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Appendix G Technology Solutions for TSU Sensor Missions Sensor and optics technology is employed to increase the effectiveness of the squad. A sensor system transduces propagating energy encoded with certain information on the threat environment into a format usable by the Soldier. Examples include full motion video (FMV), infrared search and track (IRST), radar, communications intelligence receivers, acoustic unmanned ground sensors, and acoustic sniper detection systems. Generally, the waveband determines the type of sensor and its potential utility. Squad-level sensors are used in three types of missions: Situational awareness (SA)1, Force protection; and Precision targeting. Other sensor missions—most notably intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—support the squad but are generally accomplished at higher levels or by other organizations. Sensors providing situational awareness yield timely information about current events in the space around the squad, such as the locations of dismounted threats, approaching vehicles, or potential targets within buildings. Force protection sensor technology focuses on providing adequate warning to minimize lethal engagements involving rockets, artillery, mortars, small arms fire, mines, improvised explosive devices, and chemical-biological- radioactive-nuclear (CBRN) agents. Precision targeting sensors provide highly lethal fire-control information to blue force weapons; examples include infrared seekers or the counter-battery solution generated from weapons location radar (WLR). Navigation sensors applied in a GPS-denied environment is a squad-level consideration falling under the situational awareness umbrella. Electronic warfare is a very important consideration; however, for the purposes of this discussion, is only considered where there is electronic protection (anti-jamming). The following are some guidelines for employing sensors for small-unit ISR: 1 The SA sensor mission is to gather information that can be used to increase Soldier/TSU situational awareness. 175

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS Sensor technology should create a decisive advantage and in no way impair other tasks critical to the squad’s operations. The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TCPED) process for the technology should be carefully developed with full attention to human-system interface factors. Sensor technology should be interoperable and modular. Soldiers should train with available sensor technology. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of available technology is critical. Unmanned sensors (unattended ground sensors (UGSs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), micro air vehicles (MAVs), etc.) can be used to extend the range and influence of the squad. An unprecedented degree of autonomous platform and sensor operation must be created. Given advances in network integration and small arms lethal ranges, a small unit leader must have the capability to “see” movement to 1,800 meters in all terrain and the ability to determine the character of that movement (armed men or civilians) out to 900 meters.2 Limiting the local range of operation ensures use of sensors with appropriate space, weight, and power (SWAP) and constrains information presented to the squad to that which is most pertinent. Special consideration should be given to the sensor architecture and operating environment. For example, can the sensor employ cell tower transmissions as a source of illumination for moving target indication? Sensor technology should be developed in full consideration of the roles and responsibilities of every member of the squad. Distributing capability among squad members would be prudent. Sensors may be either passive or active. Because passive sensors do not require their own sources of illumination they tend to be more stealthy than their active counterparts. Thermal imagers and signals intelligence (SIGINT) receivers are examples of passive sensing modes. Active modes employ transmitters to propagate energy; this transmitted energy convolves with the target impulse response to yield a target signal at the receiver. Radar and laser rangefinding are examples of active sensor systems. Generally, passive systems are lower cost, lighter weight, and use significantly less power to operate. SWAP and cost (SWAP-C) are the main constraints on materiel solutions and performance achievable by a given sensor technology. For example, weapons location radar may be used at a forward operating base, but for practical reasons (size, weight, power, and deployment) will not accompany a squad during a typical engagement. It is important to consider the array of squad missions and 2 Surveilling a 900m-1800m ring is nontrivial with optics. Rather, low power radar and SIGINT can be used for SA information and then can cue EO/IR for target characterization. An approach for meeting these needs is a network of sensors. Sensors organic to the tactical small unit (TSU) could meet the short range requirements, while networked access to supporting sensor systems could satisfy the longer range needs. 176

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APPENDIX G determine where enhanced sensor capability can provide a decisive edge and the practicality of deploying that capability given the squad’s SWAP-C constraints. Information gained from sensor technology is often achieved through sophisticated, automated processing. Different types of information come from the different sensor missions. Situational awareness may require sensor outputs that yield threat location and estimated characteristics (such as range rate, predicted positions, and types of targets). Force protection systems generate a warning response when a threat is deemed present and may then direct an interceptor; threat interception, at the very least, requires some knowledge of threat bearing and may otherwise need target class and state estimates for complete tracking. The ability to seamlessly and effectively combine multisource data into a common picture is advantageous for enhanced situational awareness and force protection. Sensors supporting precision targeting must provide information of sufficient timeliness and quality to meet weapon requirements; typical operator interaction involves prioritizing and confirming targets. Managing sensor-generated information is the biggest challenge facing the squad. Unlike ISR data products, which may occupy multiple intelligence analysts and function with a latency of minutes or hours, the squad requires actionable information with delays of a few seconds or less. Achieving the goal of tasking sensors, collecting necessary data, processing and exploiting the data, and disseminating important information—including, potentially, fusing data from other sources, such as National Technical Means—is an important challenge in providing the squad with superior SA and an overwhelming advantage over the adversary. (Fusing data from ISR sources generally requires multilevel security to protect data collection means and sensor features.) Tasking and collection is a time-consuming operation and has to be automated to minimize the impact on the squad’s mission. Materiel solutions supporting the squad should be based on an open system architecture (OSA). An OSA enables the integration of different sensor technologies and products from different vendors by defining system interfaces and data formats. This modular, open approach has a number of critical benefits, notably the potential for significantly reduced SWAP-C, a means to tailor sensor packages for different missions and target types, reduced learning curve and training requirements, and the ability to share time-critical information in straightforward fashion. The OSA should accommodate multilevel security considerations. SPECIFIC SQUAD-LEVEL SENSOR CONSIDERATIONS Table G-1 highlights key sensor considerations. Sensor requirements are specifically tied to mission objectives. In general, physical considerations—size, weight, power, deployment platform—impact the details of the sensor design. From the squad’s perspective, the sensor must be easily maneuvered. For example, a through-the-wall radar, used to detect activity or find weapons caches 177

