Workshop Presentations and Discussions

WELCOME: WHAT IS DMMI? AND MEETING OBJECTIVES

Robert H. Latiff, Chair, DMMI Standing Committee

Dr. Latiff welcomed the participants to this fifth meeting of the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Standing Committee on Defense Materials, Manufacturing, and Infrastructure (DMMI). The DMMI, which is associated with the NRC’s National Materials and Manufacturing Board (NMMB), was formed at the request of Reliance 21, a Department of Defense (DOD) group of professionals that was established to enable the DOD science and technology (S&T) community to work together to enhance Defense S&T programs, eliminate unwarranted duplication, and strengthen cooperation among the military services and other DOD agencies. As its name indicates, the focus of DMMI is on issues relevant to materials, manufacturing, and the infrastructure that sustains the materials and manufacturing enterprises essential to national defense.

Dr. Latiff noted that this workshop had originated in conversations with members of the Reliance 21 Materials and Processing community of interest on issues of parts obsolescence, diminishing sources for manufacturing, certification of spare parts, requalification of materials, counterfeiting, and other quality assurance and maintenance problems for DOD as defense systems are kept for longer and longer service lives. Dennis Chamot, associate executive director of the NRC’s Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences and currently the acting director of the NMMB, reviewed the NRC procedures applicable to workshops. As such the workshop was



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Workshop Presentations and Discussions WELCOME: WHAT IS DMMI? AND MEETING OBJECTIVES Robert H. Latiff, Chair, DMMI Standing Committee Dr. Latiff welcomed the participants to this fifth meeting of the National Re- search Council’s (NRC’s) Standing Committee on Defense Materials, Manufactur- ing, and Infrastructure (DMMI). The DMMI, which is associated with the NRC’s National Materials and Manufacturing Board (NMMB), was formed at the request of Reliance 21, a Department of Defense (DOD) group of professionals that was established to enable the DOD science and technology (S&T) community to work together to enhance Defense S&T programs, eliminate unwarranted duplication, and strengthen cooperation among the military services and other DOD agencies. As its name indicates, the focus of DMMI is on issues relevant to materials, manu- facturing, and the infrastructure that sustains the materials and manufacturing enterprises essential to national defense. Dr. Latiff noted that this workshop had originated in conversations with mem- bers of the Reliance 21 Materials and Processing community of interest on issues of parts obsolescence, diminishing sources for manufacturing, certification of spare parts, requalification of materials, counterfeiting, and other quality assurance and maintenance problems for DOD as defense systems are kept for longer and longer service lives. Dennis Chamot, associate executive director of the NRC’s Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences and currently the acting director of the NMMB, reviewed the NRC procedures applicable to workshops. As such the workshop was 16

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 17 an open meeting, and any publication produced from it would be publicly avail- able. No classified, proprietary, or for official use only (FOUO) information was presented or discussed during it. This workshop summary recounts the discus- sions and presents the views of individual participants; there are no conclusions or recommendations that reflect a corporate or consensus position of the DMMI, the NMMB, or any other entity of the NRC. DOD AND MATERIALS ISSUES Lewis Sloter, OSD Principal Reliance 21 Materials and Processes Community of Interest Dr. Sloter described how the Reliance 21 Materials and Processes community of interest had worked with the DMMI to develop a workshop agenda covering the broad area of materials sustainability with respect to defense equipment, infrastruc- ture, and recapitalization. Critical materials substitution and demand reduction were addressed at a previous DMMI meeting and remain a focus of DOD planning. Two weeks before this workshop, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) held a workshop on issues related to specific materials and approaches to reduce vulner- abilities related to them. Sustaining adequate supplies of materiel, particularly with respect to equipment refurbishment and recapitalization, is currently important to planning for future utilization of the mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles fielded during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Normalization and global support for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft is another highly topical issue, as is the broad subject of strategic manufacturing and local supply. Materials supply, utilization, certification, and substitution will be important aspects of Pentagon discussions on strategic sourcing, offshoring, and the control and prevention of counterfeit parts in the electronic and mechanical subsystems of critical defense systems. Dr. Sloter said these issues would provide grist for the materials research mill. Dr. Sloter sees the twenty-first century as a time when material technologies will see significant advances. He expects rapid manufacturing in small volumes to be important in many areas, including pharmaceuticals, mechanical components, and electronic components. New manufacturing, printing, and templating tech- nologies will be among the great opportunities to continue the advances reflected in Moore’s law for microprocessor-based systems. The difficulty will be in making the best use of limited resources to pursue the applied research and development (R&D) opportunities with the greatest potential benefits, given the broad range of opportunities and challenges. Dr. Sloter was asked for his perspective on how much further improvement can be expected in structural materials, such as materials for hypersonic flight or other cutting-edge applications where material properties are a constraint. Are DOD

