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APPENDIX B SUMMARY OF DOMESTIC WORKSHOPS Two domestic workshops were conducted to explore viewpoints within the United States on the opportunities, policies, and arrangements bearing on a qualitatively higher level of international cooperation in the development of magnetic fusion energy. The salient views as expressed by the workshop participants are summarized here. These views were considered, but not necessarily adopted, by the committee in reaching its conclusions. For convenience, each workshop is described separately, in approximate correspondence with its topical sessions. FIRST WORKSHOP The agenda for the first workshop is shown in Figure l. Technical and Programmatic Considerations In the past the United States has gained substantial technical benefits for its magnetic fusion program from international cooperation. Foreign fusion programs have scientific, technical, and engineering strengths in many areas that are comparable, if not superior, to those of the United States: o Japanâsolid breeding materials, superconducting magnets, materials, neutronics, engineering design. o European Community (EC)âliquid breeding materials, superconducting magnets, materials, plasma-wall interaction, tokamak physics, stellarator physics, tritium, reversed-field pinch physics, nuclear technology, radio-frequency heating technology. o Soviet Unionâplasma-wall interaction, superconducting magnets, tokamak physics, tandem-mirror physics, radio-frequency heating technology. 75
76 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 2101 Contatuoofl Avtnu* "Munfrafl. D C M** Committee on International Cooperation in Magnetic fusion WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NManric FDSICB FIRST NORESHOr Joseph Benry Buildirtg 2100 Pennsylvania Avenue, H.w. Washington, D.C. December 14-15, 1983 PURPOSB: To explore the opportunities, policies, and arrangements bearing on a qualitatively higher level of international cooperation in the development of magnetic fusion energy. AGENDA Organised by Weston M. Stacey, Jr. Wednesday Morning, December 14 SESSION 1. BACKGROUND. J. Gavin, Session Chairman Purpose and Scope of the Workshop Joseph Gavin Status of Magnetic Fusion John Clarke Program Plans of Bufbpean Community, Japan, Michael Roberts and USSB and Existing International Cooperation SESSION 2. RELEVANT EXPERIENCE. A. Morrissey, Session Chairman Joint European Torus (JET) John Sheffield Large Coll Test Facility Paul Haubenrelch International Telecommunications Satellites John McLucas United States-Japan Space Launch Agreement Norman Terrell United Technologies' Experience in James Bogard International Cooperation in the Jet Field FIGURK 1 Agenda for first workshop.
77 Wednesday Afternoon, December 14 SESSION 3. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN PLASMA PHYSICS, BASIC TECHNOLOGY, AND COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT. R. Borchers, Session Chairman possibilities of Further Cooperation in Plasma Physics and Basic Technology Large Test Facilities Needed for Component Development Panel Discussion on Technical Considerations for Cooperation in Plasma Physics, Basic Technology, and Component Development, Distinguishing Among the Three Major Overseas Programs Robert Conn Charles Baker Robert Borchers (Panel Chairman), Charles Baker, Harold Furth, Gerald Kulcinski SESSION 4. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR COOPERATION ON LARGE FUSION PROJECTS. D. Kerr, Session Chairman Anticipated Large Fusion Projects Panel Discusson on Technical Considerations for Cooperation on Large Fusion Projects, Distinguishing Anong the Three Major Overseas Programs John Gilie land Donald Kerr (Panel Chairman), Robert Conn, John Gilleland, Melvin Gottlieb, Norman Terrell Thursday Morning, December 15 SESSION 5. POLICIES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. J. Hendrie, Session Chairman Panel Discusson on the Objectives, Constraints, Long-Tern Implications, and Political Acceptability of International Cooperation, Distinguishing Among the Three Major Overseas Programs Joseph Hendrie, (Panel Chairman), James Bogard, Richard DeLauer, Jack Dugan, Bryan Lawrence, Robert uhrig FIGURE l Agenda for first workshop (continued).
