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1248 3
1249 Proliferation Risks Associated with Inertial Fusion Energy and with Specific
1250 Target Designs
1251
1252
1253 This chapter discusses the potential proliferation risks associated with inertial fusion
1254 energy (IFE). Many modern nuclear weapons rely on a fusion stage as well as a fission stage,
1255 and there has been discussion of the potential for nuclear proliferation—particularly vertical
1256 proliferation27—in a country where an IFE power plant is sited.
1257 We begin by providing some background on nuclear proliferation and inertial
1258 confinement fusion (ICF) and continue with discussions of several related topics: classification
1259 concerns, the relative proliferation risk associated with different target designs, weapons
1260 production in ICF facilities, knowledge transfer, other proliferation risks associated with ICF,
1261 and, finally, the importance of international engagement on this issue.
1262
1263
1264 CONTEXT AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1265
1266 The term “nuclear proliferation” refers to the spread of nuclear weapons knowledge,
1267 technology, and materials to countries or organizations that did not previously have this
1268 capability. Proliferation has been of increasing concern in recent years, particularly following the
1269 successful detonation of a North Korean nuclear weapon, and the signals that Iran may also be
1270 pursuing an illicit nuclear weapons program. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, special
1271 nuclear material (SNM) became available at lightly guarded facilities; it is unclear how much
1272 was lost to theft, but proliferation concerns remain. Another concern arises from the many
1273 nuclear weapons in Pakistan, and whether they are controlled adequately.
1274 Proliferation could occur in several ways: (1) the spread of knowledge about how to build
1275 nuclear weapons to other countries, (2) knowledge of—and access to—the physical technology
1276 used to construct nuclear weapons, (3) access to the materials from which a nuclear weapon
1277 could be constructed (e.g., SNM), and (4) access to people who have been engaged in nuclear
1278 weapons technology in other nations.
1279 Because the first nuclear weapons were built using technology that was later adapted for
1280 use in civilian nuclear power plants and the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, the role that fission power
1281 could play in proliferation has been considered for decades. An international safeguards regime
1282 to detect attempts at proliferation is currently in place and operated by the International Atomic
1283 Energy Agency (IAEA). This regime, which is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
1284 Nuclear Weapons (NPT), involves cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that
1285 nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities are used only for peaceful purposes.
1286 The risk of nuclear proliferation could also be associated with inertial confinement fusion
1287 (ICF) research facilities or, possibly in the future, inertial fusion energy (IFE) plants. For
1288 example, IFE plants and ICF research facilities provide an intense source of neutrons, which
1289 could, in principle, be used to generate 239Pu from 238U. In addition, information that could help
27
Vertical proliferation refers to the enhancement of a country’s capability to move from simple weapons to more
sophisticated weapons.
33
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1290 countries develop more advanced boosted weapons or thermonuclear weapons could be gained
1291 from a thorough understanding of a fusion facility’s operation.
1292 While the effect of a fission-only weapon can be devastating, the development of two-
1293 stage (both fission and fusion) thermonuclear weapons can provide much higher yield per
1294 weapon. By using an ICF facility to improve its understanding of the physics of fusion, a nation
1295 might glean information useful in transitioning its weapons program into a much more complex,
1296 modern, and threatening system. In fact, the U.S. research program in laboratory-based inertial
1297 confinement fusion has been largely funded by the nuclear weapons program, because valuable
1298 information can be learned from ICF that can otherwise be learned only from nuclear testing.28
1299 Because IFE is still at an early stage as a potential energy source, international treaties
1300 related to nuclear weapons and proliferation do not clearly apply to IFE at this time. However,
1301 due to the value of IFE to the U.S. nuclear weapons program and the programs of other nations,
1302 the applicability of some treaties to ICF has been considered.
1303 The NPT does allow for laser fusion experiments, both in states that already have nuclear
1304 weapons and those that do not. As noted in 1998, this position is based on the unopposed, U.S.