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18 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s priorities being focused more on near-term problems or far? He replied that fun- damental, curiosity-driven research, which is long-range and opportunistic with respect to using new discoveries, is very healthy. Near-term sustaining research, broadly speaking, is also very healthy. It is coming out of a period that focused on multiple-point approaches to addressing solutions for specific operational, main- tenance, and sustainability problems by the rapid application of relatively mature materials and processes to systems fielding and sustainment. The defense commu- nity is also coming out of a long period of ameliorating the environmental impact of materials processes such as plating and coating processes. He is concerned about the prospects for near-term maturation of materials and processes in areas such as hypersonics. Mechanical designs to provide thermal protection are probably ahead of the complementary development of specific materials. In areas like hypersonics, there may be a switch from technology push by innovative material solutions to requirements pull from prototype systems development. Another participant suggested that some of the challenges appear to be in putting the right teams together to address, from a systems perspective, problems that are multidisciplinary. Is DOD moving toward that team-building approach in any of its programs? Dr. Sloter replied that he has seen a positive trend toward teaming during his 14 years in the Pentagon. He cited as an example the close interactions among Joint Staff, requirements developers in the services, acquisi- tion managers, and industrial base policy staff within the Pentagon. He also sees some good examples of teaming in large integrated programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and in some of the integrated teams at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). There have also been some lessons learned from programs that did not do as well. He agreed that there was still a long way to go before defense engineering and manufacturing achieve the level of integrated planning characteristic of the automobile industry, for instance. Several other participants gave examples of defense industry companies that have initiated efforts in integrated computational materials engineering (ICME) in their DOD contract work, without being driven in that direction by DOD program management. THE AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY AND MATERIALS ISSUES Katherine A. Stevens, Director Materials and Manufacturing Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory Dr. Stevens began by noting that the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is concerned about the sustainability of future weapon systems, as well as about technology for keeping the existing legacy systems flying. Some of the required technology is related to materials and processes. AFRL’s Materials and Manufactur-

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 19 ing directorate has cradle-to-grave responsibilities for materials and manufactur- ing, which means it is involved in sustainability and cost of future materials and systems, as well as the life-cycle management problems associated with maintaining and sustaining the aircraft “on the ramp” today. In 2012 the new Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) was created, replacing the Aeronautical Systems Center. The new center is responsible for supporting aircraft weapon systems through their entire life cycle. As context for the Air Force’s problem of aging aircraft, Dr. Stevens showed a chart of the systems that had been introduced in each decade since the 1950s, with those still in the inventory shown in red, those out of the inventory in black, and systems in development shown in blue (Figure 1). The average aircraft has been in service for 23 years, with fighter aircraft averaging 22 years, tankers 35 years, and bombers 47 years. Even though the current fleet is the smallest in numbers of air- craft since the inception of the Air Force, the cost of sustaining the fleet continues to rise (Figure 2). The AFRL sustainment investment is divided among three research thrusts: • Supporting sustainment of the current fleet (field and depot sustainment); • Improving fleet health management; and • Enabling robust design of new systems through use of advanced tools, techniques, and processes. USAF Recapitalization Diminishing Currently in AF inventory F-4 In development/planned F-5 Out of inventory F-100 F-101 A-7 F-102 A-37 T-1* E-3 F-117 F-104 SR-71 T-6 E-4 B-2 F-105 B-52 C-141 F-22 A-10 CV-22 F-35 C-130 F-111 C-17 KC-46A F-106 F-15 E-8 MQ-9 LRS-B U-2 OV-10 RQ-4 F/O UAS B-57 F-16 E-9 C-27J F-X KC-135 C-5 MQ-1 T-X B-58 B-1 C-27A RQ-170 B-66 T-38 C-9* C-26, 32, C-12* C-20, 21* H-43 H-1 37, 38, 40* KC-10* C-22, 23* T-37 H-3 VC-25* T-39 H-53 C-133 C-140 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 2020s FIGURE 1  Air Force legacy and projected well be today’s” - of first flight or, as denoted by an “The fleet of tomorrow may aircraft inventory. Year Maj Gen Worley (AF/A8) asterisk, first appearance of a commercial derivative in the Air Force inventory. SOURCE: AFSAB, 2011, p. 13. 8 The above chart is a snapshot of the inventory of aircraft in the USAF fleet arranged by the date of first flight (adapted from Arledge8). Although not part of this chart, both current and

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20 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s O&M Cost History Source: Rehberg, AF/CVR from ABIDES TAI: Total Aircraft Inventory FIGURE 2  Size of total aircraft inventory (TAI) and cost of fleet operation and maintenance, FY 1962- 2010. SOURCE: Katherine Stevens, AFRL, “AFRL and materials issues,” presentation to the committee on July 23, 2012, Slide no. 7. A recent example in the first research thrust was technical information pro- Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 88ABW-2012-3956, 18 July 12. 7 vided to support risk-mitigation actions in response to the discovery that non- conforming titanium had been used to fabricate aircraft parts in the inventory. By identifying the impact of nonconforming material on the parts’ properties to enable a component risk analysis for Air Force weapon systems, the Directorate was able to help limit the scope of the problem. Currently, using a part, component, or subsystem in a different system (aircraft) than the one for which it was qualified or certified requires requalifying or recertifying it for the system(s) of potential use. This pervasive qualification process demonstrates the challenge of ensuring system safety when common materials or components are not properly tracked. With respect to improving fleet health management, Dr. Stevens said that the ultimate Air Force objective is to move to condition-based maintenance. The M ­ aterials and Manufacturing directorate’s research in nondestructive evaluation and inspection (NDE/I), such as research in multilayer crack detection, advances the move toward this objective, as does development of the capability to capture, retain, and rapidly retrieve analyses of materials and component or subsystem health from NDE/I data. In the short term, Air Force depots have adopted high- velocity maintenance for rapid turnaround, and they need appropriate evaluation techniques to support knowledge of systems before the systems or components

