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6 LESSONS LEARNED: OFFSITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The focus of this chapter is on offsite emergency responses to the Fukushima Daiichi accident and lessons learned for emergency preparedness in the United States. The chapter focuses primarily on offsite responses during the first few critical days of the accident (early phase, see Sidebar 6.1). However, information about the early phase response was useful to the committee for identifying lessons learned for the intermediate and late (or recovery) phases. The information used in this chapter was obtained from several sources: independent examinations of the Fukushima Daiichi accident carried out in Japan, the United States, and other countries (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1); Japanese regulations related to offsite emergency management in Japan at the time of the accident; and a number of scientific publications. The committee’s review of Japanese documents was limited to those translated to English. At the committee’s request, NAS arranged for English translations of selected sections of the Japanese government’s 2007 version of the “Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness” (NSC, 2013). At the time of the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, Japanese1 and U.S. approaches for offsite emergency response had many common features. These included specified incident notification levels; guidance on conditions for each notification level; designation of specific emergency planning zones; protective action guidelines (PAGs) for decisions relating to shelter, evacuation, and distribution and administration of potassium iodide (KI)2; and guidelines for food and water intake. However, approaches for managing offsite responses in Japan and the United States were different in some notable ways: Notably, the United States uses a “bottoms-up” approach for managing offsite emergency response. That is, the responsibility for responding to a disaster begins at the local level, extends to state and tribal governments, and can include the federal government as supplemental resources are requested (Sidebar 6.2).3 The Japanese approach at 1 Described in NSC (2013). 2 KI is a prophylactic agent that prevents the uptake of radioactive iodine (i.e., radioiodine) into the thyroid gland and thus reduces the risk of thyroid cancer. 3 There are limited exceptions to this approach. The president of the United States is authorized to support precautionary evacuation measures, accelerate federal emergency response and recovery aid, and provide expedited federal assistance (coordinated with the state to the extent possible) in the absence of a specific request from state officials (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.). Prepublication Copy 6-1

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management the time of the Fukushima Daiichi accident was “top down,” with the central government providing direction and national resources to local communities (NSC, 2013). Despite these differences in approaches, the Japanese response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident provides valuable lessons for the United States. The committee did not have the time or resources to perform an in-depth examination of U.S. preparedness for severe nuclear accidents.4 Also, many U.S. agencies are still in the process of developing lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The committee engaged in discussions with several U.S. agencies that have emergency management responsibilities (see Sidebar 6.3) to become better informed about these ongoing efforts: the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (see meeting agendas in Appendix B). In addition, the committee requested information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This chapter is organized into five sections. The first and second sections aim to put the radiological consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the difficulties in responding to the accident due to the competing natural disasters—the earthquake and tsunami—into perspective. The third section provides a brief description of the offsite emergency response during the first few days of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The fourth section discusses some key issues that arose from the committee’s analysis of the emergency management in Japan. The fifth and final section provides the committee’s lessons learned for nuclear emergency preparedness in the United States. These lessons learned are presented as findings and recommendations and are directed to the U.S. nuclear industry, states and local governments, and federal agencies with emergency preparedness responsibilities. 6.1 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT The Fukushima Daiichi accident is one of the major accidents in the history of commercial nuclear power. The accident resulted in the most extensive release of radioactive materials into the environment since the 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine. Radioactive releases in the environment started on March 12, 2011, and the significant discharge phase ended at midnight on March 25 (IRSN, 2011). However, minimal releases of radioactive material to the atmosphere continued until December 2011 when cold shutdown of the last impacted reactor at the Fukushima Daiichi plant was achieved (Brumfiel, 2011). Releases to the ocean have continued to the present. Both the Fukushima Daiichi and Chernobyl nuclear accidents were designated as Category 7 on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.5 However, the physical health-related radiological consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi accident are less severe than those for the Chernobyl accident for four main reasons: 4 See Chapter 1, Sidebar 1.2 for a definition of “severe accident.” 5 Category 7 is the highest level of the scale. Prepublication Copy 6-2

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management 1. Radioactive releases from the Fukushima Daiichi accident (approximately 100-500 Petabecquerel (PBq)6 of iodine -131 and 6-20 PBq of cesium-1377; UNSCEAR, 2013a) are estimated to be less than 15 percent of those from Chernobyl (approximately 1760 PBq iodine-131 and 85 PBq cesium-137; Povinec et al., 2013; UNSCEAR, 2011). 2. Prevailing winds at the time of the accident appear to have blown about 80 percent of the radioactive material released from the Fukushima Daiichi plant out to the Pacific Ocean (Morino et al., 2011; Kawamura et al., 2011). The majority of the radioactive material deposited over land was dispersed along a track stretching about 50 kilometers to the northwest of the plant. In contrast, radioactive material from Chernobyl was largely deposited over land (UNSCEAR, 2011). 3. Evacuation of those living in proximity (within 3 kilometers) to the Fukushima Daiichi plant was ordered a few hours after the accident began and at least twelve hours before major releases of radioactive materials from the reactors started (Investigation Committee, 2011). At Chernobyl, evacuations started almost a day after the accident began at which point releases had already started (NEA, 2002; UNSCEAR, 2011). 4. Government restrictions put into place after the Fukushima Daiichi accident kept most contaminated foodstuffs off of the market (IAEA, 2011). After the Chernobyl accident there were long delays in implementing appropriate food restrictions in some local areas (UNSCEAR, 2011). The grave consequences of the Chernobyl accident included the immediate deaths of 28 first responders and fire fighters from acute radiation sickness and an epidemic of thyroid cancer in children in Ukraine and neighboring countries.8 With respect to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there is general agreement in the scientific community that no worker received a dose that resulted in acute radiation death or sickness. Also, doses received by members of the public are estimated to be generally low; therefore, any increase in an individual’s risk of developing cancer in the future is also low (WHO, 2013; UNSCEAR, 2013a; Steinhauser et al., 2014). 9,10 6 Becquerel (Bq) is the international (SI) name for the unit of activity; one Bq is equal to one disintegration per second, or 2.7 × 10–11 curies (Ci). 1 PBq = 1.0 × 1015 Bq. 7 The entire inventory of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1-3 was estimated to be 6000 PBq iodine-131 and 700 PBq cesium-137 (UNSCEAR, 2013a). 8 About 6000 excess thyroid cancers were reported up to the year 2005 and many more were projected in the future resulting from exposure to radioactive iodine releases during the Chernobyl accident, mostly through ingestion of contaminated cow’s milk (UNSCEAR, 2011; Cardis et al., 2006). 9 This conclusion is based on the linear no-threshold (LNT) model of risk assessment. According to this model, the risk of developing cancer is proportional to dose received, and even a small dose can result in a small increase in lifetime risk of developing cancer. 10 Using risk-projection models, estimates of the number of cancer cases and deaths possibly attributable to the Fukushima Daiichi accident globally or locally have been published in peer-reviewed journals (Ten Hoeve and Jacobson, 2012; Beyea et al., 2013; Evangeliou et al., 2014). These estimates, which should be considered preliminary, are based on LNT risk models developed by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII) (NAS, 2006). The central estimates range from a few hundred to 1700 cases depending on the specific LNT model used and do not fully account for uncertainties in the model at low doses. Future revisions to the estimates are likely as doses from the Fukushima Daiichi accident are better assessed (similar to the Chernobyl dose assessments; see Cardis et al., 2006). Prepublication Copy 6-3

