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APPENDIX D SUMMARY OF TRIP TO EUROPE Some of the members and staff of the Committee on International Cooperation in Magnetic Fusion, of the Energy Engineering Board of the National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences, met with a number of officials in Europe from May 20-25, l984. The members were Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., chairman, Robert R. Borchers, Melvin B. Gottlieb, L. Manning Muntzing, and Daniel E. Simpson. In addition Dennis F. Miller and John M. Richardson, of the committee staff, accompanied the group. Visits were made in Brussels to officials of (l) the Directorate General for Science, Research and Development of the Commission of the European Communities and (2) the U.S. Ambassador to the Commission of the European Communities. The group also met in Bonn with officials of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology and the Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics. In Paris the group conferred with officials of (l) the Institute for Basic Research of the Nuclear Studies Center (2) the International Energy Agency, and (3) the Embassy of the United States. The group then visited the Joint European Torus and Culham Laboratory of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, both near Abingdon, in Oxfordshire, England. Finally the group met with officials of the U.K. Atomic Energy Agency in London. The group interacted with about 40 individuals. The itinerary is given in Figure l. PRINCIPAL IMPRESSIONS Before discussion at somewhat greater length, the principal impressions from the trip may be stated as follows: o The need to develop fusion energy is not equally urgent in Japan, the European Community (EC), and the United States, so that the incentives to cooperate are not equally strong. ll3
l14 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTEMS :101 Contnlunon fevnu« tt»hinffton D C 304li EUROPEAN ITINERARY FOR TRAVELERS FROM COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION III MAGNETIC FUSION Monday. May 21 Meeting with Prof. 0. Palumbo, Directorate G«neral Cor Science, Research, and Development, Ctxoaisgion of the European Communities, Bruneis Meeting with Honorable George S. Vest, United State! Ambassador to the Counission of the European Communities, Brussels Tuesday, May 22 Meeting with Dr. G. Lent. Director General, Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, Bonn Dinner hosted by Dr. K. Pinkau, Scientific Director, Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics Wednesday, May 23 Meeting with Dr. J. Horowitz, Director, Institute for Basic Research, Nuclear Studies Center, Fontenay-aux-Roaes Reception hosted by Dr. Thomas J. Wajda, U.S. Mission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and Dr. John P. Boright, Embassy of the United States, Paris Thursday, May 24 Meeting with Dr. Eric Willis, Director, Office of Energy Research, Development, and Technology Applications, International Energy Agency, Paris Meeting with Dr. H.-O. Wuster, Director of the Project, Joint European Torus, Abingdon Dinner hosted by Drs. Muster and Pease, Oxford Friday, May 25 He*ting with 0r. R. S. Pease, Authority PrograsM Director for Fusion, Culhaa Laboratory, U.K. Atonic Energy Authority, Abingdon Meeting with Mr. G. Stevens, Assistant Secretary, Atomic Energy Division, U. K. Department of Energy, London f MrM fo*,r*<*rnr i-trf orftf orfMiuftait FTGUF£ 4 European itinerary.
ll5 o There is no long-run commitment to the integration of the EC and U.S. economies, so that the economic cooperation that impels cooperation in fusion within EC is absent between EC and the United States and in its stead is the ultimate prospect of economic competition. o The separate stakes in fusion held by the EC, Japan, and the United States may not easily be subordinated to a common effort seeking merely reduced research costs and earlier results. o Nevertheless, there is a pressure for cooperation from the Versailles Economic Summit and there is receptivity to it at the EC level. o The preservation of the identity of the EC program will be a likely constraint on wider international cooperation. o There is technical need and opportunity for cooperation in dovetailing and phasing large, world-class machines; but the desirability of technical diversity and the primacy of indigenous interests may preclude the early consolidation of planned EC, U.S., and Japanese machines into one common effort. o There is technical need and opportunity for cooperation on alternative concepts and generic technology, but such cooperation will probably be paced more by problems of implementation than by technical urgency. o The goals of the EC and the U.S. programs have not been articulated explicitly enough to formulate a specific plan for cooperation. o The United States must deal through EC rather than directly with any Member State. o The desirability of the United States as a partner is low because of perceived past unreliability in honoring commitments, ungenerous insistence on quid pro quo, efforts to attract financial support from EC, and tendencies to put forward its low priority projects as candidates for cooperation. o Nevertheless, joint planning for the period from l988 onward is both possible and welcome. o Promising institutional forms for large cooperative projects go more toward the Joint European Torus model than toward the International Energy Agency model. With regard to the fuller discussion that follows, recall that the European program is administered at the level of the Commission of the European Communities. Nevertheless, input to the Commission comes from the various Member States. Views at both levels need to be explored to provide a comprehensive picture. Thus there are often differences of viewpoint at the country level before reconciliation into a single Commission viewpoint.
