I 0.7 _
0.6 -
0.5 -
Z 0.4 -
<' 0.3_
0.2 -
0.1 -
O - .
70
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
40 n
30
20
10
O~ .......
70 72 74 76
O Reported tor Yost
78 80 82 84 86
YEAR
3.5 -
0 Rate ox War Losses
O - · I ' I · 1 · I ' I ' I
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87
YEAR
~4 ~
0 Fleet Size (1000s of vessels)
~ Lost (ox war loss)
- O O O Or' 0 1
. ~ ~
· 1 ' 1 · 1
78 80 82 84 86 88
YEAR
~ ~ \
0 Inspected Vessels
72 74 76 78
YEAR
l
80 82 84 86
FIGURE 2-5 Annual injury rates per sea-
going employee in U.S. deepwater vessels,
1970-1987. The decline in the injury rate
for oceangoing seamen since 1970 has been
linear at a confidence level exceeding 99
percent. Source: Data from Marine Index
Bureau.
FIGURE 2-6 Rates of serious casualties
of oil tankers (actively trading vessels over
6,000 gross tons), 1974-1988. The decline
in the rate of serious tanker casualties since
1970 has been linear at a confidence level
exceeding 90 percent. Source: Data from
International Maritime Organization.
FIGURE 2-7 Numbers of tankers lost
worldwide (excluding war damage), 1970-
1988. The decline in the rate of loss of
tankers worldwide since 1970 has been linear
at a confidence level exceeding 90 percent.
Source: Data from International Maritime
Organization.
FIGURE 2-8 Reportable casualty rates of
U.S.-flag ships, 1970-1986. Although there is
a clear declining trend in the rate of casual-
ties for U.S.-flag inspected vessels, the best
estimation (nonlinear) correlates at a confi-
dence level of less than 80 percent. Source:
Data from U.S. Coast Guard, Annual Sta-
tistical Summary.
OCR for page 25
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
25
even more striking, as shown in Figure 2-7. Peaks occurred in the late
1970s, but total losses have since declined to half the prior levels, perhaps
indicating that safety measures adopted by IMO (such as requirements for
flooding crude tankers' tanks with inert gas) are having the desired effect.
U.S. Coast Guard Annual Casualty Reports
Information has also been developed from the Coast Guard's Annual
Statistical Summary of casualties and personnel injuries on inspected U.S.-
flag commercial vessels. Based on these data, reportable casualties per
ship have declined from about 0.8 incidents per vessel per year in the early
1970s to 0.6 recently (Figure 2-8~. Tanker incidents per vessel (Figure 2-9)
seem to have held fairly constant in the 1.0 per ship per year range, with
yearly variations as high as 1.4 and as low as 0.8. Correlated to tonnage,
however, marked declines of over 20 percent for all vessels and 50 percent
for tankers have occurred (Figure 2-10~.
Oil Spill Data
U.S. Coast Guard data for 1975 through 1989 were reviewed for ascer-
tainable trends. Figure 2-11 shows that the absolute number of reported oil
spills from barges, tankers, and all vessels has been declining. The number
of barge spills exceeds tanker spills every year.
Spills from vessels have also been declining as a percentage of total
spills into water, which have also been declining (Figure 2-12~. However,
this favorable trend is not reflected in the data on volumes spilled. Figure
2-13 shows that spill volumes may vary greatly from year to year and have
not changed greatly during the period reviewed. In this regard, note that,
although barge spills are usually small, in 8 of 12 years the total volume
spilled from barges exceeded the volume spilled from tankers. In addition,
large tanker spills may double or triple the volume of oil spilled from vessels
in a year. When such large spills occur, vessels account for upwards of
75 percent of oil spilled from all sources, compared with about 35 percent
in nonpeak years. Thus, while emphasis on oil spill prevention may have
reduced the number of spills in recent years, the total volume spilled in
any year fluctuates greatly.
Individual Company Data
The committee was able to obtain some safety data from individual
operators that have reduced their crews. Figure 2-14 shows trends in
the number of billets, casualties, material failures and breakdowns, and
personnel injuries and fatalities per ship for Company A during three-year
OCR for page 26
26
1.4 -
1.2 -
I 1 -
~n
~ 0.8 -
CL
in
z 0.6 -
LL -
c, 0.4
an
0.2
0.07
CO
O 0.06
C)
.t 0.05
CO
O 0.04
~ 0.03
U. 0.02
z
(, 0.01
o
4.5-
re 4
1~ 3.5-
Ct
3
~ 2.5
o
z 2
1.5
u' 1 -
O 0.5
m °-
z
AJAR
O Tankers (per USCG)
..