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management According to reports by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2013) and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR, 2013a), most people in Fukushima prefecture received an effective dose11 between 1 to 10 mSv in the first year following the accident. People from Namie, which is located inside the evacuation zone and Iitate, which is located 40 km (25 miles) northwest of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, may have received the highest effective doses; those doses are estimated to be between 10 to 50 mSv, all delivered in the first year. (For comparison, the average radiation background in Japan is 2.4 mSv per year.)12 However, infants in Namie were thought to have received higher thyroid radiation doses, between 100 to 200 mSv. The authors of the WHO (2013) conclude that “The present results suggest that the increases in the incidence of human disease attributable to the additional radiation exposure from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident are likely to remain below detectable levels.” Nevertheless, the government of Japan has launched a 30-year-long health survey of the 2 million residents of Fukushima Prefecture. The survey includes pediatric thyroid monitoring (Yasumura et al., 2012). This discussion of the physical health-related radiologic consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is not intended to downplay other severe long-term health impacts. Of the approximately 150,000 people who were evacuated as a result of the accident13 (UNSCEAR, 2013a), over 80,000 (WNA, 2014) still lived in shelters or temporary locations three years after the accident with continuing uncertainties about the future. The difficulties in evacuees’ daily lives, possible separation from family members, and loss of property and business or employment are further complicated by the fear of developing cancer from accident-related radiation exposures and the societal stigma resulting from those exposures (NRA, 2013a). As with the Chernobyl accident, mental health effects, which include depression, anxiety, and post- traumatic symptoms, are considered to be the largest public health problem from the accident (González et al., 2013; Bromet, 2014). The environmental and economic consequences of the accident are also severe. About 13,000 km2 of land (about the size of the U.S. state of Connecticut) are contaminated such that the average annual dose to occupants would exceed the 1 mSv per year long-term cleanup goal (Chen and Tenforde, 2012).14 Cleanup of such a large area is proving to be challenging due to 11 Effective dose, expressed in millisieverts (mSv), is a dose parameter used to normalize partial-body radiation exposures relative to whole-body exposures to facilitate radiation protection activities (ICRP, 1991). For nuclear power plant accidents where populations are exposed primarily to gamma radiation, such as occurred as a result of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, whole-body dose expressed as effective dose and reported in mSv and organ absorbed dose reported in mGy are numerically equivalent (NAS, 2006). For consistency throughout this chapter, discussions of dose are in terms of effective dose and reported in mSv. 12 Available at http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/ztokai/kankyo_e/kaisetsu/expln_1.html. Last accessed on June 12, 2014. 13 About 78,000 people living within a 20-km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi plant and 62,000 people living between 20 and 30 km from the plant were evacuated during the first few days of the accident. In April 2011 the government of Japan recommended the evacuation of about 10,000 more people living farther to the northwest of the plant (UNSCEAR, 2013a). See Table 6.1 of this chapter for the evacuation timeline. 14 The IAEA has recommended a short-term goal of achieving effective doses of 1-20 mSv per year with the ultimate goal of achieving residual effective doses at or below 1 mSv per year (IAEA, 2013a). Prepublication Copy 6-4

