The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) is described as “a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that serve to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control.”1 The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), an office within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), coordinates the development of the GNDA with its federal partners. DNDO has asked the National Research Council (NRC) for advice on how to develop performance measures and quantitative metrics that can be used to evaluate the overall effectiveness and report on progress toward meeting the goals of the GNDA. The statement of task for this study can be found in Appendix B.
This chapter provides background, sponsor motivations, and the committee’s approach to addressing the study charge.
1.1 BACKGROUND
U.S. government programs focused on the detection of nuclear and radiological materials have existed for many years but for the most part have been developed independently of each other. In response to the increased threat of nuclear terrorism, the GNDA was introduced by Presidential
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1 See http://www.dhs.gov/architecture-directorate. Accessed August 1, 2013.
Directive2 in 2005 as an integrated and coordinated architecture of U.S. nuclear detection assets around the world. DNDO, simultaneously created by the same directive, was assigned to coordinate GNDA development and implement its domestic portion.
In 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act (P.L. 109-347), established the DNDO under DHS, created the enhanced GNDA, and assigned DNDO the responsibility of GNDA development as the coordinating agency (emphasis added in the text below):
[DNDO shall] develop, with the approval of the Secretary of Homeland Security and in coordination with the Attorney General and Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture with the following implementation—
(A) [DNDO] will be responsible for the implementation of the domestic portion of the global architecture;
(B) the Secretary of Defense will retain responsibility for implementation of Department of Defense requirements within and outside the United States; and
(C) the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy will maintain their respective responsibilities for policy guidance and implementation of the portion of the global architecture outside the United States, which will be implemented consistent with applicable law and relevant international arrangements (NSPD-43, 2.d)
In 2007, Congress amended the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 110-53) requiring that a GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review be provided to Congress, the President and the Office of Management and Budget:
JOINT ANNUAL INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE … .
… jointly ensure interagency coordination on the development and implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture by ensuring that, not less frequently than once each year—
(A) each relevant agency, office, or entity—
(i) assesses its involvement, support, and participation in the development, revision, and implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture; and
(ii) examines and evaluates components of the global nuclear detection architecture (including associated strategies and acquisition plans) relating to the operations of that agency, office, or entity, to
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2 Both DNDO and the GNDA were initially established on April 15, 2005 via National Security Presidential Directive 43 (NSPD-43) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive HPSD-14. (http://www.dhs.gov/architecture-directorate. Accessed August 1, 2013.)
determine whether such components incorporate and address current threat assessments, scenarios, or intelligence analyses developed by the Director of National Intelligence or other agencies regarding threats relating to nuclear or radiological weapons of mass destruction; and
(B) each agency, office, or entity deploying or operating any nuclear or radiological detection technology under the global nuclear detection architecture—
(i) evaluates the deployment and operation of nuclear or radiological detection technologies under the global nuclear detection architecture by that agency, office, or entity;
(ii) identifies performance deficiencies and operational or technical deficiencies in nuclear or radiological detection technologies deployed under the global nuclear detection architecture; and
(iii) assesses the capacity of that agency, office, or entity to implement the responsibilities of that agency, office, or entity under the global nuclear detection architecture. (6 USC § 596a)
There are no official design documents that provide a systems-level description of the GNDA. However, there are several programmatic documents that define its mission and describe aspects of its design. DNDO and its federal partners have produced several key GNDA-related documents and presentations that describe aspects of the overall architecture to accomplish this mission (all of the following documents are restricted from public access):
• The GNDA Strategic Plan (GNDA, 2010);
• Three Joint Annual Interagency Reviews (GNDA, 2010, 2011, 2012);
• The Department of Homeland Security GNDA Implementation Plan (DHS, 2012), which addresses the domestic portion of the GNDA; and
• Presentation of the Draft International GNDA Implementation Plan (Wyss, 2012).
