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Maritime Research Advisory Committee Chairman.- Mr. Louis H. Roddis, Jr., President Pennsylvania Electric Company Johnstown, Pennsylvania Executive Director: Professor Harry Benford Members Dr. Glen D. Camp Professor of Operations Research Case Institute of Technology Cleveland, Ohio Mr. Roger H. Gilman Director of Port Development The Port of New York Authority 111 Eighth Avenue New York 11, New York Dr. Jesse E. Hobson United Fruit Company 80 Federal Street Boston, Massachusetts V. Adm. E. 1 Cochrane, USN (Ret.) Chairman, Maritime Cargo Transportation Conference Special Adviser to the President Massachuetts Institute of Technology Cambridge 39, Massachusetts Dean M. P. O'Brien Dean of Engineering University of California Berkeley, California Dr. Milton Plesset Professor of Hydrodynamics California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California Ex-Officio Members Professor John Chipman Chairman, Committee on Ship Steel Head, Department of Metallurgy Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge 39, Massachusetts R. Adm. E. H. Thiele, USCG Chairman, Ship Structure Committee Engineer-in-Chief U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters 1300 E Street, N.W. Station 5-3 Washington 15, D. C. Adm. Arthur W. Radford, USN (Ret.) Main Navy Building Washington 25, D. C. Dean C. Richard Soderberg Dean of Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge 39, Massachusetts Commodore Edward M. Webster, USCG (Ret.) 9518 E. Stanhope Road Rock Creek Hills Kensington, Maryland Professor N. J. Hoff Chairman, Committee on Ship Structural Design Head, Department of Aeronautical Engineering Stanford University Palo Alto, California Advisory Panel on Wartime Use of the U. S. Merchant Marine Chairmen.- Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN (Ret.) Dr. Paul W. Cherington Professor of Business Administration Graduate School of Business Administration Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts Mr. John Comstock Naval Architect, Newport News Ship- building and Dry Dock Company Newport News, Virginia Professor Samuel E. Eastman Manager, Washington Research Office Technical Operations, Inc. Washington 7, D. C. Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. Assistant to the President Brandeis University Waltham 54, Massachusetts Dr. Finn J. Larsen Vice President, Research Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company Research Center Hopkins, Minnesota Project Staff Mr. Douglas C. MacMillan President, George G. Sharp, Inc. 30 Church Street New York, New York Dr. Hartley Rowe Consultant, Jackson and Moreland Park Square Building Boston, Massachusetts Mr. Raymond S. Stevens President, Arthur D. Little, Inc. 30 Memorial Drive Cambridge, Massachusetts Dr. Franklin C. Brook*, Technical Director Mr. Robert B. Keating, Executive Secretary

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[THE ROLE OF THE U. S. MERCHANT MARINE IN NATIONAL SECURITY Project WALRUS Report by the Panel on Wartime Use of the U. S. Merchant Marine, of the ^C-, Maritime Research Advisory Committee. Division of Engineering and Industrial Research and Division of Physical Sciences Publication 748 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES—NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL Washington, D. C. 1959

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Project WALRUS was carried out under provisions of Contract No. MA-1767 between The National Academy of Sciences and The Department of Commerce Maritime Administration The National Academy of Sciences was granted permission to publish this report by the Maritime Administration. The report may not be reprinted or quoted extensively without the permission of the Maritime Administration. Such permission is not necessary for agencies within the United States Government. Avai/able without charge from the Printing and Publishing Office National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council Washington 25, D. C. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 59-64302

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NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL MARITIME RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE or THE DIVISION OF ENGINEERING AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND THX DIVISION OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES 2101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C. November 6, 1959 Mr. Louis H. Roddis, Jr. Chairman Maritime Research Advisory Committee National Academy of Sciences National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, N. W. Washington 25, D. C. Subject: Report of the Maritime Research Advisory Committee's Panel on Wartime Use of the U. S. Merchant Marine Dear Mr. Roddis: Enclosed is a report entitled L'The Role of the U. S. Merchant Marine in National Security". This report stems from Project WALRUS, the 1959 summer study session at Woods Hole, Massachusetts. This study was sponsored by the Maritime Research Advisory Committee's Panel on Wartime Use of the U. S. Merchant Marine and this publi- cation comprises the final report to the Committee. This work was carried out as part of Contract MA-1767 with the Maritime Administration. Very truly yours, Arthur W. Radford, Adm. , USN (Ret.) Chairman Panel on Wartime Use of the U. S. Merchant Marine of the Maritime Research Advisory Committee