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management the limited effectiveness of decontamination techniques (Yasutaka et al., 2013), lack of short or long-term plans for disposal of the radioactive waste created by cleanup, and ongoing negotiations among stakeholders about acceptable radiation dose criteria for resettlement. The final determination of how much residential land will be off limits indefinitely has still not been made.15 Return of evacuated persons—although a high priority of the Japanese government— remains an unresolved issue three years after the accident. 6.2 CHALLENGES FOR RESPONDING TO THE ACCIDENT Emergency response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident was greatly inhibited by the widespread and severe destruction caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami: local electrical power and regional communication infrastructure was knocked out and the transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports, and railroads) was damaged. Japan is known to be well prepared for natural hazards; however the earthquake and tsunami caused devastation on a scale beyond what was expected and prepared for. More than 20 prefectures were affected by the natural disaster. The National Police Agency of Japan reports 15,883 confirmed deaths and 2,652 people missing due to the earthquake and tsunami. Damage to buildings was extensive: over 126,000 buildings totally collapsed and about 1 million buildings were partially damaged (National Police Agency of Japan, 2014). Responses to the earthquake and tsunami diverted emergency response teams that could have otherwise focused on responding to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Immediately after the earthquake and tsunami, the government established an emergency response team headed by the prime minister. (The prime minister also acted as the director-general for the offsite response to the nuclear accident.) Within a day of the disaster, the Ministry of Defense ordered the dispatch of the country’s military, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which included 110,000 active and reserve troops, along with 28,000 members of the National Police Force as well as the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (Carafano, 2011). These three forces were also called on during the period March 14-17 to help inject water into the Fukushima Daiichi plant’s cooling systems and spent fuel pools (NERHQ-TEPCO, 2011). In addition, SDF provided air transport within the 20-kilometer evacuation zone to people who needed help to evacuate (Mizushima, 2012). Similarly, the national police assisted with environmental radiation monitoring (NERHQ- TEPCO, 2011), and the Japanese Red Cross Society provided medical and psychological support to earthquake and tsunami victims as well as those affected by the nuclear accident. In addition to the overwhelming relief demands on the emergency response teams, which had to deal with three simultaneous disasters of unexpected scale, emergency response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident was conducted with limited information on the status of the nuclear plant itself. As described in Chapter 4 of this report, many monitoring and control systems at the plant were not functional because of tsunami-related flooding. Additionally, some offsite instrumentation also was not functional. Consequently, decisions on protective actions for affected offsite populations (e.g., evacuations, sheltering-in-place, and KI distribution) were 15 There are areas where the estimated annual dose level is over 50 mSv per year due to cesium-137 (30 year half- life) and cesium-134 (2 year half -life) deposition. According to IRSN (2012a), the population’s return "seems barely feasible in the long term.” Prepublication Copy 6-5

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management made under great stress and great uncertainty about the status of the plant, accident progression prospects, and projected doses to nearby populations. 6.3 OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE The following sections describe the offsite emergency response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. 6.3.1 Declaration of Emergency Immediately after the arrival of the second (main) tsunami wave at 15:36-15:37 on March 11 (see Sidebar 3.1 in Chapter 3), TEPCO, in accordance with Article 10 Paragraph 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of Japan, 1999), informed the Nuclear Industry Safety Agency (NISA) of the plant’s total loss of alternating current (AC) power. This notification was made at 15:42 on March 11. There are two different accounts of the step that followed:  By one account (Investigation Committee, 2011), NISA, in consultation with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), determined at 16:36 on March 11 that the incident rose to the level of a nuclear emergency situation as defined in Article 15 Paragraph 1 of the Act. This Act calls for the Japanese prime minister to immediately give public notice of the occurrence of a nuclear emergency situation.  By another account, TEPCO informed NISA at 16:45 on March 11 that the situation required the Article 15 public notice. In either case, at around 17:42 on March 11, NISA and METI reported the situation to the prime minister and provided him with a draft public notice. The prime minister gave the required public notice at 19:03 on March 11. Authorities in Japan acted immediately to reduce the consequences of potential releases of radioactive materials from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Their actions were to be coordinated through the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (NERHQ), which was established near the prime minister’s office in Tokyo and was led by the prime minister. In addition, the local NERHQ was established in Fukushima Prefecture about 5 km west of the Fukushima Daiichi plant and was led by METI’s senior vice-minister. However, full operation of the local NERHQ was delayed until about March 15 (JNES, 2013). This delay was due to the lack of electrical power and damage to highways and roads, which made local travel difficult.16 Because of this delay, coordination between the national and local governments for ordering, implementing, and confirming evacuations and other protective actions was difficult. 16 The alternative location for the offsite center (in the Minami-soma City Hall) was already being used as an emergency response center for the earthquake and tsunami. The local NERHQ was therefore established in the Fukushima Prefectural Building. Prepublication Copy 6-6

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management 6.3.2 Issuance of Protective Actions Instrumentation that would normally have been used to inform protective-action decisions following the accident were unavailable due to the loss of electrical power and damage from the earthquake and tsunami. This instrumentation included  Twenty four radiation monitoring stations on the Fukushima Daiichi plant site; 23 of these stations were rendered nonfunctional by the tsunami (WNA, 2014).  The Emergency Response Support System (ERSS), which provides data on plant status to multiple offsite centers. This system malfunctioned immediately after the accident (NERHQ-TEPCO 2011). Consequently, critical information about the status of the Fukushima Daiichi plant could not be obtained.  The System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) is used during emergencies to predict atmospheric concentrations of radioactive materials, dose rates, and environmental exposures. These predictions are used to inform decisions by authorities on protective actions.17 The ERSS feeds information on radioactive release sources to SPEEDI; but, as noted previously, ERSS was not functional. Reliable real-time estimates of sources and magnitudes of radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant were therefore unavailable. As discussed in Chapter 4, some releases of radioactivity to the atmosphere from the plant occurred through uncontrolled pathways (see also Narabayashi et al., 2012). An instrument at the main gate of the plant produced a continuous record of gamma dose rate from these releases (NERHQ-TEPCO, 2011) and cars with measuring instruments produced some scattered measurements elsewhere on the site. However, these data could not be analyzed in real time. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) obtained some measurements on March 15 from a car located 20 km to the northwest of the plant (NERHQ-TEPCO, 2011). A number of monitoring instruments were also set up beyond the 20- km evacuation radius starting on March 16 (NERHQ-TEPCO, 2011). Gross gamma dose-rate measurements from these instruments were adequate to determine whether populations should be moved from already-contaminated areas. Airborne measurements of ground contamination levels were made by the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) starting March 17 (Lyons and Colton, 2012).18 USDOE focused on measuring radionuclides that had been deposited on the ground after passage of the plume.19 17 Weather forecasting is uncertain, so any projection of plume transport using SPEEDI becomes increasingly uncertain as the forecast time for the projection increases. Also, the timing of multiple, prolonged releases with respect to wind patterns complicates predictions. As a result, projections with SPEEDI or other similar systems can only be probabilistic. The uncertainties increase in situations with multiple releases occurring at apparently random times. 18 Measurements were made from altitude bands of 152-305 m (helicopter) and 550-700 m (fixed-wing aircraft). Each aircraft used detectors equipped with a total of 12 large-volume (5 cm x 10 cm x 40 cm) sodium iodide scintillator crystals. 19 Such measurements are made to identify areas that should be subject to long-term evacuations because of contamination by the long-half-life isotopes cesium-134 (2-year half-life) and cesium-137 (30-year half-life). These measurements are not intended to inform decisions on short-term precautionary evacuations (i.e., evacuations to Prepublication Copy 6-7

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management Given the sparse information on the status of the plant and uncertainties about projected doses, decision-makers who issued protective actions showed a preference for evacuation of populations located near the plant rather than sheltering-in-place. 6.3.2.1 Evacuation Orders Several evacuation orders were issued following the prime minister’s declaration of a nuclear emergency (see Table 6.1). The evacuation zones were gradually expanded over time, and residents were ordered to evacuate repeatedly from one place to another. Prior to instructions from the NERHQ (see Section 6.3.1), the governor of Fukushima Prefecture instructed Okuma Town and Futaba Town—the two towns nearest to the Fukushima Daiichi plant (see Figure 6.1)— to evacuate residents living within a 2-km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Approximately 30 minutes later, the NERHQ instructed the Fukushima Prefectural governor and all relevant local governments to issue an evacuation order to citizens within a 3-km radius of the plant and to issue a shelter-in-place order to citizens between 3 and 10 km of the plant. These evacuation orders were pre-emptive; there were no data at the time indicating there had been a release of radioactive material from the plant or that such a release was imminent. Following instructions by the prime minister to the heads of relevant municipalities, the evacuation area was increased to a 10-km radius the morning of March 12 because of fears that potentially large quantities of radioactive materials would be released. The evacuation zone was further increased to 20 km that afternoon following the hydrogen explosion at Unit 1 (see Sidebar 3.1 in Chapter 3). Fukushima Prefecture, Okuma Town, Futaba Town, Tomioka Town, Namie Town, Kawauchi Town, Naraha Town, Minamisoma city, Tamura city, and Katsurao Village were among the municipalities evacuated (NERHQ-TEPCO, 2011). An estimated 78,000 people evacuated from the 20-kilometer radius zone around the plant (UNSCEAR, 2013a). This area was designated as a “Restricted Zone” with entry initially prohibited.20 The hydrogen explosions in Unit 1 (15:36 on March 12), Unit 3 (11:01 on March 14) and Unit 4 (06:14 on March 15) (see Chapter 3, Table 3.1) led the prime minister to issue new instructions to the heads of relevant local governments, including Fukushima Prefecture, Ookuma Town, Futaba Town, Tomioka Town, Namie Town, Kawauchi Town, Minamisoma City, Katsurao Village, Hirono Town, and Iitate Village (see Figure 6.1), to order residents within the 20-30 km radius from the plant to shelter in place in what was designated as an “Evacuation Prepared Area.” Approximately 60,000 people lived within the 20-30 km shelter-in- place zone (UNSCEAR, 2013a). On March 25, these residents were advised by the government to begin voluntary evacuations. On April 22, 2011, the central government issued a new evacuation order to residents of Iitate, located outside the 20-km radius evacuation zone, where high radiation levels had been detected. Residents of that village were given one month to evacuate. The area was designated as a “Deliberate Evacuation Area.” protect populations from exposures to high-dose-rate, short-lived fission products, or decisions to advise populations to take KI to prevent thyroid-uptake of inhaled radioactive iodine when evacuations cannot occur in time to avoid such inhalation. 20 Some progress has been made with respect to the resettlement of parts of this area (METI, 2013). Prepublication Copy 6-8

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management At this point onwards the government switched from communicating evacuation orders on the basis of distance from the plant to using a threshold radiation dose of 20 mSv per year as a basis for evacuation (Hasegawa, 2013). In June 2011, the government began to identify hotspots21 where radiation levels exceeded this 20 mSv per year threshold. These hotspots were named “Specific Spots Recommended22 for Evacuation.” These hotspots were more than 20 km away from the Fukushima Daiichi plant and outside the Deliberate Evacuation Area (UNSCEAR, 2013a). 6.3.2.2 Potassium Iodide Distribution In addition to evacuation and shelter-in-place orders, residents leaving the 20 km Restricted Zone were instructed to take potassium iodide (KI). This instruction was issued on March 16, four days after major releases of radioactive iodine (iodine-131) had begun and after about half of the iodine release had occurred (TEPCO, 2012b, Fig. 27). This was also four days after residents within the Restricted Zone were instructed to evacuate and a day after residents in the 20-30 km Evacuation Prepared Area were instructed to shelter-in-place. Upon issuing this instruction, KI was made available for distribution. The KI consisted of 1.51 million pills for 750,000 people and 6.1 kg powder for 120,000–180,000 people. However, the KI was likely not distributed because the evacuation had already been completed (Hamada et al., 2012). On March 15, four towns close to the plant, Futaba, Tomioka, Iwaki,23 and Miharu, distributed in-stock KI pills to local residents without awaiting distribution instructions from the government. Futaba and Tomioka also instructed their residents to take the pills (Hayashi, 2011). 6.3.2.3 Food Interdictions On March 15, 2011, high levels of radioactive iodine (iodine-131) and radioactive cesium (cesium-134, -137) were detected in topsoil and vegetation near the Fukushima Daiichi plant (Hamada et al., 2012).24 The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) advised that monitoring surveys of food and water begin immediately. Food and water samples were collected beginning on March 16, 2011. On March 17, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) set regulatory limits for contaminated food and water; these limits were stipulated as “provisional regulatory values” (PRVs). PRVs were adopted from the index values preset by NSC except for radioactive iodine (iodine-131) in water and milk ingested by infants and in seafood25 (Hamada and Ogino, 2012). PRVs for foodstuffs and drinkable liquids contaminated with radioactive cesium (cesium-134, cesium-137), uranium, plutonium and some other transuranic isotopes were based on an effective dose limit not to exceed 5 mSv/year (Hamada and Ogino, 2012). The Food Safety Commission 21 Hot spots are defined based on radioactive contamination levels. They are regions where contamination levels significantly exceed those in surrounding areas. 22 In other words, evacuations in these areas were not ordered. 23 Iwaki is located south of the area shown in Figure 6.1. 24 Hamada et al. (2012) do not specify the location where high levels of cesium were found. 25 Contamination of foodstuffs and liquids with iodine-131 became less of a public health concern with time owing to that isotope’s short half-life (approximately 8 days). This was not the case for foodstuffs and liquids contaminated with cesium-134 and cesium-137 which have much longer half-lives. Prepublication Copy 6-9