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS in a building, must be lightweight and ideally weapon-mounted so that the Soldier is always able to fight while in threat areas. Moreover, powering the sensor should not overly burden the squad with battery and sensor mount weight. It may be that additional SWAP is warranted if the sensor provides an overwhelming advantage for a designated mission (e.g., finding weapons caches behind walls). This requires sensors with well-defined performance characteristics—such as detecting heartbeats or finding weapons caches with a specified probability—and robustness across the range of practical operating environments. Sensors must cope with a range of environmental characteristics, including urban clutter, multipath, different building characteristics, background traffic, mountain clutter, varying interference characteristics, etc. Additionally, the concept of operations (CONOPS) may affect sensor performance (e.g., in a through-the-wall sensor, the system must ensure it is detecting the threat heartbeat and not the operator heartbeat). Processing complexity is one approach to ensure increasingly robust performance, but embedded computing using modern sensor processing algorithms generally has high SWAP requirements. TCPED is the process that makes sensor technology useful to the warfighter. In many instances, whole communities are available to support TCPED. The enormity of the approach suggests an array of sophisticated sensors and well-trained analysts using complicated tools to derive critical information. Naturally, this traditional approach is of significantly less value to the squad. Rather, TCPED for the squad requires an unprecedented degree of automation and very low latency. Sensors must be positioned and tasked to collect data over very short time intervals. This data must then be processed, exploited, and disseminated to the squad to help guide tactical decision-making. Automation is the only practical way to close the TCPED loop and ensure that sensor technology does not adversely preoccupy the squad. The human-system interface (HSI) is a critical sensor design consideration. Anything that affects the squad’s cognition requires serious evaluation. The sensor TCPED process should provide information to the squad that is of high value, timely, and actionable. Providing this information in a useful manner that enhances the squad and does not detract from any other basic functions—such as performance in a firefight, interacting with locals, working as a team, etc.—is an intrinsic requirement. Additionally, the Soldier should understand the utility and quality of the sensor data, lest important information be discarded and less useful information be acted upon. Developing a test range to explicitly support acquisition and deployment of sensor technology and at the same time ensuring the incorporation of HSI best practices into squad-level sensor design, is imperative. An OSA employs specific system interfaces (e.g., inputs, outputs, and power usage) to ensure interoperability of subsystems and an integrated approach to sensor design. Key advantages of OSA standards from the squad’s perspective include modularity to support an array of missions; simplicity in integrating new technologies; support for a common user interface in abidance with HSI design goals; a means to matrix sensor capabilities across the squad; a mechanism to 178

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APPENDIX G acquire and integrate technology from a broader vendor base; and a common framework to train the squad on sensor technology usage. A government-owned OSA is necessary to ensure adherence to the spirit of the approach: Multiple vendors can participate and help enhance the OSA, with emphasis on sensor characteristics, performance, and utility. TABLE G-1 Squad-Level Sensor Considerations Issue Comments Key Considerations SWAP Limiting operating range and Modular, open approach tied field of view will minimize to strong systems engineering SWAP. Deploying on and detailed training. autonomous vehicles ideal for Approach seamlessly tied to many missions, but may cue CONOPS. adversary to squad presence. Performance Detection performance, false Operations in complex clutter alarm rate, location accuracy, and interference environments. target parameter estimation Impact of multipath and accuracy, resolution and contrast operator/platform motion. must be tied to squad’s specific Computing processor power mission goals. May vary by and overall SWAP. mission. Minimizing impact on Soldier’s cognition. TCPED Effective management of sensor Focus on regions around the assets requires a hands free squad, tie in ISR data from TCPED process for the squad. other sources with appropriate confidence weighting. Human-system Data must be presented to squad HSI, coupled with TCPED, is interface in most effective and primitive the single most important form. No time or resources for consideration in providing the interpretation. Example: blue squad the best and most useful dots for incoming threats, red sensor technology. Training dots for fleeing threats (“blue is should be included under HSI. new, red has fled”) Open Allowing multiple vendors to The government should system/modularity compete for support systems, consider developing and / cost thereby enabling significantly less owning the OSA. costly subsystems of product improvement. Interoperability of subsystems is a key feature. 179

