Page 13exacerbating them. The recent Gulf War demonstrated that, when the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council reach agreement, the U.N. can act effectively as a force for collective security.
In addition, groups of nations in several areas of the world have taken or attempted measures to limit regional arms races and attendant insecurities. Some of these, such as the initiatives Brazil and Argentina have taken to address their political-military rivalry, have a nuclear dimension. These cooperative, demand-limiting steps may become an essential ingredient in maintaining regional environments free of the kind of security concerns that in the past led nations to initiate nuclear weapons programs.
In the following chapters, we translate these general observations into more specific conclusions for future nuclear policy. Chapter II considers the main thrust of U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the changes just outlined. In Chapter III, we examine prospects for developments in cooperative security arrangements in various parts of the world and assess the status of the efforts to stem nuclear proliferation. We discuss specific nuclear force levels and configurations for the United States in the post-START era in Chapter IV, along with associated arms control measures. In Chapter V, we take up the question of the command and control and operational management of nuclear forces and recommend steps to meet the new situation.
1. The membership of WEU is not identical to that of either NATO or the European Community and includes Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.
2. The original participants included Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia.