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OCR for page 37
~2
Managing the Human Factors
Aspects of Change
The introduction of new technology in ships sometimes permits re-
ductions of crew sizes. However, these changes must be well thought
out and tested extensively before full implementation. Ships are complex
sociotechnical systems, consisting of (1) technologies, (2) people, (3) orga-
nizational structures, and (4) an external environment. As the literature
on sociotechnical systems shows, the four dimensions are interdependent;
when one changes, it affects the other three. Because of this fundamen-
tal interdependence, the introduction of technological change can not be
viewed in isolation, or even at a subsystem level; it must be viewed from a
true systems perspective. Thus, whether the introduction of new technology
will permit safe reduction in manning will depend on whether appropriate
changes can be made in the other three sociotechnical system dimensions.
If inappropriate changes are made, or if the macrosystem in which the ship
system is enmeshed constrains appropriate changes, then simply reducing
crew size is likely to have unintended or undesirable effects that result in a
reduction in safety. Undesirable human factors effects are especially likely
under these circumstances (e.g., see DeGreene, 1973~.
The sociotechnical systems literature has shown that where change to
all four sociotechnical system dimensions can be properly managed, the
introduction of new technology can not only increase productivity, but also
improve working conditions, the intrinsic motivational features of jobs, and
safety. In short, proper introduction of technology using a true systems
approach provides an opportunity to improve health, safety, the quality of
work life, and operating efficiency.
37
OCR for page 38
38
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
In the case of ships, stress, fatigue, boredom, living/social conditions,
and individual and team skills are among the most critical human factors
issues that must be addressed in managing the introduction of technological
change from a systems perspective. Adoption of new technology will need
to be supported by training, reallocations of personnel responsibilities, and
careful attention to ergonomic design.
HUMAN FACTORS REQUIRING PARTICULAR ATTENTION
The extent to which technology implementation and associated crew
reductions increase the risks of stress, fatigue, and boredom is not precisely
known, since little research has been devoted to stress in the shipboard
environment. Relatively high levels of stress and fatigue are considered
normal in the maritime world. However, anecdotal evidence and the
results of the few studies carried out aboard ship tend to confirm the
conclusions one might draw from studies in the laboratory and in other
working environments, such as aircraft and long-distance trucks (Hockey,
1986; Parasuraman, 1986, 1987~. These sources suggest that stress, fatigue,
and boredom, if not appropriately addressed, may be significant safety
concerns aboard ship.
It should be noted that feelings of stress and fatigue, as well as
degraded human performance, may result from either too high or too
low a workload (Saunders and McCormick, 1988; Salvendy, 1987~. Jobs
that are physically or mentally demanding can produce erratic performance
and/or narrowing of attention. Too light a workload most likely to occur
in passive monitoring tasks, with infrequent stimuli that require active
response can result in a low level of arousal of the central nervous system,
with an attendant lack of vigilance and feelings of boredom and sleepiness
(Hockey, 1986; Thackray, 1987~.
These concerns suggest the need for caution and the need for further
crew reductions to be based on sound research conducted under realistic
conditions with a thorough analysis of the human factors issues involved.
Work Hours and Fatigue
There are no universally accepted standards defining maximum or
permissible work hours for shipboard personnel. Some European national
authorities do have written standards setting work hour limitations for
vessels in their national fleets (International Transport Workers' Federation,
1990~. However, U.S. maritime statutes do not contain meaningful guidance
or standards for defining permissible work hours.
If smaller crews mean longer working hours, the result may be in-
creased fatigue. Fatigue may show up as lack of attention during or after
OCR for page 39
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
39
peak periods and could cause accidents, endangering life or property. The
round-the-clock responsibilities of deck officers during cargo operations
are of special concern, since ships may leave port after loading under the
guidance of severely fatigued officers.
Other crew members may suffer similarly from disrupted sleep and
associated fatigue. Vessels that make frequent port calls are of special
concern, since crew members must interrupt their sleep often for mooring,
unmooring, and cargo operations. Beetham (1989) notes, "Certain classes
of ship, notably coastal, gas and chemical tankers, make particularly heavy
demands upon their crew, which can give rise to serious fatigue. This
should be taken into account by the flag state when issuing their manning
certificates."
A study by the Coast Guard's Marine Investigation Division found
that, between 1981 and 1985, fatigue was listed as a direct or indirect
cause of casualties in only about 1 vessel in every 200 involved (Pettin,
1987~. However, the author noted, "It is believed that the impact of
fatigue in casualties is substantially under reported as most accidents are
not investigated in sufficient detail to identify its exact role" (Pettin, 1987~.
Some of the tendency for working hours to increase is mitigated, in
some companies' fleets, by efforts to shift maintenance activities to shore
personnel or to special "riding crews" that are carried aboard ships to
perform maintenance. These shifts may produce their own risks; however,
where safety-related maintenance is deferred, some regulators and others
have noted a deterioration of maintenance standards associated with smaller
crews (Folsom, 1988; Perkins, 1988~. In any case, these organizational
changes have little effect on the most critical fatigue-related risk, that of
deck officers' inattention on the bridge.
