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Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report (1984)

Chapter: INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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Suggested Citation:"INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS." National Research Council. 1984. Cooperation and Competition on the Path to Fusion Energy: A Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18541.
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2 INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS International cooperation is an amiably received proposition throughout the fusion community, being widely perceived as a way to broaden the bases and relieve financial strains of national fusion programs. Yet to arrive at sound recommendations about whether to extend international cooperation, one must examine the incentives and constraints, especially those that arise from broader policies. One must also examine the perception of these factors by the various groups concerned with cooperation. Finally, one must weigh the expected consequences, even though these cannot be known with certainty. INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS AT THE POLICY LEVEL Incentives There are a number of incentives, consistent with broad policy goals, that the conventional wisdom widely accepts in a general sense (Rycroft, l983). Nevertheless, when one goes from the general incentives to specific programs and project details, some reluctance toward international cooperation seems to appear. Achieving Program Results International cooperation makes possible a much broader and more diverse program in pursuit of its fusion goals than could be supported by any single nation within presently anticipated budget limits. The information flow available to a national program is thereby increased and broadened; there are more people working in more areas and generating more new ideas and ways of attacking problems; and the chances of generating step advances in the science and technology of 19

20 fusion—the breakthroughs or lucky accidents that both enliven and accelerate progress in research areas—are usefully increased. The sharing of scientific and technical information through international cooperation reduces national program risks and improves program opportunities. All research and development efforts have elements of risk through the pursuit of scientific or technological directions that subsequently prove unfruitful. Access to the broadest possible information base improves the chances of avoiding unfruitful ventures and of recognizing opportunities for progress. Moreover, through the sharing of test facilities and projects for materials and technology development, needed technological results may well be acquired sooner and in greater depth than otherwise. There is also the point noted by Rose (l982) that in the past capable people have come into the fusion field who might very well not have done so had the activity not offered the opportunity for international contacts. Inasmuch as fusion research and development efforts are likely to have to continue for a good number of years into the future and that the long-term vigor and viability of such programs will depend substantially on the scientific and managerial abilities of the program leaders, the broader, more diverse, and more comprehensive programs made possible by international cooperation should be an important element in attracting the most capable people to the field. The point is a far from trivial one in planning for the very long-term kind of effort that fusion power will surely require. Expanding Economic Benefits Rose (l982) also observes that international cooperation in fusion has been a very positive-sum game to date. Programs of all the participants have advanced more rapidly and with better direction than would have been the case without the cooperation (U.S. General Accounting Office, l984). It is reasonable to expect that this quality, of yielding substantially more program benefits than the funds and effort invested, should be a feature of international cooperation for some years to come. Because everyone gains from the collaboration and the whole amounts to more than the sum of the contributed parts, it should be less important that supplies and equipment contracts in a collaborative effort be distributed with great precision according to the contributions of the collaborators. The long-term economic benefits that will flow from the full commercialization of fusion through any particular national program are expected to be great, although their exact nature and magnitude cannot be foreseen with certainty. Cooperative programs, through their greater technological diversification, may be able to expand both the scope and the scale of the benefits ultimately available to each participant. The equitable capture of these benefits, of course,

2l will have to be possible under whatever cooperative arrangements are undertaken. Saving Costs of National Programs As fusion research and development moves towards large machines and supporting facilities, it becomes highly expensive and difficult for any single nation to support a comprehensive program. International cooperation and the sharing of some costs, including the joint construction and use of expensive installations for which only a single facility of a given type is considered necessary and sufficient, offer relief from national budgetary limitations. Unnecessary duplication of effort is avoided by the distribution among the members of an international cooperative effort of those tasks that can be shared. Some duplication of effort is inevitable to satisfy the interests of national partners in acquiring "hands-on" experience, but international cooperation can substantially reduce the overall level of duplication and thereby improve the efficiency of use of everyone's limited funds. Serving Political Objectives There is a more recent incentive that has considerable meaning for government program managers and staffs. Controlled nuclear fusion is the subject of one of the working groups set up, in the summer of l982 by decision of the Heads of State and Government at the Versailles meeting of the Summit of Industrialized Nations, to serve the larger political objective of technological cooperation among certain industrialized countries (Science, l983). In June l984, the leaders of Canada, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, the United States, and the European Community (EC) endorsed the activities of the working groups in exploring plans for closer collaboration in science and technology in the industrial nations (Science, l984). The working group considering fusion, in which the United States participates, noted the long-range importance of the technology and the magnitude of human and financial efforts needed and concluded that a substantial increase in the level of international collaboration is justified. Endorsement at the head-of-state level for international cooperation in fusion, even couched in the most general terms, is a powerful influence in determining the attitudes with which government staff and negotiators approach the subject. From time to time technological topics have been selected to serve, in whole or in part, broader political objectives, such as strengthening alliances, creating good will, or augmenting a particular negotiation. Examples are the United States-Japan space launch agreement, the proposal for an international telecommunications satellite consortium, and the provision of desalinization technology to Middle East countries. Indeed, the EC points with pride to its

