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INTRODUCTION
A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President
Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert,
U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Naval Studies Board
(NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surprise—both
operationally and technically related—facing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in
February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on
Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces.
The study’s terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report,
were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation
with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce
two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim
report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of
reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following:1
(1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive
technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational
deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about
these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines;
(2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies,
and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises;
and
(3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well
as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for
responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own
surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises.
This first report highlights issues brought to the committee’s attention during its
first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of
the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its
entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any
aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study
during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report,
which will address all of the elements in the study’s terms of reference and explore many
potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim
report.
In its initial three meetings, the committee received a number of helpful briefings
from commands across the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard,
as well as expert briefings from individuals working at a number of other government
agencies, including the following: the Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval
Research; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding; the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); the U.S. Navy SSBN Security Program;
1
The full terms of reference for this study are provided in Enclosure A of this report.
1
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the Missile Defense Agency; MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s Air Vehicle Survivability
Evaluation Program (Air Force Red Team); the Naval War College; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Research Development & Acquisition for Science and
Technology; OPNAV N81; OPNAV N4; OPNAV N3/N5; OPNAV N2/N6; U.S. Fleet
Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet; Combat Development Command/Combat
Development and Integration, U.S. Marine Corps; the Assistant Commandant for
Capability, U. S. Coast Guard; and the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office.
In addition, the committee conducted preliminary data-gathering sessions on capability
surprise-related issues with the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, the U.S. Navy Warfare
Development Command, and U.S. Pacific Fleet. When combined with the collective
knowledge of the committee, these briefings are considered to constitute a sufficient basis
for development of the initial observations and insights offered by the committee in this
report.
FRAMING THE PROBLEM—BACKGROUND ON CAPABILITY SURPRISE
AND U.S. NAVAL FORCES
Recent reports have addressed the issue of surprise, although not surprise specific
to U.S. naval forces (i.e., the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard). A
2009 Defense Science Board (DSB) report on capability surprise noted that: “[s]urprise
can spring from many sources. It can arise in the laboratory—
a result of scientific breakthrough. It can arise during the transition from concept to
fielded product: rapid fielding of the same technology can create tremendous advantage
to whoever fields the system first. It can also arise when an existing capability is
employed in an unconventional way or when low-end technology is adapted in
2
unforeseen ways that create an effective capability against high-end U.S. systems.
The DSB report reviewed many historical surprises experienced by the United
States and categorized them as either known surprises (i.e., surprises that should have
been anticipated and acted on because it was clear that they were in the offing) or
surprising surprises (i.e., those that may have been anticipated by some but were not
addressed—swamped by the thousands of other surprises possible—or were true
surprises).3
In addition, a 2008 Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) report titled
Disruptive Commercial Technologies noted, among other things, that “the internet
2
Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability
Surprise, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington,
D.C., September, pp. vii-viii.
3
The temporal and impact aspects of capability surprises vary widely and call for different approaches to
prepare for and respond to such surprises. As additional background for this study, the committee
examined several historical examples of ‘surprises” that have had significant impact on naval and military
operations, including short lived surprises (such as the suicide bomb attacks on the USS Cole, and the 911
World Trade Towers); and longer term surprises, resulting in major changes in U.S. naval and military
forces (such as the Monitor and Merrimac introduction of ironclad warships; as well as Russia’s launch of
Sputnik (surprising use of space—leading to the creation of DARPA) and Germany’s Blitzkrieg (uniquely
combining and exploiting the capabilities of known entities.))
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functions effectively as both a research and development (R&D) resource and supply
chain for irregular forces throughout the world. Commercial technologies pose a real and
enduring threat to Marine forces.”4 In summary, the NRAC report concluded that
globally available commercial technologies exist that might be used in adverse ways
against Marine forces. Although it did not focus on “technology surprise” per se, the
NRAC report did examine, in part, the power of unconventional and unconstrained
imagination that can be brought to bear against Marine forces operating around the world.
This committee has found that addressing surprise as it might impact U.S. naval
forces is a complex subject with multiple dimensions, including time, mission and cross-
mission domains, anticipation of enabling technologies, physical phenomena, and new
tactics that may enable surprise. In terms of time, surprises may come over scales
ranging from seconds up to minutes in a complex engagement, to the evolving, break-
through surprise that might have been secretly developed over decades. The mission
domains such as air defense and undersea warfare, which require that U.S. naval forces
operate across the open ocean and littoral (land, air, space, and cyberspace), all have
myriad entry points from which capability surprises can originate. There are also
accelerating new technological advancements globally, which again, alone or in
combination, can constitute the basis of a capability surprise.
Given its complexity, there is no simple answer regarding how to guard against
surprise. A number of explicit actions are needed. First and foremost, leaders must help
others recognize the importance of understanding capability surprise and what it means to
U.S. naval forces, such as ensuring that organizations include preparation for and
mitigation of surprise as part of their functions, including scanning and related activities
in order to advise naval forces of potential emerging surprises. It is important that
organizations are timely and diligent in examining the scope and seriousness of potential
emerging surprises, and that they are capable of identifying other organizations that
might be able to help anticipate, mitigate, or respond to potential emerging surprises.
Defining “Surprise”
From a military operational point of view, surprise can be an event or capability
that could affect the outcome of a naval mission or campaign for which preparations are
not in place. The committee believes that there are two classes of surprise that fall within
this military operational context and can be described using the terminology provided in
the study’s terms of reference: (1) intelligence-inferred surprise and (2) disruptive
technology and tactical surprise.
Intelligence-inferred surprise is an event or capability developed on a relatively
long timeline—years—whose looming operational introduction naval forces were aware
of in advance, but might not adequately have prepared for. Disruptive technology
(including disruptive application of existing technology) and tactical surprise are types of
short-timeline—hours to months—events or capabilities for which naval forces will
likely not have had sufficient time to prepare contingency counters in advance unless the
4
Naval Research Advisory Committee. 2008. Disruptive Commercial Technologies, Assistant Secretary
to the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., June
26, p. 15.