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS Issue Comments Key Considerations Multilevel security Integration of information from Well-defined metadata formats multiple sources owing to integrated into the OSA allow security constraints is a challenge. key information to be provided to the squad without divulging sensor characteristics and sources and means. Systems Methodical approach to Couple Soldier characteristics engineering developing system requirements and training with physics- and understand relationships based models of sensor among systems of systems in the capabilities. Develop systems engineering process. engineering experience within the government team. Focus on OSA as key approach to interoperability and a modular approach to building squad capability. Multilevel security is a known impediment to timely and broad dissemination of information to the squad. It is highly unlikely that anyone in the squad will have security access to the wealth of information gathered by DoD and intelligence community sensors. Moreover, much of the data from these other sources is of a strategic nature: it provides important context but may not possess the timeliness of the information required by the squad. The ability to incorporate data from other sources to help manage sensor information collected by squad- level assets would necessitate a mechanism to downgrade security. An effectively designed OSA is able to support this objective by separating critical sensor information from those items that characterize a sensor’s physical design or sources and means of data collection. In the context of the OSA, metadata formats that convey the threat details of most interest to the squad (e.g., regions where the threat was last observed and general threat characteristics) is an effective approach to interface systems of varying classification. While systems engineering may have different meanings, in the context of building sensor technology for the decisive squad of the future it points out the process to specify sensor requirements. These requirements comprise all critical considerations, including performance, subsystem interoperability, SWAP, HSI, Soldier training, and life-cycle management. Effective systems engineering requires highly competent and well-trained acquisition professionals and support infrastructure, as well as effective software tools, test ranges, and acquisition strategy. From a strategy perspective, enforcing specific acquisition standards (e.g., OSA compliance), efficiently framing system requirements, and shortening the acquisition cycle to enhance the cost-risk-benefit trade space all appear essential in better supporting the squad’s equipment needs. 180

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APPENDIX G Situational Awareness Situational awareness provides the squad with current information on the threat environment. Threats include dismounts approaching the squad or leaving the vicinity, vehicles in proximity to the squad, CBRN and explosive emplacements, weapons caches, and blockaded routes. Dismounts may be combatants or the general populace, in the open or behind cover, and carrying weapons or unarmed. The complexities of the operational environment make gathering SA a challenge: clutter environments can appear extremely heterogeneous; multiple, potential targets may occupy the search space; complete SA may require propagation through anisotropic media (e.g., layered or mixed building materials with air gaps); urban or mountainous settings can create severe multipath scenarios and obscuration; users inadvertently interact with the sensor, or the sensor platform requires specialized motion compensation techniques; and intentional or unintentional interference degrades sensor performance. From the squad’s perspective, the ability to provide SA for a diameter of 900 meters centered on the squad is highly desirable. Limiting the SA window minimizes the amount of information deluging the squad. Providing the right information is critical. SA may be divided into a secondary sector of interest, perhaps out to 1,800 meters with focus on specific threats (e.g., vehicles only) that might enter the 900 meter inner region. In addition to the typical ground threats engaging the squad, future threats may include unmanned aerial systems (UASs), helicopters, and other small aircraft. Intelligence forecasts of the threat environment are essential in the SA sensor acquisition process. Anticipated threats where superior SA will greatly enhance the squad’s performance include these: Dismounts; Ground vehicles, including trucks, cars, and motorcycles; Obscured targets (dismounts, weapons, and weapons caches) within buildings or natural structures or under foliage; Concealed weapons carried on dismounts; and Detection, characterization, and location of emitters. Additional SA missions include navigation in GPS-denied environments and life signs monitoring. SA against small airborne threats, specifically UASs, may prove an important mission in the near future. Table G-2 summarizes the SA sensor missions. Dismount and vehicle detection can involve radar, FMV, and IRST sensors. Radar has the widest field of view and is generally preferred for larger area search and quicker responses. Additionally, radar encodes target presence and motion on the amplitude and phase variation of the radiofrequency signal; automated radar signal processing methods to detect targets in strong clutter and interference environments continue to show significant advancement with corresponding improvements in sensor (e.g., multichannel arrays and waveform 181

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS agility) and computing technology. FMV has a generally limited field of view and thus has limitations in a search mode. Recent developments extend FMV capability to wider areas by using multiple telescopes and processing to stitch the resulting outputs into a common picture; this technology is called wide area motion imagery (WAMI). Moving targets are automatically tracked in FMV and WAMI by finding and tracking pixel changes from frame to frame. Similarly, IRST sensor technology searches for regions of high emissivity to detect targets and then observes changes in pixel emissivity from frame to frame to estimate vehicle motion. TABLE G-2 Squad-Level Sensor Missions Mission Description Objective Relevant Sensor Technology SA Dismount detection Detect, locate, Radar, SIGINT, and engagement characterize, and monitor FMV, IRST, dismounts in vicinity of WAMI squad SA Vehicle detection Detect, locate, Radar, FMV, and engagement characterize, and monitor IRST, WAMI, vehicles in vicinity of acoustics, squad seismometer SA Through-wall Determine presence of Radar, SIGINT surveillance possible combatants and weapons caches within buildings and structures SA Foliage obscured Determine presence of Radar, LAser target surveillance possible combatants, Detection And weapons, and weapons Ranging caches under foliage (LADAR), SIGINT SA Spectrum Find and characterize SIGINT surveillance emitters within vicinity of squad SA Navigation in GPS- Provide position Radiofrequency denied information in absence of sensor technology environments traditional, handheld GPS device 182

