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(5) In the past, U.S. security policy in East Asia has rested on collaboration with Japan and South Korea and a tacit security relationship with China. The future of this framework is threatened by the uncertainties of Chinese internal politics, contentiousness in U.S.-Japanese relations, continued tensions between North and South Korea, and North Korea's apparent interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

(6) Currently India, Israel, and Pakistan have undeclared nuclear weapons capabilities. While some nations continue interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, others, including Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa, seem to have abandoned past programs.


    (1) Security alignments in Europe will undergo major changes in the future. The major powers, including the United States, are expected to move further toward cooperative measures for resolving differences; the participation of the Soviet Union is expected but not assured.

    (2) The nature of the European security structure of the future is not certain, but foreseeable needs include:

    • institutionalizing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE);

    • a set of new and old multilateral structures, with overlapping memberships and missions; and

    • substantial bilateral guarantees.

    (3) Nuclear cooperation will be part of any future system of security cooperation in Europe. Such a system could involve joint planning for forces at significantly lower levels, detailed data exchange, and cooperation on matters such as political guidelines for use, safety, and transparency, as well as European cooperation with the United States and the Soviet Union on command and control, on safety and security, and on agreed restraints and verification of deployments and exercises.

    (4) Notwithstanding the many uncertainties in the security relationships in Asia, U.S. interests demand sustained collaboration with Japan to forestall an autonomous Japanese security posture.

    (5) A number of nuclear cooperative arrangements in Asia involving the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China appear useful. Among these are cooperation on command and control and on safety and security, and agreed restraints and verification of deployments and exercises, paralleling those planned or in place for Europe.

    (6) Substantial reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals should strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

    (7) Reduced U.S.-Soviet confrontation and shared interest among the

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