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management of Japan decided on March 20, 2011, that these PRVs were effective enough to ensure public safety. These PRVs were applied in various districts of the Fukushima, Ibaraki, Chiba, Miyagi, Tochigi, Iwate, Gunma, and Kanagawa prefectures starting on March 21 (Hamada and Ogino, 2012; FSC, 2011; IRSN, 2012a). These initial PRVs were in place until March 31, 2012. New regulatory values went into effect on April 1, 2012. These new values were expressed as radioactive concentrations of cesium-134 and cesium-137, but also considering the contributions of strontium-90, plutonium- 238, -239, -241, and ruthenium-106, not to exceed a committed effective dose of 1 mSv/year (Hamada and Ogino, 2012). 6.3.3 Accident Recovery From March 11, 2011, to August 2011, implementation of an integrated recovery plan was hampered by administrative delays. In particular, time was needed to establish the required administrative structures, regulations, and a budget framework for those recovery actions that were not covered in existing disaster management plans (Hardie and McKinley, 2013). Decontamination activities during this period were conducted outside of the evacuation zones with a focus on high-sensitivity areas, such as schools and playgrounds, associated with radioactive hotspots (see Footnote 24). These decontamination activities were carried out primarily by local groups coordinated at a community or municipality level; technical support for these activities was provided by organizations such as the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) (Hardie and McKinley, 2013). In August 2011, the Japanese government passed the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution.26 Pursuant to the Act, Japanese agencies developed a framework and guidance for remediating contaminated areas. These guidelines cover methods for surveying and measuring contamination levels as well as strategies for decontamination and storage of contaminated materials (Yasutaka et al., 2013). The Act took full effect in January 2012; it established JAEA as the responsible organization for coordinating the development of a technical basis for the regional remediation plan to be developed under the Act (Hardie and McKinley, 2013). According to the Act, contaminated areas were to be grouped into two categories:  Special decontamination areas. These areas comprise the Restricted Zone (i.e., areas within 20 km of the plant), as well as the Deliberate Evacuation Area (i.e., area beyond 20 km where the annual effective dose for individuals was anticipated to exceed 20 mSv27). The national government is responsible for the decontamination of these areas with a goal to reduce annual cumulative doses to less than 20 mSv. The long-term goal is to reduce annual cumulative dose to less than 1 mSv.  Intensive contamination survey areas. These comprise all other contaminated areas in which the cumulative radiation dose for individuals was anticipated to range between 1 26 http://josen.env.go.jp/en/. Last accessed July 2014 27 According to ICRP (2011), 1-20 mSv per year is the reference dose recommendation for exposure situations involving, for example, people living in long-term contaminated areas after a nuclear accident or a nuclear emergency. Prepublication Copy 6-10

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management mSv and 20 mSv annually. Decontamination is to be overseen primarily by local municipalities with the goal to reduce the “air dose rate” to less than 1 mSv per year. The special decontamination area has been further subdivided into three areas (see Figure 6.2 for the most current (April 2014) map of these areas)28:  Area 1: Estimated annual dose level is below 20 mSv and residents can return home temporarily. Evacuation orders within this area are “ready to be lifted.”29  Area 2: Estimated annual dose level is 20-50 mSv; residents are allowed entry for specific purposes but are ordered to remain evacuated.  Area 3: Estimated annual dose level is over 50 mSv and residents are legally required to remain outside these areas. Levels are not expected to drop below 20 mSv per year before about March 2016, five years after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Decontamination of these areas involves the cleaning of structures and removal of contaminated soil. The removed soil and other contaminated wastes are being stored at remediation locations or at temporary sites.30 Incineration is being used for volume reduction of some contaminated materials (while meeting applicable emission standards for limiting public exposures) (IAEA, 2014b). Contaminated soil and waste are to be gathered and placed into interim storage facilities until transferred to a long-term disposal site outside of the Fukushima area. The national government aims to have these interim storage facilities in operation by early 2015.31 6.4 VULNERABILITIES IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN JAPAN FINDING 6.1: The Fukushima Daiichi accident revealed vulnerabilities in Japan’s offsite emergency management. The competing demands of the earthquake and tsunami diminished the available response capacity for the accident. Implementation of existing nuclear emergency plans was overwhelmed by the extreme natural events that affected large regions, producing widespread disruption of communications, electrical power, and other critical infrastructure over an extended period of time. Additionally: 28 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20120330_01b.pdf 29 METI’s April 2014 map of Area 1 has remained unchanged, with few exceptions, since the previous update provided by the agency in August 2013. Therefore METI’s designation of Area 1 as “evacuation orders are ready to be lifted” may be misleading. (See METI maps http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20130807_01.pdf and http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/140401MapOfAreas.pdf for a direct comparison of the areas.) 30 Available at http://josen.env.go.jp/en/ from the Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan. Accessed on June 4, 2014. 31 See https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/2013/03/decontamination-process.html. Accessed on July 17, 2014. Prepublication Copy 6-11

