Data systems are needed to provide for follow-up and compliance when safety performance is unacceptable.

There is presently no universal program for evaluating safety in the commercial fishing industry. Monitoring techniques tend to be rudimentary: for example, monitoring personnel injury incidents and costs or correlating accidents with diesel fuel consumption to approximate the relative effectiveness of safety actions within comparable corporate fleets. Computer software for monitoring vessel performance was introduced by the NCFVSI in 1989, but information from such programs belongs to the user and is not tracked. Insurance claims are a natural resource for casualty statistical analyses, and the CFIVSA requires insurers to provide casualty data to the Coast Guard. This is not yet being done. Some claims data are provided voluntarily by marine underwriters to the Commercial Fishing Claims Register (CFCR) maintained by the Marine Index Bureau (see Appendix D), but the data are far from complete and cover only a portion of vessels and personnel casualties, and there is no effective monitoring system.

Coast Guard data include documentation of federal marine casualty investigations, SAR services, underway and occasional dockside boardings, and courtesy examinations. Unfortunately, the data record only limited safety performance information across the entire fleet of uninspected fishing vessels. Prevalent low-level maintenance deficiencies are indicated, and a close estimate of the number of annual fatalities is supported by the data. Secondary analysis of causal factors was only possible for about 30 percent of the fishing vessel casualties recorded in CASMAIN. Directly correlating information among data bases was not possible, however.

Safety problems abound within the commercial fishing industry, despite past efforts by government and industry to correct conditions. These efforts for the most part have approached the complexities of safety improvement in a fragmented and uncoordinated way, rather than as a total concept. Goals and objectives needed to establish an overall safety program have been lacking. Safety trends cannot be effectively monitored and evaluated using present means, and without accountability, fishermen have been reluctant to accept a proactive role in safety improvement. The CFIVSA signals that this is an opportune time to address safety as a total concept leading to adoption of a comprehensive safety program involving cooperative ventures by government and industry.

In the following chapters, attention is focused on the broad safety areas identified in this chapter—safety performance, the vessels, the fishermen, survival, and external forces. Specific safety issues are discussed and alternatives considered. Specific problems and possible solutions are addressed as discrete components that can be fitted into a safety program with a national infrastructure and a means of evaluating it.

FRONT MATTER (R1-R20)

1 THE NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES TO FISHING VESSEL SAFETY (1-17)

2 COMMERCIAL FISHING: AN INDUSTRY OVERVIEW (18-37)

3 THE COMMERCIAL FISHING SAFETY RECORD (38-72)

4 THE FISHING VESSELS (73-98)

5 THE FISHERMEN (99-118)

6 SAFETY AND SURVIVAL (119-130)

7 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON SAFETY (131-141)

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (142-156)

REFERENCES (157-170)

APPENDIXES (171-172)

A. COMMITTEE MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES (173-176)

B. PAPERS PREPARED FOR THIS STUDY (177-177)

C. INTERNATIONAL FISHING INDUSTRY SAFETY ACTIVITIES (178-187)

D. DATA SOURCES AND ISSUES (188-198)

E. SELECTED CASMAIN VESSEL CASUALTY AND FATALITY DATA (199-212)

F. COAST GUARD COMPLIANCE EXAMINATIONS (213-219)

G. INSPECTION OF FISHING INDUSTRY VESSELS (220-242)

H. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS ON A LONGLINE VESSEL (243-250)

I. SURVIVAL AND EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS (251-260)

J. COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRY VESSEL SAFETY ACT OF 1988 (261-270)

INDEX (271-282)