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified the need for a strategic plan to guide development of the GNDA (GAO, 2008). In recent testimony to Congress, GAO credits DNDO and its federal partners for developing both the strategic and implementation plans but notes that DNDO needs to prioritize the various objectives related to domestic activities:
We reported, in July 2011, that the GNDA strategic plan addressed several of the aspects of our prior recommendations but did not (1) identify funding necessary to achieve plan objectives or (2) employ monitoring
mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements. In April 2012, DHS issued its GNDA implementation plan, which addresses the remaining aspects of our recommendations by identifying funding dedicated to plan objectives and employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress in meeting those objectives. However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of the domestic part of the GNDA. (GAO, 2012, p. 3)
This study addresses the concerns raised by the GAO by considering how the development of new metrics and a new analysis framework could be used to optimize and prioritize GNDA resources.
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THIS STUDY
DNDO and its GNDA-partner agencies intend to undertake a periodic review of the GNDA strategic plan to assess its effectiveness and identify new requirements arising from changes in technology and/or the threat environment. As noted previously, DNDO has asked for advice from the NRC on developing quantitative approaches for assessing the effectiveness of the GNDA. This advice may be used to improve the GNDA strategic plan and the reporting of progress toward meeting its goals during subsequent review cycles.
Currently, DNDO collects information for the joint annual interagency review from each GNDA partner agency which assesses its own involvement. Combining these and other data to provide an overall assessment of GNDA effectiveness, rather than a listing of individual programs, is one of the main challenges for this study.
There are many other challenges for evaluating the effectiveness of the GNDA. The GNDA was created to address the threat of a high-consequence event that has never occurred. It must protect against a wide variety of adaptive and committed adversaries and threat materials. As will be discussed later in the report, evaluating and comparing probabilities of different attack scenarios can be used to address this complex problem but this (and all other approaches) have the challenge of characterizing the full universe of potential attack pathways.
1.3 COMMITTEE’S APPROACH TO ADDRESS THE STUDY CHARGE
This study was carried out by a committee of 12 experts appointed by the NRC. The committee’s collective expertise spans the issues relevant to the study task: cost-benefit analysis, decision analysis (especially multi attribute utility analysis), risk analysis, national security, nuclear materials
characteristics and behavior, program evaluation and assessment, strategic planning, systems analysis, and technology development and deployment. In selecting the membership of this committee, the NRC sought to obtain a balance between members with relevant disciplinary expertise and subject-matter experts who have on-the-ground experience with testing and evaluating complex technological systems and multiorganization programs. Biographical sketches of the committee members are provided in Appendix C.
Through discussions with DNDO and its GNDA partner agencies, the committee determined that the focus of the study (see Appendix B) is the development and definition of appropriate metrics and an evaluation framework that can be used to assess and report on the overall effectiveness of the GNDA. This report is not an assessment of how effectively the current GNDA is performing. The committee was not asked to evaluate the DNDO or its partner agencies, to assess the existing organizational or budgetary structure, or to develop an implementation plan. Rather, the report provides notional metrics and an analysis framework that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the GNDA. Nonetheless, the committee needed to develop a detailed understanding of the current GNDA, its organization and funding mechanisms, the GNDA strategic plan, and the annual review process to make recommendations on how to measure and report on its overall effectiveness.
The committee held seven meetings over 12 months, including site visits to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The committee received briefings at five of the meetings from DNDO and its partners in the GNDA, other government agencies with established metrics and measures for security-related missions, and researchers investigating complex security systems. A list of meetings and presentations is provided in Appendix A.
1.4 REPORT ROADMAP
The report is organized into five chapters:
• Chapter 1 provides the background, study charge, and structure for the report.
• Chapter 2 describes the GNDA in terms of its scope, participants, and structure. General observations are provided on challenges to the GNDA.
• Chapter 3 addresses Task 1. Key terms and definitions are provided as well as criteria for development of informative and useful metrics.
• Chapter 4 describes a notional strategic planning example that includes outcome-based metrics.
• Chapter 5 addresses Task 2 and introduces an analysis framework to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the GNDA.
An effort was made by the committee to develop chapters that could stand alone for the benefit of audiences who were not interested in reading the entire report. This results in some repetition of basic facts and concepts in chapters that will be noticed by those who read the report from beginning to end.