O~ . ..
70 72 74 76 78 80
YEAR
82 84 86
~ 4
0 Tankers (per kDWT)
<0 All Ships (per kGT)
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86
YEAR
All Vessols :~
G. Tankers
A Oil Barges
' 1 — 1 - I ' I ' I ' I '
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
YEAR
in 1 0
~ 9-
CO
J 8
o7
,~ 6
UJ
~ 4
(A 2
~ 1
~ \
Tankers
OI Barges
AN
/ 1
·,4]
O- . , . , . I . , . I · I ' 1
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
YEAR
CREW SIZE AND MARfTIME SAFETY
FIGURE 2-9 Reportable casualty rates of
U.S.-flag tank ships, 1970-1986. Although
there is a clear declining trend in the rate
of casualties for U.S.-flag tankers, the best
estimation (nonlinear) correlates at a confi-
dence level of less than 80 percent. Source:
Data from U.S. Coast Guard, Annual Sta-
tistical Summary.
FIGURE 2-10 Reportable casualty rates of
U.S.-flag ships per thousand gross tons (up-
per curved, and U.S.-flag tank ships per thou-
sand deadweight tons (lower cume), 1970-
1986. In contrast to the low confidence
in the correlation of the decline in casual-
ties to the numbers of U.S.-flag commercial
ships and tankers (Figures 2-8 and 2-9), the
correlation to tonnage is very strong. For
all vessels, the decline has been nonlinear
(power function) at a confidence level ex-
ceeding 90 percent; for tankers, it has been
exponential at a confidence level exceeding
99 percent. Source: Data from U.S. Coast
Guard, Annual Statistical Summary.
FIGURE 2-11 Number of reported oil spills
from (of all vessels, (o) tankers, and (~ oil
barges, 1975-1989. Data for 1987-1989 are
preliminary only and should be used with
~caution. Although there appeals to be a
declining trend for the rate of oil spills by
all vessels, the best estimate for this trend
correlates at a confidence level of less than
80 percent. Source: Data from U.S. Coast
Guard.
FIGURE 2-12 Percentages of total reported
oil spills from tankers and oil barges, 1975-
1989. Data for 1987-1989 are preliminary
only and should be used with caution. Me
variation in the percentages for barges has
been essentially random and is best repre-
sented as an average value equal to 8.02
percent. In contrast, the exponential decline
in the percentage of spills from tankers cor-
relates at a confidence level exceeding 99
percent. Source: Data from U.S. Coast
Guard.
OCR for page 27
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
12
1 1
10
9
8
-
~ 7
LL
J
in
LL
J
o
6
5
4
3
2
o
_
27
Tankers
Oil Barges
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
YEAR
FIGURE 2-13 Volumes of oil spilled by tankers and oil barges, 1975-1989. Source: U.S.
Coast Guard.
3
AL
elm
.
co
a,
~ O
I
in
llJ
z
LL
— 1
LU
Z
— Z
I
LL
-
<5:
C:
o
z
o
-
-
-
-
1
Billets/Ship Yr
MATE Fail/Ship Yr
-
E~ CAS/Ship Yr
~ INJ&FAT/Ship Yr
l
1 .
1
-
1 ~..
::
.2
:-:-
~ :-:-:
· :-.:-.:
_ ...
· : :
~ .....
i'.],,
1973
40
30
UJ
on
20
LL
G
10
976 1979 1982 1985 1988
YEAR
o
FIGURE 2-14 1tends in numbers of billets, casualties, material failureslbreakdowns and
personnel injuries/fatalities per ship for Company A during consecutive three-year intervals
from 1973 to 19~ (indexed with 1973 = 1.0~. Source: Marine Board Survey.
OCR for page 28
28
CREW SIZE AND MARrTIME SAFETY
intervals from 1973 to 19~. While injuries and fatalities have declined as
manning dropped, ship casualties fluctuated around an average of 0.53 per
ship year.)
Data provided by Company B show marked declines in oil spills per
vessel and personnel injuries per million man-hours worked (Figures 2-15
and 2-16~. Oil spills per vessel have declined 45 percent in the last 15
years, and injuries per million man-hours worked have declined 50 percent.
Since, as shown, the average number of employees per vessel in Company
B has declined 30 percent (from 30 to 21) the absolute number of injuries
per vessel has dropped 65 percent during the 15-year period.