Organizational innovations developed in Japan and Western Europe
could help alleviate some acute fatigue at peak work periods by spreading
the work load more evenly among crew members. For example, a few
nations license dual-qualified officers, able to work in both engine and
deck capacities. More common is the use of general purpose ratings,
similarly able to cross departmental lines. In this country, so far, the
nearest approach to such flexibility is the certification of some vessels to
carry maintenance departments, composed of nonwatch-keeping personnel
who perform maintenance, but can also be assigned to help in the engine
or deck department as needed.
Moves to increase work flexibility across traditional departmental lines
with general purpose unlicensed ratings and dual-qualified officers have not
met with broad acceptance in the United States. The U.S. Merchant Marine
Academy at Kings Point, New York, in the past has offered students the
opportunity for dual licenses in both deck and engine specialties, but these
intensive programs have attracted fewer and fewer enrollees, largely because
OCR for page 40
40
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
young officers are encouraged to specialize by the departmental distinctions
built into manning statutes and the license structure, accumulating the
necessary hours of service on deck or in the engine room to qualify for the
next steps in their licenses.
The academy today is instituting a pilot program with the intent of
qualifying ship operations officers for newer, more automated ships, in
which control functions are being centralized on the bridge. In these
circumstances, watch officers responsible for operating engines as well
as navigating will need greater training in engine operations (personal
communication, Paul Krinsky, Superintendent, U.S. Maritime Academy,
November 15, 1989~.
Standard Watch Rotations and Fatigue
The traditional watch schedule followed by most of the world's fleet,
with four hours on and eight off, seems designed to interfere with normal
sleep cycles. Some researchers have proposed alternatives. In the labora-
tory, sleep loss or sleep disruption lowers human performance in mental
tasks involving working memory, and lengthens the response time to critical
events. One important finding is that fatigue and sleep loss, like exposure to
loud noises, heat, vibration, and other physical sources of stress, generally
produce a narrowing, or selectivity, of attention. That is, in dual-source
vigilance tasks (e.g., monitoring two indicators), subjects tend to monitor
one source more closely than the other. They also tend to focus on the
expected event, often missing the unexpected when it happens (Hockey,
1986~.
In one of the few shipboard experiments to document fatigue effects
related to sleep loss, a two-year study conducted on German vessels found
that the standard three-watch system (four on, eight oi~\upsets crew
members' circadian rhythms and deprives them of sleep (tow 'et al., 1987~.
Low and his colleagues confirmed that personnel do not fully adapt to
night watches and are generally less alert then (see also Hockey, 1986~. In
addition, they found that the three-watch rotation imposes more measurable
stress (as indicated by physiological measures such as catecholamine and
electrolyte excretion rates) than two-watch systems. They recommend for
general use a system in which each watch keeper has a 10- to 14-hour
period of unbroken free time each day, to permit uninterrupted sleep.
Another shipboard study, funded by the West German Ministry for
Technology and Research, confirmed that the three-watch system produces
sleep disruption that degrades performance in monitoring and judgment,
especially during the night (C,olquhoun et al., 1988; Condon et al., 1988;
Rutenfranz, 1988~. The research group proposed a new system that would
give the second and third officers full-length periods of unbroken sleep
OCR for page 41
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
41
each day, by assigning them to 12-hour watches followed by 12 hours of
free time (Fletcher et al., 1988~.
This issue is not directly related to crew size, except to the extent that
vessels with smaller crews may make heavier demands on crew members'
time and stamina, aggravating any possible effects of fatigue.
The Impact of Automation
4~7
Highly automated ships with smaller crews will place new demands on
crew members. When automation is poorly designed or crews inappropri-
ately or inadequately trained, the result can be increased boredom, fatigue,
and stress. The goal is to establish optimal levels of mental workload for
each shipboard function that is to be automated.
Human factors concerns have received insufficient review in shipboard
automation, as they have in most complex engineering systems. Many
automated systems reduce operators to passive monitors (Parasuraman,
1987; Schuffel et al., 1989) and remove much of the active content from
the job without decreasing the need for vigilance. In addition, some
say, the lack of standardization and the poor ergonomics of the systems
make them difficult and confusing to use. One pilot told the committee,
"Computerized navigational systems are designed without obtaining input
from the ultimate user. They do not use common language and nautical
terms to define functions. As a result, the people serving on board ship must
accommodate the manufacturer and learn the specific programs involved
in the equipment, rather than the other way around. At some point vessel
safety will be compromised" (Bobb, 1989~.
Integrated Budge Systems
The extent of these problems for operators of newer, state-of-the-art
bridge automation systems is uncertain. The bridge, in some new ships,
has become a ship operation center, incorporating controls and monitors
for all essential vessel functions, including navigation, engine control, and
communications. Many routine navigational tasks, such as chart updating,
position plotting, and steering, may be automated. Ballast may be adjustable
from the bridge while the ship is underway. Logs, reports, certificates,
documents, and letters may be computerized, with electronic mail links
via satellite to shore (Grove, 1989~. When systems are working properly,
this environment may be stimulating enough to keep the officer on the
bridge awake and alert. On the other hand, it may be distracting enough
to degrade performance on critical course-keeping and collision-avoidance
tasks.
