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4 Achieving Overmatch During its information gathering process, the committee identified many opportunities to improve the capability of dismounted tactical small units (TSUs) in ways that could potentially contribute to ensuring that future TSUs have decisive overmatch across all the tasks and missions described in Chapter 2. In the committee’s judgment, many of these opportunities will have their greatest effect only if both materiel and non- material factors from across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains are integrated in an optimized “capability solution,” in accordance with the four overarching recommendations presented in Chapter 3. Such opportunities, or capability options, have interactive consequences, positive and negative, that will require the rigorous assessment and design approach described in Chapter 3 to find the best set. These interactive consequences often extend across two, three, or more of the operational capability categories discussed in Chapter 2: situational awareness, military effects, maneuverability, sustainability, and survivability. Thus, a set of capability options covering all five categories will typically need to be evaluated together during rigorous systems engineering (see Recommendation 2). Even so, the committee found that the most promising options, at least in terms of costs and payoffs the committee could evaluate, given its limited assessment base, can be roughly categorized into five high- priority capability-improvement areas:  Designing the TSU  Focusing on TSU Training  Integrating the TSU into Army Networks  Balancing TSU Maneuverability, Military Effects, and Survivability  Leveraging Advances in Portable Power In each of these high-priority improvement areas, there are various options to consider and integrate, including improved or alternative technology options as well as non-materiel improvements in organization, doctrine, and other options that fall within the committee’s definition of the human dimension. Work on many of the technology options is already in progress. Rather than make specific recommendations on which options are most worthy, this chapter explains why certain of the options are most likely to achieve overmatch following rigorous systems-oriented assessment. 75

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS DESIGNING THE TSU The principles for achieving overmatch discussed in Chapter 3 would allow the Army to leverage Soldier performance as never before and to determine what TSU design would be most dominant across the full range of combat and stability operations.. A systems approach would focus on developing the metrics and opening the TSU design options to incorporate the full capabilities of Soldiers and equipment. Ideally, the TSU would be viewed as a system-of-systems and not merely as an organization or formation. A proper system-of-systems analysis would then be able to determine design parameters for the optimal size (number of Soldiers), organization (number of fire teams, duties), and equipment (communication, lethality systems, etc.) of the TSU. The lack of published U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) documentation (e.g., an initial capabilities document or capabilities development document) that could help guide TSU design is a definite handicap. Although some future TSU missions may be similar, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been effective at squad level in Iraq and Afghanistan are unlikely to provide overmatch capabilities against all future adversaries. Since World War I, the size of the Army squad has varied from 8 to 12 men. In the same time, the Marine Corps squad has been relatively stable at 13 men using three fire teams, except for a short period in the late 1970s when a Marine squad consisted of only 11 men. Army squad organization and size has been studied and reconsidered many times since World War II, starting with a 1946 infantry conference held at Ft. Benning, Georgia, and continuing at least through a 1998 study at the time that the light infantry brigade was being reorganized (Melody, 1990; Hughes, 1994; Rainey, 1998). The recommendations on squad organization and size in these studies flow from underlying functional factors assessed by the authors or study participants: recent deployment experiences; expected future squad missions; available equipment (e.g., weapons and communications), and non-materiel factors such as doctrine, leadership, and tactics. In short, squad organization and size have always been viewed as following from underlying factors, and the objective of the assessment has always been to improve future small unit performance in expected conditions of deployment. Given more-recent Army experience (deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan) with extensive use of dismounted small units conducting missions independently, the change in expected TSU missions under a wider range of military operations (i.e., stability tasks as well as offensive/defensive tasks; see Appendix D), and changes in available and emerging equipment to carry out these missions, the Army needs to conduct a new round of TSU organization analysis unconstrained by assumptions about numbers of Soldiers per unit, roles of unit members, etc. The current TSU organization is not necessarily optimal. For example, it is conceivable that three fire teams (two rifle fire teams and one machine gun/grenadier/XM25 fire team) with appropriate changes in TTPs may provide significant improvements in maneuverability, military effects (particularly lethal effects), and survivability over the current two identical fire teams. The interplay among factors such as TSU size and organization with other DOTMLPF options is discussed further 76