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 21 reach the depot for maintenance and repair. Techniques for doing this are being developed. Dr. Stevens remarked that sustainment is potentially a very rich application area for activities under the Materials Genome Initiative (MGI), even though the focus of attention has been on MGI objectives for new materials in new applica- tions. For example, if a system in the fleet has a sustainment problem, reducing the time to fix the problem and certify a new material or new parts can go a long way to keeping aircraft flying. There was further discussion among the participants on the potential impact of MGI on sustainability. One participant said that the same tools needed to enable ICME would also enable more rapid qualification or certifi- cation of a replacement material or part. Dr. Stevens added that AFRL has projects and programs that support both ICME and MGI. AFRL’s vision for the future is to move away from the current linear paradigm for the material life cycle—in which material and processes research leads sequentially through materials development, component design, component testing, certification/qualification, manufacturing, and sustainment—to an R&D paradigm in which all these stages in the life cycle are examined interactively and in parallel through an integrated approach. The manufacturing portion of this integrated life-cycle approach includes a concept called “moving manufacturing to the left” (addressing manufacturing issues earlier in the R&D process) and a digital data collection and archiving com- ponent called the “cradle-to-grave digital thread.” While the objective of the former is to enable earlier development of game-changing products and manufacturing process technologies, the cradle-to-grave digital thread aims to develop and em- ploy digital environments and tools that increase efficiencies in all stages of the life cycle. Participants noted that one of the challenges for the cradle-to-grave digital thread is capturing computer-aided design/computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/ CAM) or computer augmented design and manufacturing (CADAM) materials from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) when a product has gone out of production. The challenge is being made more difficult by cost-cutting decisions not to “buy” the data rights from the OEM contractor at the beginning of the a ­ cquisition process. This challenge is not unique to the Air Force. In response to a question, Dr. Stevens said that much of the responsibility for downstream decisions related to materials availability, environmental issues, and so on appear to have been ceded to the OEMs. James Mattice added that respon- sibility for issues at a life-cycle level formerly resided in the systems engineering function within the cognizant Program Office for acquisition of a system. Under acquisition reforms dating back to the Goldwater-Nichols Act,1 that responsibility has devolved to the OEM. He sees the new AFLCMC as having the potential to help bring some of that responsibility and engineering expertise back under Air Force 1    oldwater-Nichols G Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433.

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22 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s control. Others commented that information on the manufacturing processes, not just the CAD/CAM designs, is being lost. Dr. Stevens added that a significant issue is ­ that some portion of the data associated with the design of processes, specific con- figurations, and so on is not owned by the Air Force. There is growing recognition of the importance of capturing key design and production data for the long-term sustainment of aircraft and other complex defense systems. Referring to the right-hand side of Figure 3, Dr. Stevens said that capturing NDE/I data for individual systems as they go through maintenance during their opera­tional lives is also an essential part of the cradle-to-grave digital thread concept. Data from all three phases represented in the figure—design, production, and operational maintenance—will be necessary to enable condition-based mainte- nance and to have a digital representation (digital twin) of each physical system (e.g., each aircraft). The Digital Thread Sustainment Focus at AFRL, which is aimed at integrating data, models, and simulations throughout the system life cycle, in- cludes the following objectives: • AF ManTech’s Digital Thread Extending configuration management to include material properties and dimensional variations from production, modifications, and repairs. •  Digital  Thread  Ac;vi;es  Include:   –  Genera5ng,  capturing,  organizing,  and  u5lizing  relevant  data  and  informa-on     Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 88ABW-2012-3956, 18 July 12. 21 FIGURE 3  Air Force manufacturing technology concept of the cradle-to-grave digital thread. Digital thread activities include generating, capturing, organizing, and utilizing relevant data and information. SOURCE: Katherine Stevens, AFRL, “AFRL and materials issues,” presentation to the committee on July 23, 2012, Slide no. 21.