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FOREWORD Project WALRUS, a summer study, was a principal function of the Maritime Research Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council. This Committee, operating under a contract between the National Academy of Sciences and the Maritime Administration, has the task of advising the Maritime Admin- istration on the "nature, organization and prosecution of a scientific research and de- velopment program" appropriate to the Maritime Administration's objectives and responsibilities. This parent committee has established a variety of panels covering many aspects 'of the maritime problem. The Panel on Wartime Use of the U. S. Merchant Marine, under the chairmanship of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN (Ret. ), was directly respon- sible for Project WALRUS. For the purposes of the summer study this nine-man panel was augmented by representatives of government agencies, the military services, and university and industrial research organizations. Project WALRUS was conducted during the period August 10 to 28, 1959 at the Whitney Estate, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. The average number of participants over the period was about 35. Dr. Franklin C. Brooks was the Technical Director of the Project. Mr. Robert B. Keating, Executive Secretary, played a major role in assem- bling the group of participants and in preliminary formulation of the problem. The initially stated objective of Project WALRUS was: "To examine present and future military demands on the U. S. merchant marine in order that technical require- ments can be derived for maritime research and development planning. " During the first week the Project participants were briefed by selected government and military agencies and university and industrial groups concerned with the merchant marine. As the deliberations of the participants began, it quickly became apparent that the scope of the Project should be broadened to encompass the national security role of the U. S. merchant marine; and that a major demand was placed on the merchant marine by the currently intensifying political-economic conflict, the cold war into which the United States has been inescapably drawn. This enlargement of scope led directly to the title of this report, "The Role of the U. S. Merchant Marine in National Security". Applicable classified information was made available to the WALRUS participants. However, because the main content of the deliberations did not involve security infor- mation, this report has been unclassified. It is believed that the resulting gain in breadth of distribution and availability will more than compensate for the omission of a small number of classified'details. In a study of the short duration and high intensity of Project WALRUS, little new research can be done. The results presented here are primarily a new synthesis of known facts accomplished by a qualified group with diverse backgrounds and wide experience. There was a close approach to unanimity in the group on the major policy recommendations. vii

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The results of the study, embodied in this report, are extremely gratifying to the Maritime Research Advisory Committee. The WALRUS participants have shown the fa- vorable results that can come from a high level of cooperative effort put forth in a well organized study session isolated from the usual pressures of everyday life. The Maritime Research Advisory Committee considers this report to be a most important con- tribution to its work. The Committee sincerely appreciates the dedicated effort of all those who had a hand in the study and would like to encourage wide dissemination of the report because of its genuine importance at this critical time in United States maritime affairs. Louis H. Roddis, Jr. Chairman Maritime Research Advisory Committee National Academy of Sciences National Research Council viii

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CONTENTS LETTER OF SUBMITTAL FOREWORD ABSTRACT I. INTRODUCTION V vii xi A. Historical Background 1 B. Present Situation 2 II. THE RANGE OF THE THREATS A. Survey of Threats 4 B. The Soviet Merchant Marine and the Threat on the Economic Front ... 4 C. Towards a Definition of Limited War 7 D. General War 7 E. Summary 7 III. THE ABILITY OF THE U. S. MERCHANT MARINE TO RESPOND TO THE DEMANDS OF WAR A. Response in Limited War and General War 8 B. Response in Political-Economic War 8 C. Corrective Action 9 IV. KEY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Primary Conclusions 12 B. Specific Conclusions and Recommendations 13 SPECIAL SUPPORTING STUDIES No. 1 Labor-Management Aspects of An Improved U. S. Merchant Marine . . 16 No. 2 Technological Possibilities 21 No. 3 Maritime Research and Development Program 26 No. 4 Foreign Shipping Resources 29 No. 5 Special Cargo Ships for Military Purposes 36 No. 6 The Role of the U. S. Merchant Marine in General War 43 No. 7 Military Threat to U. S. Merchant Shipping; Countermeasures .... 46 No. 8 Current Status and Trends of U. S. Merchant Marine 49 No. 9 "Flags of Convenience" 55 ANNEXES ANNEX A. List of Participants 61 ANNEX B. Project WALRUS Organization . . . 65 ANNEX C. Background Briefings 67 ix