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management Announcements about radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant triggered public health concerns in the United States, especially on the West Coast and Pacific Islands (Tupin et al., 2012). As suggested elsewhere (Salame-Alfie et al., 2012), the Fukushima Daiichi accident could have been used as a test scenario for how communications among the responders and the public would play out if an accident were to occur in the United States. The U.S. National Response Framework (see Sidebar 6.2) was not followed, so there was no declaration of a lead federal agency for the response, and a Joint Information Center with collocated group of representatives from agencies and organizations with the responsibility to handle public information needs was not established.52 During the accident, authorities in U.S. states received a number of inquiries from members of the public regarding potential health effects from radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant; the safety of milk, water, and food; and need to take KI (Salame- Alfie et al., 2012). Thyroid dose projections for U.S. populations were well below levels that would trigger health concerns53 and, therefore, were not high enough to meet USEPA guidelines for taking KI. Despite this fact, the U.S. Surgeon General’s office issued a statement indicating that that it was appropriate for West Coast residents to take KI. This statement was viewed as incorrect by many (Salame-Alfie, 2012; Fitzgerald et al., 2012). The USNRC informed the public that “no radiation at harmful levels would reach the United States” (USNRC, 2011d) and the USEPA announced that any radioactivity detected in the United States was “well below any level of public health concern.”54 However, little authoritative information was available about the human health impacts of radiation exposures; as a result, the fear of radiation exposure and public perceptions of exposure risks were not consistent with the messaging from government agencies (Haggerty, 2011; Payne, 2011). The experience of the United States during Fukushima Daiichi accident highlights the need to review existing plans for communicating with the public during a nuclear emergency. It is important that such plans deliver clear, timely messages about the status of the emergency and notifications of planned actions; recommendations regarding actions that could be taken by affected individuals; frank discussions of uncertainties and unavailable but necessary information; and clarification or correction of alarming information and rumors originating from various sources.55 These communication capabilities need to span all phases and activities related to an accident. 52 However, as stated in the Joint Information Center (JIC) manual, the structure of the JIC could be useful in coordinating multi-agency events internationally (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nrt/jic-model.pdf. Accessed June 4, 2014). 53 Atmospheric dispersion of the radioactive materials released from the Fukushima Daiichi plant greatly reduced their concentrations by the time they reached the United States. 54 http://www.epa.gov/japan2011/ 55 Reviewing the communications efforts during the 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) accident could offer useful insights. In that instance, considerable trust was established by government leaders when Harold Denton, Director of the USNRC’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and President Carter's personal adviser for the TMI accident, took over as spokesperson. He was well equipped to answer many of the questions that the public has been found to worry about in a crisis: What happened? What is being done about it? What should we do? What is likely to happen next? What is your credible worst-case scenario? What are you doing to prevent it? The USNRC’s Special Inquiry Group tasked to investigate the TMI accident, describes Denton as a person who if he does not have the answers, “will be willing to look for them and to share them once they are found" (Rogovin and Frampton, 1980). Prepublication Copy 6-22

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management Communicating with the public about the meaning of radiation dose limits during a nuclear emergency is also important. The public confusion about dose limits that occurred in Japan (see Section 6.4.4) would most likely also occur in the United States: the United States has established a variety of radiation dose and radioactive contamination limits for different purposes; these limits are enforced by different means and different agencies. As seen in Table 6.2, dose standards applicable to the general public in the United States range from 1.0 mSv in one year from normal nuclear operations to 100.0 mSv in an emergency. This is a factor of 100 difference. There are additional standards, which are not included in the table, that are specific to individual organs (e.g., the thyroid). Not all of the public confusion originates from the existence of too many standards; another source of confusion is the lack of a separate standard for children (González et al., 2013). As noted in Section 6.4.4, the concerns in Japan that dose levels applied for the protection of the population as a whole do not provide sufficient protection to children suggests that similar concerns could also arise in the United States. 6.5.4 Decision Making for Recovery The ongoing offsite response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident demonstrates that cleanup and resettlement of evacuated populations (collectively described here as “recovery”) are complex processes. Many aspects of recovery, including issuing predetermined protective action criteria, cannot be planned in detail before an accident occurs; indeed, such criteria depend on the accident scenario, its consequences, and stakeholder preferences. However, the current situation in Japan, where about half of the evacuees (WNA, 2014) continue to live in shelters or temporary locations with uncertainty about their future plans, emphasizes the need for the United States to conduct advance planning for recovery from a nuclear plant accident. The 1992 USEPA PAG manual (USEPA, 1992) did not address recovery following a nuclear plant accident. USEPA’s recently updated PAG manual (EPA, 2013), which is still labeled as a draft, minimally addresses recovery. It recommends that resettlement criteria should be established after a contamination event has occurred and notes that the process for establishing such criteria could take months to years. The draft PAG manual also recommends that the process to determine acceptable criteria for a given community should include input from community members and other stakeholders. However, no guidance is given on how to address stakeholder concerns that would likely arise in a Fukushima Daiichi-scale accident and how they might be minimized. The USEPA draft PAG also does not provide specific recommendations for dose thresholds for long-term cleanup. It references the 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000 acceptable lifetime risk criterion for cancer incidence, a range that is generally used for cleanup of contaminated sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the USNRC’s process for decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. Assuming that the risk of developing cancer increases in proportion with dose received with no threshold (i.e., the linear no-threshold (LNT) model), this risk range translates to an approximate dose to the whole body of 0.009-0.9 mSv over a lifetime.56 The 56 The committee derived this accumulated dose range estimate as follows: Prepublication Copy 6-23