Another large operator provided personnel injury data on 16 company
ships whose crews were reduced from 34 to 21 people. Average annual
injury rates per crew member during the three years following the change
were virtually the same as the three previous years.
Safety Implications of Available Data
The historical data, viewed from several perspectives, show that the
rates of vessel casualties and personnel injuries have improved over the
past two decades. These improvements have occurred simultaneously with
a significant reduction in the average crew size. However, no direct link has
been detected between crew size and vessel or personnel safety. The broad
statistics should not be considered a basis for complacency. The limited
data from individual companies show that safety records are not uniform,
illustrating the truism that safety must be addressed by each company in
terms of its specific operations. Except for those from Company A and
Company B. none of the data discussed above provide specific information
on manning practices. The data's importance stems from the known steady
decline in average vessel manning, approaching 50 percent since World War
II, due to the introduction of newer, more automated vessels with smaller
crews and to manpower reductions on existing vessels.
Some U.S.-flag ships have manning levels as low as 15 persons, while
others have 25 or more. The larger crews are often on older vessels whose
owners may not be convinced of the desirability of such automation or the
certainty of payout on the required investment during the remaining life of
the vessel.
Replacements for older vessels invariably have more automation and
lower required manning, so the trend toward lower average manning will
continue. Foreign companies operate vessels with as few as 8 to 12 people.
1 The data on material failure in the figure represent days lost as the result of mechanical break-
downs.
OCR for page 29
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
1.0
lL
CO
0.8-
>
cr:
lL
3
I
In
J
o
o
a:
LL
m
z
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Lin Reg Oil Spills
___ Manning Per Vessel
· —~__=— —a_ _ _ _ ___— _ ,, . ~ .. ~ ~
74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
29
-I 35
- 30
U]
An
U)
UJ
25
O:
20 cD
of
z
1 5 <'
LL
10 ~
UJ
- 5 <:
O
FIGURE 2-15 Manning levels and annual rates of oil spills per vessel, Company B.
1974-1989. Ibe solid line is a linear regression fit to the data.
20 -
<,' 1 8
o 1 6
cr: 1 4
o
J
-
a;
U]
CO
LL
Z 2
Lin Reg InJunes
~~~ Manning Per Vessel
o
35
An_
__
74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
30 Act
In
In
111
25 ~
a:
UJ
20 c,
z
15 <:
111
10 (9
LIJ
5
O
FIGURE 2-16 Manning levels and annual rates of personnel injuries per million work-
houm, Company B. 1974-1989. The solid line is a linear regression fit to the data.
OCR for page 30
30
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
If they continue to operate safely, pressures will rise for the United States
to follow suit.
SAFETY CONCERNS
Gross measures of performance provide few clues as to specific steps
required to improve safety while further reducing manning. Safety factors
and problems are best identified by the personnel involved, the licensed
and unlicensed people working aboard the vessels, and the owners and
operators. Accordingly, committee members and staff visited with unions
and vessel operators to obtain their opinions and verify their concerns.
Labor Organizations
The committee solicited the views of maritime labor organizations
representing licensed and unlicensed personnel serving aboard U.S.-hag
vessels. At the committee meeting of September 13-15, 1989, spokesmen
for 10 labor organizations described their safety experiences and concerns.
Many also submitted written statements and other documents. Appendix
C lists these spokesmen and the materials they submitted.
Many union representatives believe safety has deteriorated with smaller
crews. They point to increased fatigue due to longer working hours, poor
maintenance practices, and fewer opportunities for on-thejob training.
Some express a lack of confidence in the Coast Guard's even-handedness
in addressing labor-management issues (Alliance of Independent Maritime
Organizations, 1989; Hillman, 1989; International Transport Workers Fed-
eration, 1990~.
Vessel Operators
The committee members and staff visited the offices of nine U.S.-owned
vessel operators to conduct interviews (see Appendix D for questionnaire),
and toured one vessel. The companies operate tank ships, tug-barge com-
binations, bulk carriers, container ships, and special purpose ships, under
both U.S. and foreign flags. Some, such as major oil companies, own their
own ships, carry their own products, and hire their own crews. Others
manage for other owners and hire from union rosters.
Operators generally believe safety has improved aboard ships with
smaller crews, owing to greater safety consciousness and improved equip-
ment. They point out that crew reductions require better trained personnel
who are able to accept more responsibility and to manage automated
systems. Recognizing that elimination of most entry-level positions has
reduced opportunities for on-thejob training, they believe they are taking
OCR for page 31
sAFEry EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
31
steps to ensure the necessary competence and thereby maintain or improve
safety.