78 SESSION 6. IMPLEMENTATION AND ORGANIZATION. M. Muntzing, Session Chairman Legal Instruments of Agreement for Susan Kuznick International Cooperation Organization and Administration of George Cunningham International Projects Panel Discussion on the Role of Government Manning Muntzing and of Industry in International Projects, (Panel Chairman), Distinguishing A»ong the Three Major George Cuninngham, Overseas Programs Gerald Helman, Susan Kuznick, David Leive, John Moore Thursday Afternoon, December 15 SESSION 7. SUMMARY. W. Stacey, Session Chairman Conclusions from Sessions 3-6 with Emphasis Robert Borchers, on Implications. Discussion. Donald Kerr, Joseph Hendrie, Manning Muntzing FIGURE l Agenda for first workshop (continued).
79 At the most modest level of cooperation, the free and informal exchange of basic scientific and technological information that now exists is valuable to the U.S. program and should continue to be encouraged. The only government action required is merely to insure that no impediments to free information exchange are created. Organized cooperative efforts, in which each side pays its own way, should be further encouraged in order to make the most efficient use of available resources worldwide. This category includes the following activities: o Joint planning of national research programs in specific areas for complementarityâfor example, the joint planning of materials research under the International Energy Agency (IEA)âand a sharing of results. o Joint studies, such as the International Tokamak Reactor (INTOR) under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that focus effort on critical technical issues and identify research and development needs. At the next level, participation of one or more nations in a technology test facility, a component development and test facility, or a plasma physics experiment of another country could reduce the number of such facilities needed worldwide. Examples of each type of facility are, respectively, the Fusion Materials Irradiation Test (FMIT) facility, the Large Coil Test Facility (LCTF), and the TEXTOR tokamak. It would be easier to establish an equitable cost for participation on a case-by-case basis, rather than attempting to establish a comprehensive agreement encompassing many cases. However, an umbrella agreement that provided for the possibility of several individual cases would be appropriate. The highest level of cooperation, in terms of both degree of international collaboration and complexity of organization, consists of an international projectâsuch as Joint European Torus (JET). Truly international projects are appropriate only for major facilities, such as the suggested Tokamak Fusion Core Experiment (TFCX) or Engineering Test Reactor (ETR), because of the great amount of negotiation that will be required for their establishment. Examples of International Fusion Cooperation An open and informal exchange of scientific information through publication, meetings, and visits has existed among the major fusion nations since l958, when the subject was declassified. The U.S. exchange with Western Europe has been the most extensive. There is a formal agreement for exchange of personnel for short periods of time with the USSR. Formal cooperative agreements with Japan exist in several areas: personnel exchange, joint research and development planning in seven
80 areas, joint institutes for fusion theory, Japanese utilization of the Doublet III tokaroak experiment for about $l0 million per year from Japan, and Japanese utilization of Rotating Target Neutron Source II (RTNS-II) for about $l.8 million per year from Japan. There is formal cooperation through the IEA under an umbrella agreement in three areas: o Japan and the EC use the LCTF to test their magnets (Haubenreich, l983). o The United States and other countries perform plasma experiments in the TEXTOR tokamak of the Federal Republic of Germany. o There is coordination of planning for materials research and for research on large tokamaks. There is formal cooperation with the EC, Japan, and the USSR to focus effort on critical technical issues for next-generation tokamaks and their supporting research and development in the INTOR Workshop. Policy Considerations The official goals of the U.S. magnetic fusion program, as embodied in the Comprehensive Program Management Plan (CPMP) (U.S. Department of Energy, l983), were discussed and were thought to be ambiguous in some respects and to fail to convey a firm commitment to the development of fusion power. There are significant implications of this policy for increased international cooperation: o The pointed implication of the CPMP objective "to maintain a leadership role" is that the United States has not adopted a national policy to be the leader. Other nations will be much more anxious to cooperate with the leading program than with one that is even with or behind their own. o The CPMP also states an intention "to maintain this position [of leadership] in the two major confinement concepts...through a carefully formulated and managed policy of close international cooperation to share specific tasks." The implications of this statement are that all essential elements of the mainline effort will be retained within the U.S. program, that the United States will cooperate with other countries only in areas in which they are in a leading position, and that hard bargaining on the part of the United States over equity in technical and financial contributions will be a feature of all negotiations. This is not a posture that is likely to foster a spirit of cooperation. o The goal of the U.S. program, as stated in the CPMP, "...is to develop scientific and technological information required to design and construct magnetic fusion power systems." This goal