22 magnetic fusion program as a successful example of its political goals for European cooperation in large-scale research and development. Other political objectives may arise that can be served by international cooperation in magnetic fusion and will thus provide incentives. Broadening Constituencies International cooperation can improve public, political, and electric utility confidence in and acceptance of fusion as an eventual power source. Stability of the fusion programs of the participants is another benefit. Indeed, cooperation will demonstrate a wide agreement among different peoples and different points of national view that practical fusion power sources can be developed and that—on cost, resource, and environmental grounds—fusion power may be at least as acceptable as other alternatives if not superior. Cooperation will also create a sense that not to go forward with fusion is to be left at a disadvantage in the future. The Member States of the EC, together with three other nations, namely, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain, have long since recognized the weight of the incentives over the constraints for international cooperation in fusion. These nations have formed a comprehensive and sound research and development program that has produced the leading tokamak, Joint European Torus (JET), as well as early planning efforts for a subsequent large machine. Further levels of international cooperation, between the United States, the EC, and Japan can and may respond to the same incentives, although with different arrangements to deal with the differing constraints and limitations. Constraints Just as there are incentives that are widely accepted in the fusion community, so there are some constraints and disincentives under existing policies that are also recognized at a general level. Like the incentives, the general constraints tend to weaken in the face of detailed consideration and negotiation on specific cooperative enterprises. So, in the regime of details and specific projects, just as the incentives appear less clear and forceful, so the constraints become less important as particular ways of dealing with each one are sought and developed. Maintaining National Program Strength There is reluctance for national programs to give up any significant part, scientific or technological, of what is seen as the main line of advance toward an eventual fusion power plant. This reluctance is, in

23 part, national preparation to satisfy domestic energy needs and, in part, national protectiveness for domestic industries and for a competitive position as an eventual supplier of fusion plant equipment. This policy constraint gives rise to the question of technology transfer in the implementation of cooperative programs. If it is true that national research and development budgets are tight and that international cooperation is seen as a way to share costs and maintain comprehensive programs, then it is also true that the funds available for international cooperation are not unlimited. And the funds that are contributed from national programs to international cooperation will be, at least in part, at the sacrifice of some elements of the national programs. Preserving National Program Prestige There is a similar reluctance to give up national prestige that comes from successful technical and professional competition. It is a natural instinct of project managers, laboratory directors, and government program officers to seek to maintain and extend world leadership. These instincts are reinforced by the prospect that national objectives may be in some sense endangered by giving up certain program management authority. However, there can be no international cooperation without some financial cost and some surrendering of national control to the joint enterprise. Safeguarding National Security A policy constraint that must be taken into account is to avoid impairment of national security through disclosure of militarily useful technology to potential adversaries. The degree of constraint will depend principally on the way that the question of technology transfer is perceived and handled in the implementation. The committee does not suggest that national security imposes serious limitations on international cooperation in fusion with the Western countries; rather, the topic is included here for completeness and is discussed more fully in the chapter on implementation. PERCEPTIONS OF INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS BY VARIOUS U.S. GROUPS There are diverse perceptions of the incentives and constraints for international cooperation in fusion among the senior technical leaders in the U.S. program, government program administrators, high-ranking administration officials, Congressional oversight and appropriation committees, manufacturing industries as suppliers, and electric utilities as users. (See Appendix B.)

