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The Role of Science in Natural
Resource Management: The Case for the
Colorado River
G. R. MARZOLF, Murray State University
Murray, Kentucky
INTRODUCTION
Our primary purpose here is to present information and then to foster
reasoned discussion. The symposium is meant to be a review of extant
information about the Grand Canyon reach of the Colorado River and a
forum to discuss how better to apply science to the management of the
Colorado River ecosystem in the Grand Canyon.
The great nineteenth century surveys of the American West, e.g., those
of Lewis and Clark, Long, Pike, and Fremont before the Civil War and the
King, Hayden, Powell, and Wheeler surveys afterwards, were dedicated to
documenting the extent and location of natural resources for the people of
the United States. These surveys were, in fact, an early application of
scientific observation to document natural resources for purposes of plan-
ning for development;
Some of the information that John Wesley Powell developed is recorded
in his 1878 report Lands of the Arid Regions of the United States, a tren-
chant bit of writing that presents a compellingly logical approach to the
development of water resources for the "reclamation" of lands for agricul-
ture (Powell, 1878~. This document underpins a report of the National
Academy of Sciences that led to the establishment of the U.S. Geological
Survey by consolidating the Hayden, Powell, and Wheeler surveys in 1879
(Bartlett, 1962; Stegner, 1954~. The report documented the extent of the
western water resource for development, and it presented a logical rationale
28
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THE ROLE OF SCIENCE...
29
for federal government involvement. This eventually led to the establish-
ment of the Reclamation Service as one of the U.S. Geological Survey's
branches in 1902 (Watkins, 1983~. Thus, development of the Southwest
was hastened.
Powell's parallel ideas about (1) full surveys of irrigable land, (2) land
grant size and water rights, (3) rules for making land grants to families, and
(4) governmental boundaries (irrigation districts) being congruent with drainage
basins are outlined in the early chapters of his report. It is ironic that the
rapid pace of subsequent legislation and development outstripped any at-
tempt to implement Powell's ideas. Such implementation might have pre-
cluded many of the conflicts that we are facing in this, the last decade of
Reclamation's first century; at least the history of the West would have
been quite different. It was the articulation of these ideas that brought
Powell under his greatest pressure from development interests in Congress.
His full logic did not prevail because it was too revolutionary. It contra-
dicted a prevailing spirit of individual initiative and competition, the coop-
erative spirit of the Mormons in Utah notwithstanding (Stegner, 1954~.
Powell's surveys, of course, are the ones that identify the beginning of
the systematic accumulation of information that we will review in this meeting.
This body of knowledge was gathered with careful observation, with quanti-
tative measurement methods, and with insightful analysis. These processes
were followed by common sense interpretation and synthesis. As such, the
analysis was scientific. Powell followed those reports with aggressive and
assertive translation of his ideas into federal public policy. Many said that
he was acting in his own self-interest, to position himself to have national
influence (Stegner, 1954~. In any event, he was an extraordinary man.
I suggest that we dedicate what we do and say here to the early scientists
and engineers who tackled difficult problems on the Colorado River with
enthusiasm. By doing so, I ask that we keep in mind that more reasoned
discussion would have served the common welfare in the 1890s. Surely, it
should serve well 100 years later.
THE STRENGTH OF SCIENCE
If a logically compelling rationale for a long-term interaction between
natural science and useful management of the river can be developed here,
it will be based on candid understanding of the kinds of knowledge that
science can and cannot yield. Science, as the general concept is used here,
has several aspects. My use will entail a combination of these.
First, science is method. It is a way of knowing based on the premise
that what our senses tell us is the truth. Observation with a keen eye,
common sense, and careful recording are often all that is necessary to per-
form solid scientific inquiry. The modern trappings of science, electron
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COLORADO RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MANAGEMENT
microscopes, side-scan sonars, inhered radiometers, computers, etc., all marvelous
inventions, are technological extensions of the keen eye that merely en-
hance powers of observation and analysis. Technological advances, how-
ever, do not replace common sense.
