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CREW SIZE AND
MARITIME SAFETY
Committee on the Effect of
Smaller Crews on Maritime Safety
Marine Board
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
National Research Council
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C. 1990
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NationalAcademy Press · 2101 Constitution Avenue,N.W. · Washington, D.C. 20418
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the
National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy
of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of
the panel responsible for the report were chosen for their special competencies and with regard for
appropriate balance.
This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures
approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of dis-
tinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of
science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter
granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the
federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Frank Press is president of the National
Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National
Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its
administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences
the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also
sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research,
and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Robert M. White is president of the
National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to
secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy
matters pertaining to the health of the public The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the
National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government
and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Do. Samuel
O. Thier is president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to
associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering
knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies
determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the
National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the
government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered
jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Funk Press and Dr. Robert M. White
are chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.
The program described in this report is supported by Cooperative Agreement No. 14-12-0001-
30416 and 14-35 0001-30475 between the Minerals Management Service of the U.S. Department of
the Interior and the National Academy of Sciences. The federal agencies that active supported and
participated in the committee's work were the U. S. Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration.
Library of Confess Cataloging-in-Publication Data
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on the Effect of Smaller
Crews on Maritime Safety.
Crew size and maritime safety / Committee on the Effect of Smaller
Crews on Maritime Safety, Marine Board, Commission on Engineering
and Technical Systems, National Research Council.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-309 04375-1
1. Ships—Manning. ~ Merchant marine—Safety measures.
I. Title.
VK221.N35 1990
623.88'8—dc20
Printed in the United States of America
90 48577
CIP
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DEDICATION
Rear Admiral William Michael Benkert, United States
Coast Guard, retired, chaired the authoring committee un-
ti! his death in December, 1989. Mike Benkert was a lead-
ing world spokesman for safety in maritime operations and
protection of the marine environment. His friends and
colleagues miss his wisdom, friendship, and indefatigable
spirit. The work represented by this report could not have
been completed without him and his outstanding leader-
ship. The report is dedicated to his memory and to the
furtherance of safety at sea everywhere.
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COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECT OF SMALLER CREWS ON
MARITIME SAFETY
WILLIAM M. BENKERT, Chairman (Through December 1989), U.S.
Coast Guard (retired), McLean, Virginia
RICHARD T. SOPER, Chairman (`From January 1990), American Bureau
of Shipping, Paramus, New Jersey
JOHN ~ CAFFREY, Mobil Oil Corporation, Fairfax, Virginia
MICHAEL DENNY, Grumman Data Systems, Northpoint, New York
WILLIAM D. EGLINTON, Seafarers Harry Lundeberg School of
Seamanship, Piney Point, Maryland
ROBERT ELSENSOHN, Maritime Institute of Graduate Studies,
Linthicum, Maryland
MARTHA GRABOWSKI, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Roy, New
York
HAL W. HENDRICK, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado
FRANK J. IAROSSI, American Bureau of Shipping, Paramus, New Jersey
JEROME E. JOSEPH, District 2 Marine Engineers Benevolent
Association Associated Maritime Officers, Washington, D.C.