OCR for page 42
42
CREW SIZE AND MARTTIME SAFETY
In most cases where integrated bridges are introduced, bridge equip-
ment is automated and decision aids are added (Grabowski, 1989, Kris-
tiansen et al., 1989; Schuffel et al., 1989~. The systems need to be designed
in a systems engineering fashion, with careful attention to the operator
tasks to be supported, limitations of the hardware and software, appropri-
ate allocation of tasks between humans and machines, and ergonomic and
human factors design. However, decision aids that have been developed
within the context of integrated bridge designs have often been stand-alone
systems, not integrated with existing bridge designs (Grabowski, 1989~.
The results of experiments evaluating the impact of integrated bridge
systems on bridge watch team performance have been mixed. Kristiansen,
Renswick, and Mathisen (1989) found improved track-keeping and watch-
keeping skills in experiments aboard seven Norwegian ships outfitted with
highly automated bridges equipped with decision aids. Grabowski (1989)
described the piloting expert system, a navigation aid for pilots and ship's
officers. In tests at MARAD'S Computer Aided Operations Research Fa-
cility (CAORF) ship simulator, junior watch officers using the aid showed
improved watch-keeping skills, but showed no significant improvement in
track-keeping. The system is one piece of an integrated bridge system.
Unlike Schuffel's (1989) design, it is not intended to integrate all bridge
functions and so cannot be judged on the basis of its allocation of functions
between human and computer.
Single-Handed Bridge Operation
Single-handed bridges—on which the watch officer serves also as helms-
man and lookout are being introduced by some foreign-flag shipping op-
erators, and some national certificating authorities have permitted some
vessels to operate this way, provided they have certain automated equip-
ment (Habberley, 1989; Vail, 1988~. Many other vessels reportedly operate
in this way without permission, even in restricted waters (Beetham, 1989;
Habberley, 1989; Parker, 1987; George Quick, International Order of Mas-
ters, Mates and Pilots, oral statement at September 13, 1989, committee
meeting).
One attempt to integrate bridge functions aboard single-handed
bridges, with a careful allocation of functions between humans and com-
puter, is described in a paper by Schuffel (1989~. In a simulation study
of navigation performance and mental workload, an officer of the watch
focused on the feasibility of single-handed navigation using an automated
bridge design called "Wheelhouse 90." He found that "a careful func-
tional allocation [between human and computer] can lead to an automated
wheelhouse concept suitable to single-handed navigation.'' His analysis of
276 accidents due to human error showed that 68 percent would have
OCR for page 43
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
43
been prevented by a single-handed bridge similar to the one described in
his paper. Schuffel notes, however, that "ship control tasks have changed
from active manual control actions to passive monitoring activities," and he
warns against such reductions of operators to passive monitors of control
systems.
Kristiansen, Renswick, and Mathisen (1989) also studied single-handed
bridge operations, and found watch officers generally satisfied with the
bridge configuration, workload, and levels of stress, and with the absence
of a lookout. Into essential elements of the officers' satisfaction were
identified: (1) single-handed operations were restricted to times when the
ships were in open seas under favorable environmental conditions, and (2)
watch officers could suspend single-handed operations when necessary.
A two-year study by Low et al. (1987) of watch-keeping officers on
10 West German ships with single-handed bridges found different results.
There were objective indications of stress and only partial adaptation of
circadian cycles to night watches, even though officers generally kept the
same watch cycle every day for months. The authors recommended adjust-
ing watch rotations, carefully selecting personnel, and operating with two
people on the bridge at all times.
Some empirical research shows that officers serving single-handed
watches aboard such "Ship of the Future" bridges were significantly better
at maintaining the vessel's course than traditional watches (Kristiansen
et al., 1989; Schuffel et al., 1989~. These improvements were reported
to have been accomplished with no accompanying information overload.
However, caution with single-handed bridges is wise, because this mode of
operation places responsibility for the ship on a single fallible person. No
one may be present to catch errors, to take over if the officer of the watch
is incapacitated, or to help keep the officer of the watch awake. More
empirical work assessing mental workload, required decision supports, and
human-machine trade-offs needs to be done.
Deck and Eng~ne Room Automadon
The U.S. Coast Guard specifies the levels of automation in certain
systems necessary for safe operation with reduced manning levels. Deck
manning reductions are permitted if the vessel has adequate labor-saving
equipment, such as automated (self-adjusting) mooring winches, automated
hatch cover securing equipment, and internal communications equipment
sufficient to raise reinforcements if necessary (U.S. Coast Guard, Manne
Safety Manual, 23.~2~. Automated engine departments are subject to the
restriction that the vessel carry the minimum crew to safeguard it if all
automated systems fail, including enough personnel for round-the-clock
watches (Mane e Safer Manual, 23.A.3~.