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management Fukushima Daiichi accident recovery has demonstrated that attaining cleanup goals in this range (i.e., a small fraction of the radiation dose received from natural background in a lifetime) may be impractical when contaminated areas are large. International radiation protection agencies, such as the ICRP and IAEA, advocate for the principle of optimization when it comes to protection of populations living in an existing exposure situation such as in the areas contaminated by radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant (ICRP, 2007). This approach is a departure from conventional cleanup guidelines under CERCLA or decontamination of nuclear sites, both of which are based either on radiation dose or health risk levels. The intent of these international recommendations is to take into account not only risk of developing cancer in the future, but also competing factors, for example the local economy, future land use, cleanup options, and ultimately public acceptance. The NCRP, consistent with the ICRP recommendations, is currently (June 2014) finalizing a study that establishes the framework of an approach to optimizing decision-making for recovery.57 Deciding on recovery strategies for severe nuclear accidents and their implementation should be part of the U.S. government’s advance planning. The U.S. government should be able to develop and articulate guidance for state and local authorities in dealing with radiation contamination recovery. Issues for which needed policies and decision criteria are required include resettlement and decontamination, including disposal, reduction of volume, or storage of removed contaminated materials. In cases where resettlement may not be desirable, policies will also need to be developed for redirection of (and assistance to) evacuated populations to alternative permanent homes in new locations. Using the LNT model, the risk of cancer incidence (all cancers) for a dose equal to 1 mSv/year over a lifetime is 621 per 100,000 for men and 1019 per 100,000 for women (NAS, 2006, see table 12D-3). Assuming a 50:50 gender ratio within a population, the risk for the population as a whole is 820 per 100,000 or else 8200 per 1,000,000. For USEPA’s reference to the 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000 acceptable lifetime risk criteria for cancer incidence, the effective dose would be 0.012 mSv/year to 0.00012 mSv/year. Assuming a 75-year average life span, the lifetime dose would be equal to 0.009 to 0.9 mSv over a lifetime. For comparison, the annual average effective dose from background radiation to populations in the United States is 3.1 mSv annually (NCRP, 2009). 57 Presentation by S. Y. Chen, http://www.ncrponline.org/Annual_Mtgs/2014_Ann_Mtg/PROGRAM_2-10.pdf. Last accessed March 20, 2014. The study will be published as NCRP Report No. 175. Prepublication Copy 6-24

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management SIDEBAR 6.1 Phases of a Nuclear Power Plant Accident During a radiological emergency in the United States there is a generic framework for structuring responses following a disaster based on three phases: early, intermediate, and late. According to the USEPA (USEPA, 2013), the early phase (also referred to as the emergency phase) lasts from several hours to several days. During this phase, conditions at the location of the incident are evaluated, responsible authorities are notified, and the potential consequences of the incident to members of the public are predicted or evaluated. Decisions on protective actions such as evacuation, sheltering-in-place, and taking KI for thyroid protection are made based primarily on the status of the nuclear power plant and the prognosis of changes in the conditions. The intermediate phase lasts from weeks to months. During this phase, the source and releases from the plant have been brought under control. Also, environmental measurements of radioactivity and dose models are available to project doses to members of the public and base decisions on additional protective actions such as food and water interdictions. The late phase (also referred to as the recovery phase) can last from months to years. It begins sometime after the initiation of the intermediate phase and proceeds independently of the protective actions implemented during that phase. During the late phase, recovery actions designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment are commenced and end when all recovery actions have been completed. Because of the possible overlap, phases of the emergency response are not viewed in terms of time but instead in terms of activities performed. Prepublication Copy 6-25

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management SIDEBAR 6.2 National Response Framework The roles of federal agencies in U.S. nuclear emergencies are laid out in the National Response Framework (NRF) (USDHS, 2013). The NRF creates a broad-based “all-hazards response” emergency planning process to address a wide variety of emergencies including natural disasters, terrorism, and other human-initiated accidents and events, including nuclear and radiological events. Nuclear power plant accidents involving radioactive material releases are just one of the many potential emergencies to which this all-hazard approach applies. The all-hazards approach is based on the notion that there are common features among disasters irrespective of their initiating events; therefore, many of the same planning strategies can apply to all emergencies. These features include the need for robust communication channels; collection of adequate data; information exchange and interpretation; requisitioning of resources and expertise; assessment and management of offsite impacts; and community involvement. Many elements necessary to an effective response to a nuclear incident are common to other types of emergencies, such as sheltering or evacuating a specific population, establishing an emergency communications network, or implementing mutual aid agreements with nearby (but unaffected) jurisdictions. Thus, embedding planning for a nuclear-related event in an overall emergency response plan for all types of natural and man-made emergencies provides the framework for a scalable, flexible, and adaptable plan that is expected to be responsive to small, common, and well-defined events as well as large, rare, and complex events. An additional advantage of the all-hazards approach is that it maintains a higher state of readiness, because the plan is implemented more often and because all response agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private entities are working within the same response framework with a common command structure. Prepublication Copy 6-26