EUGENE M. KELLY, Kelmar Associates, Sea Bright, New Jersey
STEPHEN F. SCHMIDT, American President Lines, Ltd., Oakland,
California
Staff
CHARLES A. BOOKMAN, Director
C. LINCOLN CRANE, Staff Officer (Through December 1988)
DUNCAN L. BROWN, Editor
GLORIA GREEN, Project Assistant
1V
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MARINE BOARD
BRIAN J. WATT, Chairman, The Ralph M. Parsons Company Ltd.,
Brentford, Middlesex, Great Britain
ROBERT N. STEINER, Mce-Chairman, Delaware River Port Authority,
Camden, New Jersey
ROBERT G. BEA, NAE, University of California, Berkeley
JAMES M. BROADUS, III, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
Woods Hole, Massachusetts
SYLVIA ALICE EARLE, Deep Ocean Engineering, San Leandro,
California
LARRY L. GENTRY, Lockheed Advanced Marine Systems, Sunnyvale,
California
ROBERT TURNER HUDSPETH, Oregon State University, Corvallis
MARCUS J. JOHNSON, Sea-Land Service, Inc., Iselin, New Jersey
JUDITH T. KILDOW, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts
BERNARD LE MEHAUTE, University of Miami, Miami, Florida
WILLIAM R. MURDEN, NAE, Murden Marine, Ltd., Alexandria,
Virginia
JOSEPH D. PORRICELLI, ECO, Inc., Annapolis, Maryland
PAUL ~ SANDIFER, South Carolina Wildlife Marine Resources
Department, Charleston, South Carolina
JERRY R. SCHUBEL, State University of New York, Stony Brook
PETER R. TATRO, Scientific Applications International Corporation,
McLean, Virginia
GEORGE P. VANCE, Mobile Research and Development Corporation,
Dallas, Texas
DON WALSH, International Maritime Inc., San Pedro, California
EDWARD WENK, JR., NAE, University of Washington, Seattle
Staff
CHARLES ~ BOOKMAN, Director
v
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Preface
Automation and mechanization of ships over the past three decades
have resulted in continual reductions in the sizes of crews. Today the crew
of a typical, recently built U.S.-flag vessel totals 20 to 24, compared with
about 45 crew members 30 years ago. Some similarly designed foreign-flag
vessels are manned by crews of 12 to 16. Highly automated foreign ships
may operate with crews of 8 to 12.
Crew reductions accelerated in the 1980s as ship owners and operators
throughout the world applied automation technology to make ships more
efficient in the face of a serious shipping recession. The traditional shipping
nations of Asia and northern Europe have been especially aggressive in
substituting technology for personnel. Crew reductions by those national
fleets came only after considerable study, review, and experimentation by
the governments, operating companies, and labor organizations involved.
The U.S. maritime industry has been slower to adopt these innovations.
While the crew reductions recently realized in the United States, and
more dramatically in other nations, have improved operating efficiency,
they have also raised concerns about their impacts on vessel and personnel
safety.
ORIGIN OF THE STUDY
The U.S. Coast Guard, responsible for the safety of waterborne com-
merce, requested that the National Research Council (NRC) assess the
safety implications of recent sharp reductions in crew sizes and advise on
. .
V11
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. ~ .
V111
PREFACE
ways to evaluate and improve the safety of different manning levels. Ac-
cordingly, the NRC's Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
(CETS) convened the Committee on the Effect of Smaller Crews on Mar-
itime Safety. Committee members were selected for their expertise and
to achieve balanced experience and viewpoints. (Biographical information
about committee members is presented in Appendix N) The principle
guiding the constitution of the committee and its work, consistent with
NRC policy, was not to exclude the bias that might accompany expertise
vital to the study, but to seek balance and fair treatment. The committee
operated under the auspices of the Marine Board, a unit of CETS.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The committee's study encompassed all aspects of the safety issues
raised by smaller crews. It was charged with:
· identifying the economic and technology changes that are causing
manning reductions;
forecasting the evolution of ship operating technology and the
associated changes in crew organization and training;
identifying the risks of smaller crews and assessing how they may
be affected by changes in manning patterns;
assessing the implications of smaller crews for training, skill levels,
crowing patterns, and vessel operating technology; and
· developing a method for assessing the effects on safety of crew size,
organization, and capabilities.
The study addressed mainly the manning and safety of U.S.-flag, ocean-
going ships. Small passenger vessels, river tows, offshore supply boats, and
fishing vessels were outside the study's scope.
STUDY METHODS
The committee sought experience and information from around the
world. Ship operating companies, maritime labor organizations, national
ship safety administrations, and international ship classification societies
were contacted in person and through questionnaires to identify and doc-
ument safety concerns, experience, and information sources. This effort
included literature reviews; extended visits by the original chairman of
the committee with senior managers from 10 major U.S. ship-operating
companies to document and discuss their operating experience (Appendix
D); an open meeting of the committee with leaders of 10 maritime labor
organizations and discussions leading to documentation of maritime labor's
perceptions concerning changes in shipboard crowing, management, and
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PREFACE
IX
safety problems (Appendix C); visits by members of the committee and
staff to three different ships with extensive automation and small crews
and informal discussion with individual crew members; and interviews with
more than 40 shipping executives, union officials, government shipping ad-
ministrators, and human factors researchers in northern Europe conducted
by a committee consultant.