1305 unilateral statement at the 1975 NPT Review Conference stating that “nuclear reactions initiated
1306 in millimeter-sized pellets of fissionable and or fusionable material by lasers or by energetic
1307 beams of particles, in which energy releases, while extremely rapid . . . are nondestructively
1308 contained within a suitable vessel . . . [do] not constitute a nuclear explosive device within the
1309 meaning of the NPT . . .” (U.S. DOE, 1995). Even so, the status of pulsed-power fusion
1310 experiments under the NPT remains unclear (Paine and Mckinzie, 1998).
1311 In the 1990s, there was discussion in the United States about whether the Comprehensive
1312 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) also banned the use of ICF.29 Ultimately, the Clinton
1313 administration took the position that ICF is not a prohibited activity under the CTBT (Jones and
1314 von Hippel, 1998), and this position continues to be that of the Obama administration. However,
1315 some experts still debate the applicability of this treaty to ICF (Paine and McKinzie, 1998).
1316 ICF research has received a great deal of specifically directed funding in the United
1317 States in recent years, even though IFE per se has not. This research is funded primarily through
1318 the U.S. nuclear weapons program, which envisions using ICF experiments and modeling as a
1319 method of verifying codes and calculations related to the current U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
1320 Because many of the topics involved in ICF are related in some way to nuclear weapons, much
1321 of the work is classified. The next section provides a brief introduction to the history and current
1322 status of the classification and declassification of various ICF concepts.
1323
1324
1325 CLASSIFICATION: ICF AND IFE
1326
1327 The primary reason stated by the U.S. government for classifying information related to
1328 ICF is to protect information relevant to the design of thermonuclear weapons. The possibility of
28
The moratorium on nuclear testing announced on October 2, 1992, by President George H.W. Bush and extended
by the Clinton administration remains in effect. It was reinforced by the 1996 U.S. signing of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which, however, has not been ratified by the United States Senate. The information gained
by the nuclear weapons program is related to improving our understanding of weapons components built during the
cold war, including the effects of aging on component performance.
29
It should be noted that the U.S. is not currently a party to the CTBT but as a signatory is bound not to act in
violation of the fundamental restrictions of the CTBT.
34
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1329 using lasers to ignite fuel was first considered by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the
1330 national weapons laboratories in the early 1960s. At that time, concerns about the potential for
1331 laser fusion weapons as well as close ties between ICF concepts and nuclear weapons design
1332 (particularly physics and simulation codes) led the AEC to classify research on ICF. The first
1333 classification guidance for inertial confinement fusion information was issued in 1964. Initially,
1334 all aspects of ICF were considered to be classified.
1335 Declassification of fusion concepts began slowly in the 1970s, and by August 1974,
1336 essentially all work with directly irradiated fusion targets was declassified. After a long pause,
1337 declassification began again in the late 1980s and continued through the early 1990s. Most
1338 notably, in late 1990, an Inertial Confinement Fusion Classification Review was requested by the
1339 Secretary of Energy with the intent of eliminating unnecessary restrictions on information
1340 relevant to the energy applications of inertial confinement fusion. The panel included
1341 representatives from the DOE national laboratories, the Department of State, the Arms Control
1342 and Disarmament Office, and other stakeholders, and the report was issued on March 19, 1991.
1343 The key panel recommendations included these: (1) “For laboratory capsules absorbing <10 MJ
1344 of energy and with maximum dimension <1 cm, all information should be declassified with some
1345 exemptions,” and (2) “Some Centurion-Halite declassification would be desirable to gain the
1346 scientific credibility needed to advance the energy mission of ICF.” (U.S. DOE, 2001). Later, on
1347 December 7, 1993, nearly all information on laboratory ICF experiments was declassified.30
1348 At present, much of the information related to ICF targets has been declassified, with several
1349 notable exceptions. First, some aspects of computer codes and certain target designs remain
1350 classified, as well as the details of some historical experiments related to ICF (in particular, the
1351 Centurion-Halite program). Some aspects of classified targets are discussed in the classified
1352 Appendix F.
1353 Whether or not aspects of ICF are classified is highly relevant to the future of IFE. If
1354 essential parts of an IFE plant are classified, this could create significant complexities for
1355 commercialization. Although some commercial facilities rely on classified concepts (such as
1356 those involved in the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear fuel), there are likely to be export
1357 controls or specific regulations involved in dealing with this situation.