OCR for page 44
44
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
Organizational changes associated with reductions in engine room
watch-standing and operating personnel have had a significant impact on
combatting fatigue, boredom, and inattention. Unattended engine rooms
relieve engineers of the traditional four-hour-on, eight-hour-off watches.
Instead, automation and alarm systems provide surveillance previously pro-
vided by engine room watch-standers. The watch-standing engineers are
thus organized into day working teams, working 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. shifts
in groups, often troubleshooting problems together. One engineer is on
call each night to respond to emergencies. The result has been increased
socialization by the engineers, greater job satisfaction, and increased pro-
ductivity. Interestingly, the deck officers aboaid such ships who were
previously paired with their engine room watch-standing counterparts-
have been increasingly alienated by these changes.
Sociological Impacts
Changes in shipboard living conditions due to the use of smaller crews
(such as less social interaction and less time ashore) could produce a variety
of stress reactions that make shipboard personnel less reliable. Some vessel
operators regard this risk as serious and have assigned psychologists to
address the problem in the course of manning reductions. On cargo vessels
running experimentally with very small crews, scheduling pressures and
minimal crew size means that shore leave is nearly nonexistent. On one
Europe-to-North America run by a Swedish container ship, crew members
stay aboard ship for the entire 28-day round-trip voyage in the company of
as few as 15 shipmates, including officers.
Attempts to address the problem on smaller-crewed vessels include
moves toward increased social integration of officers and crew and rear-
rangement of living and working spaces to encourage interaction. Most of
these approaches have been pioneered in Europe and Japan, but a few
U.S. operators are beginning to adopt some of them.
Drug and Alcohol Abuse
There is no evidence to suggest that drug and alcohol abuse has
increased during the past 30 years while average crew size has fallen.
However, the problems of shipboard drug and alcohol abuse could become
more serious as crews grow smaller, since there would be fewer crew
members to compensate for impaired shipmates.
The Coast Guard in late 1988 issued its final rule, "Programs for
Chemical Testing of Commercial Vessel Personnel" (COD 86-067), requir-
ing employers to establish drug and alcohol control programs, including
OCR for page 45
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
45
testing before employment, after accidents, and under other specified con-
ditions (National Transportation Safety Board, 1989~. Since mid-1989, each
crew member has been required to possess a "drug-free certificate" when
first joining a vessel. Regulations prohibit a crew member's standing watch
if he or she has consumed any alcohol within the previous four hours. A
person is considered legally intoxicated if his or her blood alcohol content is
0.04 percent or greater. Companies are now also required to have alcohol
test kits on board, with personnel trained in their use, to test crew members
suspected of being intoxicated.
Many companies have introduced programs to teach key shipboard
personnel to detect alcohol or drug abusers. Some have established strict
prohibitions on alcohol consumption aboard ship. Others limit alcohol
consumption to the use of beer during restricted hours. Many companies
and unions have formal drug and alcohol addiction treatment programs. In
the future, companies may go further; personnel selection and assignment
decisions, for example, may hinge on evidence of past drug or alcohol
abuse.
Adequacy of Coa.~t (guard Human Factors Analyses
The U.S. Coast Guard recognizes the need to use more sophisticated
human factors tools in judging the adequacy of future manning levels. As
vessels are further automated and crews grow smaller, this need will become
greater. At present, the Coast Guard has no explicit human factors models
for judging the risks of stress, fatigue, and boredom.
Automation of ships must address not only the reliability of the hard-
ware and software (and its ability to fail safely, without endangering the
vessel), but also the training requirements imposed by the automated system
and the design of the human-computer interface to make it user-friendly.
The design process is complex and subtle; the penalty for failure can be
very high.
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
As Iloted in this chapter, much additional human factors research is
needed to clarify the human factors implications of technological change in
the maritime industry. However, as suggested by research already accom-
plished, sufficient knowledge does exist to effectively manage the critical
human factors issues noted. The additional research needs cited above
will enable the maritime industry to more knowledgeably, effectively, and
precisely manage change. Much can be done to address each of the major
human factors issues within the present state of the art.
OCR for page 46
46
CREW SIZE AND MARTTIME SAFETY
Fatigue and Boredom
While there is much still to be learned, it is known that excessively
long work periods are likely to result in serious fatigue that can increase
the likelihood of human error. As noted earlier, voyage profiles that
call for frequent in-port time loading and unloading cargo and related
transiting of restricted waters greatly increase the man hours worked. Any
technological change that reduces shipboard manning will have to address
the distribution of work load among crew members (and possibly shore-
based personnel) and the organizational structure of the macrosystem to
ensure that excessively long work periods do not occur. This systems
assurance must be verified as a part of the authorization for reduced
shipboard manning if safety is to be preserved. Function and task analysis
methods can be adapted to assist in this purpose; a functional analysis
model developed by this committee is described in Chapter 4.
Another factor known to increase the likelihood of fatigue is the
traditional watch rotation system, which fails to provide a long rest period
(10-14 hours) each day for uninterrupted sleep and relaxation. Use of a
revised watch system on long voyages may reduce fatigue and could become
an important component of operating safely with small crews.