Observation and subsequent accumulation of facts lead directly to pat-
terns of inductive reasoning, or empiricism. Knowledge emerges as a result
of forming general concepts from the assembly of specific facts into coher-
ent and consistent patterns. Understanding grows as concepts of how things
work can be stated with increasing certainty. Such understanding can be
checked by predicting the outcome of events correctly. Prediction, refined
in terms of observational design and analytical procedure, is the basis for
experimentation in science.
There is great danger, however, in concluding that the understanding has
been "proven" by correctly predicting the outcome of events once, or twice,
or thrice. Some uncertainty always remains; if the outcome were checked
again, under different circumstances, events might not proceed the same
way, or resulting observations would not be the same. Proof by means of
correct predictions is tenuous at best.
On the other hand, if predictions are made in the form of cause-and-
effect hypotheses and tests are performed by manipulating conditions and
observing the subsequent events, always seeking evidence that would show
the hypothesis to be untrue, the method becomes more powerful. This is
the planned experiment. Of course, there are degrees of elegance and clev-
erness in experimental design, and there are various levels of analytical
power to be applied to the results. The logic, however, is that if any results
under experimental conditions show the hypothesis to be incorrect, the hy-
pothesis can be rejected as false. Disproof, falsification, or rejection of
incorrect hypotheses is more powerful because it is final. Experimental
science develops knowledge most rapidly by rejecting what is not true, thus
leaving the truth more and more certain with each experiment (Doyle, 1890;
Popper, 1965~.
Science also may proceed in the absence of empirical data. Deductive
reasoning is theoretical; it depends on the thoughtful application of first
principles. This aspect of science may lead to the development of abstract
conceptual models, many of which may be represented in mathematical
notation. These methods become most powerful when they result in predic-
tive hypotheses that are followed by testing. Again, experimental design
and analysis become central to learning new knowledge and developing
information. In practice, both inductive and deductive (empirical and theo-
retical) approaches are used in combination, though not equally well by the
same person. The crux of the matter, however, is that tentative ideas are
put to the test by confronting them with facts.
Second, science is knowledge. It is the subset of all human knowledge
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that has accumulated according to the methods briefly outlined above. It
represents our understanding of the universe in which we live and the ob-
jective understanding of our place in it. A feature of this body of knowl-
edge is that it changes. What was thought to be true is routinely falsified.
We are constantly reminded that our understanding is imperfect. This un-
certainty about truth is a common condition among practitioners of science.
Science, among all human endeavors, is therefore relatively quick to find
and correct its own errors. The drive to expose and learn the truth is
tempered by the sure knowledge that truth is rarely certain, yet we are
driven to find it because the excitement of discovering new knowledge is so
rewarding. Errors in manuscripts are abhorred by authors, of course. Yet
when they occur, they are found by peer reviewers, more often than not,
before the articles are published. Errors that escape the review process and
appear in the open literature are soon pointed out by "friends" and competi-
tors. The risk of being humbled by errors forces conservatism on all but the
most confident, audacious, or naive scientists. The value of review as an
error screen and as a guard against fraud is a significant value that must
attend the publication of scholarly scientific investigation.
Third, science is application. Distinctions between basic and applied
science may be beyond the scope of what is necessary here, but methods are
similar, rules of evidence are the same, and uncertainty remains. The po-
lemic conflict between the two is not important.
Basic science is characterized as seeing the universe more as a puzzle to
be assembled than as a problem to be solved. Progress is less definable;
fads and hot topics are common as "corners" and "edge pieces" are estab-
lished and as recognizable patterns take form.
Applied science is characterized by seeking solutions to particular prob-
lems; as such, applied science underpins technology. The full extension of
applied science is thought by many to define engineering, where human
utility is an important criterion. Much problem-oriented research is per-
formed by engineering consulting firms, called in because it is inefficient
for agencies to carry research staffs large enough to cover the potentially
wide array of research needs.