81 does not contemplate the development of an industrial base for the fabrication of engineering components or the construction of either a demonstration or prototype power reactor; rather, these tasks are left to industrial initiative. Since the other major fusion nations seem to consider the goal of their programs to be the development of fusion power through the demonstration reactor stage, including engineering component development, there is a possibility that this incompatability of goals could inhibit the development of cooperative agreements. o The Japanese, EC, and USSR program plans in magnetic fusion call for engineering test reactors of roughly similar objectives and characteristics. The devices are designated as Fusion Engineering Reactor (FER) in Japan, Next European Torus (NET) in the EC, and OTR in the USSR. These reactors would be built during the l990s, followed by a demonstration reactor. The U.S. program plan, as contained in the CPMP, also calls for a similar machine, ETR, to be planned during the later l980s. However, recent budgetary constraints have caused planning at the technical level, as of the time of the workshop, to be directed towards a less ambitious next step, TFCX, which embodies the physics of ETR but few of the technological and engineering testing features. A clear policy statement on the goals of the U.S. fusion program and a corresponding firm commitment to meet those goals is a prerequisite for establishing international cooperative projects on a major scale. It was noted that one of the principal reasons for the success of the French Super-Phenix project was a clear national policy that assigned the project high priority, strong technical and industrial support, and adequate financial support. It would be a mistake for the United States to try to compensate for a half-hearted commitment to fusion with increased emphasis on international cooperation. Broader U.S. policy considerations may be at odds with technical opportunities for cooperation: o The USSR has officially proposed the design and construction of the next major tokamak experiment on an international basis and has informally expressed a willingness to see this device sited in Western Europe. Administration policy and Congressional inclinations are negative towards cooperation with the Soviet Union now, but this position could be reversed if East-West relations change. o Japan would probably welcome the opportunity for further cooperation with the United States on engineering component development and major fusion projects. Congress would probably be reluctant to endorse such cooperation because of political sensitivity to Japanese incursions into U.S. markets and the
82 impact of technology transfer upon U.S. technological leadership. o The countries of the EC believe that leadership in magnetic fusion research lies in Europe in the near future and are skeptical of the reliability of the United States as a partner because of past experiences; consequently, the EC presently shows little inclination to cooperate on major new projects. On the other hand, cooperation with EC would probably be acceptable to Congress; and the technology transfer issues would be easier to resolve. The extent of reliance on international cooperation to achieve the objectives of the U.S. magnetic fusion program is a key policy issue. There are two aspects of the issue: o Should the United States rely on cooperation with programs abroad, where they are or may become available, to carry out technology development or to investigate plasma physics questions in areas that are vital to the mainline U.S. program(s)? The past practice has been not to do so, but rather to encourage foreign program leadership in areas considered less vital. This position is quite probably unsatisfactory from the viewpoints of other countries. o Should the United States require early joint planning, in the hope of achieving collaboration with programs at home for major new component test facilities and fusion experiments? It seems more likely that foreign collaboration could be established after a firm commitment to go forward with a project had been made by the United States, although there are good reasons to involve prospective partners in early planning. One compromise on the first point would be to minimize the effects of duplication of effort by phasing related efforts in time among the several partners, rather than asking any partner to forgo an important line of work entirely. In three policy areas conditions on technology transfer arise in the implementation of cooperative projects: national security, protection of the economic interests of U.S. industry, and preservation of advantage to foreign participants from technology developed by them in the face of provisions of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act mandating public access to such information. Implementation and Management Considerations There appear to be many possible methods of implementation of international cooperative arrangements: treaties, Executive agreements, intergovernmental agreements, and bilateral purchase contracts. Treaties establish the most binding commitments of the
