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The following HTML text is provided to enhance online readability. Many aspects of typography translate only awkwardly to HTML. Please use the page image as the authoritative form to ensure accuracy. Page 58 
~ enlarge ~ FIGURE B-3 Cumulative value of Soviet ground forces. Similar arguments can be made to estimate the forces needed to attack substantial fractions—on the order of 50 percent—of the value of other militarily significant target categories, including airfields, logistic and transportation nodes, and command and control centers. We note that, in addition to the intended destruction of the target, tens of millions of people would be killed and injured, especially in attacks on military-related manufacturing targets in urban areas. Explicit anticity targeting would produce comparable casualties with far fewer weapons. NOTES1. Central Intelligence Agency, USSR Energy Atlas. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 2. Ibid. 3. R.D. Speed, Strategic Forces: Future Requirements and Options. Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Report UCRL-ID-105336, November 1990, pp. 52-53. 4. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1990. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990; International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-1991. London: IISS, 1990, pp. 28-43
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