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 23 • Providing digital twins representing the current state of a physical com- ponent, system, or manufacturing enterprise for condition-based decision making. • Integrating and visualizing as-maintained representations across the fleet and throughout the supply chain. • Delivering individual and fleet life-cycle lessons learned back to designers and planners. In response to a question about the one or two biggest areas where more needs to be done, Dr. Stevens cited the challenge of transitioning technology from the system development and acquisition world to the sustainment world. Different views on which organization has which responsibilities for preparing technology for implementation into sustainment applications are part of this challenge. At least as important are funding problems related to how expenditures are categorized for appropriations (which costs can be recovered from which pot of money). The busi- ness case for a sustainment application not only has to make sense on its own but also has to align with the available resources (the pots of money that are not empty). A second question to Dr. Stevens and the workshop generally was this: What can be done to solve the problem of program-specific certification requirements for the same part or component used in different systems? Dr. Stevens replied that part of the problem could be addressed through new approaches to standard- ization of specifications. Dianne Chong added that the problem also exists for manufacturers who have merged the operations of multiple acquired companies. The solution there is seen as having a single system for recording and maintaining parts specifications. Corporate- or enterprise-wide initiatives are needed to address the problem of multiple distinct part numbers for what is in reality the same part. A participant asked if it makes sense for DOD to emulate the best practices that industry has adopted to address problems such as those of multiple specifications for essentially the same part or of different part numbers/identifiers, each with its own specifications, for what is in reality the same physical part. Can the best industry-tested practices be moved into the defense establishment? The discussion of this question revolved around the difficulty of identifying and encouraging best practices across different organizations without becoming caught up in too-rigid specification of standards. Another question was how willing potential competitors might be to share approaches and practices that in some cases they might see as part of their competitive advantage. On the problem of different OEM part numbers for the same physical part in different systems or in different subsystems or components of the same system, Royce Smith of the Air Force Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Materiel Shortages (DMSMS) Program said that while it is important to retain the original OEM part numbers in the system used for sustainment, they need to be linked to

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24 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s one stock number associated with the physical part. A given stock number may be identified by five or ten different OEM part numbers. This point led to clarification of the problem in terms of sharing a common set of qualification and certification requirements for the same physical part in essentially similar applications. THE ARMY AND MATERIALS ISSUES Scott Fish, Chief Scientist, U.S. Army Dr. Fish began by emphasizing the commonality of the issues that the Army faces with those identified by Dr. Stevens. He first described Army S&T activities in materials and proceeded on to the issues of counterfeit parts, parts obsolescence, and materials shortages. In addition to its role in the MGI, the Army’s Multiscale Research on Materials focus includes two collaborative research alliances (CRAs): Materials in Extreme Dynamic Environments (MEDE) and Multiscale Modeling of Electronic Materials (MSME). Both CRAs, in which the Army partners with university investigators, involve fundamental research on applying multidomain modeling to investigate and develop multiscale materials. MEDE is aimed at fundamental research on new materials for armor and blast protection applications. MSME is focused on improved sensors and other electronics applications. The kickoff meetings for both CRAs were at the end of July 2012. Both CRAs are taking a materials-by-design approach, with the long-term goal of designing revolutionary materials—structural materials in the case of MEDE, electronic materials in that of MSME—for Army systems. The other military services have representatives monitoring both CRAs, and there have been routine conversations among representatives from the Army and the other services about the research. In addition, the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) has its own strategic research initiatives, one called Materiel and Devices in Extreme Environments, another, Extreme Energy Science. Dr. Fish expects there will interesting crosstalk between the CRA teams and the ARL activities because new approaches to modeling and to metrics for measuring materials performance are important for all parties. Dr. Fish next gave four examples of recent Army experience with counterfeit parts. In these four cases, each of which involved a counterfeit microprocessor chip, the routine performance tests carried out at several points in the supply chain did not detect any anomalies. Nor have component or system failures so far been at- tributed to these four counterfeit parts. Dr. Fish described the corrective actions being taken to deal with the parts that were installed in fielded systems. In addition to remedial actions, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASAALT) is taking the following proactive steps to address the counterfeit parts problem:

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 25 • ASAALT has established an initial risk management capability for supply chain issues like this. The capability includes increased attention within the government and increased diligence on the part of Army prime contractors and associated intermediate providers in their supply chains to test for part performance compliance. • ASAALT is continuing to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop a Trusted Supplier standard. Dr. Fish described the problem of counterfeit parts, particularly counterfeit microelectronic chips, as “very tricky,” given that many of them are passing current quality screening tests. From his understanding of the situation, the current testing requirements are not sufficient to ensure that counterfeit parts like these chips are not getting into fielded systems. In response to a question, Dr. Fish said that evidence of malicious intent had not been found yet in the examples he described, but investigation of the sources of the counterfeit parts is ongoing. Dr. Fish stressed again that the parts distribu- tor and the prime contractors affected by these counterfeit chips had been quick to notify their DOD customers of the problem, once it was discovered. Dr. Fish was asked if there were sufficient existing legal sanctions against a supplier that intentionally sells parts that it knows to be counterfeit. He said that he was unsure if sanctions might apply to the ultimate supplier or manufacturer of a counter­ eit f part, but there are statutes in place that apply to the prime contractors and their tier 2 and tier 3 subcontractors for properly qualifying their suppliers. This led to further discussion of issues surrounding the growing reliance on foreign manu- facturers and suppliers located outside the United States and the likelihood that counterfeiting is motivated solely by the economic value of supplying demand for an otherwise hard-to-find authentic part. Also discussed was the type of testing available to detect “added functionality” or location- or target-specific alterations that might be present on counterfeit chips. Dr. Fish concluded with a list of materials supply and shortage issues that were serious enough to be reported up to Army Headquarters from Army Program Executive Offices (PEOs) because they were viewed as having a significant impact on acquisition costs and schedules: • Strong nitric acid. An explosion in May 2012 at a major domestic source for this chemical stock will require drawing down reserve stocks until produc- tion comes back on line in 12 to 18 months. There are alternative sources, but they do not produce enough to meet demand. • Aerospace castings. Dr. Fish described the problems of long lead times and late deliveries of these castings as an across-the-board problem for DOD,