An unfortunate feature of much applied research is that the emergence of
problems often catches us unaware, with inadequate background informa-
tion and with little time for the full development of scientific inquiry before
management decisions must be made. This imposes a crisis atmosphere on
many investigations. Under time-limited schedules investigations proceed,
under pressure, until the time for decision arrives. Once the decision is
made, the value of the results drops because there is no further need for the
information by the decision maker. The researcher, meanwhile, must get on
to the next contract, or "crisis." The results of such investigations are not
often prepared for publication. Nevertheless, new knowledge is discovered
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COLORADO RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MANAGEMENT
routinely in the process, but it is rarely peer reviewed and it is barely
accessible to others in agency reports, known as the "gray" literature.
Finally, science is public perception. It is a cultural concept with many
shades of meaning. Science is what scientists do. Science is what the
National Academy of Sciences or the National Science Foundation or the
Bureau of Reclamation or the Geological Survey say it is. There is an
authoritarian ring to this perception that is distasteful and incorrect. Being
correct by rule of authority in science is nonsense.
This point is important to any consideration of applying science to man-
agement or public policy because the credibility of science risks being com-
promised or used inappropriately. Statements risk being misleading. Things
are done in the name of science only because of the credibility that the term
"science" carries with it. Most scientists are aware of this; most guard
against it because credibility is a precious virtue. Some scientists, unfortu-
nately, take inappropriate advantage of science's inherent credibility. Per-
haps I dwell too much on this, but the subject of water management in the
Southwest is potentially contentious. We must be cautious.
THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE
Despite its several strengths, there are limits to what can be known through
the methods of science. Understanding and awareness of these limits, as
the applications of science to management are discussed, should be useful.
Understanding and predictive success through scientific inquiry lead to
the opportunity for using manipulation to control or to alter events in nature
through management. This premise has been the very basis for the develop-
ment of modern crop and livestock agriculture, of forestry management, and
of the management of fisheries and wildlife, i.e., of the development of all
renewable natural resources. Many management shortfalls or errors have
been made because adequate scientific inquiry was left behind. Often a
management practice is implemented to solve a problem with too little, or
no, interest in checking to see whether the problem is solved. More damag-
ing, the results of scientific analyses are suppressed because they run counter
to short-term financial gain of natural resource exploiters.
Science is clearly a powerful way to learn about nature or to predict the
outcome of events given a known set of circumstances, but science cannot
make judgments about what outcomes are good or bad. These are value
judgments that require other human systems for knowing. Science may
serve in such decisions by (1) objectively documenting changes and rates of
change, (2) making predictions about the potential outcomes of change, (3)
helping to develop management options, (4) evaluating the feasibility of
management goals, (5) making predictions about management utility and
success, (6) assessing results, and thus (7) illuminating public choices, but
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THE ROLE OF SCIENCE.~.
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science itself is valueless; i.e., it has no inherent mechanism to evaluate
good or bad or to choose between right and wrong. Decisions about the
desirability of management objectives are therefore beyond the purview of
science.
MANAGEMENT CHOICES
So, choices of management goals in the Colorado River ecosystem be-
come a central issue the "tough nut." Several agencies and their constitu-
encies are in conflict. How are these conflicts to be resolved? How per-
fectly can they be resolved? What is the range of management choices?
How do we know when resolution has been reached, or management suc-
cessful? Who gets to choose the management goals? If management goals
are incompatible, who decides which goal takes priority? What are the
costs? Who pays? These are some of the questions that the Bureau of
Reclamation is being asked by other agencies and by the public as the
future operation of Glen Canyon Dam is considered. All of them are be-
yond the purview of basic science.
Science can contribute significant information to people seeking answers,
making decisions, and setting management goals. But the people must
decide. They must decide how much information is needed before they
choose.
Our goals for the symposium follow from two questions:
Question: What can science provide now?
Answer: The body of knowledge waiting to be applied to these particu-
lar problems will be reviewed by speakers in this symposium.
Question: What can science do on a continuing basis?
Answer: The application of science to management, in this case, may
be novel. A rationale is offered below, will be discussed as
the symposium proceeds, and can serve as a focal point as
decisions about management goals are made, planned, and
implemented.