1358 It is important to realize that classification or export controls could themselves indirectly
1359 cause proliferation risks if denial of information, technology, or materials causes some nations to
1360 mount covert programs or withdraw from the NPT.
1361 There are four possible scenarios for future classification of IFE concepts. The first
1362 possibility is simple—the target will be classified or other key aspects of the concept will be
1363 classified. The second possibility is that the target is unclassified, but the expertise needed to
1364 make or assess it will involve classified information or codes. A third possibility is that other
1365 parts of the plant (e.g., lasers) will be considered to be dual use and subject to export controls.
1366 Any of these three outcomes could be very troublesome at a commercial plant. On the other
1367 hand, a fourth possibility is that the target and expertise will be unclassified, and none of the key
1368 elements of the plant are subject to export controls. If this is feasible, it would be the simplest
1369 configuration and a highly desirable goal for the future commercialization of IFE.
1370
1371
30
Roy Johnson, LLNL, “The History of ICF Classification,” a document provided to the panel on February 24,
2011.
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1372 PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT IFE TARGET
1373 CONCEPTS
1374
1375 Any kind of ICF seeks to achieve thermonuclear ignition and burn. As noted previously,
1376 this goal relates ICF to thermonuclear weapons, and for this reason ICF (whether in a research
1377 facility or a power plant) is seen to pose some proliferation risk. However, this risk is mitigated
1378 by the fact that (1) nuclear weapons are much larger than ICF targets, and (2) their operation
1379 presents some different engineering challenges.
1380 Indirect-drive targets are associated with some proliferation concerns because the physics
1381 involved is more closely related to the physics associated with thermonuclear weapons than is
1382 the case with direct drive. In particular, the functioning of indirect-drive targets involves the use
1383 of X-rays in the hohlraum to drive the capsule implosion. ICF using indirect drive was
1384 declassified in 1991.
1385 In any case, the processes involved in heavy-ion deposition (for heavy-ion-driven fusion)
1386 and the beam-plasma interactions that occur in direct-drive capsules are physically much more
1387 remote from conditions in existing thermonuclear weapons. In addition, these processes do not
1388 relate to any feasible design for a weapon that the panel is aware of. For these reasons, it is the
1389 judgment of the panel that heavy-ion fusion and direct-drive fusion pose (arguably) fewer
1390 proliferation concerns.
1391 The Z-pinch fusion concept is likewise remote from existing weapons. However, during
1392 the cold war, the Soviet program in explosively driven magnetic implosion (MAGO) progressed
1393 further than any other approach to pure fusion, though like all such approaches, it was still very
1394 far from ignition (Garanin et al., 2006, Velikhov, 2008). Since the 1990s, LANL and the All
1395 Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) have carried out joint experiments
1396 on MAGO (Lindemuth et al., 1995).
1397 In the future, as processing power for desktop and academic computers continues to
1398 increase, and as knowledge of plasma physics continues to accumulate in the open literature,
1399 many of these concerns may become less relevant, including the proliferation risk distinction
1400 between indirect drive and other forms of ICF that might be used for IFE. Enough physics
1401 knowledge may accumulate in the public arena that the use of indirect-drive IFE would not be
1402 able to add much to publicly available knowledge. In such a world, codes would be classified
1403 according to their direct use for (and calibration from) nuclear weapons, not according to the
1404 physics that they model. However, if an IFE plant were to rely on classified codes for target
1405 design or other operational aspects, and knowledge of these technologies could be used to gain
1406 information about the codes’ details, proliferation would be a concern.