It should be noted that the proper introduction of new technology not
only may enable a reduction of crew size, but also may actually reduce the
workload or other fatigue-inducing aspects of the job for the remaining
crew members. An excellent example of this has been the development
of the unattended engine room and elimination of watches for the engine
personnel (described in Chapter 1 and later in this chapter).
New technology provides a unique opportunity to ergonomically re-
design jobs and related human-machine interfaces to make them intrinsi-
cally more interesting. In particular, providing for active as well as passive
activity and a sufficient variety of tasks is essential to minimizing boredom
(and related subjective fatigue) and maintaining alertness. This type of
good ergonomic design is within the state of the art for automated systems,
and should be incorporated in any automated system's design process.
The redesign of jobs will require breaking away from the traditional
departmental and officer-crew distinctions, which are based on old tech-
nologies. It also will increase the skill requirements of jobs, and hence
their education and training requirements. Changes in regulations and
union-management relationships and contracts are likely to be required to
redesign these jobs and change related sociotechnical systems.
For tasks in which vigilance is critical, such as watch-keeping, the use
of technological innovations such as integrated information and decision
support systems should enhance reliability and safety. For single-handed
navigation, the use of "dead man" switches and alarm systems to guard
OCR for page 47
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
47
against lapses in attention, sleep, or sudden incapacitation are well within
the state of the art. The key is to require these technological features
and ensure that they are effective before authorizing single-handed bridge
operation.
Excessive Workload
Careful attention to function and task analysis of jobs and equipment
redesign can prevent excessive load on the worker. Such analysis of the
design and implementation of new technology is well within the state of the
art of ergonomics. It must be done using a systems approach, since careful
distribution of work load among the crew becomes critical as crew size is
reduced. The use of a shipboard maintenance department represents a
first step in this direction. Chapter 4 describes a functional task analysis
model developed by the committee, which could be used by operators and
regulators to ensure the appropriate allocation of tasks aboard ship as new
technology is adopted.
Shipboard Living Conditions
Careful ergonomic attention to the design of living areas can enhance
living conditions and improve social interaction of crew members. With
small crews, a breakdown of the traditional departmental divisions and the
sharp distinction between officers and crew not only is likely to be required
operationally, but can significantly enhance the social aspects of shipboard
. .
living.
Operating with smaller crews is likely to require greater crew continuity
of employment. With proper use of team-building training, greater crew
continuity should generally improve not only performance, but social and
living conditions as well.
Drug and Alcohol Abuse
Careful management of alcohol availability and closer monitoring of
the physical and emotional health of crew members will be essential for
safety with smaller crews. One major potential advantage is that small
crews imply greater mutual dependence for safe operation, so that peer
pressure to be sober and fit for duty is likely to be greater, particularly if
living areas are ergonomically designed to foster social interaction.
OCR for page 48
48
Cerdfiranon
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
Adequacy of Coast Guard Human Factors Tools
The U.S. Coast Guard currently has no human factors models adequate
for judging the implications of manning innovations for stress, fatigue, and
boredom, or for assessing construction and manning plans with varying
levels of shipboard technology. This study is one approach being pursued
by the agency to provide a more appropriate basis for their decisions.
The challenge to the Coast Guard in carrying out its certificating re-
sponsibilities in a more highly automated environment will be substantial.
Mends in shipboard automation should be thoroughly understood, and cer-
tification decisions should be based explicitly on new systems' training, use,
and maintenance requirements. The functional analysis model described in
Chapter 4 is a step in that direction. More research is required.
Accident Investigation
Current U.S. Coast Guard accident investigation tools may be insuffi-
cient to guide manning decisions related to stress, fatigue, and boredom.
Recent research and development done for the Coast Guard has yielded
promising approaches to accident investigation that take human factors into
account (Dynamics Research Corporation, 1989~. The Dynamics Research
Corporation's Human Action Sequence Model allows accident investiga-
tors to specify the precise sequence of actions that resulted in an accident
and to identify the many underlying causes. Human factors causes will be
classified using some 68 different standardized categories.
This system is still under development. Once it is implemented, Coast
Guard investigators will begin analyzing accidents and gathering detailed
data relating accidents to human factors and adjusting ship design and
operations to alleviate problems.
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION OF SKILLS
FOR SHIPS OF THE FUTURE
The members of smaller crews must be more broadly skilled. First,
small crews imply broader individual responsibilities. Second, vessels de-
signed for smaller crews are generally technically more sophisticated. Itain-
ing and certification of personnel qualifications must reflect these changes.
In most advanced shipping nations of Asia and northern Europe,
both officers and unlicensed personnel are trained in the broad technical
skills demanded by evolving technology and crowing practices. In the
United States, by contrast, most formal training still reflects traditional
departmental divisions of labor (enforced by law). However, officials of
OCR for page 49
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
49
the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and many in industry expect that
a single class of broadly qualified watch officers (with training in both
navigational and technical skills, as well as business and logistics) will be
in charge of U.S.-flag ships of the future. Shipboard maintenance, now the
province of highly trained licensed engineers, may become the responsibility
of specialists (perhaps unlicensed technicians) and riding crews (Krinsky,
1989~. Some shipping companies are already beginning to undertake their
own training programs to broaden crew members' skills in response to new
technology (American President Lines, 1989b).