THE CASE FOR THE COLORADO RIVER
There are adequate introductory descriptions of the Colorado River and
its history published elsewhere. The three oversimplified points here are
made only to underpin a rationale to wed science and management on a
continuing basis. Background and more detailed discussion may be found
in our report River and Dam Management (National Research Council, 1987~.
First point: The construction of Glen Canyon Dam three decades ago im-
posed substantial changes on the Colorado River in Grand Canyon National
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COLORADO RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MANAGEMENT
Park and elsewhere. The changes did not all happen at once. In fact, they
continue to occur, they will continue for the foreseeable future, and they are
related to the operation of the dam. The river is in disequilibrium. Our
detailed knowledge of pre-dam patterns in natural processes is sketchy and,
until this symposium, has been scattered. Nevertheless, the alteration of the
river because of the dam is obvious.
Second point: The river in Glen Canyon and Grand Canyon changed in
response to low flows while Lake Powell was filling (ca. two decades,
1963-1980~. These flows were governed by releases called for in the law of
the river and generation of hydropower as possible.
Third point: The river went through a period of high flow spills in 1983-
1985, but it has been readjusting to controlled fluctuating flows during the
postfilling decade (1981-1990~.
The paces of many ecosystem changes vary in all of these periods, but
they are thought to be long term relative to annual patterns (e.g., seasonal
changes) and multiyear legal and economic patterns (e.g., law of the river
and hydropower marketing cycles).
THE LONG-TERM INTERACTION BETWEEN
SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT
Some dispute that the operation of Glen Canyon Dam can (1) serve to
control the release of water according to the terms of the Colorado River
Compact, (2) generate hydroelectric power effectively, and (3) achieve man-
agement goals in the Glen Canyon and Grand Canyon reaches of the river.
There will be, I suspect, considerable disagreement about the third of these
suggestions. The issue has been raised, however, and so the following is
offered as a preliminary approach to finding solutions.
ECOSYSTEM SCIENCE
Most ecosystem scientists believe that the talents and skills of several
people from various disciplines are required to understand complex sys-
tems. The ecosystem approach begins with the understanding that the ele-
ments of the system and the processes that drive them are interconnected.
Furthermore, no element of the system is independent of others. Thus, changing
one component or process will change all others. The degrees of change
and the rates at which changes happen vary, depending on degrees of con-
nectedness and the effects of random events.
Phenomena in the Colorado River ecosystem offer examples. Sediment
erosion, transport, and deposition are linked to hydrologic events, topogra-
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35
phy, and geologic structure. These patterns were probably the most obvi-
ously changed by the construction of dams. Solution of materials (e.g.,
salts and nutrients) by the water from the drainage basin is dependent on
solubility characteristics of the sources. They are further dependent on
rainfall, whether it runs off or percolates into soils, the temperatures at
which this happens, etc.
The subsequent fates of dissolved materials are mediated by chemical
and biological processes that, in turn, are controlled by physical features
such as sunlight, temperature, and hydraulic turbulence patterns. Many of
these components, e.g., patterns of nitrogen and phosphorus distribution and
rates of photosynthesis, both in Lake Powell and downstream, were changed
by the dam. Some system components are less obvious, however, and
change is proceeding more slowly.
The central point is that the changes are related to one another. This fact
emphasizes Mat scientific inquiry must begin with definition of the compo-
nents of the system and how they interact. When the elements of the
system and their connections are defined, often resulting in a complex con-
ceptual scheme, then and only then can the conceptual scheme be simplified
or disaggregated into component parts for study.
To begin with investigation of component parts, or seek solutions to
narrowly defined problems, leaves too much of subsequent synthesis and
integration of useful information to chance. There is risk of missing impor-
tant information by not considering how components are interconnected.
Thus, some things may not be learned that are crucial to interpretation, or
worse, corrective management actions may be taken that have unintended
detrimental effects. Another risk is that insignificant or inappropriate com-
ponents may be included in study plans, resulting in wasted time or misap-
propriated resources.