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surprises have been at least somewhat anticipated. In some cases both types of surprise
can occur, for example, a much anticipated surprise capability found on the battlefield to
have tactical war reserve modes.
The committee recognizes that a preponderance of intelligence-inferred surprise is
being addressed (on a continuous basis) within naval program areas such as air and
missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and strike warfare. In such instances, the future
threat is projected and upgrades to naval systems are developed and fielded to meet the
threat. This report does not address this class of already-addressed intelligence-inferred
surprises. It does, however, address intelligence-inferred surprises for which “cradle-to-
grave” upgrades do not exist or for which the capability represented by the projected
threat requires coordination among a number of program areas. An example of such a
scenario surprise—denial of access to space—is discussed in the next section of this
report.
The committee also recognizes two variants of disruptive technology and tactical
surprise. One variant is the “pop up” emergence of a new capability enabled by a new
technology or an unexpected application of a pre-existing well known technology, e.g.,
improvised explosive device triggers, as well as an unexpected tactic such as an
adversary’s use of previously unknown war-reserve modes. The other variant—“black
swan” events—may be self-inflicted surprises, e.g., an anticipatory “blind spot” that no
amount of surveillance would have overcome.5 These may be the result of a sudden U.S.
policy change or directed action, such as Operation Burnt Frost,6 or natural disasters that
may have been anticipated, but not at the extreme scale of the event as it actually
occurred, e.g., the March 2011 Fukushima Disaster.7
In the broadest sense, surprise grants the adversary the ability to take unexpected
action and/or to produce consequences for which U.S. forces did not prepare in advance.
In summary, surprises may result from new technologies or from the application of
existing technologies in new ways, or may evolve from operational, social, natural, or
political factors for which technology or lack of mitigating technology may not be the
primary determinant of outcome.
5
Nassim Taleb defines a black swan as “a highly improbable event with three principal characteristics: It
is unpredictable; it carries a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it
appear less random, and more predictable, than it was.” For additional reading on black swan events see
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 2007, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House
Press, New York.
6
A nonfunctioning U.S. National Reconnaissance Office satellite was successfully shot down by a
Standard Missile (SM)-3 on February 20, 2008. The code name for this mission was Operation Burnt
Frost. See RADM Joseph A. Horn, Jr., USN, Program Executive, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and
Conrad J. Grant, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Operation Burnt Frost
Perspectives,” presentation to the committee, May 16, 2012, Washington, D.C.; and press release by the
U.S. Air Force, lst Lt. Angela Webb, USAF, 30th Space Wing Public Affairs, 2008, “Joint Effort Made
Satellite Success Possible,” February 26; found at http:www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123087750.
Accessed January 15, 2013.
7
A partial profile of U.S. naval response to the Fukushima disaster—a combined earthquake, tsunami,
and nuclear reactor catastrophe—in a coordinated effort known as “Operation Tomodachi” is found at
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=121. Accessed June 13, 2012.
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Examples of Surprise
The committee discussed a number of different examples of surprise, ranging
from an adversary’s potential deployment of disruptive technologies against naval
operations (such as specific “Day 0” cyber offense payloads), to the potential interruption
of critical supply chains (such as for rare-earth elements), to the potential unfolding of
national security-related geopolitical events (such as regional economic instability). The
committee also reviewed case studies of previous surprises and the circumstances leading
up to the surprises and will discuss several of these in its final report for illustrative
purposes. Examples of some intelligence-inferred surprises and disruptive technology
and tactical surprises are provided in Box 1; however, these examples should not be
viewed as a definitive list of all the types of surprises naval forces might face.
BOX 1
Some Examples of Surprises
Examples of Intelligence-Inferred Surprises
Cyber intrusions (e.g., programmable logic computer worms).
Ballistic missile attacks (e.g., medium-range ballistic missiles).
Use of uninhabited vehicles (e.g., semisubmersibles for attacks).
International security and cooperation (e.g., nuclear weapon proliferation, economic
instability, cultural/tribal/religious conflicts).
Denial of access to space (e.g., jamming, use of antisatellite weapons).
Examples of Disruptive Technology and Tactical Surprises
Use of synthetic biological weapons.
Use of small nuclear weapons.
Use of highly energetic sources.
Use of improvised explosive device triggers.
Social media utilizations.
In addition to reviewing previous case studies of surprises, the committee has,
so far, selected the following three surprise scenarios, which it believes are important
to U.S. naval forces, as starting points from which it can examine, illustrate by
example, and, ultimately, recommend potential changes as requested in the study’s
terms of reference:8
Scenario 1: Denial of access to space;
Scenario 2: An asymmetric engagement with complex use of cyber attacks in
a naval context; and
8
In addition to the surprise scenarios listed in this interim report, the committee anticipates further
illustration of surprise in the final report by examining additional scenarios, such as potential nonkinetic
effects to counter missile magazine limits, and the potential impact of unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs) to represent both a surprise threat and opportunity.
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Scenario 3: A “black swan” event for which the front-end scanning and
prioritization framework for mitigating surprise (to be described) is not
applicable.
Surprise Scenario 1 (intelligence-inferred surprise): Potential loss of access to
space due to antisatellite capabilities and electronic or optical countermeasures,
including loss of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds,
communications, navigation (GPS), and timing (also GPS). The loss of access to space
scenario has been broadly discussed in the open media.9 In particular, U.S. naval
warfighting systems depend heavily on positioning, navigation, and timing. In essence
an adversary, in denying U.S. forces’ access to space, could employ the following
measures against U.S. space assets, either simultaneously or with unpredictable
frequency to render those assets unreliable:
Jamming U.S. combatant or weapons GPS receivers within the line-of-sight of
adversary surface and airborne platforms,
Cyber attack on command and control centers and combatants,
Jamming or dazzling surveillance sensors to obscure U.S. orbital ISR
observations,
Jamming of communications reception by satellite receivers within the receive
antenna’s main beams or side lobes,
Jamming of satellite downlink receivers within the line-of-sight of adversary
surface or airborne combatants or weapons, or
Kinetic engagement of orbital systems.