24 Technical Leaders The technical community in the U.S. fusion area, at least as represented by the consensus of the Magnetic Fusion Advisory Committee (MFAC), strongly supports international cooperation on a general basis. MFAC made the following declaration: The U.S. fusion program and the development of fusion on a worldwide basis have benefited significantly from the active exchange of information and ideas. International cooperation in fusion reseach should continue to receive strong emphasis in the U.S. program. The planning of national fusion facilities and programs has been guided to considerable extent by a policy of avoiding international duplication and instead addressing complementary technical issues. This policy is both cost-effective and conducive to rapid technical development. It encourages broader coverage of options in the area of alternate concepts and allows larger steps to be taken in the main-line approaches within existing budgetary constraints. —Magnetic Fusion Advisory Committee, l983 MFAC goes on to note that within each confinement approach, U.S. effort has been largely complementary to activities in other nations. For example, each of the four large tokamak projects that were undertaken in the mid l970s—Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) in the United States, JET in Europe, JT-60 in Japan, and T-l5 in the Soviet Union—has a distinct set of characteristics and objectives. The MFAC report continues: While maximum effective use should be made of research facilities abroad, to supplement U.S. capabilities, the overall priorities of the U.S. program should continue to emphasize the most promising reactor approaches. The international fusion effort will benefit from increased consultation in program planning and from the initiation of coordinated—or even jointly supported—research projects. The thrust of MFAC's recommended U.S. program and strategy for the coming years, however, has a central theme of "going it alone" with regard to major new steps. The MFAC recommendations have been for maintenance and continuation of the U.S. base program in magnetic fusion and for early initiation of a major new facility, the Tokamak Fusion Core Experiment (TFCX), with an increase in the U.S. fusion budget ramping up over several years to a new level 25 to 40 percent above the present one in constant dollars. Present international cooperative ventures would presumably be continued and opportunity sought for additional exchanges, at least on an information sharing basis; but there is no suggestion in the MFAC plan of more ambitious collaborative ventures.

25 One can sympathize with program technical leaders who would much prefer to be fully supported by the U.S. domestic budget in a comprehensive research and development program including major new machines at appropriate intervals. That prospect is certainly a more pleasant one than contemplating heavy cuts in the base program in order to provide funds for a major new machine within current budget limits, or surrendering substantial elements of technology and of management control in the next major machine to international partners in a joint venture, or, most likely, both. If the increased funding can be obtained, then the MFAC recommendations certainly lead to a very strong U.S. position in fusion and are probably the actions of choice. However, if U.S. fusion program budget levels are to remain at current levels, or to diminish slightly as suggested by recent Congressional actions on the FY l985 budget, then the options appear to be to reduce the base program substantially to accomodate TFCX (or other major next-step tokamak), to maintain the base program and delay indefinitely TFCX, or to seek substantial international collaboration on the next major tokamak together with some base program cuts. Program Administrators The views of U.S. government program administrators on international cooperation in fusion are consolidated into the Comprehensive Program Management Plan (CPMP) for magnetic fusion, prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy (l983). The CPMP states current U.S. policy with respect to leadership in magnetic fusion in the following terms: The Department's intent is to maintain a leadership role for the United States in the area of magnetic fusion energy research and development. The term, "a leadership role," pointedly indicates that the United States is to be among the leaders and lead in some areas but not others, rather than to move agressively into the world leadership position in magnetic fusion—a position it has had at times in the past. At least one implication of this policy for the prospects of increased international cooperation, particularly for cooperation in major next-generation machines, comes to mind: other nations may be less enthusiastic about entering arrangements with a program that is, at best, even with their own. The current U.S. policy on international cooperation is stated in the following terms in the CPMP: The Department intends to maintain this position [of leadership] in the two major confinement concepts and in the development of critical technologies. We recognize that progress can best be made through a carefully formulated and managed policy of close international cooperation to share specific tasks.