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management SIDEBAR 6.3 Nuclear Power Plant Accident Preparedness in the United States In the United States, state and local governments have the primary responsibility for making protective action decisions and communicating health and safety instructions to affected populations during a nuclear power plant accident. As laid out in the National Response Framework (NRF; see Sidebar 6.2), a number of Federal agencies also play an important role in responding to the accident (USDHS, 2013). USNRC and FEMA The USNRC and FEMA are the primary federal agencies responsible for radiological emergency preparedness in the United States. The USNRC is responsible for ensuring that nuclear plants are prepared for radiological emergencies. The USNRC coordinates with FEMA, which oversees state and local agencies’ preparedness for offsite actions. FEMA also provides guidance and support to local and state authorities through its Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program (FEMA, 2013a). It is not practical for emergency plans to address every possible combination of events (no matter how unlikely) or to present every possible action that can or should be taken in response to an evolving event. Instead, a “planning basis” is available for nuclear power plant events in the United States and is described in a 1978 USNRC/USEPA Task Force report (USNRC and USEPA, 1978). The planning basis is utilized in the joint USNRC and FEMA document “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants” (USNRC and FEMA, 1980). This document is currently undergoing review; a revised draft is expected to be available for public comment in November 2014. USEPA One of the USEPA’s roles in radiological emergency preparedness is to establish protective action guidelines (PAGs) and provide guidance on implementing them, including recommendations on protective actions. USEPA’s PAGs are expressed in terms of projected doses at which protective actions should be taken to reduce or eliminate exposures (USEPA, 2013). In setting the range of values for its PAGs, USEPA considered the following four principles (Conklin and Edwards, 2000): 1. Avoid acute radiation health effects. 2. Minimize the risk of delayed health effects. 3. Dose values should not be higher than justified by a cost-benefit analysis. 4. Risks to health from implementing the protective action should not be greater than the risk from the dose avoided. Emergency responders can use the PAGs for any radiation incident involving relatively significant releases of radioactive materials, including nuclear power plant accidents for the early and intermediary phases. CDC CDC’s roles in radiological emergency preparedness include: 1. Providing guidance to state and local governments on the health effects from exposure to radiation and guidance on how to minimize adverse health effects, including psychological health effects from exposure to radiation. Prepublication Copy 6-27

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management 2. Providing medical treatment of exposed individuals and epidemiological surveillance of exposed populations. 3. Participating in the Advisory Team for Environment, Food and Health, a radiological emergency response group tasked with issuing protective action recommendations to prevent or minimize radiation exposure through ingestion by preventing or minimizing contamination of milk, food, and water. USDOE USDOE’s role in a radiological emergency is to coordinate federal environmental radiological monitoring and produce predictive plume models and dose assessments. USDOE makes use of a variety of emergency response assets to estimate the probable or actual spread of radioactivity in the environment. The assets include the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) for plume and deposition modeling and the Aerial Measuring System (AMS) for measurements of ground deposition with aircraft-mounted detectors. USDOE can create a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) to help integrate consequence management resources and coordinate the development of a common operating framework. Prepublication Copy 6-28

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management TABLE 6.1 Chronologies of Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Orders Following the Fukushima Daiichi Accident Date in 2011 Distance Ordersa Area designation (time) from plant March 11 2 km Compulsory evacuation Restricted Zone (20:50) issued by the Fukushima prefectural government 21:23 3 km Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone March 12 10 km Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone (05:44) 18:25 20 km Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone March 15 20-30 km Shelter in home Evacuation Prepared Area March 25 20-30 km Self-evacuation Evacuation Prepared Area April 22 Areas with Evacuation within 1 Deliberate Evacuation dose >20 month Area mSv/year June 16 Hotspots with Recommended for Specific Spots dose >20 Evacuation Recommended for mSv/year Evacuation September 30 20-30 km Lifted order to shelter Lifting of Evacuation indoors or self-evacuate Prepared Area NOTES: a Issued by the central government unless otherwise stated; order unless otherwise stated. SOURCE: Adapted from R. Hasegawa (2013); published by the Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationals and available at http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/STUDY0513_RH_DEVAST%20report.pdfAcces sed on June 4, 2014. Prepublication Copy 6-29

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management TABLE 6.2 Selected U.S. Radiation Dose Guidelines for Members of the Public Circumstance or pathway Standard Agency (mSv) Drinking water (per year) 0.04 USEPAa Air effluents (per year) 0.1 USEPAb Decommissioned site (per year) 0.25 USNRCc Normal nuclear operations (per year) 1.0 USNRC/USDOEd Ingestion 5.0 FDAe Relocation (standard per year after year 1) 5.0 USEPAf Lower evacuation threshold (early phase NPP accident – first 10.0 USEPAb 4 days) Relocation (first year dose) 20.0 USEPAb Upper evacuation threshold (early phase NPP accident – first 50.0 USEPAb 4 days) Evacuation with serious adverse external conditions for 100.0 USEPAb special populations (during one incident) a 40 CFR 141.66(d); from beta and gamma dose b 40 CFR 61.92, 40 CFR 61.102, and 10 CFR 20.1101(d) c 10 CFR 20.1402. d 10 CFR 20.1301 and 10 CFR 835.208. e USFDA, 2004 f USEPA, 2013 Prepublication Copy 6-30

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management FIGURE 6.1 Evacuation zones established by the Japanese government following the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant (No. 1) is the Fukushima Daiichi plant; Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant (No. 2) is the Fukushima Daini plant. SOURCE: Adapted from R. Hasegawa, 2013, published by the Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationals and available at http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/STUDY0513_RH_DEVAST%20report.pdf. Accessed June 4, 2014. Prepublication Copy 6-31

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Chapter 6: Lessons Learned for Offsite Emergency Management NOTES: Zones of contaminated areas in Japan resulting from radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant: Area 1: estimated annual dose level is below 20 mSv; Area 2: estimated annual dose level is 20-50 mSv; Area 3: estimated annual dose level is over 50 mSv and residents are not allowed entry. FIGURE 6.2 METI projections for land decontamination end states in regions affected by the Fukushima Daiichi accident SOURCE: METI. Available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/140401MapOfAreas.pdf. Prepublication Copy 6-32