ll6 THE FUSION PROGRAM OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY In the words of the most recent proposed five-year plan, for l985-89, ...the Community Fusion Program is a long-term cooperative program embracing all the work carried out in the Member States in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion. It is designed to lead in due course to the joint construction of prototype reactors with a view to their industrial production and marketing (emphasis added). âCommission of the European Communities, l984b The EC program is about two-thirds of the size of the U.S. program, with the tokamak as the dominant approach. The overall program is staffed by about 3500 people, slightly over l000 of whom are professionals. There is no mirror confinement and little inertial confinement work going on. Alternative confinement schemes being studied are the stellarator and the reversed-field pinch, together representing roughly l0 percent of the program. Almost all of the work is carried out in national laboratories rather than in universities. Roughly half the support comes from the EC, the other half coming from separate national budgets of Member States. The flagship of the program is the large Joint European Torus (JET) tokamak (about twice the volume of the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor), installed adjacent to Culham Laboratory. JET is funded 80 percent by the EC and 20 percent by EC Member States individually. Budgets for the whole EC program are prepared and funded on a five-year basis and are reformulated after three years. The project is staffed by personnel drawn from all the European national laboratories, for example, Culham, Garching (Federal Republic of Germany), Fontenay (France), Frascati (Italy), and Jutphas (Netherlands). JET is now in the early operational phase. Successful completion of the facility represented a major success for European cooperation. In addition to JET there are three large ($40 million to $l00 million) tokamaks being built at Caderache, France (TORE SUPRA); Garching (ASDEX Upgrade); and Frascati (FTU). The TEXTOR device at Julich, Federal Republic of Germany, continues operation. Each of these four tokamaks is expected to stress a different aspect of tokamak physics while at the same time serving to maintain the national capability and national objectives of the participating EC countries. The EC program is coordinated by the EC staff in Brussels, utilizing a "consultative committee" drawn from all member states. Each national program (or "Association") is managed by a steering committee drawn from both the EC and the particular association. Future planning is centered on the Next European Torus (NET). The new tokamaks (previously mentioned) will probably go into operation in l987, and JET is expected to attain operation with tritium in l989. Assuming favorable results from these experiments, NET might move from
ll7 conceptual design to detailed engineering design by l988 and into construction by l99l. NET conceptual design studies are now under way at Garching with an EC team under the leadership of a former director of the Italian laboratory (NET Team, l984). NET is viewed currently as an engineering test reactor. The current intent is that NET should provide all the data needed for a real, though perhaps not an economic, power-producing reactor. Other, less ambitious, options will also be studied. These studies have not yet developed to a point where they can be compared with U.S. designs and cost estimates, but such comparisons should be possible beginning later this year. INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS ( Needs for Program Results An obvious condition for successful international cooperation is that the needs of the participants for program results must be reasonably compatible. A French official noted that both the EC and the U.S. programs lacked clear enough objectives to provide high compatibility. Although the stated goal of the EC programâ"construction of prototype reactors with a view to their industrial production and marketing"âseems straightforward, it omits much detail as to performance, schedules, and cost. U.S. goal statements are even less definite. United Kingdom (U.K.) officials noted that the need for fusion perceived in that country was not strong, since the United Kingdom still exports energy. Fast breeder reactors were thought to be more promising and less costly. The point was made that materials research in connection with the fast breeder reactor is not "open." This remark is interpreted to be an indication of approaching commercial interest. Fusion work is needed mainly as an "insurance policy" and is not to be supported to the detriment of fission research. A German official held similar views. These views imply a descending level of incentive for fusion in Japan, the EC, and the United States and correspondingly different levels of effort. There was little evidence of any French purpose or objective that will provide an incentive for more than incidental international cooperation in fusion beyond the EC program. Economic Cooperation and Competition in the Long Term The long-term economic benefits from fusion are thought to be great, but they certainly cannot be estimated accurately. All three of the world-class programs thus lack quantitative justification for their size and pace. The same long-term feature necessarily puts support for the program in the public sector. The utilities in Europe, as