26 This statement suggests an affirmative policy toward international cooperation, but on a selective basis and with close controls on project scope and activities and on technology aspects to be shared. The phrase "to share specific tasks" was understood to mean that the United States would attempt to retain all essential technologies within the U.S. program. The implications for international cooperation are that hard bargaining as to technical and fiscal contributions and as to the sharing of results will be involved in arranging any joint projects. The current goal of the U.S. program is stated as follows in the CPMP: ...to develop the scientific and technological information required to design and construct magnetic fusion power systems. This overall objective of the program is more limited than the visions of some years ago and reflects current budget constraints. The CPMP does not contemplate a prototype power plant in the U.S. program and may leave a substantial gap between the government program and any serious attempt at commercial use of the technology. In particular, the CPMP leaves to potential commercial users the development of an industrial base for the fabrication and construction of fusion power plants. Since at least one and perhaps all of the major foreign magnetic fusion programs seem directed toward an eventual goal of controlling and marketing fusion plant technology, there may be significant problems of compatability in basic goals in agreeing on international joint ventures. The CPMP does call for a large machine, the Engineering Test Reactor (ETR), to be built in the late l980s, but recent budgetary constraints caused planning at the technical level to be directed towards a less ambitious next step, TFCX. TFCX embodies the physics of ETR but little of the technological and engineering testing features. During the writing of this report this goal has been set aside, and a revised plan is not yet available. The Japanese, EC, and Soviet program plans in magnetic fusion continue to contemplate an engineering test reactors* of roughly similar objectives. Decisions would be taken in the late l980s or early l990s and, if favorable, the machines could be ready by the late l990s. These machines in the foreign programs would then be followed by demonstration reactors. U.S. government program administrators recognize the potential benefits of international cooperation on a wide scale and, faced with the realties of current budget levels, look to it as an essential part of a successful fusion program. Situated precariously between would- be budget cutters at some levels in the administration and in the Congress and would-be budget raisers in the technical community, the government program administrators' task is to develop a consensus on a reasonable program that balances the dual needs to maintain a strong base program and to move ahead with the next major machine, includes *Designated as Fusion Engineering Reactor (FER) in Japan, Next European Torus (NET) in the EC, and OTR in the USSR.

27 substantial international cooperation, and operates at realistic budget levels—an admirable but difficult task. Administration Officials The fusion-related views of high-level U.S. administration officials seem concentrated on program cost matters. Budget officials are unenthusiastic about significant new commitments to large projects, or to increases in base programs either. The President's Science Advisor has talked of a "balanced fusion program," which is to advance with due deliberation, obtaining a maximum of information available from each step and taking full advantage of progress in other technical fields and in other countries. International cooperation would be judged in both quarters, one expects, on its promise to reduce overall U.S. fusion program costs or at least help to hold them level. Congressional Committees The Congressional authorization committees tend to be fusion program supporters and inclined toward a comprehensive U.S. program including new machines. The appropriation committees are mainly interested in accomplishments in relation to costs. Recent actions on the fusion budget for fiscal year l985 were accompanied by questions on the readiness of the U.S. program to advance from a scientifically oriented program to an applications oriented program so soon. In particular, there was a concern that funding the planning for TFCX before full results were available from TFTR might be tantamount to a premature choice of a particular reactor concept. Thus, along with cutting the fusion budget, the appropriation committees admonished the Department of Energy not to damage the base program in favor of TFCX or other new machines.. In general, it may be expected that the Congressional committees will act positively and decisively only when there is consensus on goals, objectives, and program content and when the costs of these are commensurate with probable benefits. Industry Executives Apart from those of a few specific firms, executives of the manufacturing industries as suppliers and the electric utilities as users of eventual fusion power systems evince polite interest in the whole subject, including international cooperation, and not much more, principally because the commercial aspects of fusion are so far in the future. There is not much business to be done in fusion for the present; and what there is involves difficult technologies to which American manufacturers seem reluctant to accord matching priority, talent, and energy.

28 EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS These impressions are culled from the visits of the committee to Japan and the EC to talk to fusion program leaders there. Summaries of these trips appear as Appendixes C and D. In general, the Europeans and the Japanese seem affected by the general incentives and constraints for international cooperation in much the same way that Americans are. There is some feeling that fusion research and development budgets are not unlimited and that international cooperation, as it has in the past, can be an aid to achieving program results. At the moment, the Europeans and the Japanese seem to feel this incentive less strongly than the Americans. Some other observations indicating European and Japanese perceptions of the incentives and constraints of international cooperation are noted below. European Perceptions For a number of Europeans, the perceived need for fusion was not especially strong in view of other energy sources and supplies. Fusion work was classed mainly as an "insurance policy." While the long-term economic benefits from fusion were thought by the Europeans to be great, those benefits cannot be estimated accurately at present. There is, therefore, in the European view, no quantitative justification for any particular program scope and pace. With any deployment far in the future, fusion development programs must be funded entirely by the public sector. The utilities in Europe wait and watch without investing in fusion. At the political level in the EC, international collaboration on fusion research and development is considered desirable. Cooperation with both the United States and Japan has been endorsed. However, it was felt that the three world-class programs would have to be brought into better coordination in order to enjoy full cooperation on the next large step. The fusion collaboration within the EC and the product of that collaboration, JET, is viewed with much pride. Indeed, there is some expectation by its participants that the EC tokamak may shortly achieve the leading technical position in the world. There is a desire on the part of some EC participants to maintain the self-sufficiency of the EC program and not to broaden the scale of cooperation to the extent that EC unity might be diminished (Commission of the European Communities, l984a). Thus, preservation of the unity and coherence in the EC program may be an important constraint on any further cooperative planning and may even diminish interest in large-scale collaboration beyond the EC.