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH below, under the “Organization” heading in the section titled “Selected DOTMLPF Opportunities for Balancing Maneuverability, Military Effects, and Survivability.” TSU Design Considerations The lack of an analytical foundation for squad performance limits future advances in capability to what infantry leadership is advocating at a given time; it precludes development of a stable TSU architecture. While the TRADOC Analysis Center has some force-on-force models that could be used, it has not used these to develop measures of performance (MOPs) or measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the TSU. MOPs and MOEs for the current squad are based on operational experiments to assess particular materiel systems using scenarios developed for the experiment. The Army has adopted 72 hours as the mission-duration standard for squad performance. A standard operation would require each Soldier to carry a “sustainment” load of about 60 pounds for the 72-hour mission, in addition to an assault load of about 45 pounds. This standard represents a “worst case” load, in the sense that a mission duration less than 72 hours would reduce the Soldier load. As a consequence of the 72- hour standard, Army developers have pursued multiple alternatives for manned and unmanned support vehicles, such as the M274 mechanical mule and the planned Soldier Mission Support System. Robotic augmentation of TSU functions is a design consideration of enormous potential for Soldier and TSU capabilities in the future. However, proponents and developers of support vehicles for the squad continue to ignore the need to address many basic shortcomings that have been identified using prototypes, including several issues relating directly to TSU design. These include such things as: provisions for operator and maintainer manpower; vehicle mobility that is less than that of dismounted Soldiers (which means the vehicle cannot keep up with dismounts in complex terrain); load security when separated from the TSU formation, as well as other “minder” distractions; safety of dismounted Soldiers; and tactical noise and other signatures. In addition to support vehicles to assist with load-carrying, there are portable unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance, “port bots” for special purposes, and exoskeleton systems to consider in future designs for the most capable TSU organization. Appendix H provides descriptions of current relevant programs in robotics technologies. As discussed in Chapter 3, until the Army develops a better understanding of TSU requirements, it will have no choice but to continue using worst-case approaches and faulty support concepts. The Army has a mature set of metrics for Armored Systems and Mounted Combat, which, together with models and simulations, can predict or estimate engagement, battle, and campaign outcomes for a given set of performance data and conditions. Analogous capability is needed for designing and evaluating dismounted TSU concepts. Using foundations developed in the 1980s, objective metrics, as recommended in Chapter 3, can be developed for social processes that are critical to achieving decisive overmatch, even if the scores on some metrics are not necessarily on an ordinal scale (that is, they are not ranked from a highest to lowest score). It should be possible for the Army to develop metrics for the dismounted Soldier and TSU in operations such as direct fire, movement, indirect fire coordination, information collection, mission planning, 77

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS culturally aware behavior, situational awareness and understanding, and decision- making. These metrics, in the form of MOPs and MOEs, could be used in the near term as a basis for establishing realistic goals for future capabilities, as well as setting acquisition objectives and training readiness standards. Development and analyses of TSU options will require collaboration among multiple Army activities, including the TRADOC Infantry School at the Maneuver Center of Excellence and the TRADOC Analysis Center, the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM), Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, and the Army program executive offices for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) and Soldier (PEO Soldier). Finding: The task of developing metrics for the Soldier and TSU lacks organizational focus and responsibility. A single organization should have the responsibility for developing the metrics for dismounted Soldier and TSU operations. Recommendation 5: The Army should transform and sustain the design of the TSU, including re-assessing unit organization and size, by the following actions: a. Develop representative measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the primary dimensions of TSU performance, and ensure these measures incorporate human dimension criteria. b. Assemble a consortium of stakeholders to implement iterative work-centered analyses of the Soldier task workload and the TSU and Soldier-system performance required by increasing the scope (range, quality, thresholds) of TSU MOPs and MOEs. The analyses should enable development of predictive analytical models of Soldier physical and cognitive task and mobility performance, Soldier-to-Soldier task and mobility interaction within a TSU network, and TSU task and mobility performance. c. Expand the TSU task and mobility model to predict influences of weapons, information collection, and information technologies on TSU MOPs and MOEs. Such a TSU task and mobility model could be expanded in the mid-term to include individual Soldier and TSU social network factors as well as training states. Soldier Performance Changes in TSU design will require not only considerations for future missions and equipment but also adequate attention to the human Soldiers. Capabilities of the TSU and of the Soldiers in it are highly dependent on each other. Enhancements to TSU performance and effectiveness should also enhance performance and effectiveness of the individual Soldier. Likewise, Soldier enhancements should increase the performance and effectiveness of the TSU. For example, sharing situational awareness within the TSU enhances an individual Soldier's situational awareness. Enhancing the shooting skills of 78

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH one Soldier will, in turn, enhance the lethality of the TSU. Future capability enhancements to the TSU and individual Soldiers should be designed to provide a synergistic effect that is greater than the sum of incremental improvement from each enhancement by itself. As the Army considers encouraging enlisted careers reaching beyond the 20-25 years now the nominal standard, a shift in the expertise and experience levels of individual Soldiers might well have profound results on TSU performance, allowing the Army to capitalize on the training and experience of longer-serving deployment veterans. In listening to and questioning Soldiers, troop leaders, and materiel designers, the committee learned that what is broadly known in the research and development (R&D) community about human physiological performance applicable to TSU dominance is not being applied by the Army. This deficit in applying critical information to understand and improve Soldier performance is discussed in the sections that follow. Physiological Readiness Most accept that sleep loss or extreme heat will affect physical performance. Less accepted, but well established in research, is that cognitive performance is just as profoundly affected by lack of sleep, temperature extremes, time zone shifts, poor nutrition, and extreme elevation changes. In particular, cognitive ability declines substantially with sleep loss (Miller et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2000; Van Dongen et al., 2004). Depending on the individual, performance decline due to lack of sleep can be as much as 1 percent per hour after last rest. So, Soldiers operating 24 hours without sleep, assuming they were fully rested at the start of the 24 hours, may be operating with as much as a 24 percent cognitive deficit. Seventeen to nineteen hours without sleep, which many consider not much more than a long day, can have the same impairment as alcohol consumption at the legal standard for driving under the influence (Williamson and Feyer, 2000). While there is wide variation among individuals in performance decrement from sleep deprivation, there is no correlation between individual self-assessments of their "alertness" and measured performance (Van Dongen et al., 2004). As with raised blood-alcohol levels, “Can do!” spirit does not restore brain function, and it is the higher-order functions of judgment and analytical reasoning that fade first. Miller et al. (2011) discussed how “…sleep deprived leaders appear to have a diminished capacity to recognize their own sleep debt, as well as the sleep debt of their subordinates.” The researchers surveyed recently returned combat veterans attending the Army Infantry Officers Advanced Course. Nearly 70 percent reported that their superiors received less or much less sleep than needed, 55 percent reported they themselves received less or much less than needed, and 47 percent reported their subordinates received less or much less sleep than required. The veterans noted that they averaged 4 hours of sleep per night during the periods of high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) that made up almost half of their time deployed. The mental abilities required to achieve success exploiting network-centric capabilities are those most vulnerable to battlefield stressors that include sleep loss, environmental extremes, dehydration, and high OPTEMPO. Functional brain imaging 79

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS studies show that sleep loss selectively deactivates the prefrontal cortex, the brain region where anticipation, planning, and situational awareness culminate (Thomas, et al., 2000; Wesensten et al., 2005a). While the research literature on performance losses from a degraded physiological state is fairly robust, the committee found mention of these degradation factors missing in small unit leaders’ considerations of operations planning. The mission planning aid described later in this chapter (see Recommendation 14 and preceding text) would be a tool for delivering this knowledge to small-unit leaders for operations and mission planning. Most of the research on the physiological bases of degraded performance has concentrated on single-attribute relationships. Additional research is needed to understand the relationships among multiple degrading factors, such as the effects on physical, cognitive, and emotional performance attributes of combinations of sleep loss, poor nutrition, poor hydration, temperature extremes, exposure to extreme motion (air and ground vehicles), high elevations, and prolonged physical fatigue. Such research could better quantify the relations between the degrading factors and performance attributes relevant to mission planning, predictive simulations, and the models used for analyzing alternatives. Further, there is an equally urgent need for research evaluation of training, pharmacologic, and heating and cooling mitigation strategies, to include both the short-term and long-term effects of a mitigation strategy on Soldier fitness and Soldier health. For example, both Ritalin (methylphenidate) and modafinil are in some use by the U.S. military as antidotes to sleep loss, but little is known of the effects of such use on cognitive or emotional performance (Wesensten et al., 2005b). A second objective in this research should be to develop biomarkers that could indicate to TSU and other small unit leaders the physiological readiness of their Soldiers. Even when the OPTEMPO requires the assignment of Soldiers with reduced physiological performance, it is critical that mission planners understand the decrement in performance their TSU may encounter. A more complex third objective would be to learn how Soldiers differ in their sensitivity to the performance degradation factors and if such a sensitivity might be the basis for selection measures. In the near term, physiological readiness could be inserted as a “must-do” checklist in TSU mission planning: “Have the Soldiers had a night’s rest?” or “Is there an extreme elevation change planned?” And so on. When such precautions are not possible, both the assignment of squads to particular tasks and the number of squads allocated to a task should reflect a quantitative knowledge on the part of mission planners of the expected physiological efficiency of each unit. Emotion Regulation Small unit leaders reported that, on occasion, they had seen peer leaders perform while influenced by an emotional state brought about by family or domestic issues from home, by recent casualties, or other sources. Training should be incorporated into courses for small unit leaders to make them aware of the need for “mindfulness” in their decision- making and troop leading. This training could take the form of game scenarios that highlight the role of emotion regulation in tactical decision-making. Doctrine should be 80