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APPENDIX G Mission Description Objective Relevant Sensor Technology SA, force Concealed weapons Detect concealed weapons Millimeter wave protection detection among general populace radar, metal detector, magnetometer SA, force Life signs Remote detection of Millimeter wave protection monitoring fallen-Soldier life status radar, acoustics, laser Force Perimeter Force protection in Radar, IRST, protection surveillance vicinity of encampment acoustics, SIGINT Force Counterrocket, Force protection in Radar, IRST, protection, artillery, and mortar vicinity of encampment acoustics precision (CRAM) targeting Force Counter- Detect and locate likely Radar, HSI/MSI, protection improvised improvised explosive SIGINT explosive device device (IED) (CIED) emplacements Force Counter-shot/sniper Detect location of small Acoustics, IRST protection, arms fire precision targeting Force Mine detection Detect buried mines Ground protection penetrating radar, HSI/MSI, magnetometer, metal detector Force CBRN agent Detect threatening agents CBRN-tailored protection detection to support evasive actions sensors, remote sensing techniques (radar, EO/IR, HSI/MSI) Precision Vehicle Target armored and IR, radar, optical Targeting engagement nonarmored vehicles sights 183

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS Mission Description Objective Relevant Sensor Technology Precision Concealed Threat Engage threats hidden EO/IR, radar targeting Targeting behind abutments, on imaging other side of buildings, etc. Note: HSI/MSI, hyperspectral imaging/multispectral imaging. Obscured targets include objects within buildings, under foliage, or buried under soil. From an SA perspective, identifying all threats close to the squad is the goal. Lower frequency radar—about 1 GHz and below—is the technology of choice for obscured target detection. These lower frequency signals penetrate many building materials and foliage. Signal attenuation is severe and multipath can prove problematic, thereby limiting the system operating range. Laser detection and ranging (or LADAR, sometimes called light detection and ranging or LIDAR) is also a useful technology to map detected threats under foliage; LADAR generally does not detect sense-through-the-wall collections but can be used against targets under foliage when the laser has line of sight to the target. Millimeter wave (mmw) radar can detect concealed weapons at moderate ranges. Such radars (typically in the range 35-95 GHz) are generally smaller systems of comparable or better resolution than their lower frequency counterparts. New airport surveillance technology uses mmw scanners at security checkpoints. Squad applications would likely be for concealed weapons detection at ranges of a few meters to tens of meters. Magnetometers and metal detectors are not likely to have application, since they operate over shorter distances than mmw radar. Detection, characterization, and location of enemy emitters is a SIGINT function. Typical emitter threats are in the radiofrequency range, though SIGINT receivers have been developed to intercept laser-modulated signals. SA against all common emitters—typically, cell phones in the GSM bands and other handheld radios down to VHF—is of value to the squad. The common approaches to SIGINT collection include the use of a single, multiaperture receiver with sufficiently long baseline to achieve accuracy goals; multi-sensor intercept topologies (fusion of the intercepts from two or more sensors); or, moving a single intercept receiver through large integration angle and using frequency or time-differencing techniques. This latter approach requires greater time and may have limited applicability to the squad’s SA needs. SIGINT sensors can apply to obscured target detection when an emitter is present, such as a cell phone or a key fob or other exploitable device; lower frequency operation is essential to minimize signal attenuation through the obscuring medium, but SIGINT incurs only one-way loss (as opposed to two-way loss in radar). Navigation in a GPS-denied environment can employ coded radio frequency signals and multilateration in a local network, using principles similar 184

