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  • Cooperation toward a minimum level of strategic and tactical forces. This includes the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-based tactical nuclear systems and, if possible, the French Hades as well. Decisions about basing for other U.S. systems would have to be made jointly.

  • Support for NATO as the link in the transition to cooperative management. Whatever happens, NATO is likely to be the primary link for the United States in its new relations with the emerging European security community.

  • Support for development of cooperative security in Europe. The new arrangements will evolve in stages, and participation may initially be more narrow than the United States prefers. The institutions could include the CSCE and other regional groups that can provide frameworks for further specialized discussions. A first step could be declaratory policies to provide assurance or reassurance of cooperative intentions and goals. Next could come cooperation to improve transparency among the present nuclear states regarding conditions of deployment, safety, command and control, and warning systems affecting possible nuclear threats inside and outside Europe. Over time, these could foster steps toward mutually responsive planning and the development of constraints on deployments, modernization, and use.

  • Due recognition of all European security interests. Even if the Soviet Union is not directly involved in many U.S.-European and intra-European decisions, it is essential that the Soviet Union not be made, or made to feel, a marginal participant in European security issues. The same holds true for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, where security cooperation may be expected to lag behind economic and political ties to the rest of Europe.

ASIA

The balance of power in East Asia has clearly entered a period of substantial flux. The task at hand, therefore, is to devise security understandings that will permit all the principal actors to pursue their national goals without stimulating an intraregional arms competition that could destabilize East Asia for years to come. These new arrangements need to assure that no single state or new coalition of states assumes a position of political or military predominance within the region. A serious, sustained effort must also be made to avoid any prospect of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. If Japan or China moved into a vacuum created by the drawing down of Soviet and American power, or if nuclear proliferation did take place in Korea, regional security would suffer. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union, in conjunction with major actors within the region, have a stake in helping to define collaborative security and arms control arrange



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