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH developed to guide leaders sensing the potential for emotion-driven degraded leadership in others or themselves. Research would be needed to develop effective measures of leaders’ emotional states and the relationship to decision-making in high-stress and extreme environments, the effectiveness of the developed doctrine, and the effectiveness of leader emotion-regulation training. Research should also explore the potential for neurosensing of the emotional state of Soldiers and their leaders. Resilient Soldiers In parallel, perhaps, with the research on emotion regulation for leaders, research should seek to determine the attributes of resilience in Soldiers: the ability to perform effectively throughout the extremes expected in unified land operations. Such extremes are likely to include “three-block wars”—ranging from lethal fire and maneuver to humanitarian assistance and back to lethal fire and maneuver in a span of minutes. Increased resilience could also make Soldiers and units more survivable, both physically—able to survive threats posed by the enemy and the environment—and mentally—able to resist depression and assaults on cognitive ability, such as post traumatic stress disorder. Army research can provide new knowledge applicable to selection, assignment, and training strategies for increasing the levels of Soldier and TSU resilience. The Army Center for Enhanced Performance, originally an enhanced performance program at West Point, has grown to have 100-plus affiliated professionals; it provides direction for basic training and interventive training events to several Army units. If institutionalized with Department of Army support, the center’s results could be applied to expanded R&D program efforts in small unit leadership and small group social dynamics at ARI, the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, the Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED) at ARL, and elsewhere. Optimizing the TSU Social Network Each TSU forms a discrete social network that must function efficiently. But little is known beyond the intuitive level about how the social network is forged within a unit, how it is maintained, and how personalities influence that process. For example, cohort training, in which Soldiers continue training and serving with the same unit beyond Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training, showed some success in experiments during the mid- to late-1980s. The concept of keeping dismounted infantry units together for training and service over extended periods thus has merit, but its potential still needs to be objectively evaluated with other options (including combinations of such options), such as the master trainer concept discussed below. As Soldiers move toward more interactions in electronic forums such as chat rooms, Facebook, and text messaging systems, it should be possible to automate the monitoring of each squad as an effective social network. This could yield huge benefits at low cost, if commanders were able to easily identify squads with degrading social 81

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS cohesion or shifting internal loyalties. Such measurements lie well within the scope of current behavioral research and should be explored. Soldier Selection Selection figures prominently in achieving overmatch inasmuch as selection processes form the basis for recruitment, assignment, training, and retention decisions. Were one to succeed in defining the optimal squad or squads at a structural level, then it would also be possible to develop tools for maximizing the efficiency of individual squads during the process of personnel assignment. It is no secret that squads vary in their effectiveness and that this variation reflects the interaction of the personnel that make up each squad. While there has been a significant effort to enhance leader training and development at the squad level, there has been very little effort devoted to the notion that the squad—as a group of interacting personalities—forms a network that must function optimally if the squad is to achieve its potential. Just as commanders can improve the performance of individual squads by transferring squad members to different squads to overcome personality conflicts, it is possible that cohesive TSUs whose members work well together can be constructed based on achieving a proper mix of personalities. Significant numbers of Soldiers are required for the volunteer Army, and the infantry specialties have traditionally not been the most selective. As a consequence, small unit leaders reported to the committee that, especially after first combat, on the order of 30 percent of their Soldiers were no longer effective and were thus a drain on the small unit for the remainder of the deployment. Although the Army’s selection and placement process, Tier One Performance Screen (TOPS), is improving the prediction of initial training completion and first enlistment retention program, the selection technology could be further developed to learn if a propensity to become combat ineffective, at least in the perception of the small unit leader, can be predicted. Whether the outcome is an expansion of the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS), another off-the-shelf or new psychological instrument, or a neuroscience- based biomarker, the need is critical if TSUs are to be more effective. Careful research on this theme might also reveal the role of leader traits and TSU composition on a Soldier being informally classified by a leader as combat ineffective. Individual Differences In all of the committee’s data collection visits, a theme heard from the training base as well as from recently deployed Soldiers is that, through concentrating on the human dimension, the Army could exploit the talents and abilities of Soldiers to get closer to excellent performance, rather than settling for the lowest common denominator performance that was acceptable in the Cold War era. Using individual differences as a future force multiplier was an overarching recommendation in the recent National Research Council study, Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications (NRC, 2009, Pp. 103-104): 82