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26 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s based on a recent OSD Industry Study. This is a supplier (capacity) issue rather a materials shortage issue. • Ammonium perchlorate. The price per pound from the single U.S. supplier of this ingredient for rocket propellant is increasing significantly. Foreign sources exist but are not qualified for U.S. defense requirements. This is a DOD-wide industrial base issue. • Nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin. Production volume will be reduced during the changeover to a new contractor at the government-owned, contractor- operated facility, which is the only one worldwide with sufficient capacity for nitrocellulose. • Butanetriol. There is no existing U.S. supplier for this chemical used in rocket motor manufacture. A source is being developed in Memphis, Tennessee. In response to a question, Dr. Fish agreed that the chemical supply issues in this list stem from the limited market for the chemicals in question, which makes the economic context analogous to that of therapeutics with small markets. Thus, there may be some commonality with the approaches being considered by pharmaceuti- cal manufacturers for therapeutics with small markets but important niche uses. The Army does have authority to use foreign sources that are in NATO countries, and Dr. Fish thought that the butanetriol example was in that category. Dr. Fish was asked to comment on the difference, from an Army acquisition perspective, between chemical shortages where U.S. industry still has the facility capacity to manufacture (perhaps with adaptation) and chemical shortages where a manufacturing capability no longer exists domestically and the only capacity is foreign-based. Dr. Fish replied that whether the lack of domestic capacity was a critical issue would probably be decided case by case. In general, though, the Army does not presume that all production of a defense-critical chemical or material must be domestic. But there would have to be adequate controls in place on both production and transport to ensure that supply requirements will be met. The overall protection mechanism must be adequate, as the line between domestic and foreign sourcing is not always distinct. With respect to his examples of single-source specialty chemicals with supply issues, Dr. Fish said that reliance on a sole (domestic) source for a critical material must be paired with a program to stockpile sufficient reserves to carry through an interim supply shortage, as happened for strong nitric acid. That approach works, but it does stress the system. A related question was whether the new Sector by Sector, Tier by Tier (S2T2) analysis of the defense industrial base provides the services with a tool for assessing their supply vulnerabilities, such as single-source vulnerabilities. Dr. Stevens replied that the Air Force Manufacturing Technology Program has plans to use the S2T2 database as a resource. Dr. McGrath added that there are policy constraints on how

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54 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s OPEN DISCUSSION RELATED TO COUNTERFEIT PROBLEMS, SUBSTANDARD PARTS, AND SUBSTANDARD MATERIALS Discussion Leaders: Denise F. Swink and Robert Latiff In response to questions from other workshop participants, Dr. McCants made the following points: • Although the initial work specifications for IRIS technology developers only require them to assess reliability at an IC’s specified operating conditions, DARPA is asking them to consider ways of exploring how an IC would respond to off-normal conditions. • For radiation-hardened ICs (for example, in spacecraft), it may be reason- able to build a proof-of-concept prototype using an FPGA, then use the experience with that unit to design an ASIC. • Funding for TRUST was $80 million. Current funding for IRIS is $75 million. • For DOD to implement and sustain a sound “trust but verify” approach as a customer for electronics parts, given the risks discussed, the cost of ade­ quate testing will need to decrease. Good risk analysis of the risks of testing versus not testing should drive decisions about when, how, and what to test. • In Dr. McCants’s opinion, malicious-intent alterations to hardware are more likely to target low-cost components such as resistors, diodes, or AC/DC transformers rather than microprocessors. Thus there needs to be more systems-level testing aimed at detecting nonconforming parts any- where in an assembly or subsystem. • DARPA is not currently working on “Trust at the PC Board Level,” but there is a lot of work on “Trust in Software.” A service laboratory that did a lot of board fabrication would be a good place to take on technology develop- ment to deal with the former. • FPGAs are not yet able to cover fully the application space in which ASICs are used, particularly where non-silicon-substrate ASICs give a distinct performance advantage. • Dr. McCants agreed with a comment that testing based on high-volume random inputs to compare the responses of two chips could in principle be a way to look for differences in chip function.