The committee also recognizes that cyber attacks or other interference in this
scenario could originate from imbedded threats in commercial off-the-shelf hardware and
software that are widely deployed in present naval systems and could render naval
systems and networks inoperable at a critical moment of need. The heavy dependence on
certain widely used satellite communications operating in frequency bands that can be
more readily jammed is a particular concern. Jamming of communications and denial-of-
service attacks are clearly an intelligence-inferred surprise that can be mitigated with
alternatives.10
For the final report, the committee intends to explore the broader issue of an anti-
access/area denial environment, one element of which is the loss of access to space. Such
an enquiry will allow for further examination of the following issues:
9
For example, see Background Briefing on Air-Sea Battle by Defense Officials from the Pentagon, News
Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, November 9, 2011;
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4923, accessed May 9, 2012.
See also Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, 2012, “Asymetric Warfare, American Style,” Proceedings
of the Naval Institute, April, pp. 24-29; Andrew Erickson and Amy Chang, 2012, “China’s Navigation in
Space,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute, April, pp. 42-47; and David Fulghum, 2012, “Under Siege:
Foreign Countermeasures Proliferate as U.S. Electronic Warfare Programs Falter,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, April 9, pp. 22-23.
10
The issue of cyber defense for U.S. naval forces will be covered more extensively in an upcoming NSB
study, commissioned by the CNO, and anticipated to be ready in the first quarter of 2013.
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Potential gaps between missions that could provide openings for surprise, e.g.,
between strike, antisubmarine warfare defense, antisurface warfare defense,
and air defense capabilities, as well as the complexities of multiplicative use
of every asset from every mission area to “take out” a Navy aircraft carrier;
New concepts of operations for emerging advanced new capabilities such as
low-observable, unmanned aerial vehicles; precision strike; 5th generation air;
Mach 3+ air, high-speed, and surface threats;
Potential novel uses of nonkinetic, rapidly reconfigured assets such as
electronic warfare, especially in the context of “red versus blue and blue
versus red”;
Implications for logistics chain protection;
Potential cultural expectations and blind spots;
Use of social media in a propaganda strike in an attempt to influence attitudes
at home and even debilitate a nation’s will to fight; and
The role of surprise tactics.
Surprise Scenario 2 (disruptive technology and tactical surprise): Potential
consequences of social media crowd emergence that could place U.S. personnel and
property at risk in foreign areas or threaten U.S. domestic infrastructure. The committee
has begun to explore the potential implications of population unrest, whether spontaneous
or induced, in which social media is used to turn a local population against the United
States and to facilitate coordinated search and engagement of U.S. citizens and U.S.
assets on the ground in a manner not unlike some of the uses of social media during the
Arab Spring.11 This is an area that may require a combination of tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) and perhaps creation of a new situation awareness capability,
especially as it might apply to naval ships or other U.S. naval personnel operating in
foreign ports. This scenario is also a mechanism for examining the complexities of
attempted cyber manipulation of a crowd’s mood and actions, and it provides a context
for considering potential effects of surprise in on-the-ground and coastal operation of
naval forces.
Surprise Scenario 3 (“black swan” surprise): Black swan (self-inflicted and/or
natural disaster) surprises include a full range of potential actions that might have a
significant impact on the capability of U.S. naval forces. These include events such as
acts of nature (e.g., tsunamis, earthquakes, or disease outbreaks), as well as surprises that
might evolve from actions such as national strategic decisions and/or national budget
priority changes. Examples of national strategic decisions include the recent decision to
deploy the U.S. Coast Guard to remote areas of global conflict and the earlier U.S. naval
forces humanitarian assistance/disaster relief response to the 2010 catastrophic
earthquake in Haiti.
11
See Lisa Anderson, 2011, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs, May/June. Available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67693/lisa-anderson/demystifying-the-arab-spring. Accessed May
12, 2012.
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In addition to data gathering and discussions that helped the committee formulate
the three surprise scenarios described above, the committee also received briefings from
exemplar programs that appear quite capable of timely anticipation of and response to
surprise. In this interim report, the committee applies the above three surprise scenarios
and three exemplars—the Navy SSBN Security Program, the Air Vehicle Survivability
Evaluation Program (Air Force Red Team), and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Program—as example cases to help illuminate the following:
Impediments that currently exist for certain areas of potential surprise outside
of mainstream acquisition programs that may be hampering anticipation and
response;
Successful principles and infrastructures that might be integrated into already
existing naval organizational structures and processes to address the broader
realm of potential surprises;
Structures and processes that could accommodate the above three examples of
unaddressed/under-addressed surprises (denial of access to space, flash mob
activity via social media, disaster response);
Key capabilities, policies, and metrics that support successful structures and
processes for dealing with surprise; and
Potential changes to better prepare for, and be more resilient in the face of
capability surprise for naval forces.
These concepts, and opportunities for improvements, are explored and integrated
below.
A POTENTIAL NAVAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH SURPRISE
Complexities in Dealing with Surprise
The committee has observed and acknowledges the challenges and complexities
for naval forces in dealing with potential capability surprise as exemplified in the above
three surprise scenarios. In each of the three scenarios, various stakeholders (e.g.,
operational, intelligence, technical, and acquisition related) should be involved in raising
awareness of potential vulnerabilities that capability surprise could expose. Likewise,
different entities should be responsible for prioritizing, resourcing, exercising, and
developing TTPs against such scenarios. For example, entities ranging from Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets, to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to the Office of Naval Research may
be involved in scanning for potential surprise. Entities ranging from laboratories to naval
operating forces, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCDDC), Navy’s
OPNAV N2/N6 and N9 organizations, and the Program Executive Offices have key roles
to play in prioritizing and developing responses and assuring readiness. Although many
stakeholders are involved, there is currently no designated lead working across the Navy
to ensure not only recognition of potential capability surprises, but also the required
integration and prioritization of efforts to help mitigate their negative impact. A
supporting infrastructure or lead integrating authority that can rapidly work through the
complexities and that cuts across various naval authorities does not, in most cases, appear
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to exist.12 It is crucial to understand that to be effective, counter-surprise efforts not only
must scan for and address new or emerging technologies but also must anticipate and
search for the use in unforeseen ways of technologies and capabilities that already exist.