Some operators cited fatigue and the difficulty of retaining key person-
nel (especially junior licensed officers) as management challenges resulting
from moves toward smaller crews. Most have made changes in maintenance
practices to relieve crew members of some of their workload.
Specific Safety Concerns
More important than the general opinions expressed by labor and
operators was the fact that they identified many common safety concerns.
These concerns should be the object of efforts to further improve safety.
Fatigue
The potential for fatigue is the safety concern voiced most often and is
taken seriously by labor and management. Both recognize that inattention
can cause accidents. A few casualties have been attributed to inattention
associated with fatigue. The recent World Prodigy grounding and oil spill
near Newport, Rhode Island, is an example (National Transportation Safety
Board, 1989~.
Coast Guard casualty reports rarely note fatigue as a contributing
factor; however, there is reason to believe that its contribution is under-
reported, owing to reporting procedures (Pettin, 1987~. Complicating anal-
ysis of the problem is the difficulty of measuring fatigue. Hours worked is
at best a rough indicator, one which does not measure stress, the nature
of the work performed, or the physical condition of the emnlovee (Pollard.
1990~.
r ~ ~
Long working hours are common in the maritime industry, and indeed
desired by many union members as a means of increasing their take-home
pay. Since shipboard workers do not commute or cook their own meals,
long hours may not be as tiring as they would be ashore. Where long hours
are a recognized problem (e.g., the round-the-clock cargo responsibilities of
deck officers or the heavy workloads imposed by frequent port calls), many
companies employ personnel in excess of the minimums set by the Coast
Guard to compensate for the increased work load. Others use shore-based
personnel for cargo operations, so that crew members may rest.
Little information is available to indicate the increase or decrease in
working hours as crews have been reduced. Although some companies
indicate that overtime has not changed significantly, some labor organiza-
tions are genuinely concerned that smaller crews mean more hours worked,
more fatigue for remaining licensed and unlicensed personnel, and there-
fore degradation of safety. Management responds by saying that, properly
managed, average working hours need not increase and that in some cases
OCR for page 32
32
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
fatigue may decrease; for example, in engine rooms certified for unmanned
operation, engine department personnel can work days only instead of
standing four-hour on, eight-hour off watches. In a given situation, either
point of view may be correct, depending on the degree of work planning
and management of work effort.
Maintenance Practices
Traditionally, vessel crews have done most routine deck and engine
maintenance. Newer materials and design changes have eliminated some
of this work or made it a biennial shipyard repair item. Nonetheless,
ship safety will be impaired if reduced manning causes deferral of needed
maintenance on safety-related equipment.
Union representatives have filed grievances alleging that crew reduc-
tions have resulted in essential safety equipment being allowed to remain in
disrepair in violation of Coast Guard regulations and collective bargaining
agreements (Hillman, 1989~. Coast Guard personnel also have blamed crew
reductions for maintenance deficiencies. In reporting a 1988 incident in-
volving the simultaneous failure of electrical power and propulsion systems
on a ship near the harbor entrance at Portland, Maine, the commander of
the First Coast Guard District pointed out that the vessel's reduced en-
gineering complement made adequate maintenance "impossible" (Folsom,
1988~. Furthermore, he stated, "Shoreside or riding maintenance crews
look good on paper but are easily dropped, especially considering the eco-
nomic conditions that currently plague the U.S. fleet." He expressed the
opinion that "revalidation of reduced manning levels should be occurring
with every Inspection for Certification." He noted that many chief engi-
neers favor the licensing of electronics engineers to maintain automated
systems.
To avoid this potential problem while carrying smaller crews, some
companies employ "riding crews" or repair firms to perform needed main-
tenance in port. These approaches may be quite acceptable, but it remains
incumbent on the companies to maintain records demonstrating compliance
with Coast Guard regulations.
Emergency Response Capacity
Operators and unions agree that more attention to safety systems and
emergency procedures will be necessary as crews are further reduced.
Three general categories of emergency should be considered:
First and perhaps most critical is the "all hands" type, such as
fire and explosion, collision, or grounding. Vessel design and personnel
training can help ensure the shipboard capability to evaluate and respond.
