cultural understanding, human-system interfaces, and other areas with potential to contribute to decisive overmatch. Current measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are not adequate to assess these improvements. In the past, use of MOPs and MOEs and other elements of analysis have focused on platform-centric evaluations, using improvements in Soldier and small-unit performance and effectiveness as measures for the benefits of the platform or other materiel system being assessed, rather than as measures of Soldier and TSU capabilities.

A rigorous methodology and comprehensive set of MOEs and MOPs that represent the performance and effectiveness of a TSU, including the capabilities and limitations of all components—the Soldiers and materiel systems—and their interactions, would provide objective measures that can be directed at the entirety of the TSU ensemble.

Recommendation 3: The Army should develop, maintain, and evolve an optimal set of measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for assessing capability improvements for the dismounted Soldier and TSU by investing in an analysis architecture and infrastructure, including a comprehensive metrics development methodology that supports objective dialogue among combat and system developers, systems engineers, trainers, and program activities. The MOPs and MOEs, together with the guidance for using them, should be tested and validated for practical application and ease of use, as well as for accuracy as predictors and indicators of desired performance and effectiveness outcomes.

Streamline Acquisition Processes

Despite the advice of multiple review teams on the importance of a holistic approach to development, procurement, and support of Soldier capabilities, the Army is still equipping the dismounted Soldier through separate programs of record. Army acquisition essentially consists of providing for multiple independent pieces, rather than providing for integrated systems. The urgency to support the force in the field during current operations has led to a reliance on rapid equipment fielding, which has exacerbated this stove-piped approach.

The acquisition system has been relatively unresponsive to the needs of dismounted Soldiers when compared to large weapons and mobility systems. The goal of achieving overmatch capabilities cannot be accomplished until small-unit and Soldier requirements are accorded the same high levels of attention as major materiel systems requirements. At the same time, the approach of acquiring and fielding every “new” technology is both impractical and unaffordable. Most important, it is unlikely that the solutions to achieve overmatch capabilities can be successfully implemented within the Army’s current acquisition framework. A principled groundwork for analyzing the TSU system has not been laid for a natural progression to define and implement overmatch capabilities that integrate



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