ll8 eventual end users, are even more content than those in the United States to watch and wait without investing their own money. Cooperative efforts on fusion within the EC are driven by the accepted reality of long-run economic cooperation. Thus natural obstacles to fusion cooperation have been overcome. There is faith that the ultimate economic benefits will be captured more or less equitably by all EC participants through normal diffusion within the European economy. By contrast, there is no natural economic force that compels the EC and the United States to cooperate. The natural long-run competitive relationship will prevail and will make obstacles to fusion cooperation hard to overcome. The same observation holds between the EC and Japan and between the United States and Japan. No mechanism assures that the economic benefits will be captured equitably. More specifically, the fundamentally different treatment of government patent rights in Japan and the United States, for example, remains an unresolved obstacle. One might expect that the separate stakes in fusion perceived by the EC, Japan, and the United States would tend to persist unaltered and not be easily subordinated to international cooperation. The Influence of the Versailles Summit The stated aim of the Summit Working Group in Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion is "to reach a consensus on the desirable strategy in fusion in order to facilitate early joint planning to coordinate individual development programs." Thus, by pushing for a world strategy to which all can agree, the meeting of the Summit of Industrialized Nations at Versailles in l982, together with subsequent meetings, constitutes an external force toward cooperation. A German official was sympathetic with Summit guidance for joint planning of sequential (or phased) programs in the three world regions. U.K. officials conceded that high costs might compel a high-level mandate for cooperation, say, if the costs of NET reached the neighborhood of $4 billion. Character of the Program of the European Community Fusion collaboration within the EC is viewed with much pride as a showpiece of research and development. JET is similarly viewed as the showpiece of fusion. There is significant desire by several of its participants, especially Germany, to maintain the self-sufficiency of the EC program. Germany supports cooperation as much for the psychological benefits of European cooperation as for actual progress in fusion. German officials were not anxious to broaden the scale of cooperation, since EC unity might be diminished and the German contribution might lose relative importance thereby. A U.K. official had no view, without extensive staff analysis, as to whether the EC program should proceed alone or collaborate with
ll9 Japan or the United States. The same official, however, expressed reservations about any attempts to accelerate the EC program. Thus preservation of the unity and coherence of the EC program, tailored as it has been to fit member-country needs, may be an important constraint on any broader-scale cooperative planning. European Attitudes A draft proposal for an EC Council decision (Commission of the European Communities, l984b) states, "The Commission is convinced that international collaboration on fusion research and development is particularly desirable." At the political level of the Summit of Industrialized Nations, which includes the EC, science advisors to their respective governments have endorsed international scientific cooperation (Science, l983; Science, l984). A senior official of the EC fusion program, speaking from a position intermediate between the political and the management level, said that international cooperation should be an essential part of the fusion program, not just an incidental part. This official added that the EC is trying to extend collaboration beyond its frontiers. The motive may be anticipated budget problems associated with the high costs of future large devices. However, the three world-class programs would have to be brought into better coordination in order to enjoy fruitful cooperation on the next large step. Attitudes in individual Member States differed somewhat from the above sentiments. Germans were largely opposed to large-scale cooperation with the United States, believing that the EC could probably pursue fusion development by itself. They perceived the United States as interested mainly in the one-way flow of cash from the EC to the U.S. program. French officials thought that collaboration was likely only on medium-sized projects and that, if the small-scale cooperation did not work, it would be all the harder to collaborate on large projects. French officials complained about lack of U.S. cooperation on the TORE SUPRA project. A U.K. official expressed his country's reluctance to become enmeshed in another large technology project like the Concorde supersonic transport. Another U.K. official noted that three-way collaboration would have such difficulties with design agreement, siting, procurement, and project management that it might not be workable in practice. There are limits to large-scale cooperation, as evident in the second report of the so-called Beckurts Committee (Commission of the European Communities, l984a), recently released. The Beckurts report recommends that expenditures "should be sufficient to keep Europe fully effective, competitive and thus in a strong position to negotiate information exchange and cooperation agreements with other partners." The report further recommends maintaining "a self-consistent European planning, avoiding too much reliance on decisions from other programmes." Overall, however, it would appear