The Navy must scan for other countries’ military exercises, doctrine, and publications as
well as technologies.
A Model for Dealing with Potential Surprise
Despite the above complexities, a positive factor is that the committee has been
briefed on example programs that have demonstrated the ability to anticipate and respond
to surprises with material solutions that are timely, even within the currently
acknowledged process-laden, acquisition system. These “exemplar programs” are (1) the
Navy SSBN Security Program,13 (2) the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation Program
(Air Force Red Team),14 and (3) the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
(whose responsiveness was exemplified by the shoot-down in Operation Burnt Frost of a
wayward National Reconnaissance Office satellite.15 The principles and key
“ingredients” for dealing with potential capability surprise in each exemplar program are
similar: a stable program and infrastructure; a capability thread that includes research
and technology development, modeling and simulation, expert staff, acquisition and
industrial capability, and testing infrastructure; and very visible senior leadership support
and top cover. Furthermore, several organizations, including the U.S. Marine Corps
expeditionary forces, the U.S. Coast Guard operations for responding to natural disasters,
OSD Rapid Prototyping, and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S)
organizations, have each developed remarkable resilience for anticipating and responding
to rapidly developing, on-the-ground needs.16 Key common attributes of these successful
programs will be discussed and developed more fully as the committee continues its data-
gathering work toward producing a final report.
To help guide the approach and understanding needed to address potential
capability surprise for U.S. naval forces, the committee has developed a functional
12
The potential impact of a recently announced OPNAV structural reorganization, creating the N9 as a
single baron to oversee warfighting programs is a step towards providing structure that may help mitigate
capability surprise. The impact of this new structure will be explored further as this study progresses. For
additional information on this realignment see “CNO Realigns OPNAV Staff,” Navy Office of
Information, March 3, 2012; available at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=65845.
Accessed May 24, 2012.
13
Stephen C. Schreppler, Andrew F. Slaterbeck, and CAPT Christopher J. Kaiser, USN, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, N97, “SSBN Security Program Perspectives,” presentation to the committee,
April 12, 2012, Washington, D.C.
14
Christopher Roeser, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, “Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation Program (Air
Force Red Team),” presentation to the committee, May 16, 2012, Washington, D.C.
15
RADM Joseph A. Horn, Jr., USN, Program Executive, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and Conrad J.
Grant, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Operation Burnt Frost Perspectives,”
presentation to the committee, May 16, 2012, Washington, D.C.
16
Benjamin Riley, Director, Rapid Prototyping Technology Office, and Principal Deputy, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding, “Rapid Prototyping Perspectives,” presentation to the
committee, February 29, 2012, Washington, D.C, For additional information on the OSD Rapid
Prototyping Office, see National Research Council, 2009, Experimentation and Rapid Prototyping in
Support of Counterterrorism, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
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framework, shown in Figure 1, consisting of five phases that can be aligned with the
development functions, accountabilities, and principles observed in the exemplar
programs noted above.
Scanning Assessing Prioritization, Development Force
and Surprise Decisions, and and Response
Awareness Resourcing Implementation
FIGURE 1 Five phases required for mitigating capability surprise. This is a continuous process in which
each element informs the other. For example, Force Response adjustments may generate a loop-back in the
process. Further reaction to a tactical or Black Swan surprise may enter one of the three right-most phases
depending on the nature and timing of the required response.
The five phases—(1) scanning and awareness; (2) assessing the potential for
surprise; (3) setting priorities, decision making, and resourcing; (4) development and
implementation of tactics and capabilities; and (5) force response—are discussed below.
All are necessary to successfully anticipate or react to potential or real surprises.
Specifically, the first three phases allow for the impact of a surprise to be assessed, with
either a high or low priority as the outcome. In phase 4, several outcomes are possible,
including the development of new tactics. At the same time, there is a natural tendency
to implement a “quick and dirty” partial solution between phases 4 and 5, and to ignore
the limitations that the solution may leave as residual risks to operations. Accordingly,
the adequacy of proposed responses should be assessed before any outcome emerges
from phase 5.
In the context of the two classes of surprise previously noted, the first three
phases would help naval forces better anticipate intelligence-inferred surprises. On the
other hand, natural disasters whose occurrence may have been anticipated, but not at the
scale of a black swan event (e.g., the March 2011 Fukushima disaster), would enter the
framework at phase 4. Moreover, events in-theater may require tactical or strategic
operational adjustments in phase 5 as a result of assessing the adequacy of proposed
responses.
Scanning and Awareness
Phase 1—Scanning and Awareness—involves scanning the horizon for potential
technologies, technical applications, and operational behaviors that could cause surprise,
which is defined here as “an adverse event whose outcome is worsened by lack of
preparedness or awareness to counter unexpected developments.” The committee’s
initial data gathering confirms that certain capabilities are already available to anticipate
surprise, including the Office of Naval Research-Global (ONR-G) global science and
technology network and the technical intelligence provided by the Office of Naval
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Intelligence (ONI).17 Integration of these and other broader capabilities can inform a
potential risk spectrum relating each potential surprise to the standard measures of
“likelihood of occurrence” and “operational impact if such an event transpired.” More
specifically, the committee believes that collaboration among operational, intelligence,
and technical experts to fully vet which capability could become surprises, and in what
timeframe, in the context of standard risk framework would significantly increase
awareness.
Assessing Surprise
Phase 2—Assessing Surprise—includes such key items as effective modeling,
simulations analysis, and “red teaming.” The somewhat over-used term “red teaming” is
applied here to emphasize the dynamic tension required of the operational, technical, and
intelligence communities to flesh out potential negative impacts of surprise and prioritize
which should be addressed in each timeframe, from short term through long term. Key to
the success of this process is application not only of operational experience and
campaign-level modeling as it is used currently, but also of the more detailed system- and
physics-level modeling, coupled with experiments, as necessary, to determine feasibilities
and maturity levels of the potential surprise events as well as their potential operational
impacts. Further, the cultural thinking of potential adversaries must be part of the red
team formulation. This assessment process must inform decisions about use of resources
in subsequent phases.