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ABSTRACT The U. S. merchant marine is deteriorating. Most of its ships are nearly over- age and long outmoded from the standpoint of modern design. U. S. flag shipping is carrying a steadily decreasing portion (12 percent in 1958) of U. S. foreign trade. Con- currently, the United States is in danger of losing its "flag of convenience" fleet which carries about a third of its foreign trade and over which the Government now has effective control. The current rate of subsidy funding shows small promise of assuring timely replacement of the subsidized segment of the U. S. flag fleet. Most owners of non- subsidized U. S. flag ships have little incentive for even starting a replacement pro- gram. This decline is of serious concern to the Government, to industry, and very particularly to the military services. Energetic leadership is required to correct this trend. The U. S. merchant marine should be prepared to play a significant national security role in three types of conflict: (a) the intensifying political-economic conflict (cold war) that is with us now; (b) the spectrum of limited wars which we may face at any time at the option of the enemy; and (c) the more remote possibility of general nuclear war. In their political-economic offensive, our opponents have avowed their intention to "bury" us in the field of international trade. They are expanding their merchant fleets to carry this trade. The United States must use its merchant marine defensively to counter economic thrusts--it must also use it positively as a weapon in the cold war arsenal. However, the U. S. flag fleet is in danger of becoming unable to meet the challenge and the continued ability of the "flag of convenience" fleet to serve as an instrument of national policy is threatened. U. S. flag shipping, augmented by "flag of convenience" shipping, is adequate in quantity to meet reasonable expectations of limited war needs, at least through 1965. The fleet in general, however, is qualitatively deficient for limited war purposes be- cause of inadequate speed, relatively low cargo-hand ling rates, and lack of "over the beach" capability--coupled with obsolescence. In the event of general nuclear war, the merchant marine could play a vital role in rescue, rehabilitation, and restoration. It is likely to be the least damaged trans- portation resource. The panel believes, however, that this role should not dominate maritime planning. A foresighted, positive program designed to meet cold and limited war needs will go a long way toward producing an effective fleet for general war tasks. National security maritime needs will be largely met by the construction of a fleet which can be commercially competitive with minimum subsidy. Both commercial and military interests can effectively use balanced speed in cargo handling and ocean transit, unitization of cargoes, and automation of ship operations to attain their goals. Such features entail capital intensification in order to reduce the number of man-days required to load, sail, and discharge a merchant ship. xi

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Additionally, the military services require a number of special ships having "over the beach" cargo-handling capability. These ships may even prove effective in special- ized commercial operations, such as in meeting Communist competition in underdevel- oped countries that have limited port facilities. Their utility as an instrument of national economic policy should be thoroughly explored. Three main steps should be taken now to assure a strong merchant marine in support of national security needs. Immediate action by the Government is required to avoid the flight of "flag of convenience" shipping from effective U. S. control to uncon- trolled registries under European flags. Some degree of exodus has already started. The Government should be prepared to take the lead in enlisting the co-operation of maritime labor and management to produce a technologically feasible fleet which will be commercially competitive with minimum subsidy. Without significant improvement in the attitudes of both labor and management towards technological advances, we can achieve no sound basis for competitive objectives. The goal of the Maritime Administration's Research and Development Program should be established as the creation of a U. S. merchant fleet which can be self-supporting without subsidy; and the Program should be so conducted as to lead rapidly to ships in being which demonstrate this possibility. xii