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APPENDIX G to those used by radio navigation satellite systems, such as GPS, Global Navigation Satellite System, Galileo, and the Computerized Movement Planning and Status System. Generally, four transmitter sources are needed to determine location in three dimensions and account for time, yielding absolute position. Frequency diversity is also required to minimize multipath effects on geolocation performance. Life signs monitoring is considered separate from through-the-wall target monitoring. A sensor is used to determine the life and health status of a fallen comrade. This technology can help protect members of the squad during a firefight or in other compromising situations. One approach is to use mmw radar to detect respiration. Depending on the range to the target, mmw radar can also be used to detect and calculate heart rate. LADAR detects respiration but not heart rate. The above discussion suggests the need for multiple sensor assets operating over different frequency regimes. Identifying and developing multipurpose sensor packages (e.g., a single aperture to provide both radar and SIGINT capabilities; or, a single sensor for concealed weapons detection, life signs monitoring, and navigation) would be highly desirable. Force Protection The primary force protection objectives (Table G-2) include the following: Perimeter surveillance for encampments; Early warning for incoming rockets, artillery, and mortars; Counter improvised explosive device (CIED); Fire/sniper location; and CBRN and explosives detection. Life signs monitoring and concealed weapons detection fall in both domains, SA and force protection. Perimeter surveillance provides early warning of an attack on an encampment. Radar, acoustics, and infrared (IR) sensors are likely sensor technology choices. Radar and acoustic sensors search for Doppler-shifted returns indicative of motion in the vicinity of the encampment; dismount targets have a very specific radar and acoustic signature, a “whoomping” sound, predominantly due to torso motion (the radar signal can be converted to an acoustic output, and this is sometimes done in perimeter surveillance radar systems). Early warning against rockets, artillery, and mortars is commonly the domain of WLR systems. WLR systems first detect the incoming threat and provide a warning. Then they calculate a counterfire solution based on the threat type and trajectory. IRST sensors can also be used; however, the false alarm rate in occupied environments (e.g., urban environments with dense traffic backgrounds) is a bigger concern than it is for radar. Active protection systems calculate the presence of an incoming threat and then deploy a kinetic kill 185

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS response; again, radar is best suited for this difficult volume search and incoming threat location challenge. Counter-IED sensor systems generally seek to find the threat and any details about its emplacement. In this sense, counter-IED benefits from ISR system products, such as change detection outputs and subsidence measurements. From the squad perspective, however, some capability for rapid determination of likely IED emplacements is essential. For example, a sensor system to scan and determine whether cordoned culverts have been tampered with would prove invaluable to a squad. Similarly, the ability to remotely scan and determine the presence of CBRN and mines is another key to force protection. A likely strategy for CBRN agent detection is to remotely interrogate sensors whose properties (e.g., radar cross section, resonance, luminescence) change when exposed to the target agent; radar, laser, and IR sensors are applicable technologies. Ground penetrating radar and hyper- or multispectral imagers can be used to detect disturbed soil and find buried mines at limited depths; such sensors exhibit variable performance depending on soil properties. Rapidly determining the general location of hostile fire provides the squad with time to take cover and prepare to return fire. Of the technologies available to determine shot location, acoustic sensors appear best. IR sensors can detect muzzle flashes, but the search problem is challenging, and background clutter is a concern. The small radar cross section of a bullet renders radar less useful in this particular case. Multipath in urban and mountainous terrain is a limiting factor for acoustic-based hostile fire indication systems. Precision Targeting Squad-level precision targeting objectives include the following: Solutions against batteries of rockets, artillery, or mortars; Counterfire solutions against small arms; Vehicle engagement with high probability of kill; and Concealed threat targeting. WLR systems employ target tracks and kinematic models to estimate the location of the hostile fire. This counterbattery solution is then used to return fire. Acoustic sensors are the likely choice to locate small arms fire; time-difference of arrival among several microphones, for example, can be used to determine the threat location. Vehicle engagement can involve fixed or moving targets detected by radar, FMV, WAMI, or IR sensors. Given likely constraints on squad engagement ranges, a multimode seeker fusing radar, laser, and IR sensors will provide the most robust solution. Concealed threat targeting could involve formulating a fire control solution against targets behind walls or abutments; the ability to engage unseen targets is clearly a decisive advantage for the squad. In each of the aforementioned cases, system calibration is critical to achieving the 186

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APPENDIX G specified accuracy; calibration must account for internal system imperfections as well as changing environmental conditions. Table G-2 also summarizes precision targeting missions. As in the two preceding sub-subsections, some sensors are dual-purpose. Additionally, precision targeting can maximize the capability of SA and force protection sensors, varying the sensor mode and collection strategy to calculate a fire-control solution. This approach is very common in radar, where system resources are modified to best meet the requirements of each mode—for example, short dwells and rapid antenna scans for search versus longer dwells and focused antenna beams for refined track and engagement. Summary of Squad-Level Missions Table G-2 summarizes all of the squad-level sensor missions (situational awareness, force protection, and precision targeting). The first column places technologies in one of those three mission areas. Some technologies support multiple mission areas. SENSOR TECHNOLOGY GAPS In this section, the committee assesses the gaps in squad-level sensor technology. Technology is assessed using the following key: green, mature; yellow, development required; and, red, serious technical hurdles remain. Where applicable, the relevant programs are mentioned. Squad-level sensor technology development should carefully consider the issues identified in Table G-1. Sensor SWAP and deployment and TCPED strategy are of foremost concern. The fundamental issues are evident: How can sensor technology seamlessly provide the right information to the squad without disrupting cognition required to carry out critical elements of the mission? Sensor scaling, improved algorithms/techniques and computing, and autonomous platform capabilities are important in this regard. To support materiel development, a rigorous systems engineering approach is also critical and should include: Training of the acquisition workforce, Development of enterprise-wide analysis tools, and Government-owned open system architecture. The next three sections briefly describe sensor technology gaps from the squad perspective. 187