Prioritization, Decisions, and Resourcing
Phase 3—Prioritization, Decisions, and Resourcing—includes strategic naval
planning, budgeting, and evaluation of policy implications for executing a response to the
prioritized risks identified in phase 2, and budgeting and allocating resourcing for the
response. Here, naval commands with resources must possess the span of control in rapid
prototyping, development of tactics, acquisition program adjustments, and force
introduction to ensure that the vetted, validated risk response priorities are implemented
in a timely manner. A key element that this authority should expect of the assessment
process is that first priority will be given to making use of existing systems and
capabilities, perhaps with modifications. Such an approach would minimize the
expectation of new-start programs that consume much more time and funds.
17
The operations of ONR-Global were discussed with the Executive Director of the Office of Naval
Research, Walter Jones, and the committee at its data-gathering meeting on February 29, 2012,
Washington, D.C. Also, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) “Intelligence Perspectives” were discussed
with Wayne Mason, Chief Scientist, ONI Scientific and Technical Center, at the February 28, 2012,
committee data-gathering session.
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Development and Implementation
Phase 4—Development and Implementation—can take several forms, as options,
including:
1. Development of new tactics, perhaps using existing assets or technologies in
unexpected ways;
2. Development of new variant capabilities within existing programs, e.g.,
converting the software of a surface-to-air missile to make it a surface-strike
missile as was done with the Standard Missile 1 (SM-1) in the 1970s;
3. Rapid prototyping to field a few critical units as either sufficient to meet the
need or as a “stop-gap” prior to acquisition program production unit
introduction;
4. Use of naval support centers to make changes to systems that are in service
but out of production; and
5. More aggressive use of quick reaction capability (QRC) or other authorities.18
The options for development and implementation should be considered based on
the expected time frame of the emergence of the surprise, the technology readiness level
of the requisite counter-capability, and the community resources and schedule capacity to
develop the capability. Note that these options may be exercised not only to
accommodate anticipated surprises, but also to develop U.S. counter-surprises that could
be used to disrupt an adversary in the midst of its unleashing a surprise on U.S. forces to,
for example, buy time for a U.S. response.
Force Response
In Phase 5—Force Response—U.S. naval forces test the capability, leveraging the
U.S. naval test infrastructure, ensure training and proficiency, and determine the impact
of the new capability on a readiness level against surprise. This additional attribute,
fleet/forces readiness level against surprise, is the basis from which the preparedness is
characterized. As each new urgent need arises, it should be determined whether the
surprise element is a driver and, if so, characterized in terms of this attribute.
INITIAL OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS
The five functional elements outlined above, provide the framework as illustrated
in Figure 1, which the committee chose to organize its interim report and ultimately
address the study’s terms of reference. Within this framework, the committee has begun
to examine what works well, along with what does not work well (i.e., the obstacles,
barriers, and bottlenecks preventing progress) in the three example surprise scenarios
18
“QRC programs leverage DODI [Department of Defense Instruction] 5000.02 procedures and
authorities to speed up the fielding of systems and capabilities to satisfy near-term urgent warfighting
needs.” See Air Force Instruction 63-114, January 4, 2011, Quick Reaction Capability Process, p. 5, para.
1.1.
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examined thus far. Accordingly, the committee offers the following initial observations
and insights, which will be expanded and built upon in its final report, to help mitigate
the impact of potential surprise and to address capability surprise as integral to the naval
enterprise.
Observation 1: Scanning and Awareness
(Surprise is Unavoidable, Prepare for It!)
The recommendations for surveillance in a 2009 Defense Science Board (DSB)
study19) differ slightly from those in a 2008 Naval Research Advisory Committee
(NRAC) study,20 and a 2011 report of the Center for a New American Security report
(CNAS)21 has prescriptions to better account for predictive failure. Taken together, these
documents form a reasonable starting point for the strategy this committee seeks to
develop. The committee categorizes the recommendations of these three reports as either
“preparation” or “avoidance” strategies. It specifically notes that DSB 2009 argues that
surprise is unavoidable and thus places less emphasis on avoidance strategies and greater
emphasis on preparation, flexibility, and speed of response, whereas the NRAC 2008
emphasizes the surveillance aspect; i.e., both of these previous reports deal almost
exclusively with the front end of the framework suggested in this report.
It is worthy of note that the DSB 2009 study on capability surprise does not
recommend any specific efforts to avoid the effects of surprise. The study concludes by
presenting options for decision makers, including the integration and management of
surprise at a high enough level to affect senior decision making; among other things, it
recommends a pair of definite “surveillance” tasks (scanning and sifting and capability
projection). In the present report, scanning and sifting is included in “scanning” and
capability projection is part of “awareness.”
Scanning and sifting may not appear as a priority in the National Intelligence
Priorities Framework (NIPF), but the NIPF nevertheless requires mindfully gathered
inputs.22 There may not be sufficiently high NIPF categories to allow careful collection
of surprise-based intelligence. Science and technology information will have to be
collected even if there is no “smoking gun” that points to specific subject matter as a
concern. Scanning and sifting will be useful only if enough data are used to make good
guesses.
19
Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability
Surprise, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington,
D.C., September.
20
Naval Research Advisory Committee. 2008. Disruptive Commercial Technologies, Assistant
Secretary to the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of Defense, Washington,
D.C., June 26.
21
Richard Danzig. 2011. Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Predictions and National
Security, Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C., October.
22
The National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) is “a means to capture issues of critical interest
to senior intelligence community customers and communicating those issues to the IC for action. The
NIPF consists of a dialogue with the senior policy community, a matrix of intelligence priorities, and
written guidance to the community explaining critical information needs associated with the priorities in
the matrix.” See http://www.dni.gov/content/AT/NIPF.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2012.