The committee developed a computerized model for analyzing the
manning of ships depending on their levels of automation, maintenance
requirements, and crew skill levels. The model was validated with work
records and other information from two vessels. The committee met five
times over two years. The conclusions and recommendations represent the
committee's consensus.
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Acknowledgments
The committee benefited from the interest and contributions of a
number of individuals and organizations. Admirals William Kime and Joel
Sipes of the U.S. Coast Guard saw the need for a study of the safety
implications of smaller crews and helped to set the course for the study.
Norman Lemley of the U.S. Coast Guard provided effective liaison with
the committee throughout its deliberations. Alex Landsburg represented
the Maritime Administration in the committee's deliberations and was
especially helpful in providing information on ship operating costs and
human factors aspects. Sean Connaughton of the American Petroleum
Institute and Joseph Cox of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping
provided information and perspective.
Several experts gave time and energy to help the committee. Todd
Grove, American Bureau of Shipping, addressed the committee on the
"Ship of the Future." Raja Parasuraman, The Catholic University of
America, spoke on "The State of the Art of Knowledge on Stress, Fatigue,
and Boredom." Donald Sussman, Transportation Systems Center, shared
current research concerning human factors aspects of ship operations.
Alex Blanton of the law firm Dyer, Ellis, Joseph ~ Mills, provided a critical
analysis of U.S. manning laws (Appendix F). Joseph Angelo of the U.S.
Coast Guard shared his understanding of international developments. Tom
Gillette and Richard Silloway, Exxon Shipping Co., and Daniel Steppe,
American Institute of Merchant Shipping, assisted with the analysis of
safety data.
Michael Gafiney, Cornell University, shared his rich knowledge of
X1
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X11
ACKNOl;YLEDGMENTS
ship manning practices and conducted visits in northern Europe with ship
manning experts. George Ireland, U.S. Coast Guard (retired), an expert
in ship safety and regulation, made visits to ship operating companies and
provided historical information on crew reductions in the U.S.-flag fleet.
Lissa Martinez organized the roundtable with maritime labor representa-
tives and helped coordinate other committee activities. Duncan Brown was
an indefatigable rapporteur.
The committee is indebted to all who took the time to meet with
committee members and otherwise respond to requests for information.
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Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety Concerns, 3
Manning Reductions in the World's Fleets, 1950s-1980s, 3
The First Generation, 4; Progress Toward the Unattended Engine
Room, 5; Innovations in the Deck Department, 6; Technology in
the Steward's Department, 7; The Maintenance Department
Aboard U.S.-Flag Vessels: Response to a Regulatory Impasse, 7;
State of the Art and the Decade Ahead, 8
Making the Best Use of Technology, 12
Lee Need for a Systems Approach to Manning Assessments, 12
Summary, 13
References, 14
SAFETY EXPERIENCE WITH SMALLER CREWS
The Problem of Quantifying Maritime Safety, 17
Lack of Reliable Data, 18; Improving the Collection of Data, 20
Industry Safety Information, 21
Lloyd's Vessel Loss Data, 21; Marine Index Bureau Injury Data,
22; Tanker Casualty Data, 22; U.S. Coast Guard Annual Casualty
Reports, 25; Oil Spill Data, 25; Individual Company Data, 25;
Safety Implications of Available Data, 28
Safety Concerns, 30
Labor Organizations, 30; Vessel Operators, 30; Specific Safety
Concerns, 31
Further Research, 34
Findings, 35
References, 36
XIl1
. .
XV11
1
15
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XIV
MANAGING THE HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS
OF CHANGE
Human Factors Requiring Particular Attention, 38
Work Hours and Fatigue, 38; Standard Watch Rotations and
Fatigue, 40; The Impact of Automation, 41; Sociological Impacts,
44; Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 44; Adequacy of Coast Guard
Human Factors Analyses, 45
Managing the Human Factors Aspects of Change, 45
Fatigue and Boredom, 46; Excessive Workload, 47; Shipboard
Living Conditions, 47; Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 47; Adequacy of
Coast Guard Human Factors Tools, 48
Gaining and Certification of Skills for Ships of the Future, 48
Training and Licensing Programs of Advanced Shipping Nations,
49; Training in the United States, 51; Certifying Skills for the Ship
of the Future, 54
An Example of Successful Technology Implementation, 55
Findings, 55
References, 56
4 ESTABLISHING SAFE CREW LEVELS
U.S. Coast Guard Certification Procedures, 59
Regulatory Procedures, 60; Manning Reductions to Date.