1407
1408 CONCLUSION 3-1: At present, there are more proliferation concerns associated with
1409 indirect-drive targets than with direct-drive targets. However, the spread of technology
1410 around the world may eventually render these concerns moot. Remaining concerns are likely to
1411 focus on the use of classified codes for target design.
1412
1413
1414 WEAPONS MATERIAL PRODUCTION AT IFE PLANTS
1415
1416 One of the key proliferation risks associated with any fusion plant (ICF or magnetic
1417 confinement fusion) is that it is possible to use the plant to create materials that are essential for
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1418 the construction of nuclear weapons. These materials fall into two primary categories: special
1419 nuclear materials and tritium. Both types of material can be produced without the use of fusion
1420 facilities, but commercial fusion plants may be a more convenient source for these materials for
1421 those who cannot acquire them easily in another way. The potential for the production of each
1422 type of material is discussed next.
1423
1424
1425 Special Nuclear Materials
1426
1427 As noted previously, it is technically possible to utilize the significant neutron flux
1428 emanating from a fusion reactor core to produce 239Pu from 238U. To accomplish this task
1429 covertly, it would be necessary to:
1430
1431 • Move quantities of uranium into the immediate vicinity of the fusion core and
1432 • Acquire technology for—and construct—the appropriate reprocessing facilities to
1433 separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products.
1434
1435 The first task is likely to be operationally cumbersome. In addition, the transfer of large
1436 quantities of uranium into and out of a fusion power plant would likely be detectable, as such
1437 conveyance would not be a normal operation for such a plant. The development and construction
1438 of a reprocessing facility—assuming that it had not already been built and brought into
1439 operation—would also be necessary. The technology is not new, but it requires significant
1440 radiation-handling capability. The construction and operation of such a facility would probably
1441 be detectable by the current safeguards regime.
1442 Overall, the panel judges that the construction and diversion of an IFE plant in this
1443 fashion is not the simplest path for a host state to produce SNM. Research reactors and
1444 commercial nuclear plants capable of serving the same purpose (irradiation of uranium for
1445 plutonium production) exist in many nations. However, a previously built and operating fusion
1446 plant could serve as a path of opportunity for a nation interested in developing weapons. Such
1447 facilities may therefore have to be subject to inspection to assure that they would not be so used,
1448 and to IAEA safeguards in states that do not already have nuclear weapons.
1449 However, if terrorists were to seize an IFE plant, it could provide them with neutrons for
1450 the production of material to make a weapon of mass destruction. In this case, any facility
1451 capable of producing neutrons could be useful, but it is possible that no better solution would be
1452 available. Nonetheless, as noted above, an effective form of reprocessing would still be needed
1453 to isolate the plutonium.
1454 For these reasons, the panel believes that a fusion plant raises fewer proliferation
1455 concerns than a fission plant with respect to the production of nuclear materials. However, in a
1456 region free of nuclear facilities, siting of a fusion plant could increase the proliferation risk in
1457 that region if the fusion plant were totally exempt from inspection by the IAEA or other
1458 international body. A hybrid fusion-fission plant would have the proliferation disadvantages and
1459 the economic problems of both technologies.
1460
1461
1462
1463
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1464 Tritium
1465
1466 In order to fuel itself, a functioning IFE plant would likely be designed to continually
1467 breed a stream of tritium in vast amounts: about 60 kg per year for a plant of 1 GW (thermal)
1468 capacity. Tritium is not only an essential fuel for a fusion power plant, but it can also be used in
1469 part to fuel modern, boosted fission weapons or thermonuclear weapons.