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Capability projection requires the support of technically and operationally
qualified experts and an adversarial mindset. Scanning and sifting requires operations in
multiple intelligence modes: financial, open-source, human, and other clandestine
means. Surveillance may require an organization within the Navy to “own” this
responsibility lest it be neglected, and it should be a standing organizational element
because surveillance activities need to be ongoing throughout the lifetime of any product
enabling a surprise. Awareness is a further extension identified by this committee in
which a risk assessment is performed on the capability projections to surmise which are
more likely and in what timeframe. The primary product of phase 1 in the committee’s
proposed framework is a standard risk assessment to gauge which potential surprises
represent the greatest risk to naval forces in the expected time frame. The expected
timeframe would be based partly on trends in technology readiness level (TRL) of
technologies enabling surprises, which can be different for different potential adversaries.
Observation 2: Assessing Surprise
(Adopt Nonconventional Thinking!)
In discussions with leaders from the three example programs named above, the
committee has observed the following characteristics of a strong anticipatory modeling
and analysis capability:23
Team independence;
Access to a strong base of cross-disciplining technical, and operational
expertise;
An ability to identify threats through campaign-level modeling, system-of-
systems simulation, and high-fidelity physics-based models;
Precise vulnerability modeling, and analysis capability;
Mechanisms for recommending and/or deploying solutions as necessary;
Significant steady funding; and
Focus on a particular mission.
Delving into each of these areas in greater detail, the committee has observed that
successful red teams have been granted independence in their assessment of
vulnerabilities and evaluation of threat responses.
The committee has also observed that in order to identify threats and anticipate
surprise, successful red teams perform modeling and analysis at three levels of fidelity:
(1) campaign-level modeling validated through (2) system-of-systems simulation made
realistic by (3) high-fidelity, physics-based models. Successful implementation of this
multitiered modeling involves an ability to leverage simulations that exist today and are
being developed in government laboratories and industry, often by individuals in the
small and medium enterprises networks. Running exercises and threat scenarios through
23
As discussed earlier in this report, these example programs are (1) the Navy SSBN Security Program,
(2) the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation Program (Air Force Red Team), and (3) the Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense Program (whose responsiveness was exemplified by the shoot down of the wayward
National Reconnaissance Office satellite, code name Operation Burnt Frost).
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this 3-tiered modeling and analysis capability will identify potential threats, allow for
response evaluation, and identify potential vulnerabilities. Subsequent, in-depth
vulnerability assessment (including precise evaluation of algorithm, software, hardware,
or system performance issues) has proven essential to determining the impact of a threat
and an effective response.
Following on the theme, as understanding of the implementation of and
capabilities for potential surprises mature it is important that independent red teams are
engaged with the appropriate balance of skills to ensure as complete an understanding as
possible, particularly from military and/or cultural perspectives that may not exist within
core organizations. Their own cultural ethos makes U.S. forces vulnerable to
unanticipated surprise by determined foes that do not play by U.S. rules or values, as is
all too visible in hostage taking and exploitation of civilians. For example,
misrepresentation coupled with media exploitation to influence world opinion and rally
discontent could provide a fatal punch to a military operation. Social media could be
exploited to interfere with the executions of naval missions as in the Surprise Scenario 3
example, flash mob-like surprises.
In this committee’s opinion, radical departures from conventional thinking are
essential to preparing forces for combat and the development of new tactics. Indeed,
various organizations have looked at methods to expand the composition of red teams to
achieve diversity in thinking to better represent the adversary. Desired attributes of red
teams include cultural, ethnic, and international diversity; are multiservice,
multigenerational, multidiscipline makeup; independence, and inclusion of nonmilitary,
business, commercial, and academic-sector members. The NRAC 2008 “Commercial
Technology Red Cell Experiment” that allowed a group of nonspecialists to brainstorm
possible responses to U.S. power projection was an example of a good experiment to
predict capabilities.24 This experiment demonstrated that “credible threats to [naval]
forces could be developed from imaginative combinations of commercial products and
that the internet functions as an R&D resource and global supply chain for irregular
forces.” An expected outcome of this activity is the continually updated prioritization of
projected surprises based on the risk and expected timeframe from the scanning and
awareness function and the projected impact of the most likely surprise capabilities from
the red-teaming assessment.
Observation 3: Prioritization, Decisions, and Resourcing
(Evaluate and Prepare to Make Tough Choice Trade Offs!)
With inputs on both (1) risk assessment of emerging technologies and behaviors
and (2) technology readiness level (TRL) of those technologies with greater risk of
surprise, including projected timeline, from the Scanning and Awareness phase, and with
vetted impact prioritization by an authoritative red teaming community from the
Assessing Surprise phase, the Prioritization, Decisions, and Resourcing process can focus
on the tradeoff options for the most cost-effective, lowest risk to deliver, and timeliest
24
Naval Research Advisory Committee. 2008. Disruptive Commercial Technologies, Assistant
Secretary to the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of Defense, Washington,
D.C., June 26, pp. 5-11.
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introduction of surprise mitigation or contingency capabilities. This tradeoff is not
trivial, since the relative value of effective, “time-to-market” cost and risk may not be
easy to establish and, in fact, may lead to a series of capability releases—one that can be
fielded quickly by that is only partially effective and a follow-on release that provides
more needed capability at a later time.
In this context, a new program start is a last resort as it is the most expensive and
has the longest time to deliver. As this is typically not a new program start, the full
assessment of alternatives methodology may not be warranted due to cost and time
constraints. A model-based, and perhaps experiment-verified, approach to mitigate or
provide contingency against surprise in a straightforward and timely manner is
envisioned. If an operational TTP is deemed most appropriate, the Navy’s Fleet Forces
Command (FFC) or its U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Coast Guard counterpart would be
resourced to develop, train, and field the capability. The operation of the SSBN Security
Program provides a very useful and model and example for prioritization, decision
making, and resourcing in adopting mitigating actions against an array of potential
surprises.25
Given the prioritization of needs against surprises presenting high risk to U.S.
forces, and based on the potential impacts that have been identified and red teamed, what
is needed next is to determine how to best programmatically integrate each surprise-
mitigating capability into the force. This determination requires anticipatory analysis and
the associated modeling. It is important that each of these mitigation determination
efforts be done at the appropriate modeling resolution and scale; i.e, model fidelity, so
that the potential program impact is properly understood for operational system and
resource requirements development.