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS Situational Awareness Sensor Technology Table G-3 provides a SA sensor technology gap assessment. While established sensor technology is available for a number of these missions, the constraints of squad-level deployment and operation is a primary concern. TABLE G-3 Situational Awareness Sensor Technology Gap Assessment Mission Description Relevant Sensor Technology Gap Technology Assessment SA Dismount detection Radar, SIGINT, Deployment platform, and engagement FMV, IRST, scaling, TCPED, WAMI autonomy SA Vehicle detection Radar, FMV, Deployment platform, and engagement IRST, WAMI, scaling, TCPED, acoustics, autonomy seismometer SA Through-wall Radar, SIGINT Deployment, robustness, surveillance CONOPS SA Foliage obscured Radar, LADAR, Radar aperture size target surveillance SIGINT SA Spectrum SIGINT Obscuration, surveillance deployment, TCPED SA Navigation in GPS- Radiofrequency Multi-transmitter denied environments sensor technology deployment SA, force Concealed weapons Millimeter-wave SWAP protection detection radar, metal detectors, magnetometers SA, force Life signs Millimeter-wave SWAP, deployment, protection monitoring radar, acoustics, CONOPS lasers Dismount and vehicle detection and discrimination capability has been a focus of recent Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Army, and Air Force RDT&E investments. Examples of radar programs are: DARPA- JIEDDO’s Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar; the DARPA-U.S. Army 188

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APPENDIX G FOliage PENetration Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Tracking and Engagement Radar (FORESTER); the DARPA-U.S. Army Affordable Adaptive Conformal ESA Radar; and the All-Terrain Radar for Tactical Exploitation of MTI and Imaging Surveillance (ARTEMIS) of the U.S. Army’s Communication- Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center. EO systems include the U.S. Air Force Angel Fire wide-area persistent FMV system; the US Army Constant Hawk ISR payload; the U.S. Air Force multitelescope, Gorgon Stare WAMI system for the Reaper; and the DARPA-sponsored Autonomous Real- Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System for use on the YMQ-18A (Boeing A-160 Hummingbird). Each of these sensor payloads is currently suitable for larger, Class IV UASs—like the Reaper, YMQ-18A, or Global Hawk—or for light surveillance aircraft, but concerns over best TCPED strategies remain because enormous quantities of data are generated by each of the various sensors. Moreover, these payloads require continued improvement to operate in diverse threat environments. The assessment of yellow in Table G-3 was arrived at as a result of substantial concern over a suitable deployment strategy for the squad. A sensor package scaled for a lower tier UAV and close-range operation might be a good idea. TCPED—especially processing/exploitation and dissemination aspects—and autonomous and clandestine operation remain areas for further evaluation and development. Through-the-wall surveillance technology has been another area of focus for DoD investment. Key efforts include the DARPA RadarScope, DARPA’s Visibuilding program, the U.S. Army Sense-Through-The-Wall program, and the U.S. Navy Transparent Urban Structures (TUS) effort. Visibuilding and TUS both had reach-goals that included mapping the interior of specific buildings of interest to identify hallways, stairwells, hidden rooms, weapons caches, etc. The RadarScope is a weapon-mounted radar used to detect motion and heartbeats behind a wall. The U.S. Army Sense-Through-The-Wall blended features of Visibuilding, TUS, and the RadarScope. With the exception of the RadarScope, the sensor CONOPS and deployment of through-the-wall systems remain a concern. One possible strategy is to deploy the sensor on a tripod; UAS and tractor-trailer deployments have also been considered. In the deployment, operator motion—leading to false detections and obscuring potential targets—is a critical concern. This technology is given a yellow rating since further development, scaling, and CONOPs best meeting the squad’s needs are needed. Obscured target detection has been the focus of a number of developmental efforts, including the aforementioned FORESTER and ARTEMIS programs, the U.S. Air Force Tanks Under Trees effort, and the DARPA-U.S. Army Jigsaw program, to name a few. Jigsaw is a three-dimensional ladar that maps beneath the foliage by moving through a large angle and poking through holes in the tree canopy. Additionally, ground-penetrating radar systems are commercially available and regularly used by the electrical utilities industry. This technology receives a red assessment, since radar is the preferred and most robust technology that nonetheless must operate at low frequency, generally in the UHF (450 MHz and below). These low operating frequencies require physically large 189