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH Conclusion 17: Neuroscience is establishing the role that neural structures play in the individual variability observed in cognition, memory, learning behaviors, resilience to stressors, and decision-making strategies and styles. Differences from one soldier to the next have consequences for most of the Army applications discussed in this report. Individual variability influences operational readiness and the ability of military units to perform assigned tasks optimally, but it is in many ways at odds with the conventional approach of training soldiers to be interchangeable components of a unit. Recommendation 17: Using insights from neuroscience on the sources and characteristics of individual variability, the Army should consider how to take advantage of variability rather than ignoring it or attempting to eliminate it from a soldier’s behavior patterns in performing assigned tasks. The goal should be to seek ways to use individual variability to improve unit readiness and performance. Exploiting the talents and abilities of individuals would apply to Army recruiting and training across the board, not just to dismounted infantry. But taking advantage of these individual differences at the level of dismounted TSU operations has several facets. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), although undergoing change, is an objective measure of physical readiness recognized as being combat relevant. Passing the APFT is a critical milestone for recruits to become qualified in a Military Occupational Specialty. Recycling trainees in initial entry training to give them more time to reach the fitness goals has been a constant feature of Army training. A recruit scheduled for Basic Training is also scheduled for follow-on Advanced Individual Training. With each Basic Training recycle, a follow-on Advanced Individual Training “seat” is vacated, resulting in wasted training resources. (Similarly, a trainee recycled in One-Station Unit Training “vacates” the remainder of his training seat.) A predictive screen for application in Military Entrance Processing Stations that would predict APFT potential success at the outset should be developed and used to schedule a recruit’s Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training, or One-Station Unit Training, with or without physical training remediation. This would reduce Army training expenses for trainees, transients, holdees, and students and possibly improve trainee morale and retention. Fielding such a measure would be a needed administrative precedent for exploiting other facets of individual differences. It is very likely that the differences in cognitive abilities and temperament among Soldiers exceed differences in physical appearance or ability. The Armed Forces Qualification Test, a subset of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), is a respected measure of cognitive ability, and the ASVAB as a whole is a useful indicator of vocational affinity. These instruments are used to make both accession decisions and assignments for Military Occupational Specialty training. ARI developed TAPAS, which is another accession decision instrument that assesses temperament and interests. The use of TAPAS in a battery along with ASVAB and TOPS (the latter to assess educational attainment) is significantly improving training completion rates. This R&D should be broadened to determine if instruments deliverable in the Military Entrance Processing Stations could usefully predict learning styles, which could yield 83

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS training base economies. To be successful, this effort would need to develop alternative training course syllabi for trainees with a preferred learning style, to capitalize on the potential for reduced training times and reduced recycle times or attrition. Company and battalion commanders affirm that the difference in performance among squads (and among platoons) is large, suggesting factors of two or three or more between the lowest and highest performing units. Most of the research on small unit performance has focused on the leader as the central determinant of unit performance differences. The favorable fielding of TOPS provides a foundation for further and accelerated exploration of the role of team member attributes on collective team performance. This could then lead to research to define cognitive, noncognitive, and physical performance attributes that contribute to excellence in TSU performance. If useful relationships are found among individual Soldier attributes and TSU performance, then further R&D could explore methods for filling TSU vacancies based on optimal complements to already assigned personnel already in a TSU. While using such data to make optimum assignments from a centralized authority may be beyond near-term feasibility within the Department of the Army, the potential for both avoiding poor TSU performance and for gaining broad excellence should not be entirely ignored. The personnel pipeline flow rates are sufficient that garrison or lower-level assignments could be made to attain most of the potential performance gains. Finally, the Army may not be aware of much research, government-funded or otherwise, that could be highly relevant. For example, personality measures being studied for use by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in assigning astronauts compatible for long-term missions to Mars may have utility in TSU assignments, perhaps for use as diagnostics in improving sub-par TSU performance or as markers for potential poor performance. Changes in TSU design will require not just considerations for future missions and equipment but also adequate attention to the Soldier as a human. Capabilities of the TSU and of the Soldiers in it are highly dependent on each other. Enhancements to TSU performance and effectiveness should also enhance performance and effectiveness of the individual Soldier. Likewise, Soldier enhancements should increase the performance and effectiveness of the TSU. For example, situational awareness within the TSU enhances an individual Soldier’s situational awareness. Enhancing the shooting skill of one Soldier will, in turn enhance the lethality of the TSU. Future enhancements to the TSU and Soldiers should be designed to provide a synergistic effect that is greater than the sum of incremental improvement from each enhancement by itself. Several near-term actions support the goal of achieving decisive Soldier performance:  Institutionalizing the functions of the Army Center for Enhanced Performance;  Assembling a “Physiological Readiness Check List” for use in training and operational testing and refining development of nonintrusive physiological status monitors;  Expanding research in the social processes of small units; and,  Expanding research in individual differences, especially as applied to physical readiness screens used in recruitment and military training. 84