1470 The diversion of some portion of the substantial tritium stream would be relatively
1471 straightforward, but such diversion does not necessarily pose a significant proliferation threat per
1472 se. However, for a state already possessing nuclear weapons the diversion of only a few grams of
1473 tritium would be significant and would be difficult to detect. In addition, tritium can be produced
1474 in other ways if a state needs it. To date, tritium for nuclear weapons and other purposes has been
1475 produced using fission reactors.
1476 With current technologies tritium alone, unlike SNM, cannot be used to build a nuclear
1477 weapon, and only a host state with relatively advanced capabilities would find such a stream of
1478 tritium to be useful. Indeed, for primitive nuclear weapons, tritium does not need to be used at
1479 all. However, if a significant diversion of tritium is observed, it could be a signal to the
1480 international community that the host state is considering increasing its nuclear capability to
1481 include more advanced weapons using boosting or thermonuclear burn.
1482
1483
1484 KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AT ICF FACILITIES
1485
1486 A second path for a potential proliferator might be the covert acquisition of key
1487 information about fusion, drawing on knowledge gained from operating a fusion facility. This
1488 path is discussed separately for research facilities and energy facilities in the following sections.
1489
1490
1491 Inertial Confinement Fusion Research Facilities
1492
1493 Research facilities—such as the National Ignition Facility (NIF)—pose different
1494 proliferation concerns than a fully functioning inertial fusion power plant, and the concerns
1495 associated with a host country misusing a research facility are likely to be greater than those
1496 associated with a fusion power plant. A fusion research facility is designed for the purpose of
1497 increasing physics understanding on a range of topics, not for a specific function (i.e., energy
1498 production). A power plant, however, is likely to be highly specialized and not designed with the
1499 flexibility inherent in a research machine. In addition, research facility diagnostics by their
1500 nature will provide hints about the underlying physics that power plant diagnostics may not.
1501 If considered fully, the proliferation risk associated with a research facility can go beyond the
1502 physical presence of the facility in one nation or another. Research facilities may cater to a range
1503 of scientific interests beyond the needs of either the power generation community or the weapons
1504 community. For example, the NIF provides the plasma physics community with a highly
1505 effective experimental test and validation for a number of codes and theories that may indirectly
1506 or directly relate to the physics required for an understanding of thermonuclear weapons.
1507 Because the research community is intrinsically both open and international, such an improved
1508 understanding of plasma physics could provide a range of potentially useful information to a
1509 proliferator.
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1510 This increase in understanding is unlikely to stop, regardless of U.S. decisions. In the
1511 coming decades, both experiments and simulation in research facilities worldwide are likely to
1512 surpass current U.S. capabilities. For example, continuing increases in computing speed and
1513 understanding in the open research community could result in extremely capable physics codes.
1514 However, it should be clear that information about physics is not the same as information about
1515 weapons design. For a nation that has never successfully (or unsuccessfully) detonated a
1516 thermonuclear weapon, no fusion research facility or power plant can adequately replace
1517 experimental physics and engineering knowledge gained from nuclear testing.
1518
1519
1520 IFE Power Plants
1521
1522 An IFE power plant, as noted above, is unlikely to be highly flexible, and a research
1523 facility is likely to provide more information to a potential proliferator. By the time a design is
1524 commercialized, the physics will likely have been well understood (or engineered around), and
1525 the designs of the individual components will have been optimized to the extent possible for
1526 power production. In addition, the diagnostics will be likely to be optimized for the needs of a
1527 power plant operator, not for the needs of a physicist attempting to learn useful weapons
1528 information.
1529 However, knowledge transfer remains a concern if an IFE power plant is deployed
1530 overseas in a country where proliferation is a concern, because local expertise will be needed to
1531 operate the plant. The plant may not yield useful information about the physics involved in the
1532 reaction, but could provide information about energies needed and other technological details
1533 that must be known to obtain ignition in a fuel pellet. Moreover, personnel would gain practical
1534 experience in handling tritium. Whether this knowledge would be greater than that obtainable in
1535 the open literature is unclear.