OPPORTUNITY FOR MANAGEMENT
The patterns and processes of the Colorado River ecosystem that are
under consideration are changing slowly. Therefore, management protocols
should seek to match the pace of phenomena. Subsequently, the pace of
ecosystem responses to management will be similar so that the design of a
performance monitoring plan should also match the pace of the change; i.e.,
our thinking and our actions should be long term.
Once a conceptual scheme of the interacting components is established
and their relationships to changing flows are understood, then the chance to
use the dam to achieve desired states can be considered. Knowledge can be
used to predict and to control, that is, to manage.
However, management of a changing system can be expected to require
continuous adjustment. A dam discharge regime that has desirable manage-
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COLORADO RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MANAGEMENT
ment effects now may not have the desired effect a decade from now.
Furthermore, unexpected responses to management discharges are likely
because of uncertainty in understanding; any management plans to achieve
particular goals will likewise be uncertain. The failure to achieve a man-
agement target will therefore require management corrections. This means
that ecosystem responses to management should be checked with a sus-
tained program of monitoring and research so that requirements for mid-
course adjustments are known.
On the bright side' such corrections will be more certain to have desired
results with each iteration because we will have learned about system re-
sponses to the previous management flows; i.e., some uncertainty will have
been removed and new knowledge will result.
Thus, the sustained iteration of management and monitoring becomes a
compelling way of documenting system status as it changes and of conduct-
ing useful scientific investigation. This is the simple rationale for long-
term collaborative efforts between science and management among the sis-
ter agencies of the Department of the Interior. It is not a passive attempt to
preserve an illusory or imagined pristine condition in the river but an active
program to achieve predetermined desirable objectives.
New knowledge acquired in the process will serve management of rivers
elsewhere in the world, a major societal benefit of such a program. As
water resources approach their limits and thus require greater effort to maintain
their quality, this new knowledge will have significant utility. This is an
opportunity for claiming world leadership in an important aspect of natural
resource management.
LONG-TERM MONITORING AND SUSTAINED EXPERIMENTAL
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT TERMS
A long-term data base managed according to modern research data base
protocols will document the changing status of the ecosystem. It also will
help identify needs for management decisions and corrections. Analysis of
the long-term record itself allows for the discrimination of long-term trends
from cyclic phenomena (signals) and provides for analysis of short-term
variation (noise) and the system's responses to management activities.
Analyses of long-term data sets can correlate system elements, but they
cannot provide for understanding of cause and effect. They can, however,
suggest the short-term experiments necessary to evaluate cause and effect,
and they provide the information for planning such experiments. After
experiments have been performed, the long-term record aids in their inter-
pretation because the status of the system when the experiment was per-
formed is known. Conversely, experiments aid the interpretation of the
long-term record because cause and effect can be better understood.
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This mutually beneficial interaction of long-term monitoring and short
term research is powerfully compelling both with respect to monitoring the
performance of management decisions by providing a way to adjust them
and with respect to applying scientific methods to learn new knowledge
about complex systems. A long-term program without experiment is weak
because cause and effect cannot be known. Management protocols, which
depend on knowing cause and effect, are therefore less certain to work.
On the other hand, a program of short-term experiments without the
long-term record is weak because the results cannot be interpreted with as
much certainty. Furthermore, the documentation of management responses
is missing. This cannot be remedied because the long term record cannot
be added later. The long-term monitoring should be renewed as soon as
possible.
MANAGEMENT IN SCIENTIFIC TERMS
Natural ecosystem features (beaches, native fishes, riparian habitat) are
likely management targets in the Grand Canyon National Park. Unfortu-
nately, there are no preexisting river ecosystem models from which to bor-
row or from which to develop management protocols. On the positive side,
there are some important long-term data sets from the Colorado River be-
cause of its historic importance. Furthermore, the very existence of Glen
Canyon Dam provides a control structure just upstream from a national park
of long standing, a protected reach of river with unusual potential opportu-
nities for science and for management.