OCR for page 33
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
33
Preventive maintenance programs can help ensure that the vessel is in con-
dition to operate properly and safely. Strict adherence to safety procedures
(e.g., the use of fireproof doors in cargo areas) is also necessary. (Chapter
4 discusses a modeling exercise in which the personnel requirements for
fighting an engine room fire are calculated.)
Second, the vessel must be able to operate safely in case of power
losses and failures of vital equipment such as steering gear, navigational
equipment, mooring equipment, the main propulsion plant (including loss
of automation and problems with diesel engines or boilers), and cargo gear.
· Third is the ability to handle personnel casualties. Manning deci-
sions must allow rapid and efficient response without depriving the vessel of
its ability to operate. For example, evacuating a crew member by helicopter
requires enough personnel to transfer the injured person (including at least
four stretcher bearers) as well as enough to operate the ship. Rescues at
sea presently involve at least six people in addition to those left aboard
to operate the ship. Launching and retrieving lifeboats also can be labor
intensive.
Some operators and labor representatives interviewed stressed the im-
portance of redundant safety systems (including internal communications
equipment) capable of operation from several places on the vessel.
Reduced Gaining Opportunities for Unlicensed Personnel
The elimination of entry-level positions (such as wiper and ordinary
seaman) on many vessels has reduced the opportunity for on-thejob train-
ing, some of which is required for the more responsible positions that
remain such as oiler and able-bodied seaman. Both labor and management
personnel agreed that inexperienced or inadequately trained personnel can
create safety problems, whether on watch, handling cargo, or operating
emergency and safety systems.
To prevent such problems, some companies have instituted "cadet"
programs to train unlicensed personnel. Others hire in excess of the normal
complement until crew members gain the necessary experience. Recent
high unemployment in shipping has allowed some companies to meet their
skill requirements by recruiting recent graduates of maritime academies
(who are licensed officers) to work in unlicensed positions; the industry's
expected upturn may limit that option. A few companies in recent years
have negotiated labor contracts that provide for employment continuity
among key personnel, thus ensuring that investments in additional training
can be recaptured (see, for example, American President Lines, 1989~.
Whatever the approach, it is essential that Coast Guard certifications be
based on demonstrated proficiency and that management exercise diligence
to promote or hire only qualified people.
OCR for page 34
34
Service Continuity by Crew Members
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
All operators agreed that continuity of service by crew members is an
important safety factor, particularly with sophisticated shipboard systems
requiring intimate knowledge. Repeated service aboard the same vessel
ensures familiarity with the equipment and promotes teamwork. Continuity
is most desirable among key personnel (master, chief engineer, chief mate,
and 1st assistant engineer), and is helpful with junior officers and unlicensed
personnel as well. One operator noted that crew levels of 9 to 11 would
require 100 percent continuity.
Physical Demands on Crew Members
Concerns were also expressed about the growing need for physical
fitness of crew members. Smaller crews mean fewer people available for
emergency operations and very likely fewer physically strong people in
situations where strength is needed. Assessments of minimum manning
levels must take into account the degree to which labor-saving devices are
available or tasks requiring strength have been eliminated.
Several of those interviewed pointed out the desirability of designing
vessels to minimize things such as unnecessary ladder climbing or heavy
lifting to eliminate some of the causes of injuries as well as impediments to
emergency response. Annual physical examinations were recommended by
some operators. 1b be effective in improving safety more rigid standards
of "fitness for duty" may need to be established and enforced.
Changed Shipboard Social Conditions
Recognizing that attitudes may affect alertness and attention to safety
rules, several operators expressed concern over the impact of reduced
manning on the shipboard social environment. With the smaller licensed
and unlicensed groups and the breakdown of some of the traditional
distinctions between the deck, engine, and steward's departments, new
social structures will be necessary. Some companies are already promoting
the ship's team concept, an effort that may be assisted by movement toward
greater continuity of assignments. One operator, whose ships carry crews
as small as 14 persons, reported that it had used psychologists from the
beginning of its manpower reduction program.
FURTHER RESEARCH
Better information is needed on the relationship between crew size
and safety experience. As noted earlier, the Coast Guard data bases are
presently inadequate to support even retrospective conclusions about the
OCR for page 35
SAFEIY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
35
safety records of U.S.-flag vessels that have reduced crews. Prospective
regulatory judgments to support further reductions of crews rest on an
even more inadequate base since the Coast Guard has not developed the
human factors methods to assess such steps.