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS (20 feet or more) antenna systems for effective operation. LADAR, such as Jigsaw, can be more compact; such LADARs, however, are limited by the characteristics of the obscuration: As the foliage increases in density, Jigsaw performance degrades. The use of several smaller, electrically coherent sensors on low-tier, autonomous UASs may be an option to overcome the challenges of obscured target detection at the squad level. Spectrum surveillance—tactical SIGINT—in support of the squad must provide information with low latency and operate effectively in diverse and spectrally congested environments. Urban and mountainous terrains result in signal multipath and signal obscuration. Spectral congestion is a result of the significant demand for spectral allocation; spectral management techniques include architecting wireless cells with disjoint frequency allocations that repeat after a specified number of cells. Airborne collectors “see” the many emitters on Earth’s surface, averting line-of-sight issues but increasing the co-channel interference problem. Multichannel processing and near-vertical incidence collection geometry are mitigating strategies. This technology area receives a yellow assessment because the squad’s specific needs—ease of deployment, operation in complex environments, autonomous platform operation, and advanced TCPED—are not readily addressed by current technology. Navigation in GPS-denied environments has been the target recently of RDT&E investment. Specific programs have considered navigation in caves and below ship decks. The key challenge is the transmitter deployment. GPS is easily jammed owing to low signal strength and simple receiver design, and so a separate radio navigation satellite system is unlikely to be useful. A better strategy from the squad’s perspective is to deploy transmit signal sources on several (generally four or more) low tier UASs, such as the ScanEagle or to set up a regional network using larger UAS platforms; squad members then could rely on lightweight navigation receivers based on modifications to commercial designs. Alternative approaches, such as active ranging, require a communications link back to the squad; at the same time less desirable navigation communication links could present blue force tracking information directly to the squad. This technology receives a red assessment since investment would be required to develop and implement an appropriate solution. Concealed weapons detection technology is currently available. The National Institute of Justice, for example, has invested in handheld mmw technology to image weapons hidden under clothing. Airport security screening includes mmw scanners to image hidden objects. The challenge from the squad’s perspective is to develop and deploy a low-SWAP, mobile capability with a CONOP useful to the squad. Handheld devices are plagued by operator motion, and tripod mounted devices are unfortunately fixed and still require calibration. Packing mmw technology in a useful form for squad operation remains an open issue. For this reason, this technology area is given a yellow assessment. Life signs monitoring technology does not appear to be currently available. DARPA has made some investments in this area and requested proposals from a number of potential sources. Likely sensor technologies include mmw radar and 190

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APPENDIX G laser. Both solutions would probably require a tripod mount to avoid operator- sensor interaction. Advantages of the radar solution include its ability to penetrate clothing and perhaps armor. The laser can detect small, repetitive motion consistent with respiration. While a technological solution seems viable, given the absence of a specific program or deployed product, this mission area receives a yellow assessment. Gaps in Force Protection Sensor Technology Table G-4 assesses the gaps in force protection sensors. As in the preceding section, squad-level constraints—specifically, SWAP, mobility, CONOPS, and ease of deployment—dictate a more pessimistic assessment of the currently available technology. TABLE G-4 Force Protection Sensor Technology Gap Assessment Mission Description Relevant Sensor Technology Gap Technology Assessment SA, Force Concealed weapons Millimeter-wave SWAP protection detection radar, metal detector, magnetometer SA, Force Life signs Millimeter-wave SWAP, deployment, protection monitoring radar, acoustics CONOPS Force Perimeter Radar, acoustics, Solutions currently protection surveillance SIGINT available, reduced SWAP desirable Force CRAM Radar, IRST, SWAP, mobility protection, acoustics precision targeting Force CIED Radar, HSI/MSI, Challenging target protection SIGINT signature, persistence Force Counter-shot/sniper Acoustics, IR Multipath, calibration, protection, SWAP precision targeting 191

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS Mission Description Relevant Sensor Technology Gap Technology Assessment Force Mine detection Ground- Commercially available protection penetrating radar, solutions, vehicle HSI/MSI, mounted magnetometer, metal detector Force CBRN agent CBRN-tailored Customized sensor protection detection sensors, remote development for varying sensing techniques threat characteristics (radar, EO/IR, HSI/MSI) The first two lines in Table G-4 were discussed in prior sections. Perimeter surveillance technology is well developed and has been used in the field for several decades. From the squad-level perspective, miniaturization, power reduction, and automation efforts would prove most beneficial. The U.S. Army has invested substantially in CRAM technology. Systems like Firefinder and Enhanced Firefinder are sophisticated, weapons-locating radar systems. The Omni-Directional Weapons Location radar is a new capability being developed by PEO IEWS/PM Radars. The Firefinder and the Omni-Directional Weapons Location radars are fairly large systems with significant prime power requirements. For this reason, they have limited applicability at the squad level. The Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar weighs approximately 90 lb and is packed in two sections; its ruggedized design enables it to accompany paratroopers on airborne assaults. Yet, 90 lb is still substantial load for squad members. A smaller, lighter, shorter-range version of the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar would better support the squad. This new, lightweight system should provide 360 degree coverage and accept battery power. Moreover, the system should be highly transportable, with minimal set-up time. Taking advantage of novel materials and electronics should be an imperative in this new CRAM system design. The U.S. Army has also invested in active protection systems (APSs) to protect ground vehicles and rotorcraft. Cost and less-than-hoped-for cooperation of our allies have proven major challenges in deploying APS’s, along with concerns over anti- radiation seekers. Identifying a way to integrate vehicle and dismount detection missions with CRAM is a meaningful objective; APS will likely have to be a unique sensor package tied to a kinetic kill mechanism. Integrated Force Protection Capability (IFPC) is a new program of record focused on multisensor integration of CRAM products; networking capabilities developed under this program may find applicability to squad-level protection. CIED is a three-pronged approach. Two of the prongs are direct: Find the IED and jam its triggering mechanism. The third prong is indirect and centers on finding the network that supplies and emplaces IEDs. Squad-level missions 192