l20 that international collaboration is desired by the EC, although the extent and nature still are to be determined. With regard to international cooperation, there are several different possibilities: o The EC, Japan, and the United States prefer to place primary reliance on their own programs in a self-sufficient way. o All three entities prefer to place primary reliance on their own programs, subject, however, to joint planning of scientific and technical developments. o Two or three of the entities desire to establish international relations that have a high degree of interdependence. The attitude at the EC level seemed to be that the first possibility is not desired and that they are prepared to proceed at this time with the second, with the remote possibility of moving to the third sometime later if other matters are progressing well. An International Energy Agency official cautioned that U.S. insistence on strict quid pro quo is counterproductive. The official also advised against completing a U.S. design for its proposed Tokamak Fusion Core Experiment (TFCX) and then asking for international financial support for such a design. This move would repeat the Fusion Materials Irradiation Test (FMIT) mistake. No serious thought of large-scale collaboration with the USSR was evident. TECHNICAL NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES EC seems to have a coherent and unified technical program, with JET at the center and with complementary efforts filling gaps without duplication of effort. An extension to world cooperation first requires some consensus on the future world program, then improved collaboration on smaller projects, like FMIT, and then advances to larger projects. international agreements in force, such as TEXTOR, Large Coil Task (LCT), and Radiation Damage in Fusion Materials, lend encouragement to this view. Large Machines There was universal EC agreement on the JET to NET to demonstration reactor (DEMO) strategy. NET will be the basis for international cooperation on the next step. The aim of the l985-l989 EC program is to establish the physics basis for NET, intended to be a burning reactor. Reactor-relevant technology is planned in conjunction with NET, but individuals disagree as to the relative importance of this feature. German officials favored several world-class machines to provide the technical diversity necessary for achieving optimal solutions for a fusion reactor. German officials also felt that EC must have its
l2l own machine to learn the technology of fusion. This view precludes the strategy of a single world machine. By contrast, the Summit Working Group recommends that parties "review the advantages and disadvantages of one single comprehensive project versus several interdependent, complementary, and partially sequential machines." French officials were cool to the concept of TFCX. They perceived TFCX as more a matter of political expediency to maintain U.S. momentum than a matter of sound scientific investigation. Most of the Europeans believe that (l) the present TFCX designs are not sufficiently ambitiousâfor example, spending an additional 50 percent would more than double the value of the deviceâand (2) the insertion into the world scene of a device like TFCX might delay NET, which they regard as more fully committed. A "reasonable" share of TFCX costs (over $l00 million) would be extremely difficult for EC to commit. Even to help support FMIT would require the difficult process of requesting supplemental funding. Some of the European reluctance to express any interest in an ignition experiment like TFCX is certainly attributable to their waiting for the performance of JET to be understood better. Technology Projects The EC program seems in clear need of access to FMIT or equivalent, as well as other technology development work. However, the EC inclination is not to contribute to the construction costs of FMIT; and no funds are in the l985-l989 budget for it. One the other hand, one French official did favor finding money for the operation of FMIT. The opportunity to cooperate on TORE SUPRA is offered to the United States. TORE SUPRA may critically need U.S. support to maintain position in EC. The future of the International Tokamak Reactor (commonly known as INTOR) study is pending, with U.K. and French officials not persuaded of the merit of further effort. AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION The Unity of the Program of the European Community The EC program is extremely stable and long-term. It has provided significant benefits that would not have been realized otherwise, such as division of labor, concentration of effort, mobility of personnel, establishment of JET, and significant participation of European industry. These features are valued so much by the Member States that the continuation of the unity of the program will certainly be sought as a feature of wider international cooperation. Furthermore, all member countries would insist that wider cooperation be carried out only via the framework of EC, rather than by direct national agreements.