29 Japanese Perceptions The Japanese appear to have a firmer and more consistent government energy policy than the United States, stemming from their lack of natural resources. They intend to be successful with fission breeder reactors and eventually with fusion. Compared with the United States and the EC, Japan seems to have more direct industrial participation in fusion programs. As for the Japanese utilities, they are more centralized, appear to be more financially sound than in the United States, and are somewhat more involved in the fusion program. Japanese industry is actively involved as supplier of experimental equipment (Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, l983). The industry has exhibited interest in acquiring and protecting fusion technology "know-how." Industry representatives of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum expressed a generally negative attitude on international cooperation, which seemed to be motivated primarily by their desire to establish industrial leadership. They did not appear concerned that financial constraints might reduce the fusion program or stretch out the period over which it is carried out. They also indicated that Japan should not rely on any other country for the development for any technology that is critical. One form of cooperation proposed by the Japanese industrialists was to let Japanese vendors supply components to the U.S. fusion effort, provided that similar technology promised to be useful to the Japanese program as it progressed. A generally positive attitude about international cooperation was expressed by government ministry officials, by fusion program leaders, and by influential advisors. The incentive seemed in all cases to be concern about current or future Japanese financial constraints. If fusion were near the application stage, there might not be any Japanese interest in international cooperation. However, with the commercial application of fusion decades away and total development costs running into tens of billions of dollars, it is difficult for anyone to be against international cooperation, especially since Japanese funding seems to have leveled off just at is has in the United States. Program administrators see international cooperation as a means of conserving scarce resources. Scientists see cooperation as a means of expanding or accelerating the fusion program. All groups except the industrial one endorsed international cooperation in principle as desirable or necessary for technical progress, risk sharing, and cost sharing. It was a Japanese view that international cooperation must not impair national programs. Therefore, cooperative efforts will have to be supplementary to the main core of these programs or else, if more extensive, will have to fit well with the national program content. In the case of collaboration on a major project the parties should start with joint formulation of the objectives, schedules, design features, and so forth. This approach would apply when the collaborating partners had approximately equal shares in the venture.

30 The Japanese summarized a number of desirable principles for international collaboration. These included the following points: no erosion of the national programs, mutual benefit, participation on an equal footing, assurance of continuity in the collaboration, acceleration of the national program of the partners, overlap of program interest, achievement together of what is not achievable separately, full participation in planning from the beginning, and full access by all sectors to the technology developed. QUESTIONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION There are a number of questions about international cooperation that may illuminate useful policy boundaries and criteria for cooperation. The answers to these questions by various groups within the U.S. and by the Europeans and Japanese may very well be somewhat different as suggested in the following discussion. Will International Cooperation Accelerate Technical Progress and Return on the Technical Investment? It almost certainly will in the long run. As noted in the discussion of incentives, there may be synergistic effects from international cooperation that multiply the return on investment in assorted ways. These effects are almost certain to work in the future with international cooperation as they have in the past and to be in addition to the more direct and obvious features of allowing a project to go forward in a cooperative effort where it would either not be possible or would be delayed in a single national program. There are matters of timing involved, however. Note, for instance, the concern voiced in both Japan and the EC that discussions about joint ventures in TFCX and in the next Japanese and EC machines, FER and NET, might delay those machines. Will International Cooperation Allow Us to Cover Technical Ground That We Could Not Otherwise Cover? Yes, it will, especially in large-scale collaborations, such as JET, by providing access to a technically broader program than we could maintain by ourselves at a constant budget level. The same is true, of course, for other partners in the collaboration. Will International Cooperation Gain Us a Competitive Edge in Future World Markets? If international cooperation is continued to the commercialization phase, it probably would not put us ahead of the other major partners