1536
1537 CONCLUSION 3-2: The nuclear weapons proliferation risks associated with fusion power
1538 plants are real but are likely to be controllable. These risks fall into three categories:
1539 • Knowledge transfer,
1540 • SNM production, and
1541 • Tritium diversion.
1542
1543 CONCLUSION 3-3: Research facilities are likely to be a greater proliferation concern than
1544 power plants. A working power plant is less flexible than a research facility, and it is likely to
1545 be more difficult to explore a range of physics problems with a power plant. However, domestic
1546 research facilities, which may have a mix of defense and scientific missions, are more
1547 complicated to put under international safeguards than commercial power plants. Furthermore,
1548 the issue of proliferation from research facilities will have to be dealt with long before
1549 proliferation from potential power plants becomes a concern.
1550
1551
1552 ICF FOR OTHER PURPOSES
1553
1554 One proliferation concern associated with ICF is the potential for the development of a
1555 laser fusion weapon, as discussed briefly in the section on classification earlier in this chapter.
39
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1556 However, owing to the size, complexity, and energy requirements of existing or planned driver
1557 systems, the panel does not consider this to be a credible and immediate concern with respect to
1558 current concepts for inertial fusion energy, such as laser-driven fusion energy. However, in the
1559 distant future, advances in laser technology could change this picture.
1560 In a 1998 declassification decision, the Department of Energy (DOE) stated that “the U.S.
1561 does not have and is not developing a pure fusion weapon and no credible design for a pure
1562 fusion weapon resulted from the DOE investment.” (U.S. DOE, 1991). According to information
1563 released after the cold war, the Soviet experience was similar. However, this concern might
1564 someday materialize with currently unforeseen technology developments. For this reason and to
1565 alleviate any current concerns, it will be important to address the possibility (or impossibility) of
1566 pure fusion weapons in policy discussions and in the safeguards regime.
1567
1568
1569 THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
1570
1571 As described in the previous sections, there are proliferation risks associated with the use
1572 of ICF facilities around the world, and—should IFE concepts prove to be fruitful—with IFE
1573 plants themselves.
1574 Managing proliferation, whether it is associated with fission concepts or fusion concepts,
1575 is intrinsically an international problem. While one country may not allow the export of certain
1576 technologies, other countries that do not consider the technology as sensitive may choose to
1577 allow it. In addition, the result of proliferation—the successful construction of a nuclear weapon
1578 by one more state—is international in its consequences.
1579 For this reason, preventing proliferation associated with fusion energy requires
1580 international agreement on methods for managing the risks of the technologies involved,
1581 including safeguards. The IAEA defines the purpose of its safeguards system as follows:
1582
1583 …to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other
1584 specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. Towards this end, the safeguards
1585 system consists of several, interrelated elements: (i) the Agency’s statutory authority to establish
1586 and administer safeguards; (ii) the rights and obligations assumed in safeguards agreements and
1587 additional protocols; and (iii) the technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements.
1588 These, taken together, enable the Agency to independently verify the declarations made by States
1589 about their nuclear material and activities.
1590
1591 This safeguards system has been in place for decades to verify compliance with the
1592 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) for fission plants and fuel cycle facilities around the
1593 world. If new facilities that also pose a proliferation risk—such as fusion facilities—were to be
1594 deployed around the world, it would be sensible to either include them in the current regime or to
1595 design a similar safeguards regime for these facilities.
1596 Of course, these safeguards would need to take into account the design of a particular
1597 fusion power plant. Although numerous design concepts have been advanced,31 the panel did not
1598 see any credible, complete power plant designs. This has benefits, as it provides an opportunity
1599 to consider “safeguardability” directly in the initial design of a fusion power plant.
31
See, for example, OSIRIS and SOMBRERO Inertial Fusion Power Plant Designs – DOE/ER-54100-1, March
1992, and “Inertial Fusion Energy Reactor Design Studies Prometheus-L and Prometheus-H,” DOE/ER-54101,
March 1992.