New training, beyond that necessary to inculcate technical skill, will
be needed. The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy has instituted courses in
communication between masters and mates (White, 1989~. The Maritime
Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies (MITAGS) of the Inter-
national Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots offers a course in
shipboard management. American President Lines (1989b) has invested
substantially in training crews of its new C-10 series vessels, with technical
and management training as well as watch-keeping effectiveness. Many
new automated shipboard systems have built-in capabilities for individual
and team training, which permit operators to simulate training exercises
and mentally rehearse typical and atypical conditions. These capabilities
are similar to those found in U.S. Navy shipboard systems (Schuffel et al.
1989; Kristiansen et al., 1989; Grabowski, 1989~.
The growing sophistication of crew members' responsibilities, many
believe, will lead the Coast Guard to take more control over the precise
qualifications of licensed and unlicensed personnel. Some qualifications
may become more specialized to reflect differences in vessel type and
service. For example, the Coast Guard might permit the introduction of
additional skill requirements as employment conditions aboard ships re-
quiring specialized knowledge. Periodic recertification of skills will become
more important, to ensure that crew members develop and retain the
necessary qualifications.
Training and Licensing Programs
of Advanced Shipping Nations
Fleets of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands
are among the most technically advanced in the world. Their training and
licensing programs illustrate changes the United States should anticipate.
Japan
Japan has moved much further toward general purpose ratings and
dual-qualified officers than any other nation. The initial experiments, in
1979, were succeeded by carefully planned steps toward a new "Hypothetical
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50
CREW SIZE AND MARTTIME SAFETY
Image of Seafarers." The newer Japanese vessels, with crews of 18, 16,
or 14, are staffed largely with watch officers, dual-qualified officers who
hold major qualifications in navigation or engineering but are operationally
qualified to stand bridge or engine room watches. Even radio officers
are being trained with watch-standing qualifications. All of them hold
the license of watch officer, with the appropriate specialty (navigation,
engineering, or radio).
Unlicensed personnel aboard these Japanese vessels are trained for
general purpose work (Anonymous, 1989~. Specially qualified unlicensed
personnel are trained and certificated to head bridge watches in the open
sea, although not in restricted waters. Companies themselves have borne
most of the substantial cost of training for these new positions (Yamanaka
and Gaffney, 1988~.
The Federal Republic of Germany
The German shipping industry provides another illustration of training
that may be required. In 1987, building on shipboard experiments con-
ducted on vessels operated by Hapag-Lloyd AG, the industry shifted all
programs for unlicensed personnel to general purpose training, eliminating
separate deck and engine training. After three years, the neophyte sailor
is qualified as a ship's mechanic. Further training, aboard ship and/or in
a technical college can lead to an examination for the position of ship's
foreman.
The Federal Republic of Germany has not moved completely to dual-
qualified officers. The shipping industry there, however, expects highly
automated state-of-the-art ships, with controls and monitors centralized
on the bridge, to require ship management officers for the most efficient
operation. This class of officer would be responsible for the entire ship—
cargo, navigation, and maintenance and would need both technical and
navigational skills (Froese, 1989~.
In 1986, as a first step in that direction, the industry, with government
support, began offering officers with existing top-level deck and engine
licenses training leading to medium-level credentials in the opposite spe-
cialties. The course involves eight months of practical training aboard ship,
followed by one year of study at a technical university. (All officers are also
required to complete the standard ship mechanics course.)
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, all officers are now being trained in both deck and
engine skills. The training is only partly integrated at present, but Dutch
authorities expect to achieve full integration, with only one class of license
for new officers, in the near future.
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MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
51
The four-year course for officers of large vessels includes a year at
sea, with both technical and navigation experience. The traditional depart-
mental distinctions are preserved to the extent that each graduate receives
major and minor certifications (in navigation and technical qualifications),
depending on the results of a series of final examinations. Further optional
training is offered to bring graduates to fully integrated status. This training
will soon be included in the standard four-year course, whose graduates
will be certified as broadly qualified "maritime officers" or "ship managers"
(Cross, 1988~.
Some unlicensed crew members in the Netherlands are also trained
in both deck and engine skills. For example, skilled ship mechanics,
with general-purpose qualifications have been employed aboard Dutch
ships since the late 1970s. Most vessels, however, carry only one or two
ship mechanics to maintain mechanical systems. More recently, these
personnel have been assigned as core crew aboard vessels manned largely
with unskilled Third World crew members; in the guise of ship technicians,
they may assume supervisory responsibilities.
liairong in the United States
Gaining of seafarers in the United States is the responsibility of a wide
variety of institutions. Federal- and state-supported academies and schools
operated by labor unions train deck officers and engineers. Unlicensed
personnel are trained mainly in union-run schools. The union schools are
funded by the ship operating companies. Ship operators are increasingly
becoming involved in training to meet the demands of high-technology
ships.