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH Recommendation 6: The Army should evaluate Soldier performance for the future mission effectiveness of the TSU in the near term by leveraging existing research and development and by considering all DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities) domains. Mid to far term actions toward maintaining decisive levels of Soldier performance in TSUs include:  Provide near-real time physiological readiness state reporting from Soldier and TSU to the command chain using physiological state monitors  Leverage personality inventories, such as TAPAS, to determine the cognitive, noncognitive, and physical performance attributes that predict TSU performance.  Conduct analyses to predict probable increased TSU MOP and MOE levels attainable if two-year and five-year technology goals are met and anticipated improvements are implemented.  Explore the potential to discern the state of the social network, morale, and other performance-relevant attributes from the communications among the TSU members without invading individual privacy and without individual identifications. Recommendation 7: To maintain the currency of representative measures for the primary dimensions of Soldier and TSU mission performance, the Army, including its doctrine and training, research and development, acquisition and testing elements, should undertake a recurring program (at least biannual) to re-evaluate Soldier performance considering the analytical foundation for the functional design of the TSU, including numbers of Soldiers, grades and specialties, career experience, organization, and external support requirements. FOCUSING ON TSU TRAINING Not only will Soldiers and TSUs be expected to do more, but an increased emphasis on exploiting human-dimension knowledge will demand innovative approaches to training. Focused training is essential to improving the performance of Soldiers and TSUs to levels that can ensure overmatch. Small unit training and leader training are more important than ever, not just because of sophisticated technology but because the TSU is the centerpiece of future Army operations. The TSU Training Imperative The TSU must have mastery of the methods, tactics, and technical knowledge and skills required to accomplish the assigned missions before the missions are undertaken. Current senior Army leader training emphases are that future missions comprising the entire range of military operations, including counterinsurgency and wide area security as 85

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS Nonlethal Alternatives Finding: The full range of prospective operations for dismounted Soldiers and TSU is very likely to exceed that experienced in current conflicts. Stability operations especially will require a mix of lethal and nonlethal capabilities that are not currently available. The emphasis in the nonlethal weapons R&D community appears to be on expanding the menu of options available to warfighters, with the expected outcomes from use of nonlethal effects being as straightforward as for lethal effects. However, nonlethal weapons should be used with an expectation of initiating a specific behavior on the part of the targets. There appears to be little research on understanding the behaviors to be anticipated with each of the nonlethal weapon technologies and the variance of these behaviors among cultures. Also, there appears to be little understanding of the engagement decision complexity that could come to individual TSU Soldiers, with attendant lengthened decision cycle times and greater opportunities for errors. For managing Soldier load and simplifying dismounted kit, one or more “weapons” that can be readily shifted between lethal and nonlethal modes would be useful. But two downsides to such multimodal weapons are that (1) Soldiers must be well trained on the rules of engagement (ROE) and TTPs for selecting the right mode for a given situation, and (2) in noncombat encounters such as stability operations, signaling to the other side in an encounter that a multimodal weapon is in nonlethal mode could be mission-critical. The effectiveness of nonlethal actions, as an alternative to lethal effects, will depend to a great extent on the perceptions of those being confronted. Recommendation 13: In the mid-term, the Army should undertake research to identify a range of unambiguous signals of nonlethal intent. The research should extend to the exploration of cultural differences in intent interpretation. TSU Mission Planning Aid Finding: TSU leaders and their commanders at higher echelons need to understand how factors across all the DOTMLPF domains affect not only Soldier load but also the more encompassing goal of balancing maneuverability, effective action, and survivability to ensure small units have decisive overmatch wherever and under whatever circumstances they operate. Given the range of missions and tasks that dismounted TSUs may be called upon to perform in the future, even experienced leaders at the TSU level and higher echelons cannot be expected to know immediately the best combination of available options, extending across all DOTMLPF domains, for the optimal balance of maneuverability, military effects, and survivability in every environment and engagement. An easy to use mission planning aid could incorporate the relationships among options learned from prior operational experience (lessons learned), as well as the relationships among metrics, indicators, and DOTMLPF options found and validated through experimental trials and incorporated in assessment models used by the development community. 120