Future Manning Reductions, 62
A Functional Model for Assessing Crew Levels, 63
, 62;
Shipboard Ask Analysis, 63; The Committee's Functional Model,
64; Evaluation of the Model, 69; The Model's Utility, 71
Findings, 73
References, 73
5 LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES
Shipping and Civil Aviation: Contrasting Regulatory Policies, 75
The Statutory Basis for Manning Regulation, 76
Key Provisions of the Manning Statutes, 77
The Need to Modernize Safety Regulation of Vessels, 78
The Maintenance Department: A Regulatory Makeshift, 78
The International Manning Regime, 79
International Agreements Affecting Manning, 79; Port State
Control of Foreign-Flag Manning Practices, 82
Findings, 83
References, 84
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Safety Experience with Smaller Crews, 85
Technology and Innovation, 86
Human Factors and Safety Certification, 86
Training and Licensing, 87
Legal and Regulatory Issues, 88
CONTENTS
37
59
74
85
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CONTENTS
APPENDIXES
Biographies of Committee Members
B. Survey of Classification Societies and
Foreign Governments
C. Information from Labor Unions
D. Maritime Management Perspectives
E. Previous Research on Shipboard Ask Analysis
F. Vessel Manning: New Applications for Old Statutes
INDEX
xv
89
94
104
122
126
132
157
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Executive Summary
Commercial vessels throughout the world have reduced the size of
their crews dramatically in the past few decades. Modern, automated U.S.-
flag ships have crews of about 20. Thirty years ago, vessels of comparable
tonnage had twice that number. In contrast to American standards, the
most technologically advanced ships in the world fleet today have crews of
about 10.
The trend toward smaller crews has been accompanied by increasing
concern for safety. While the impacts of crew reductions on operations have
been carefully studied, the effect on safety has not received widespread at-
tention. The most fundamental question is whether smaller crews degrade
safety. A related issue is whether international and domestic statutes regu-
lating crew size adequately protect workers, vessels, and the environment,
and unduly restrict the adoption of new technology. Another issue is the
Coast Guard's role in ensuring that foreign-flag vessels, with smaller crews
than permitted under U.S. law, do not compromise safety in domestic
waters.
WHAT ARE THE SAFETY CONCERNS?
Concerns about the effect of crew reductions on safety relate primarily
to three operational considerations.
1. Fatigue: Will there be greater demands placed on crew members,
and if so, will they be less alert? Or, will smaller crews work the same or
fewer hours and thus be no more likely to suffer fatigue than larger crews?
. .
XV11
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. ~ ~
XV111
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2. Training: Will the crew be able to handle emergencies if automated
systems fail? Will the crew be adequately trained to handle broader re-
sponsibilities and more sophisticated technology? Are higher or different
levels of competence required?
3. Maintenance: Wit1 crew reductions result in neglect of essential
maintenance? To what extent will automation and technology advances
improve reliability of ships' operating systems?
Lack of attention to these problems will raise the risk of injuries and vessel
accidents with attendant social, economic and environmental costs.
WHAT IS THE SAFETY RECORD?
Available statistical information on maritime safety is inadequate to
make definitive judgments about how various factors, including crew sizes,
contribute to safety. Precise and uniformly defined information is needed
to establish trends in safety performance and to make decisions about
safety based on those trends. However, available safety statistics indicate
the following:
· There has been a measurable and substantial reduction in vessel
casualties (accidents) and personnel injuries during the past 20 years. These
trends are consistent worldwide.
tially.
During the same period, average crew size has declined substan-
· Other factors have also changed. Technology has improved, oper-
ating procedures have been refined, and maritime operations have come
under increased scrutiny by government and industry.
Vessel casualties and personnel injuries cannot be correlated with crew
size based on available safety data. Thus it is not possible with avail-
able information to determine whether any causal relation positive or
negative exists between crew size and safety. There are valid concerns
about fatigue, training, and maintenance, but their effect on safety can be
minimized through vigilance by management and labor organizations. Ef-
fective and thoroughly trained crew members and reliable automated ship
systems become more important as crews are reduced.