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APPENDIX G benefit from the direct CIED approaches. ISR technology can be used to find potential IED emplacements: This information can be provided directly to the squad. Yet, providing technology to the squad that allows remote status monitoring of culverts and other structures where IEDs can easily be emplaced is more useful. For example, providing the squad with radio frequency or optical readers to scan antitamper mechanisms along a chosen route is a direct, valuable, and low-SWAP solution, especially if integrated with other systems. IED electronic warfare technology, such as the Joint Counter-Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare system, is effective for vehicle- borne squad missions and should continually be improved. The DARPA Boomerang system is a counter-fire, small arms locator. It was originally developed for use on vehicles. Specifically, it was found that vehicle noise made it difficult for blue forces to identify the location of hostile, small arms fire. Boomerang, a multimicrophone system, would provide a general location of incoming fire. Multipath signal degradation, especially in urban and mountainous terrain, is a fundamental, limiting factor. The extension of Boomerang to the dismounted squad was a planned activity under the Land Warrior system; this integration has not yet been accomplished, perhaps in part due to cancellation of Land Warrior. Providing enhanced small arms locating systems to the squad should be an objective. The lack of such a capability and the degradation of sensor performance in urban and mountainous terrain lead to a yellow assessment for this sensor mission area. A number of commercially available ground-penetrating radar systems are available. Mine detection is complicated by mine composition and soil attributes. Naturally, detecting a metal mine in dry sand is easier than detecting a composite mine in wet clay. Generally, ground-penetrating radars are vehicle mounted and usually placed in proximity to potential mine locations. Other than vehicle-borne ground-penetrating radar, it is hard to imagine a dismounted Soldier mine detection capability, except for the very dangerous approach that employs metal detectors. This technology is mature, but the hatched green assessment in Table G-4 indicates that it may not be possible to further adapt mine detection capability to the squad. Technology is currently available to respond to an array of chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear agents. For example, it is possible to build carbon nanotube switches that are sensitive to ammonium nitrate or a number of other chemicals; once the switch is thrown, a signature characteristic of the deployed device—such as resonant frequency—is detectable via remote sensing by means of, for example, radiofrequency or optical probing. The development of low-cost CBRN detectors that are reliably and easily probed by a squad during execution of its mission is an invaluable force protection capability. Some relevant technology has been developed and demonstrated in government and university laboratories, and further system development is warranted. A responsive approach that is able to deploy new sensors as the threat evolves is essential, hence the yellow assessment. 193

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MAKING THE SOLDIER DECISIVE ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS Gaps in Precision Targeting Sensor Technology Table G-5 provides a gap assessment of precision targeting sensor technology. The first two rows were discussed previously in the preceding section. TABLE G-5 Precision Targeting Gap Assessment Mission Description Relevant Sensor Technology Gap Technology Assessment Force CRAM Radar, IRST, SWAP protection, acoustics precision targeting Force Counter-shot/sniper Acoustics, IRST SWAP, deployment, protection, CONOPS precision targeting Precision Vehicle engagement IR, radar, optical Technology available targeting sights Precision Concealed threat EO/IR, radar Specialized sensors targeting targeting imaging coupled with new weapons needed Vehicle engagement at range is presently supported by radiofrequency, EO, and IR seeker technology. Optical sights can be used to support long-range operation. Ancillary sensors to measure environmental conditions may be necessary. Overall, sensor engagement technology is mature and enjoys rich collaborative efforts across the Services and with coalition partners. One area for consideration at the squad level is correctable projectiles. The DARPA Self- Correcting Projectile for Infantry Operation program integrated sensor technology and piezo-based actuators into a 44-mm projectile to compensate for dispersion due to muzzle velocity variation. Perhaps coupling like technology with offboard sensor information to engage targets at long distance with modest caliber projectiles would vastly boost dismounted squad lethality. In this vein, moving target indication, discrimination, and tracking capabilities or fixed-target imaging systems are critical. Mounting corresponding capability on a UAS provides an approach for peering behind abutments and buildings and the like. The U.S. Air Force has demonstrated synthetic aperture radar target geolocation and hand-off to GPS-guided munitions for precision targeting; a famous video of a smart munition entering an elevator shaft during the 194

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APPENDIX G first gulf war points to the maturity of this radar and navigation technology. Newer capabilities, such as the DARPA Synthetic Aperture Ladar for Tactical Imaging (SALTI) system may prove more useful on small UASs supporting the squad; the SALTI system’s goals include high resolution, coherent, optical imaging with three-dimensional views. The Global Hawk UAS served as the target platform for the SALTI payload. Scaling SALTI to smaller UASs may be possible. In Table G-5, this technology receives a red assessment, since no autonomous capability is currently available or envisioned. The preceding line on vehicle engagement is green hatched, since technology is available, but it has not been adapted to squad-level activities. 195

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