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OCR for page 85
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6
Conclusions and Recommendations
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
Analysis of national and worldwide maritime safety data supports the
conclusion that the number of vessel casualties and personnel injuries has
declined steadily over the past two decades. During the same period,
average crew sizes have been substantially reduced. In gathering and
analyzing worldwide maritime safety data, the committee was unable to
establish a causal relationship between manning levels and safety.
Available data on maritime safety are inadequate to support firm
judgments about the contributions of various factors, such as crew levels,
to safety. A worldwide effort is needed to standardize, gather, and evaluate
safety data in order to identify trends and provide the technical basis for
constructive management of maritime safety. The following developments
are needed worldwide:
· standardization of information about casualties, their causes, and
their consequences;
· collection of information about the exposure of ships to casualties,
including data tabulated on the basis of ton-miles and numbers of port
calls; and
collection of comprehensive data, including size and organization
of crews, on all vessels.
RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. Department of Transportation, through
85
OCR for page 86
86
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
the Coast Guard, should organize and lead a broad-based effort (interna-
tional in scope) to gather, standardize, evaluate, and disseminate maritime
safety data.
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
The pace of change continues. Foreign-flag fleets have set the pace
at which new technologies are being adopted on ships. They have well
planned, methodical programs to use technology effectively and safely,
bringing crew levels in some cases down to the low teens. Innovation in
the U.S. fleet is essential to competition. The way in which innovation is
implemented will determine whether safety is helped or hindered. Above
all, the U.S. fleet should leverage other countries' experience with their
systematic programs in developing its own reduced crew ships of the future.
Progress can be achieved only by close cooperation among all inter-
ested parties, including ship operators, the seagoing work force, and the
industry's safety and economic regulators. This collaborative effort should
encompass training, research, evaluation and dissemination of information
on international developments, and pilot programs under the U.S. hag.
Government can serve as a catalyst in this effort, but the industry itself
(including operators and labor) will need to lead.
RECOMMENDATION: The industry, with the aid of the U.S. Department
of Transportation, should implement a program to demonstrate the safety of
changes in the crowing of ships. This program would have three elements:
1. a program focusing on (1) research oriented toward innovation in
the application of new technology; (2) efforts to understand and apply
foreign experience; and (3) research to determine how human factors, such
as fatigue and stress, affect maritime safety;
2. a program to demonstrate and evaluate U.S.-flag ships of the future,
leveraging other nations' experiences with ship of the future programs; and
3. a government-industry-labor forum to oversee developments in the
manning of ships.
As a first step, the Department of Transportation should call a meeting of
senior executives of ship operating companies and maritime labor unions
to determine the extent of interest in this initiative and to discuss its
leadership. An important outcome of this process will be the definition of
specific developments needed in training programs and maritime licensing.
HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY CERTIFICATION
The introduction of new technology should consider ships as sociotech-
nical systems, consisting of personnel, technology, organizational structures,
OCR for page 87
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
87
and an external environment. Change in any of these four subsystems
should suggest appropriate changes in the others.
New vessel technology coupled with appropriate training, organiza-
tional innovations, and ergonomic design can enhance safety. For example,
these approaches can reduce potential problems of stress, fatigue, and
boredom.
The U.S. Coast Guard and other national ship safety administrations
do not presently have the necessary human factors analysis methods to
make solid certification decisions on minimum safe manning for highly
automated ships.
In establishing safe crew levels, government and industry need to
consider demands on the crews on different vessels, taking into account
specialized technologies, type of service, skills required, and quality of
management. Formal analytical methods need to be incorporated into the
establishment of safe crew levels and the consequent issuance of Certificates
of Inspection (COIs). Lack of an analytical approach has led to inconsistent
COI determinations and has made it difficult for the Coast Guard to exercise
its port state control authorities.
RECOMMENDATION: The Coast Guard should institute formal analytical
methods, such as the functional analysis approach suggested in Chapter 4,
in making manning decisions.
RECOMMENDATION: In the vessel certification process for vessels em-
ploying new manning concepts, each operator should conduct a thorough
assessment of shipboard functions and tasks required by the particular
vessel and should submit a functional analysis (with specified crew num-
bers and structure, skills and training, voyage profiles, and operational and
maintenance plans) to the Coast Guard for approval. Upon conditional
approval by the Coast Guard, vessels should be subjected to such sea trials
as the Coast Guard deems appropriate, with logs of crew activities. Data
from the trials should be used to validate the results obtained from the
model.
TRAINING AND LICENSING
The skills needed to operate ships are changing with advances in technology.
Lines dividing deck and engine departments are fading, along with the need
for engine room watch-keeping. The importance of individual and team
skills is increasing as crews are reduced. These changes need to be reflected
in training programs and licensing requirements.
Gaining programs must reflect not only technical skills required, but
subjects such as management of personnel and communications. Licensing
requirements must become more specialized to reflect the differences in
OCR for page 88
88
CREW SIZE AND MARITIME SAFETY
vessel type and service and to require periodic recertification of skills
to ensure that crew members develop and retain necessary qualifications.
The certification and licensing of general purpose ratings, dual-qualified
officers and watch officers should be established to reflect the changing
ship organizational structure.
LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES
While U.S. manning laws have not been a major impediment to crew
reduction aboard U.S.-flag vessels to date, they have led to needless in-
efficiency and complexity and to unwarranted obstacles to most effective
manning that realizes the benefits of new ship operating technology. Fur-
thermore, it is clear that these statutes will effectively prohibit manning
reductions below current levels regardless of the opportunities offered by
technology, such as those evident in state-of-the-art foreign-flag vessels.
Thus, while not a major problem in the past, these statutes will block
innovation and competitiveness in the future.
Even more important, existing manning laws do not directly address
safety. They do not have a clear underlying safety intent, and therefore
inhibit innovation without affording real gain in safety. The little guidance
available is informal and administrative.
RECOMMENDATION: The manning laws of the United States should be
modernized in line with the following objectives:
· Incorporate a statement of congressional intent linking vessel man-
ning and safety.
Remove unwarranted barriers to innovation (such as requirements
for three watches where impractical or not needed).
Establish a clear federal role in reviewing the safety of vessel man-
ning practices by (1) authorizing the overhaul of the licensing system; (2)
ratifying the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certifi-
cation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, (3) establishing a uniform COI
issuance process; and (4) reviewing the need for work-hour limitations that
provide real protection of crew members' health and environmental safety.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
coast guard