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 55 CURRENT ISSUES AT THE DEFENSE MICROELECTRONICS ACTIVITY Daniel M. Marrujo, Lead Microelectronics Reliability Engineer Defense Microelectronics Activity Mr. Marrujo’s objectives for the presentation were to explain what DMEA does, for participants not familiar with it, and to show how DMEA is addressing some of the issues posed for discussion at this workshop. The new Systems Assur- ance and Security Division now includes DMEA’s Trusted IC program and reverse e ­ ngineering capability. The Microelectronics Design and Integration Division is able to design ICs from legacy technologies down to the state-of-the-art node sizes. The Microelectronics Development and Test Division includes the fabrication center, packaging capabilities, and testing capabilities. Two major challenges for defense microelectronics are that (1) weapons systems have extended life cycles, from 20 to 40 years, and (2) commercial requirements, not military requirements, dictate the technology and market for new microelectronics. Mr. Marrujo contrasted the life cycle performance, reliability, and security demands of defense systems with conditions and functionality drivers in the market for commercial microelectronics applications. He noted the multisupplier and global nature of the commercial microelectronics supply chain, as discussed by previous speakers, and summarized the range of risks to reliable and secure operations. In addition to the increasingly sophisticated counterfeits being introduced into the supply chain, the growing use of COTS parts raises performance degradation issues stemming from the lower quality of commercial versus military-specified ICs and from unannounced changes by commercial-market vendors in IC design, processing, and packaging. Because military applications are such a small part of the IC market, loss of production capability occurs for a range of reasons, which Mr. Marrujo illustrated with recent examples. To address these challenges, the DMEA mission is to provide all of DOD, as well as other federal entities and foreign allies, with microelectronics technology solutions by leveraging advanced microelectronics technologies: • DMEA’s Advanced Reconfigurable Manufacturing for Semi­onductors c (ARMS) program includes an adaptable, flexible IC foundry at the ­Sacramento facility. All the processes are under government-held licenses. ARMS is capable of prototype and low-volume production at this DMEA facility; any high-volume production runs are done by industry partners in the program.

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56 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s • The Advanced Technology Support Program III (ATSP3) awards Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract vehicles with defense industry part- ners that give DMEA and all DOD program offices streamlined access to state-of-the-art technologies and engineering capability. DMEA engineers provide technical support to ATSP3 task orders. Contracts under ATSP3 are capped at $4.7 billion. • As the accreditation authority for the Trusted Foundry Initiative, DMEA evaluates security parameters, process controls, and the like for design houses, aggregation facilities, mask-making facilities, fabrication facilities, and test facilities throughout the supply chain to ensure they are abiding by security requirements. Every company in the program must renew its accreditation every 2 years, and DMEA audits the fabrication and mask-making facilities. There are currently 55 suppliers accredited under this initiative. In response to questions about the Trusted Foundry Program, Mr. Marrujo gave the following responses: • With respect to the balance between new production and sustainment c ­ apability among participants in the program, most of DMEA’s sustain- ment production for older systems is done through its in-house fabrica- tion capability rather than through new contracts with participants in this program. • The program is set up to include facilities in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but the only current non- U.S. participant is a semiconductor manufacturer in Australia. Other f ­ acilities located outside the United States are nearing completion of initial accreditation. • Facilities that participate receive no guarantee of work; the amount of effort required of a facility to be accredited depends on case-specific circumstances. • The Trusted Foundry designation does not remove all the risks of malicious activity and nonconforming parts discussed by Dr. McCants and others. It does help to minimize the risk of malicious intent by ensuring that certain security practices and conditions are in place. • A trusted source of supply for a variety of microelectronics technologies, including FPGAs, is being looked at by a White House-led DPA cyber­ security group with the end goal of determining if Title III funding should

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 57 be ­ pplied. Aside from this relationship there seem to be no other ties a between Title III and the Trusted IC program. In response to participants’ questions about other aspects of DMEA activities, Mr. Marrujo gave the following responses: • As a recent example where DMEA had solved an obsolescence problem, he described the design and fabrication of a form/fit/function replacement ASIC used on SSN Virginia-class submarines, after the facility that had made the original ASICs burned down, destroying all the design and mask- making documentation as well as the production capability. • DMEA’s production activity can provide added (upgrade) capability in addi­ ion to meeting original form/fit/function requirements. t • With respect to how quickly the DMEA flexible foundry can change from one production run to another, he said the facility runs different processes for different substrates and device types every day. • The replacement ASIC production for the Virginia-class submarines oc- curred before the Trusted Foundry Program was established, so doing that work through a Trusted Foundry participant was not an option. DMEA now provides broker services for program managers who are interested in contracting with participants in the Trusted Foundry initiative. In principle, a program office seeking a similar replacement device (e.g., an ASIC for another application where the original supplier had ended production) can have the fabrication done by a Trusted Foundry participant. Workshop participants discussed the potential for expanding the relationship between DMEA and participants in the Trusted Foundry Initiative. Helping to direct DOD and other government customers to the Trusted Foundry participants was suggested as a way to sustain such foundries and stimulate the community’s interest in participating in the program. Another suggestion was to market Trusted Foundry participants’ high-value obsolete parts to commercial-sector OEMs and to encourage private industry customers generally to use Trusted Foundries. Par- ticipants favored these approaches for expanding the Trusted Foundry partnership because they thought it could help with the problems of electronic parts obsoles- cence and counterfeits.