3l in the cooperation. Nor would it give any of the partners any particular edge over us. What international cooperation will do in that case is to keep us well informed in a technological sense and thus help us to maintain a competitive competence among equally competent potential suppliers of future markets. If international cooperation is continued only through the phases of scientific inquiry and generic technology development, with disengagement of the partners or other common measures for protecting proprietary interests as commercialization approaches, then the cooperation need not limit the competitive advantages that can be sought and attained by any country. However, such scenarios and consequences are not possible to predict. The pace of the commercialization of fusion will probably be deliberate enough that appropriate competitive adjustments can be made along the way. Will International Cooperation Reduce Our Costs? The great article of faith is that it will reduce our costs, and that it will reduce everybody else's as well. The faith is held perhaps a bit more strongly among program administrators and finance officials than among technical people. There is a school of thought that thinks an international collaborative project would be more expensive than doing it within a single national program. The International Tokamak Reactor (INTOR) workshop, for instance, was asked, "What are the effects on cost and schedule of undertaking the INTOR project internationally and partitioning the detail design and fabrication of components, so each of the four parties could benefit from the development of all advanced technologies involved?" The consensus was that relative to a national project, such an international project would cost about 70 percent more, require a larger staff by about l5 percent, and would require about two years longer to complete. However, it is not clear that the question was asked in the right way. For instance, it is doubtful that JET, with many partners in the project, is costing 70 percent more than if it were, for example, totally a United Kingdom project. Nevetheless, true or not, if a major new machine is too expensive a project for any single national program, but can be managed financially by two or three collaborating together, then it does not matter if it is 70 percent more expensive because there is no other way to do it. In that case it is a bargain for each of the partners. That fact suggests that the answer to the question is not so much, "Yes, it will reduce our costs," as it is, "No, but it will allow us to maintain a broad program and to take significant steps forward without increasing our costs." As to the next few years, there is little possibility that cooperation will produce large annual savings because EC and Japanese plans and budgets are committed to projects in train and thus unavailable for major new initiatives that might create significant savings.

32 Will International Cooperation Smooth the Way Towards Acceptance by Utilities and the Public? Yes, it will, for reasons given in the general incentives about acceptance. Again this effect works for the other partners in a collaborative effort equally well. There is, of course, no fundamental rule of nature that if everyone is marching in a certain direction, it is the right direction. Nevertheless, there is a strong momentum created by such a movement. What Portion of the "Critical Path" to Fusion Energy Is the United States Willing to Allocate to Cooperative Ventures? Initially, only tasks at the margins of the national program will be offered up for cooperation because of the desire to maintain its strength. The same will be true for all the other partners. All will want full access and participation in all critical elements of cooperative projects that are established. That condition does not mean that there cannot be lead partners for particular parts of a machine in a joint enterprise. But it does mean that no single partner will be allowed to go off in his own laboratories and develop some critical piece of the technology without the full access and participation of staff from the other partners. As time progresses, the margins of cooperation can probably be widened as ways of equitably sharing results are developed. What Degree of Project Management is the United States Willing to Yield? After some internal debates, the United States will probably settle for dividing the management authority in a joint project approximately in proportion to investment. The EC and Japan, after similar processes, would probably arrive at the same results. This division would have to apply at levels corresponding to steering committees and on up to boards of directors. Any project that is actually going to be built ought to be headed by a single individual, and that means a single individual of one nationality or another. RECAPITULATION To recapitulate, this chapter has identified a number of factors at the level of policy that provide either incentives or constraints for expanded international cooperation in magnetic fusion. The incentives include promise of enhancement of needed technical progress, potential expansion of long-term economic benefits for each participant, possibility of saving cumulative development costs over the long term,

33 achievement of worthwhile political objectives, and broadening of fusion constituencies. Constraints are imposed by policies to preserve the strengths of the various national programs and to seek national prestige through technical leadership in fusion. No major short-term cost savings appear possible because firm plans in the EC and Japan will preclude any large-scale cooperative ventures over the next few years. Even so, taking into account the views of the groups who would be affected by expanded cooperation, the weight of the incentives prevails over the constraints. Thus, on balance, there are substantial potential benefits of large-scale international collaboration in the development of fusion.

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