Thus, when dam operations for management purposes are thought of as
manipulative experiments, long-term data collection becomes performance
monitoring. The mixes between management and research, between basic
and applied research, and between problem and puzzle become mutually
supportive rather than divisive.
THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
It is clear that long-term ecosystem management programs such as those
being considered here will require commitment and detailed planning. Careful
planning is essential because the approach is novel at this magnitude. It
will take cooperation among the sister agencies of the Department of the
Interior. It will take a pact of cooperation among scientists and managers.
It will also take cooperation among scientists within government and those
from the academic sector to the extent that needed skills do not exist in the
agencies.
Approaching the task will call for commitment to institutional changes,
for commitment to a program that will extend beyond the careers of indi-
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COLORADO RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MANAGEMENT
viduals, and for willingness to think the unthinkable in terms of linking
economics, policy, and law with science.
In theory this seems quite natural; in practice it seems intractable. Many
factions are competing now. The assumption of effective leadership will be
difficult because understanding and credibility are in short supply. The
absence of credible information!undermines the mutual trust that will be
necessary to conduct scientific and unbiased evaluation of-the effects of
operating Glen Canyon Dam.
Recently, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the
National Park Service and the Western Area Power Administration, all agencies
with mission responsibilities (three in the Department of the Interior, one in
The Department of Energy), have begun to prepare an environmental impact
statement about the operations of the dam. These agencies have mission
responsibilities defined by Congress. Thus, they view the river and the dam
from such different perspectives, based on uses of the water resource in
ways that are often incompatible, that the ecosystem perspective has been
virtually impossible to develop. This difficulty was at the heart of the Na-
tional Research Council criticism in December 1987, and it has not been
corrected. To the extent that agency missions are incompatible and generate
bias, they are more likely to be served than the truth about the effects of the
operations of Glen Canyon on the basic geomorphic processes in the Colorado
River as it flows from Glen Canyon Dam to Lake Mead. These are the
processes that underpin river ecosystem function. Understanding them is cen-
trally related to the level of uncertainty about management effectiveness.
The approach that works may take many forms and could engage differ-
ent numbers of people, but the costs need not be high. The basic views that
must be accepted are (1) that the phenomena being influenced by dam
operations are occurring on time scales better measured in decades than in
years and (2) that they are tied to hydrologic and geomorphic processes that
have been changed and are changing. Therefore, if the changes are to be
understood and managed, then the management, investigations, and moni-
toring must be scheduled to match the pace of events.
Candidly, I fear that this opportunity for designing a proper approach to
conducting science in concert with management is slipping away. On the
other hand, if the common welfare has not been served by the present way
of doing things, then we should find another way. The simple facts of the
matter remain (1) construction of Glen Canyon Dam caused dramatic changes
in the Colorado River ecosystem, (2) operational options available at Glen
Canyon Dam are greater than those required to meet the purposes for which
the dam was built, and (3) the Grand Canyon National Park generates strong
feelings among a significant fraction of the U.S. population. The opportu-
nity is there if someone has the courage, the will, and the conviction to take
advantage of it.
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REFERENCES
Bartlett, R.A. 1962. Great Surveys of the American West. University of Oklahoma Press.
410p.
Doyle, A.C. 1890. The Sign of the Four. Spencer Blackett. 283 p.
National Research Council. 1987. River and Dam Management. National Academy Press,
Washington. 203 p.
Popper, K. 1965. Logic of Scientific Discovery. Harper, New York. 479 p.
Powell, J.W. 1878. Lands of the Arid Regions of the United States. Congress of the United
States (3rd Session) in the House of Representatives. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington.
Stegner, W. 1954. Beyond the Hundredth Meridian. John Wesley Powell and the Second
Opening of the West. Houghton MiMin, Boston. Reprinted 1982 University of Nebraska
Press, Lincoln. 438 p.
Watkins, T.H. 1983. Introduction to a facsimile edition of: Powell, J.W. 1878. Lands of the
Arid Regions of the United States. Harvard Common Press, Boston.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
glen canyon