The newer models at all levels of detail that have been developed and are being
used in various programs are of much higher fidelity as compared to older models, based
on evolving computing capabilities and increasingly instrumented test data for validation.
These should be used as appropriate to gain sufficiently accurate predictive data and
metrics on a potential capability surprise. Further, some of the potential surprises may be
of such a nature that new models must be developed to make adequate evaluations.
In performing the model-based analysis, it is also important to define metrics that
can put surprises in an operational context that will permit reasonable program tradeoff
25
In the prioritization of efforts against the access denial scenario, the committee believes the best near-
term mitigation to an unfavorable offensive/defensive missile exchange in an anti-access/area denial
(A2AD) environment may be to advance the capabilities of networked electronic warfare and creation of
cyber attack contingencies for which missile engagements become a last resort. It envisions a program to
resource development of nonkinetic system modifications and solutions (electronic countermeasures and
deception, cyber intrusion, and directed energy) as a viable prioritization option. A key focus area would
be to develop approaches for which the nonkinetic means would be attempted first with sufficient kill
assessment indication to provide a reliable input to the decision to engage with kinetic means.
Alternatively, if such kill assessment is not readily identified in the near term, the contingency conditions
for which nonkinetic measures are most appropriately used separate from kinetic measures should be
investigated. For this example, investigations of nonkinetic approaches be considered along the entire
threat kill chains.
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evaluations to be conducted.26 For example, the operational concept for unmanned
undersea vehicles (UUVs) both as a surprise threat and as a potential U.S. surprise
enabler, would likely require new system level and, at least upgraded campaign level
models to allow capability impact assessments and development of operational and
resourcing requirements.
The committee recognizes that hedging against surprise is not free, and that in a
period of declining national security budget “top lines,” protecting the flexibility to deal
with surprise will perforce come at the direct expense of reductions in traditional naval
capabilities.
Observation 4: Development and Implementation
(Use New Acquisition Starts Only as a Last Resort!)
In the early stages of this study, the committee was exposed to several critical
cases where acquisition of new capability was identified as a process that is inordinately
slow, and has the risk of impeding naval forces ability to respond to potential surprises—
even for those surprises that fall into the category of intelligence-inferred surprise. For
example, in the committee’s exploration of potential capability surprises associated with
denial-of-space (Scenario #1) discussions with NRL’s Tactical Electronic Warfare
Division provided examples wherein multiyear acquisition strategies do not appear to be
pacing the evolving threat.27
A natural and easy response to why it takes so long to field new potential
capabilities (in address to potential surprises by adversaries) would be to point to the
DOD acquisition system and address changes through an update to the DOD 5000
procedures.28 Traditionally this has focused on the Federal Acquisition Regulations
System (FARS)/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Systems (DFARS) procedures
with a particular emphasis on the requirements oversight (e.g., the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS), etc.) processes.
Unfortunately, while the problem is widely recognized and while numerous
studies over the past few years have recommended changes or adjuncts to the DOD 5000
process, little meaningful progress has been made in speeding up the acquisition process.
Therefore, as this study moves forward, it is the intent of this committee to take a
different approach to the acquisition challenge and focus less on the procurement process
and more on the way that we ask industry to develop and provide capability. As with any
solution, the answers must not only be capable but also affordable to both the military
26
To date, the committee has received input from several organizations that have modeling and analysis
capabilities for use by naval forces, including OPNAV N81, the Naval Research Laboratory, the Office of
Naval Research, the Naval War College, the Naval Post Graduate School, the Navy Warfare Development
Command, MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.
One output of this committee’s final report is anticipated to be a brief profile of the various type modeling
capabilities in organizations at the disposal of U.S. naval leadership.
27
Data-gathering session with the Naval Research Laboratory, Tactical Electronic Warfare Division,
Washington, D.C., May 2, 2012.
28
The Department of Defense acquisition policy is contained in DOD Directive 5000.1.
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and industry alike. As suggested earlier, because of the burdens associated with DFARS,
a new program start is a last resort, as the most expensive and longest time to deliver.29
Several organizations interviewed by the committee indicated that a regulation-
burdened acquisition program as an almost insurmountable barrier to preparation and
rapid technology response to any capability surprise.30 The committee recognized an
even more foundational issue: that naval surprise normally occurs at the operational and
mission level, while naval acquisition organizations and processes are centered on
platform delivery. Several promising suggestions were raised during our investigations.
Consciously building in capacity and capability reserve (software, hardware, and
weapons) in platform payloads, including mission modules for the littoral combat ships,
has potential for a cost-effective way to establish agility to respond to surprise. This
method minimizes the changes to the capital intensive investments to platforms, while
focusing on the packages that actually deliver mission capabilities and offers the
emphasis on incremental improvements that may be rapidly implemented. Another
suggestion explored formalizing and resourcing mission syndicates composed of the
platform, sensor, and weapon research, requirements, resource, and acquisition
organizations that provide contributions in delivery of a particular mission’s capability.
This is an enhancement to OPNAV N95 coordination of a mine warfare enterprise and
the naval laboratory warfare center concepts, where the syndicate lead is the holder of
resources and “buys” mission platforms, sensors, and weapons from the providers. A
mission focus approach to acquisition may inspire a more “systems of systems”
engineering approach, and could reach across a board category of mission resources to
anticipate and respond to surprise.
Observation 5: Force Response
(Exercise, Exercise, Exercise!)
In its current preparation for addressing known gaps that might arise from a new
surprise, naval forces typically identify shortfalls in capabilities and flow these into the
Department of the Navy and Department of Homeland Security requirements process—
including use of urgent operational needs. The process by which gaps are identified,
articulated, and prioritized is essential to maximizing naval capabilities and aligning
appropriate countermeasures. Current success utilizing the requirements process in
29
The committee notes with interest the computer-model-based approach that the U.S. Army, in
partnership with DARPA is taking to develop the next generation ground combat vehicle, a new start
program. The premise is that validated model-based calculation and simulations can expedite passage
through the complex acquisition milestones by providing a more quantitative basis for decisions without
requiring the building and testing of critical components. This development bears monitoring. LTC
Nathan Wiedenman, USA, and Paul Eremenko, Program Managers, DARPA’s Tactical Technology
Office.”DARPA Perspectives,” presentation to the committee, February 29, 2012, Washington, D.C.