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1600 Early international discussions on this topic could be very helpful in reaching an
1601 international consensus on the key proliferation concerns associated with the use of inertial
1602 fusion power plants as well as how to manage these concerns (Goldston and Glaser, 2011).
1603
1604 CONCLUSION 3-4: It will be important to consider international engagement regarding
1605 the potential for proliferation associated with IFE power plants.
1606
1607
1608 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF FUSION PLANTS WITH RESPECT TO
1609 PROLIFERATION
1610
1611 Proliferation is most tied to access to SNM, e.g., using enrichment processes. Richard
1612 Meserve32 recently wrote that “There is no proliferation risk from the [fission] reactors.
1613 Proliferation risks can arise from enrichment facilities because the technology could be used for
1614 weapons purposes.” (Meserve, 2011) An advantage of fusion plants with respect to
1615 nonproliferation is that SNM will not be used in the plants and SNM will not be accessible from
1616 the waste products, as it is from fission plants. This lack of direct access to SNM is the major
1617 nonproliferation advantage of a fusion plant.
1618 The disadvantage is inertial fusion power plants is that they allow access to knowledge
1619 and experience with fusion, which will necessarily increase with the design and operation of
1620 such plants. The latest nuclear weapons use fusion as a major source of the explosion energy.
1621 These concerns were outlined in a presentation by an official (Massard, 2010):
1622
1623 As an EU [European Union] requirement, we keep a clear separation between IFE and
1624 ‘sensitive’ weapons science (nonproliferation)
1625 • No use of weapons codes in the European programs
1626 • No benchmarking of physics code with weapons code
1627 • Not in favor of indirect drive capsule option in the European program for sensitivity
1628 issues
1629
1630 European countries have strong collaborations in ICF (for example, HiPER). The French
1631 are building a laser fusion facility, LMJ, which is broadly similar to NIF and which will be the
1632 most capable driver available in Europe. As a matter of policy, these programs will pursue
1633 direct-drive ICF but do not intend to pursue indirect drive for IFE (Massard, 2010), because of
1634 the perceived proliferation risk. The United Kingdom participates in LMJ and HiPER and also
1635 actively participates at NIF in the United States, and in the latter context is pursuing indirect-
1636 drive ICF.33
1637 The Russian program in pure fusion evolved historically from the pre-1991 Soviet
1638 nuclear weapons program (Velikhov, 2008). Its major emphasis is on magnetic confinement
1639 fusion, which is not within the scope of this report. In ICF, two methods have received
1640 continuing attention in Russia: laser fusion and magnetized target fusion (MTF). Although
1641 research supporting ICF development is ongoing with smaller lasers (Kirillov et al., 2000;
32
Former Chair of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and chair of the IAEA safety advisory group.
33
John Collier, UK Science and Technology Facilities Council, “Recent Activities and Plans in the EU and UK on
Inertial Fusion Energy”, briefing to the NRC IFE Committee, June 15, 2011.
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1642 Belkov et al., 2010), Russia currently has no laser facility comparable to NIF or LMJ,34 and is
1643 unlikely to achieve laser-driven ignition in the near future. As for magnetized target fusion, the
1644 Russian MAGO concept has been widely advertised, and, as mentioned, joint work with LANL
1645 is ongoing. The proliferation risks of the MAGO MTF concept have been discussed in detail
1646 (Jones and von Hippel, 1998). Little concern about the potential for proliferation in MAGO is
1647 evident in Russian publications and policy. Indeed, in general, different countries have different
1648 classification policies.
1649
34
A news report in Aug., 2011 suggests that plans for a NIF-class laser at VNIEFF are once again going forward,
with commissioning expected in 2017; however the stated purpose is stockpile stewardship, not ICF
(http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/09/30/57370758.html).
42