83 U.S. government, but they are the most difficult to establish. Intergovernmental agreements are much easier to put into place because they can be negotiated at lower governmental levels, but they are also much less bindingâthey can be unilaterally terminated. The credibility of the United States as a "reliable partner" has been damaged by past unilateral terminations in space sciences, synthetic fuels, and even fusion itself. Existing international organizations offer auspices under which more extensive international cooperation could be carried out without the necessity of new implementing agreements. As previously noted, the IEA is currently serving quite effectively as a mechanism for the participation of several nations in LCTF and TEXTOR. The INTOR workshop under IAEA was also mentioned above. An expansion of such activities under these agencies is reasonable. However, neither IEA nor IAEA, or indeed other existing international organizations, would be suitable as sponsors for a major international project because they all are primarily coordinating, rather than managerial, organizations. Still, an existing international organization may provide a framework for initiating a project, as was the case with the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). CERN was initiated by an organizing conference in l95l, sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in an action that was ratified three years later by enough countries to assure 75 percent of the required funding. CERN went on to become a highly successful institution, with international participation in design and construction of large-scale facilities and in performance of experiments. For fusion the most relevant example of a major international project is JET (JET Joint Undertaking, l982). The project was set up as a Joint Undertaking by the Member States of the EC in l978 (Wilson, l981) under provisions of the l957 Treaty of Rome, which established the EC. Establishment of the Joint Undertaking was preceded by the JET Working Group in l97l and the JET Design Team in l973. Failure in the initial agreement to create a mechanism to decide on the site almost resulted in cancellation of the project in l977. The following aspects of JET management (Commission of the European Communities, undated) are noteworthy in that they combine technical and political elements in the decision-making chain: o The JET Council, assisted by the JET Executive Committee and the JET Scientific Committee, is responsible for the management of the project. The Council meets at least twice a year. o The Commission of the European Communities is responsible for financial decisions to the extent of its 80-percent contribution to the project. o National research organizations provide guidance to the JET Council on technical issues.
84 o The EC Council of Ministers, with the assistance of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, is responsible for political decisions. The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) provides a relevant example of the principle of "phasing in" an international project. Rather than attempting to define a complete set of international agreements at the outset, INTELSAT was established on an interim basis. The agreement specified a time period for a study of the permanent form of the organization but did not set a deadline for the end of the interim arrangements. The permanent INTELSAT agreement, which was concluded six years later, provided for a phased shift from management of its space operations by the United States, as agent, to truly international management. The following features of INTELSAT management are noteworthy as to the combination of technical and political elelents: o The Assembly of Parties, which meets every two years, is composed of all nations party to the Agreement and is primarily concerned with issues of concern to the Parties as sovereign states. The principal representation is provided by foreign ministers. o The Meeting of Signatories, which meets annually, is primarily concerned with financial, technical, and program matters of a general nature. The principal representation is provided by the appropriate technical ministry. o The Board of Governors, which meets at least four times a year, has responsibility for decisions on the design, development, establishment, operation, and maintenance of the international portions of the system. The principal representation is provided by officials concerned in their home countries with the operation and management of the system. o Several advisory groups expert in technical, financial, and planning matters assist the Board. INTELSAT provides an example of finance and control in an international project. Each member's financial interest and voting share on the Board of Governors is strictly proportional to its use of the system, determined on an annual basis; and the member is required to contribute that proportion of the incurred costs. The LCTF provides an example of finance and control in a national project with international participation. The United States funds, constructs, and operates the facility and pays the costs of its own test coils. The other participants pay for their own test coils. An executive committee, with one representative from each participant, decides on the test program. The annual appropriation process makes it difficult for the United States to commit to multiyear projects without the possibility of