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH Properly designed, such a mission planning aid would include long distance endurance and sprint speed (as surrogates for engagement vulnerability), functions of terrain (specific terrain route, including elevation), meteorological factors (temperature, humidity, and wind), ration intake, loads (including IPE), physical attributes of TSU members (fitness, anthropometry, degree of misfit of IPE), and resupply points. It would identify the TSU member-by-load combination most likely to be the mobility limit for that particular TSU. If the empirical basis could be developed, the planning aid could also predict the probability that the mission would contribute to the long-term injury or disability of particular TSU members. The mission planning aid would be used in training TSU leaders on the factors that affect squad mobility, including terrain, meteorological conditions, loads, load configurations, accumulated fatigue, IPE, and how factors like IPE fit and load configuration constrain agility. Practical exercises for leader trainees would increase confidence in using the planning aids in operations. Also, the aids to Soldier load planning and mobility and the endurance effects of different loads could be incorporated in training simulations and games. Recommendation 14: The Army should develop a mission planning aid to assist in balancing maneuverability, military effects, and survivability, for use in training and operations by TSU leaders and leaders at higher echelons. LEVERAGING ADVANCES IN PORTABLE POWER The importance of overcoming limitations placed on Soldier and TSU operations related to ensuring adequate power sources cannot be overestimated. The last decade has seen major advances in portable power materiel technologies, which could have outsize influence on overmatch. However, this can occur only if the Army can leverage the advances to their full effect. DOTMLPF Considerations Portable power issues have doctrinal implications because of their impact on TSU TTPs. Non-rechargeable (primary) batteries tend to be less expensive to purchase, have greater energy storage density, have longer shelf life, and, in general, are safer than rechargeable batteries, which may become unstable or even hazardous in extreme temperatures or charge states. Rechargeable batteries also have a relatively limited life and must be kept charged to avoid deterioration. For these reasons, primary batteries have been the predominant type used in operations, while rechargeable batteries have been used primarily for training, with only limited use in operational environments. Any portable power solution that incorporates battery recharging as a key element must therefore address these reasons why rechargeables have not been widely accepted in operational TTPs. 121

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS There are also personnel and leadership considerations. To adequately prepare for missions, Soldiers must have an accurate accounting of the state of all their equipment— weapons, bullets, equipment, water, food, and energy provisions (including batteries). To better understand battery status, advanced “gauges" are needed to give trustworthy estimates of remaining capacity. For example, even without use rechargeable batteries lose storage capacity over time, and a 100 percent reading of the charge level is a false representation of the originally designed capacity—it may well be only a fraction of the original energy storage capacity. The size and weight of power sources can also dictate the duration of operations by affecting the load that must be carried on the operation or the particular electronics that can be utilized. These considerations in turn can affect the optimal organization of the TSU as well as training, leadership, personnel, and facility requirements. Figure 4-2 lists prospective Soldier power solutions to meet the Soldier energy demands as compiled by the Army in the near, mid, and far terms. Appendix I discusses the state of the art in the underlying Soldier energy technologies, including the battery, fueled, and energy-harvesting systems that are listed in Figure 4-2. While the range of solutions is definitely impressive, each entry on the list comes with its own set of DOTMLPF challenges that must be met to make measureable improvements in dismounted Soldier and TSU capabilities. Battery and Fueled Energy Storage Systems Considering the current squad organization and equipment, batteries remain the energy source of choice for missions less than 72 hours. Batteries range in sizes from button cells to large single cells that are arrayed in series and parallel to achieve the requisite energy storage, pack voltage, and acceptable discharge rate for the variety of equipment required. However, Soldier criticism of battery technology is very specific and has formed the basis of the Army R&D program. Materiel shortcomings of batteries include:  Too many battery types;  Not energetic enough;  Too many batteries needed for long missions;  Too heavy and bulky; and  Evolution of capabilities adds to energy requirements. As described in Appendix I, battery systems will continue as the mainstay energy source for the Soldier either as a stand-alone source or as a component of an air breathing hybrid configuration. The specific energy of rechargeable batteries is approaching the specific energy of today’s primary batteries, and advances in rechargeable lithium-air batteries now provide battery-like performance on a par with fuel cells. 122