ARE THERE HUMAN FACTORS CONCERNS?
HOW CAN THEY BE MANAGED?
The introduction of new technology in ships should consider not only
technology, but human factors related to it. Ships should be viewed as so-
ciotechnical systems, consisting of technologies, personnel, organizational
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
XIX
structures, and an external environment. Change in any one of these sub-
systems may necessitate change in others. However, very few human factors
studies have been conducted in the maritime field. Moreover, the Coast
Guard does not have the necessary analytical tools to support decisions
concerning the number of people needed to operate highly automated
ships.
With appropriate training, organizational innovations, and ergonomic
design, new vessel technology should not degrade safety. Staining programs
need to change as new technology is adopted, and licensing requirements
need to be modernized. The general shift will be from specialized skills
to a higher level of competence with a broader range of skills and more
sophisticated technology.
HOW SHOULD SAFE CREW LEVELS BE ESTABLISHED?
In establishing safe crew levels, government and industry need to con-
sider demands on crews on different vessels: specialized technologies, type
of vessel service, the varied skills required, and the quality of management.
Currently, the Coast Guard (and other national shipping safety adminis-
trations) relies in large part on laws, traditions, and informal guidance to
determine manning levels. This piecemeal approach may have been effec-
tive when technology changed slowly and crews were larger, but today a
consistent, internationally accepted method for determining safe manning
is needed. The need for such a method will become more urgent with
the worldwide adoption of new ship technology and innovative manning
patterns. Systems engineering methods, including functional task analysis,
offer an objective basis for determining crew sizes. The committee devel-
oped a systems engineering model to assess functions and tasks that could
be used by the Coast Guard to determine safe manning levels for a variety
of ship types and operating conditions.
A comprehensive international process for determining manning levels
would include (1) a universally accepted statement of principles setting
forth functional manning requirements, and (2) objective analysis tools to
establish minimum safe manning scales. Such a process framework would
help each vessel's flag state set manning levels and could be used by
port states to assess whether vessels entering their waters are sufficiently
manned. Internationally dictated manning scales are not desirable, since
they would impose inappropriate standards on some ship operators and
would hinder innovation for others.
DO U.S. MANNING LAWS NEED TO BE MODERNIZED?
U.S. manning laws have led to needless inefficiency and complexity and
to unwarranted obstacles to the adoption of new ship operating technology.
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xx
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Clearly, these statutes will effectively prohibit reducing crew sizes below
current levels regardless of opportunities offered by technology. More
importantly existing manning laws do not have a clearly identified emphasis
on safety; in fact, they inhibit operational innovation without relation to
safety aspects.
The Coast Guard has the authority to enforce safety requirements on
foreign-flag vessels in U.S. ports. As a practical matter, the agency normally
accepts manning levels established by other flag states as safe manning for
entry into U.S. ports. However, manning decisions vary among the flag
states. Consistent manning criteria among flag states and consistent en-
forcement authority by port states require a universally accepted analytical
method for assessing safe manning similar to that developed by the com-
mittee. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the appropriate
forum for developing such a method.
RECOMMENDATIONS
~ foster safer shipping amid rapidly changing ship technologies, the
committee recommends the following:
.
Congress should modernize U.S. manning laws to allow innovation
without degrading safety.
· The U.S. maritime industry, with the aid of the United States
Department of Transportation, should implement a program to demonstrate
the conditions under which reduced crew size can be considered safe.
Among the demands on the crews that need to be evaluated are specialized
technologies, type of vessel service, skills required, and the quality of
management. Assessment and incorporation of worldwide developments to
foster manning innovation should be an element of this nro~ram
r - -I- ~---
The industry, with the aid of the U.S. Department of liansporta-
tion, should undertake a research program to determine how human factors
such as fatigue and stress affect maritime safety.
· The Department of Transportation should gather, standardize, eval-
uate, and disseminate maritime safety data.
The Coast Guard should use formal analytical methods, such as
the approach developed by the committee, to make manning decisions.
The goal should be to develop an internationally accepted method for
establishing minimum safe manning levels.
The committee's complete conclusions and recommendations appear in
Chapter 6.
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CREW SIZE AND
MARITIME SAFETY
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