• Implement an integrated S&T approach, to include:
—Creation of a warrior systems design office
—Provision of adequate funding, and
—Development of a virtual prototype of the warrior system.
• Energize the Soldier Integrated Concept Team and strengthen S&T input.
INDICATORS OF FAILURE TO INTEGRATE TSU AND SOLDIER DECISIVE OVERMATCH CAPABILITIES
It was disappointing—at least to the current committee—to learn that the Army’s responses to the ASB recommendations for the Soldier in 1991 and similar recommendations from the IRT in 2000 have not been successfully integrated in the way that dismounted TSUs and Soldiers are prepared for the missions they face. If anything, the current and projected demands upon the dismounted Soldier and the TSU are greater and more critical tactically, operationally, and strategically. The importance of implementing a systems approach and creating a single management authority to equip and prepare the dismounted TSU and the Soldier cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, despite numerous mentions of the “Soldier as a system” as being key to Soldier and TSU performance and consequent warfighting effectiveness since at least the 1991 ASB report, the Army has not adequately applied systems engineering discipline to either the Soldier or the dismounted TSU.
Although the Army’s combat development community (e.g., the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) has identified many physical and cognitive performance capabilities that would enhance Soldier and TSU enhanced warfighting effectiveness, even a cursory comparison of desired to currently fielded force capabilities identifies numerous capability gaps. Given the range of TSU and Soldier capability gaps to be addressed and the complex solution space of potential Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions, the Army should be applying systems engineering discipline to close these gaps, just as it does for its major platform systems and other systems-of-systems that currently have decisive overmatch. However, DOTMLPF enhancements for individual Soldiers and TSUs appear to be based on independent efforts (“eaches”) rather than on integrated systems engineering. This issue is not limited to Army combat developers; the materiel development community—comprising the Army Research, Development and Engineering Command and the Program Executive Offices and program managers under the Army Acquisition Executive—also exhibit this limitation.
The committee believes that the following problems and failures in recent operations—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—exemplify the lack of success in applying adequate systems engineering discipline.
In dismounted operations, Soldiers and TSUs are often not integrated into the Army network. One result is that they are too often surprised in tactical situations, resulting in unnecessary casualties. Dismounted TSUs and Soldiers lack sufficient timely situational understanding of the locations of their supporting assets, the enemy, and noncombatants.