l22 The national components of the EC program are highly valued now; but in time they may be supplanted by Commission activities only, just as the European Organization for Nuclear Research (commonly known by its original French acronym CERN) supplanted national activities in high-energy physics. Provided the EC member countries remain economically cooperative rather than competitive, this result may be acceptable. Reliability of the United States as Partner Officials of EC, IEA, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom stressed reliability, predictability, and avoidance of arbitrariness of style as essential to U.S. partnership in the implementation of cooperation. FMIT and LCT were cited as examples of prior U.S. unreliability in fusion, the Synthetic Refined Coal 2 (commonly known as SRC-2) project in energy, and the International Solar Polar Mission in space exploration. U.K. officials acknowledge a need for flexibility in program content, but opt for rigidity in carrying through projects, once agreed. A way to provide flexibility in programs is to collaborate over a broader base, so that tradeoffs are available. An IEA official advised the United States to stop putting forward its low priority projects for international cooperation. While granting that some instances of the sort have occurred, one must still entertain the possibility that complaints about the reliability of the United States are being exploited as a bargaining position. Institutional Suitability The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is not a promising institutional home for collaboration because of USSR membership and because of the small scope and relevance of the IAEA fusion program. The IEA has a record as a suitable institution for medium-sized projects, like LCT, but does not seem to have the infrastructure to manage large-scale collaboration, nor to be likely to acquire it. A French official noted that, whatever the institutional entity, international agreement lends a project an extra degree of stability, protecting the project against budget fluctuations. The effect may be due to the perceived importance of the existence of an agreement. The Europeans, by virtue of JET and the overall EC experience, seem better able to cope with the idea of international cooperation in a realistic way. Our discussions did not address how cooperation with the United States could be achieved without political and economic ties similar to those within the EC. No one seemed convinced that United Nations sponsorship or a "world science fund" could succeed. The issue of access to high technology information and know-how, not to mention technology with potential military applications, will need to be faced without an overall political and economic umbrella like
l23 the EC. Such matters are not simple even with such an umbrella, as the breeder program demonstrates. Finally the issue of siting a large world-wide, or even a bilateral, endeavor will be an enormous problem. The Joint European Torus as a Model of Project Management The governance of JET (Commission of the European Communities, undated) seems to be a successful model, well worth study and imitation for implementation of other large international fusion projects. The undertaking enjoys great stability because of high-level commitments sought and obtained early in the program planning and budgeting process. The Director of the Project has broad authority and responsibility. He reports to and is subject to annual budget and program review by the JET Council. The Executive Subcommittee of the JET Council also approves procurement contract selection over 200,000 European Units of Account (ECU). The Scientific Subcommittee reviews in detail, and approves, the "project development plan." The JET management system has been intact and has worked effectively since project initiation in l978. JET does not supersede various national activities, because they are still needed to round out the program. By the time NET is undertaken these programs are expected to have run their courses, and more national activities may not be needed. A U.K. official suggested that NET may require new political agreements and organization beyond JET. Participation in JET by an additional country, say the United States, would be possible upon approval by the Director of the Project, the JET Council, and the Council of the European Communities. Joint Planning for Increased Cooperation The United States might well consider fusion in a larger context of cooperation in science and technology, so as to match the EC science structure better. For example, fusion might be considered along with breeder reactors, space technology, computers, or biotechnology. It was clearly stated, from JET experience, that joint multilateral effort involves interdependence, requires vigorous debate to produce an agreed program, and should result in a program of considerable stability. Since the preponderant view is that international cooperation will be necessary but that it will take time and effort to achieve, it is generally agreed that it would be appropriate to start the discussions soon. Discussions should take place at two levels. First, there should be an effort to reach agreement on program goals since the Europeans do not understand current U.S. program goals. Second, there should be joint efforts at a technical level to see if agreement can be reached on the intermediate objectives and the possible timing of
l24 the major devices and facilities that would be needed, as well as the critical criteria and decision points that would be involved in the go-ahead decisions. There are new agreements in preparation that will keep the possibility of cooperation active at medium levels of effort, at least. However, what is lacking now is an international joint planning team to consider concepts for TFCX or equivalent, NET, and the Fusion Experimental Reactor proposed by Japan and how these machines might be modified to give optimum phased advances. German officials thought that joint planning would be feasible only for the period from l988 onward, since plans until l988 are rather firm. It was conceded that there is some flexibility in the EC program for NET, through joint planning, to take advantage of whatever physics results might be provided by TFCX. U.K. ministers would countenance some exploration of the possibility of bringing the world-class fusion programs together. A U.K. official noted it was still an open question of whether EC will go forward to NET and DEMO by itself, with only the incidental help of others, or will seek a truly joint undertaking with Japan or the United States. The former course has the advantage of making sure the technology is acquired by the EC, and the latter course has the advantage of probable savings in cost and time. A JET official noted that an outside country could participate in a large EC project, like NET, say, without participating in all the rest of the EC program. A U.K. official would like to see as much collaboration as possible on smaller projects to gain experience and confidence. Site selection for NET will remain a difficult issue, as judged by prior insistence to exclude the site of JET and by the competition among Cadarache, Garching, and Ispra as candidate sites. It seems that, given a strong and well presented U.S. initiative, an international agreement on joint program planning and collaboration at intermediate project sizes could be achieved. However, there would be substantial obstacles, problems, and friction in reaching agreement and in implementation. The question is: Is it worth it?