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58 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s ISSUES AT THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE OF THE CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH Bryan H. Benesch, Special Assistant to the Director and CDRH Device Determination Expert, Food and Drug Administration Mr. Benesch’s responsibilities in the Office of Compliance in the CDRH include counterfeit products policy. The areas of the economy that FDA regulates account for 20-25 percent of consumer expenditures. Counterfeiting in these domains is primarily an issue in the area of drug products. Statistically, Mr. Benesch said, 5 to 8 percent of drugs sold globally are counterfeit.6 With the rise of drug marketing and sales via the Internet, shipment of counterfeit drugs into the United States from foreign sources has increased and is difficult to interdict. The FDA was set up to deal with domestic production, Mr. Benesch said, but it has had to become global in reach to deal with counterfeit drug production. In July 2011, FDA published Pathway to Global Product Safety and Quality, which includes a section on counterfeiting.7 Work groups are being started to take into account all aspects of global counterfeiting of FDA-regulated products in developing a risk- based strategy to limit entry of counterfeit products into the United States. FDA is working with the World Health Organization, which is adding counterfeit medical devices to its long-standing concern with counterfeit drugs. It also works with the Office on Intellectual Property in the Executive Office of the President, which has issued several white papers on counterfeit pharmaceuticals. Mr. Benesch also works with FDA’s criminal investigators on their work in counterfeit device operations. FDA investigators typically team with enforcement officers from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Compli- ance Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to interdict illegal shipments at points of entry, including the large international mail facilities. Until recently, when President Obama signed the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA), these inspections did not have authority to seize and destroy the counterfeit drugs that were interdicted. Now they may be destroyed rather than returned to the 6    ccording A to the FDA Web site, a U.S. law defines counterfeit drugs as those sold under a prod- uct name without proper authorization. Counterfeiting can apply to both brand name and generic products, where the identity of the source is mislabeled in a way that suggests that it is the authentic approved product. Counterfeit products may include products without the active ingredient, with an insufficient or excessive quantity of the active ingredient, with the wrong active ingredient, or with fake packaging. Available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm169898.htm. Accessed October 12, 2012. 7    his FDA special report is available online at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ T OfficeofGlobalRegulatoryOperationsandPolicy/GlobalProductPathway/default.htm.

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 59 shipper. The inspectors use a drug-listing database system, which includes photo- graphs of many drug products, to compare items visually with authentic products. Samples can be sent to FDA laboratories for analysis, and for large shipments, the manufacturer of the authentic drug may be contacted to help determine if the interdicted shipment is authentic or counterfeit. FDA is also doing some field testing of equipment for chemical characterization. The FDASIA requires that a trusted supply chain between authorized producers of licensed drugs and shippers of these products be developed. Those provisions currently apply only to pharma- ceuticals, not to medical devices. However, FDA does have a regulation requiring a Unique Device Identifier on authentic medical devices, similar to the universal product code barcode used on retail sale items. Because FDA will have a database of the authentic identifiers from two trusted suppliers of the codes, counterfeiting should become more difficult. FDA also learns of counterfeiting operations from the large pharmaceutical manufacturers, which have their own operations to look for counterfeits of their products and identify the sources. FDA assigns criminal investigators if these corporate investigators find signs of counterfeiting. Since 2001, the FDA has had only 16 cases of counterfeit medical devices. In 2010, DOD came to the FDA because it had found counterfeits of the combat appli­ cation tourniquets included in soldiers’ personal first aid packs. Other cases have involved surgical mesh, infusion pumps, glucose test strips for diabetics, condoms, dental filling material, and contact lenses. Reshipment back to the United States of devices originally distributed for sale in another country is illegal if the FDA- allowed medical indications for a device differ from those in the country of original distribution, because the item is considered to be misbranded and/or adulterated. FDA is working with foreign regulators to (1) get intelligence on material coming out of China and other major sources of counterfeit drugs and devices, (2) develop a system of trusted suppliers and partners, and (3) find ways of iden- tifying counterfeits. Mr. Benesch participates in a Department of Justice working group on microelectronics counterfeiting. FDA can only examine 1 to 2 percent of the medical devices being shipped into the United States. To make this limited inspection effort more effective, FDA has a new software program that uses risk analytics applied to internal and open source intelligence, such as information on companies that other countries have taken actions against, to identify suspect importers and the products with the greatest safety and health risks to the American public. In medical devices, obsolescence issues are encouraging counterfeiting just as they do in defense microelectronics and other parts of legacy systems. For example, refurbishing of older x-ray equipment, CAT scanners, etc., often requires electronic parts that are no longer being produced. This creates the same economic incentive for counterfeiting and the same types of problems as the workshop had already discussed in connection with sustainment of legacy defense systems. For FDA en-