30
The committee was briefed by several experts who pointed out acquisition challenges associated with
capability and readiness, including discussions with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation on April 12. For detailed discussion of a concrete example of
concern, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House
of Representatives, 2012, Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on
Overcoming Acquisition Challenges, GAO-12-15, Washington, D.C., March.
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establishing capabilities for surprise will be reviewed in detail in the final report. Any
deficiencies noted by the committee addressed through recommendations.
The committee’s initial observations are that naval forces may not be preparing
realistically for surprise, such as through reliance on games, modeling and simulation,
exercises, and challenging red-teaming that creates and exploits simulated failures in
networks and in space capabilities like GPS. Moreover, naval forces must adopt
unconventional thinking and a common weakness is letting the designers of systems and
concepts do their own red teaming. Experience teaches time and time again that people
do not find a lot of flaws with their own work and, as such, independent red teaming is
vital. At the same time, it is reasonable to state that red teams are subject to the same
cultural influences discussed earlier and, as such, the committee plans to address these
and other areas related to red teaming in greater depth in its final report.31
Rather, this committee’s impressions are that it is more typical for naval forces to
exercise assuming chat rooms are operating and networks are functioning, because the
denial of these would be “too hard” and/or require substantially more resources than
available for the exercises. Yet it is well known that this potential surprise exists. The
presence of cyber attacks, for instance, would be so disruptive that it is imperative that
top cover be provided to execute any game or exercise with it. The Navy has not trained
to operate in a denied environment for many years, though that condition was typical in
past practice events some 20 years ago. There is a need to move out aggressively with
realistic red-teaming, exercises, and training to establish procedures—such as for voice
recognition—that must function in less-optimum environments.
To date, the committee has conducted only preliminary discussion on preparation
and readiness with naval fleet. This area will be explored more completely in the final
report and will utilize the surprise examples of this study (mitigation of space access,
missile magazine depletion and social media surprise), plus potentially other scenarios as
‘pathfinders’ to develop and exercise the new organizational processes.
Observation 6: Factoring Surprise into Naval Preparedness
(Drive a Cultural Shift!)
As discussed earlier in this report, capability surprise is an inherently complex
and multifaceted issue. As such, a sustainable and effective approach will likely require a
shift in organizational thinking. An organization’s ability to react to any type of surprise
depends on all levels of leadership to properly assess the situation, understand the overall
mission objectives, create a mental decision model on which to act, and have the
authority to call on as many diverse naval capabilities as required to respond.
For example, while some surprises arise slowly with ample indicators of a
potential capability, the future types of very short-term capability surprises such as
suicide bomb attacks on the USS Cole, and the 911 World Trade Towers require having
31
Similar remarks pertain to the statements about the need to shift to a more “surprise ready”
organizational culture, and the concomitant need for metrics for surprise readiness. Strong evidential
support for the lack of surprise readiness and clear justification of the benefits of moving toward a culture
of surprise readiness is important will be important for the committee to consider in its final report.
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“meta-organizations”32 approaches understood and ready to be executed in minutes to
hours across the appropriate skill and authority areas. This is important not only to
support the immediate responses, but to rapidly examine other areas where an adversary
might use these capabilities and very rapidly prepare responses to mitigate those potential
capability surprise extensions across the entire regime that might be at risk.
While the committee has not yet explored the potential for generating meaningful
metrics that might be used in addressing naval preparedness for dealing with potential
capability surprise, we believe a cultural shift is needed towards increased flexibility and
agility to react when such surprise or “black swan” events occur. This committee
believes that integral to the organizations’ effectiveness in dealing with surprise is the
issue of metrics, and the potential incorporation of surprise readiness into these metrics.
Concepts to develop and integrate the culture of surprise readiness across the naval
enterprise will be presented in the final report.
THE WAY AHEAD
All naval forces of the world have been nurtured in an environment that breeds on
honing one’s ability to deal with surprise. Professionalism as a mariner was often judged
by an ability to “read” the winds and seas or to “weather” a storm without lost of limb or
ships capability. This single-handed ability to deal with the surprises faced by the captain
of a vessel is a classic template that has colored naval operations since 1776.
Thankfully, tremendous advances in technology and information sharing have
given captains enhanced tools and data with which to face today’s surprises—as long as
the event has been previously experienced and a reliable solution known.
However, when a totally new surprise emerges, it takes strong leadership to steer
away from “let the captain handle it” or “let the commander and his staff figure this one
out.” An ad hoc approach to facing a new problem is not likely to result in a high-quality
solution, even less likely to be worthy of attribution to the mature and capable naval
forces of the United States.
Historically, the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard have registered some “eye-
watering” successes based upon timely and thoughtful ad hoc reaction to surprise.
Similarly, some solutions have been less than stellar.
The goal of naval forces must be to always find the best reaction to a surprise,
using the fullest measure of knowledge, intelligence, experience, and talent that can be
brought to bear.
In the coming months, the committee plans to continue its work to provide an
expanded and more comprehensive examination of the topics covered in this interim
report and to complete its final report expeditiously. Furthermore, in the preparation of
its final report, the committee will explore additional capability-surprise-related topics,
32
Meta-organizations or meta-leadership are used when there are unexpected or fast changing situations
such as in public health or homeland security to coordinate/lead across different organizations. An
example was the response led by ADM Thad Allan, former Commandant of the Coast Guard, in response
to Hurricane Katrina. Additional discussion on meta-organizations is found in the Scandinavian
Management Journal, 2005, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 2005, pp. 429-449; available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956522105000813. Accessed June 8, 2012.
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such as the interaction of intelligence and operations, and the potential use of offensive
means to create surprises of U.S. origin to help mitigate or deter unanticipated surprise.
It will also pursue additional interaction with the fleet to explore additional operational
concepts for dealing with potential surprise based on hypothesized scenarios. Finally, the
committee will explore the potential refinement of organizational concepts and suggested
authorities against the committee’s postulated framework for addressing surprise.
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