Officer Gaining
Mantime academies and training schools. The maritime academies of
the United States and the training schools operated by unions representing
licensed personnel train the vast majority of their students in separate
deck and engineering specialties. This pattern reflects the practices of the
industry as enforced by manning laws and regulations. However, some
steps have been taken to prepare officers for the future.
Since 1965, for example, the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings
Point, New York, has offered students the opportunity to quality for dual
licenses in both deck and engine specialties. The intent of these intensive
programs was to train officers highly skilled in both deck and engine
specialties who could serve in either capacity. The proponents of this
approach held that engineering competence would grow more- not less-
vital as ships were automated and that the dual-licensed officer could
provide that competence (personal communication, Walter McLean, U.S.
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52
CREW SIZE AND ANYTIME sAFEry
Merchant Marine Academy, February 1, 1990~. This farsighted effort to
ready the work force for the future, however, has been frustrated by Coast
Guard licensing practices. While graduates of the program could qualify for
both third mate and third engineer licenses, they were forced immediately
to choose one path or the other to accumulate the service time required to
become eligible for the next license level.
More fundamentally, the dual license in this form has been overtaken
by evolving ship operations practices. The idea that modern vessels can
safely traverse oceans without highly trained maintenance specialists aboard
has gained acceptance worldwide. Many fleets have turned to shore-
based personnel for major maintenance, leaving shipboard engineers in
the more limited capacity of operating engineers. Thus, these programs
have attracted fewer and fewer enrollees. The United States Merchant
Marine Academy's dual license program was dropped for the class of 1993
but has been reinstated.
As a response to changing technology and management practices, the
academy has instituted a pilot program to qualify ship operations officers
for highly automated ships with control functions centralized on the bridge.
Officers in the future, it is thought, will be in charge of entire ships- engines,
navigation and communications, and management rather than specializing
in traditional departmental responsibilities. Notably, these officers will
not need high-level training in engine operations. Rather, they will be
trained to monitor engine functions, respond to alarms, and do elementary
troubleshooting. The expectation is that the licensed engineer's role on
these highly automated ships will become less important and that onboard
maintenance may become the responsibility of an unlicensed engineering
technician, with major maintenance the province of shore-based personnel
(personal communication, Paul Krinsky, Superintendent, U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy, November 15, 1989~. This training course is expected
to serve as the basis for a possible new category of license, that of watch
officer (Krinsky, 1989~.
Corporate training programs. Some companies have made their own
increasing investments in training, reflecting the advance of world ship
technology. For example, American President Lines (APL) in contracting
with its unions to man its new, highly sophisticated C-9, J-9, and C-10 con-
tainer ships negotiated high skill requirements. The company worked with
established maritime schools to develop appropriate courses and required
its C-10 officers to complete them. The investment in these courses was
partially justified by the deck officers' union agreeing to give up rotation
hiring in favor of long-term employment contracts (American President
Lines, 1989a).
A notable feature of these agreements was the requirement that not
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MANAGING TlIE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF ClIANGE
53
only engineers but deck officers have training in diesel operations. To
prepare for the acquisition of the C-9 vessels APL's first diesels—engineers
were sent to ride modern European ships for 30 days and received two
weeks of factory training as well as special training in a variety of technical
subjects, including exposure to a ship-handling simulator to gain knowledge
of the vessels' maneuvering characteristics and navigation equipment (APL,
1989b).
With the J-9 container ships, the company developed a variety of
team-building and "quality of work life" courses for officers. In addition,
engineers spent 30 days each aboard the ships under their previous own-
ers and received factory training on the engines and associated systems
(Gaffney, 1989~.
The C-10 vessels, up-to-date German "Ships of the Future," have a
variety of unprecedented technical systems, including the largest diesel en-
gines ever built and automated bridge equipment integrating the monitoring
and control of all shipboard functions. Both deck officers and engineers re-
ceived special training (American President Lines, 1989b). Experience with
these new vessels, and the expectation of future operations with increasingly
highly automated ships, led APL to establish the position of Director of
Gaining, with a broad assignment to develop and carry out training policy.
The company established a training library and contracted with MITAGS to
develop and offer a series of courses stressing management skills, ship han-
dling, and technical engineering competence (American President Lines,
1989c).
Much of the company's new training is centered around the opera-
tional demands of new integrated bridges, in which controls and monitors
for all shipboard systems are centralized. For example, MITAGS is now
developing "bridge organization and team management" courses for APL
to be taught using simulators and other facilities of the U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy and one or more of the union-run schools.
Gaining of Unlicensed Crew Members
Unlicensed personnel are trained mainly in schools operated by their
unions. While the programs generally reflect traditional shipboard divi-
sions of labor among deck, engine, and steward's departments, they have
adapted to much new technology. For example, the Harry Lundeberg
School of Seamanship, operated by the Seafarers International Union,
recently introduced an electronics technician course to meet the mainte-
nance requirements of automation and communication systems. It also
offers courses in the use of computers for managing stewards' invento-
ries, oil spill containment and cleanup, marine propulsion automation, and
Sealift operations and maintenance (Seafarers Harry Lundeberg School of
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54
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
Seamanship, 1990). Some of the union-run schools (including the Harry
Lundeberg School) use ship-handling simulators in their unlicensed deck
courses.