In addition to the broad safety statistics, more detailed safety studies
of the following factors are needed to support the manning innovations
now being undertaken or contemplated by U.S.-flag fleets. Such studies
should consider the following:
the prevalence and severity of fatigue aboard merchant ships, with
attention to the role of fatigue in navigation errors and personnel accidents;
· the human factors issues presented by the one-person bridge, in-
cluding the operators' responses to fatigue and the ergonomic design of
control and monitoring systems;
· changes in maintenance practices owing to reductions in engineer-
ing complements;
· the maintenance effectiveness of riding crews and shore-based
maintenance;
· the effects of traditional watch schedules on crew members' cir-
cadian rhythms, and the consequent impacts on effectiveness and safety;
and
· the data collection requirements for adequate assessments of the
safety effects of smaller crews.
FINDINGS
Rates of maritime casualties and personnel injuries, worldwide and in
the U.S.-hag fleet, have declined steadily over the last two decades, at the
same time that the manning of vessels has been reduced. While concerns
about safety have been raised—including neglected maintenance, increased
fatigue and stress, and lessened opportunities for on-thejob training-
management, labor unions, and governments have addressed these con-
cerns through training, qualification standards, and other management
techniques. The committee did not find in its analysis of safety data or its
contacts with industry and labor in the United States and worldwide any
direct causal relationships between vessel manning levels and safety.
Currently available maritime safety information is inadequate for mak-
ing definite judgments about the contributions of various factors to maritime
safety. While good information exists concerning numbers of casualties and
the extent of damage, it is difficult to assemble information needed to cal-
culate frequency of occurrence and assign the frequencies to different
populations of ships (type, flag and age of ship, and numbers of crew).
This information is needed to establish trends and make decisions about
OCR for page 36
36
CREW SIZE AND IL41UTIME SAFETY
safeW. Information about the causes of casualties is also not uniformly
assembled.
Information on the prospective consequences of further reductions,
which may involve substantial reorganizations of manning patterns, is also
insufficient for firm judgments. The human factors studies to support
increasing automation, for example, are only now beginning to appear,
mainly in Europe.
REFERENCES
Alliance of Independent Maritime Organizations. 1989. The invasion of the sixty hour
workweek standard and manning reductions in the U.S. Maritime Industry. Statement
Submitted to the Committee on the Effect of Smaller Crews on Maritime Safety,
National Research Council, Washington, D.C. September 14.
American President Lines. 1989. Marine Operations Department training program 1990.
Mimeo. Oakland, California.
Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense. 1988. Third Report of the Commission on
Merchant Marine and Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Sept. 30.
Folsom, D. L. 1988. Vessel automation control reliability, reduced manning, maintenance,
and operator responsibility. Memorandum from Commander, First Coast Guard
District, to Chief, Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection,
U.S. Coast Guard. Dec. 19.
Hillman, John L. 1989. Letter from President, Exxon Seaman's Union, to Charles Bookman,
Executive Director, Marine Board, National Research Council. September 21.
International Transport Workers' Federation. 1990. Submission to the Eighth Session of
the ILO/IMO Joint Committee on Staining (JCT8), Geneva, 17-21, September.
Meade, N.F., R.C. Anderson, NJ. Goldberg, V.F. Keith, and R.M. Willis. 1981. An analysis
of tanker casualties for the ten year period, 1969-1978. In Proceedings of the 1981
Oil Spill Prevention Conference. Washington, D.C.: Courtesy Associates.
National Transportation Safety Board. 1989. Hearing record, joint NTSB-U.S. Coast Guard
Marine Board of Investigation examination of Capt. Iakovas Georgoudis in the matter
of the M/T World Prodigy grounding in Rhode Island Sound on June 23, 1989. Oct.
3.
Perkins, M. R. 1988. Vessel automation control reliability, reduced manning, maintenance,
and operator responsibility: First endorsement on MSO Portland's ltr 16711 of 6 Dec
88. Memorandum from Commanding Officer, Marine Safety Office, Portland, Maine,
to Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.
Pettin, Thomas J. 1987. Fatigue as the cause of marine accidents, 1981-1985. U.S. Coast
Guard, Marine Investigation Division. March.
Pollard, J.K, M. Sterns, and E. D. Sussman. 1990. Shipboard Crew Fatigue, Safety,
and Reduced Manning. Contract report for Office of Technology Assessment and
U.S. Maritime Administration. (transportation Systems Center, Research and Special
Programs Administration, Cambridge MA 02142~.
Ponce, Paul V. 1990. An analysis of marine total losses worldwide and for selected flags.
Marine Technology 27~2~:114-116. March.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
coast guard