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60 M at e r i a l s and M a n u fac t u r i n g C a pa b i l i t i e s for S u s ta i n i n g D e f e n s e S y s t e m s forcement purposes, a counterfeit product has to carry the imitated brand name. If a substitute product works as intended, has no safety issues, and meets other FDA requirements, it is not considered a counterfeit; if it violates the original manufac- turer’s intellectual property rights, that is not an FDA issue. FDA requirements for a manufacturer of a look-alike product to prove that it has the same characteristics as the original vary greatly, depending on the regulatory class (Class 1, 2, or 3) into which the product falls. Class 3 products require clinical testing and higher manufacturing quality standards. Most of the device counterfeiting is at Class 1 and Class 2 levels, where the compliance requirements are less stringent. In his summary, Mr. Benesch said that FDA is engaging with the World Health Organization and with other international entities such as the Asia-Pacific Eco- nomic Community to work on a global strategy for determining where counterfeit- ing is happening and ways to detect counterfeits. It is just beginning to work more with the device industry on trusted supply chain issues and reliability of microchips and other microelectronic parts. In response to questions and comments from other workshop participants, Mr. Benesch made the following points: • He characterized a “trusted supplier” in the medical device supply chain as starting with the manufacturer of the finished device. The trusted chain of custody goes from the manufacturer to a distributor, then a retailer. Third- party distributers are difficult for FDA to regulate, and it is not illegal to import gray market medical devices, although gray market drugs are illegal. FDA has limited regulatory authority to reach back to suppliers of parts and components used in finished medical devices. The device manufacturer has to have controls on its suppliers, such as inspection and testing of incoming parts, to ensure standards set by it have been met. Mr. Benesch said FDA would like to be able to push the requirements for trusted supplier status further back to the parts suppliers. FDA is interested in learning what kinds of on-site inspections of suppliers and other quality assurance measures the final device manufacturer is undertaking. Does it know the ultimate supplier of the parts and components it is using? • With respect to the drug side, the new FDASIA gives FDA more legal au- thority to establish a Trusted Supplier program, such as registering facili- ties and knowing the source of the active ingredients, to make it harder to introduce counterfeit drugs into the supply chain. Those provisions make it harder for an entity in the supply chain to change the source of supply from one facility to another. • As for devices imported into the United States, FDA can only use the exist- ing legal authorities. All the companies that export products to the United States are supposed to register with FDA. The new screening software for

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W o r k s h o p P r e s e n tat i o n s and Discussions 61 arriving shipments can determine if data are missing that would verify the shipper’s registration. It is harder to go back to the suppliers of parts and components, although the existing law can be used when imported parts and components are exclusively for medical devices. • Enforcement actions often take years to complete. If a seller has violated the law, it can be arrested and prosecuted for violations of Title 18, as well as violations of the Food and Drug Act. However, criminal investigations can take a long time. FDA can also take civil actions, which include seizing products and civil prosecution. OPEN DISCUSSION Discussion Leader: Steven G. Wax Private Consultant and Member, DMMI Standing Committee Dr. Wax asked the participants for comments, in light of all the presentations and discussions, on unmet needs and unresolved big issues in the areas of sustain- ment, replication/obsolescence, and counterfeits. The discussion resulted in an outline of needs and issues suggested by one or more participants that can be found in the overview of this workshop summary report. After all participants present for the final session had an opportunity to ­offer sug- gestions on unmet needs and unresolved issues, Dr. Latiff adjourned the workshop. REFERENCES AFSAB (U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board). 2011. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board ­ eport R on Sustaining Air Force Aging Aircraft into the 21st Century. SAB-TR-11-01. Washington, D.C.: Head­ quarters, Air Force, Science Advisory Board. Available online at http://www.dre.vanderbilt.edu/~schmidt/ PDF/USAF%20SAB%20Sustaining%20Aging%20Aircraft%20Study%20Final%20Report%20(Public%20 Release).pdf. ­ ccessed on October 5, 2012. A Andress, J., and S. Winterfeld. 2011. Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Professionals. Waltham, Mass.: Syngress. Committee on Armed Services. 2012. Inquiry into Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Department of Defense Supply Chain. Report of Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate. Report 112-157. May 12, 2012. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Available online at http://www.­ armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Counterfeit%20Electronic%20Parts.pdf. Francis, P.J., and W.B. Boning. 2005. Summary Analysis of the Material Condition of the KC-135 Aerial Refueling Fleet. CRM D0010627.A4/1REV. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses. Available online at http://www. cna.org/sites/default/files/research/D0010627.A4.pdf. GAO (Government Accountability Office). 2010. Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Correc- tive Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. GAO-11-171R. Washington, D.C.: GAO. December. Available online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11171r.pdf. Graedel, T.E., and J. Cao. 2010. Metal spectra as indicators of development. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107(49): 20905-20910. NSTC (National Science and Technology Council). 2012. Materials Genome Initiative. Office of Science and Technology Policy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/mgi. Accessed October 14, 2012.

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Appendixes

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