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH FIGURE 4-2. Soldier power solutions. SOURCE: U.S. Army, 2010. Finding: Rechargeable lithium-air energy sources used as the primary energy source in hybrid configurations can replace many primary and rechargeable storage systems now in use. In addition to small fueled engines, the Army has focused on developing several types of fuel cells for a wide range of applications ranging from “wearable” energy sources to large battery chargers. Small fuel cells applicable at the Soldier and TSU level are sufficiently advanced that they are being evaluated in the field. An advantage of fuel cells is that they have low acoustic and thermal signatures. A major drawback to current fuel cells is that they cannot operate on JP (the battlefield logistics) fuel. Figure 4-3 illustrates the potential of the various energy storage options and provides a basis for committee findings on technology solutions considered for the TSU. The figure depicts the mass of current systems needed to provide operational kilowatt- hours of energy. Systems illustrated for comparison include six primary or rechargeable batteries (standard inventory lithium BA5590 and BA5390, lithium-polymer, lithium-air, and lithium-carbon monofluoride) plus two fuel-cell systems (direct menthanol and solid oxide). Detailed characteristics of these energy systems are discussed in Appendix I. 123

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS FIGURE 4-3. Comparison of energy options for the dismounted Soldier. SOURCE: Adapted from NRC, 1997. The selection of a rechargeable battery storage technology as the principal choice for the dismounted Soldier’s energy source would necessitate the parallel introduction of a recharger technology sufficiently small and lightweight to be applicable at the dismounted TSU level. JP-fueled motor generators for possible use in rechargers do not scale favorably to small sizes. The successful development of a JP-fuel reforming technology would allow for small combustion engine battery chargers of low cost and light weight. JP fuel has a weight advantage with respect to carrying additional batteries, given that it has about 10 times the available energy on a per-kilogram basis. But any calculation of the tradeoffs would need to include the weights of the JP container as well as the fuel-cell energy converter. A concept of operations for such a promising opportunity would have to weigh all factors and consequences, Finding: JP-reforming technology will have to be developed over a wide range of sizes before the Army can exploit either rechargeable battery technology or fuel-cell technology. The most important development for the dismounted Soldier in the near term is a rechargeable battery-based conformal central power supply to power the Soldier’s equipment ensemble. Integrating a single power source would standardize connectors and enable the Army to take maximum advantage of the best and lightest of whatever 124

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ACHIEVING OVERMATCH technology is available—weapons, navigation, communications, pointing devices, etc. For the mid-term, a Soldier-portable battery recharger, powered by a logistics fuel available in theater, would dramatically extend mission duration. The most important far- term development is a rechargeable metal-air energy system (with specific energy approaching that of fueled systems). While the Army is well on the way toward developing a rechargeable battery technology to become the principal energy source for the Soldier on the battlefield, aside from the materiel development itself, critical DOTMLPF elements have not been evaluated. Finding: There is no doctrinal philosophy for the tactical small unit to recharge the battery: there is no organizational equipment to support recharging; there is no hint of what training would be required; and, there is no parallel materiel development of the recharger or fuel reformer that would be needed. Energy Harvesting Solar and biomechanical energy harvesting systems have been developed to the point where evaluation by Soldiers is possible. Solar battery chargers are in the inventory. Use of photovoltaic cells with higher conversion efficiencies will reduce the weight and volume of solar harvesting techniques for use as battery chargers. Use of biomechanical harvesting will increase as the demand for energy by the Soldier decreases due to increases in the efficiency of Soldier equipment. If the Army can somehow reduce the energy demands of Soldier equipment, energy harvesting could be used to provide a significant amount of the individual Soldier’s energy requirement. Schemes for harvesting energy must generally be used in hybrid configurations. Of the several harvested energy systems discussed in Appendix I, the most relevant at the TSU level for the near and mid terms are portable solar systems and biomechanical systems that extract energy from individual-Soldier movement. Finding: The full impact of energy harvesting mechanisms on Soldier and tactical small unit performance has not been determined. Leveraging these advances in energy sources will help to reduce Soldier fatigue, eliminate Soldier anxiety associated with tenuous resupply, increase Soldier confidence in situational awareness from powered sensors, and provide needed assurance that communications links with higher levels in the command structure can be maintained. Finding: Portable power advances can best contribute to the decisiveness of future Soldiers by increasing the certainty of Soldiers that their equipment ensemble will have sufficient energy to carry out any TSU mission. Recommendation 15: The Army should develop and maintain a robust program in advanced energy sources based on full analysis of DOTMLPF elements, with the goal of eliminating power and energy as limiting factors in TSU operations. 125

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