In the future, increasing flexibility of shipboard assignments may re-
quire unlicensed crew members to develop and use skills traditionally re-
served to officers. For example, they may be members of tight-knit bridge
operations teams with advanced skills in radar monitoring and open-sea
watch-keeping.
Certifying Skills for the Ship of the Future
The Coast Guard's procedures in certifying crew members' skills will
evolve to reflect the changing nature of shipboard work. Both officers'
licenses and unlicensed documents will reflect the blurring of departmental
distinctions and specify more precisely crew members' particular skills. 1b
ensure that sophisticated skills remain up to date, the Coast Guard may
demand more comprehensive recertification of skills on a periodic basis.
Most broadly, licenses and documents will certify the broad shipboard
skills of the dual-qualified watch officer and the general purpose unlicensed
crew member. With smaller crews and more highly integrated automated
systems, the departmental distinction will fade.
At the same time, crew members will be called on to develop special-
ized skills to accommodate the sophisticated technology of modern ships.
Licenses and documents will therefore carry endorsements certifying the
attainment of special skills in ship handling, maintenance of electronic
equipment, operation of specific engine types, and so on. Some companies
and their unions have already negotiated agreements calling for successful
completion of courses attesting to such additional skills as conditions of
employment (American President Lines, 1990~.
The advance of shipboard technology will tend to render skills obsolete
as time passes, unless crew members receive new training or maintain their
skills on the job. While officers are retested every five years to verify skills,
unlicensed personnel's documents are good for life with no retesting. To
ensure that sophisticated skills do not decay, the Coast Guard may be
called upon in the future to recertify through periodic testing that skills
remain fresh.
The existing training facilities have the capacity for much additional
training; they are likely to play a strong role in maintaining and updating
crew members' expertise.
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MANAGING TlIE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF CHANGE
55
AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION
The application of new technology to vessel operation has been a
continuing process for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years. Change has
not always been accompanied by careful analysis of the associated safety
impacts or human factors. However, the past 30 years does provide one
significant example of technological change that has reduced work hours,
lessened fatigue and boredom, and improved the quality of work life for
seagoing personnel, while at the same time lowering manning requirements
and operating expenses. This change involved the transition from essentially
manually operated power plants to the fully automated, process-controlled
power plants of today.
The steam-powered vessel of 30 years ago required an average of
three, sometimes four, personnel on watch at any given time. The heat,
noise, and vibration coupled with the four-on, eight-off watch rotation were
not conducive to a healthy, stress-free environment. Watch duties were
often boring, and the normal eight hours of watch were supplemented with
overtime to complete maintenance tasks.
-try ^~
The transition from boiler water level controls (which replaced the
watertender) to burner management systems (which replaced the fireman)
to fully automated process control has led to the current unattended engine
room operation. The switch from steam turbine propulsion to slow-speed
diesel propulsion has assisted this transition
One U.S.-flag operator that recently completed the transition to fully
automated power plants in its fleet reported overwhelming acceptance by
its operating personnel. The average engine department aboard its vessels
has been reduced from eight to five personnel. Previously, six of the eight
engine department members aboard each ship were watch-standers. Their
average work day was 11 1/2 hours. Now all five members of the engine
department are day workers, and the work day averages 10 1/2 hours.
Even more important, all members work together as a team, sharing the
same work hours, meal times, and recreation times. Each enjoys a full
and uninterrupted night's sleep every night. While the initial reaction to
this change was one of apprehension, considerable effort was taken to
train personnel in new assignments and to anticipate the human impacts of
this change, which were as dramatic and as beneficial as the technological
aspects.
FINDINGS
The introduction of new technology in ships should take account not
only of the technology, but also of the human factors issues affected by
the technology. Ships should be considered as sociotechnical systems,
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56
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
consisting of technologies, personnel, organizational structures, and an
external environment. Change in any of these four subsystems should be
accompanied by appropriate change in the others.
Relatively few human factors studies have been conducted in the mar-
itime environment; most of those that have been conducted originated
outside the United States. Data from aviation, other transportation indus-
tries, and other working environments may not accurately reflect human
factors conditions and attendant performance aboard ships. Human factors
research specific to the maritime industry is needed.
With appropriate training, organizational innovations, and ergonomic
design, new vessel technology will not degrade safety. These approaches,
for example, can reduce the potential problems of stress, fatigue, and
boredom.
The U.S. Coast Guard, at present, does not have the necessary human
factors analysis tools to make solid certification decisions about more highly
automated ships.
Staining programs will need to be altered as new technology is adopted,
to reflect changes in work organization and the shipboard environment. For
example, as departmental distinctions break down, officers and unlicensed
personnel will need broader training, fitting them to meet the general needs
of the ship, rather than narrowly specialized needs.
Licensing practices in the United States have sometimes inhibited
innovation. As training programs shift their emphasis from specialization
to broad competence, licensing will need to reflect this shift.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
crew size