85 facing a choice later of either reneging or sacrificing other elements of the fusion program. Another limitation on the implementation of cooperative projects is to be found in conditions on the flow of money between the United States and foreign collaborators. For example, will the United States be willing to contribute money to construct a major facility sited in another country? Finally, emphasis by the United States on equity and quid pro quo in current negotiations may be inimical to creating a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation. To sum up, the success of any international cooperation depends upon the extent to which technical considerations and political requirements can be merged. Although previous experience can provide guidance, the appropriate implementation structure must be specifically designed for the project at hand. SECOND WORKSHOP The agenda for the second workshop is given in Figure 2. Technical and Programmatic Considerations Fusion is viewed in most quarters as a potential energy resource and therefore as a technology that is important to develop. However, there is not a general recognition of a clearly defined goal of the development program. For example, one participant suggested that the world may pass over the fission breeder and go directly from the light water reactor to fusion; but the fusion program does not take such eventualities into account. Without clearly defined program goals, it becomes hard to use international cooperation as an effective means of reaching them. Nevertheless, a recent report of the Magnetic Fusion Advisory Committee included the following brief introduction and summary of findings and recommendations with regard to the qualitative benefits of international cooperation in fusion: Fusion research and development have been characterized for several decades by active international cooperation and exchange of ideas. The U.S. fusion program has benefited significantly from work in other nations: the most striking example of this is the rapid U.S. development of the tokamak concept, originally investigated in the Soviet Union. Other nations' fusion programs have also benefited from U.S. research activities and concepts: for example, the stellarator approach, originally developed in the United States, is now actively pursued in Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. ...The INTOR studies provide an encouraging example of a major multinational advanced design activity....
86 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTEMS Ktahmpon. 0 C XWIi â¢ittee oo International cooperation In Magnetic Fusion WORKSHOP OH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN HAGWETIC FUSION SKCOtff) WORKSHOP Auditorium, Building 543 Lavrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, California Peburary 7-8, 19*4 PURPOSE: TO «xplor« th« opportunititles, policies, and arrangements bearing on a qualitatively higher level of international cooperation in the development of magnetic fusion energy. AGENDA Organised by Daniel B. Simpson Tuesday Morning. February 7 SESSION 1. INTRODUCTION. J. Gavin, Session Chairman Purpoae and Scope of the Horkahop status and Future Needa of the Fusion Program U.S. and foreign Fusion Programa SESSION 2. RELEVANT BXPERIENCS. R. Uhrig, S««sion Oial International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Joint Venture in the Deaign and Ground Testing of the Common Docking System for Apollo-Soyui European Organisation for Nuclear Research International Energy Agency Experience Computers and Semiconductora Joseph Savin Ronald Davidson Kichael Roberta Eric Beckjord Robert White Wolfgang Panofaky Donald Kerr John Manning «â¢"â¢â¢* <<â¢*«» rf font* ../ r»« NfMMl ,«,.«.-, â¢/ r.r.,^», FIGURE 2 Agenda for second workshop.
87 Tuesday Afternoon. February 7 SESSION 3. FUSION COOPERATION EXPEJUJOCB. R- Borchers, SMI ion Chairman Panel on U.S.-International Experience and Lessons L««rn«d in Fusion Cooperation Panel Chairman: R. Borchers imORt H. Stacey Doublet III: J. Gllleland RMS-H: C. Logan PNlTt L. Trego SESSION 4. TECHNICAL PROGRAM GOALS AND PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. 0. Kerr, Seaaion Chairman Fusion Energy Potential, and Goala Technical Prospects, Kenneth Fouler Panel Dlscusaon on Programmatic Objectives, Technical Needs, and Baeee for Cooperation in Plasma Phyaici, Reactor Deslgn and Technology, Materials, and Engineering Donald Kerr, (Panel Chairman), Ronald Davidson, Kenneth Fowler, John Sellars, Donald Steiner Wednesday Morning. February 8 SESSION 5. POLICIES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. J. Hendrie, Sesaion Chairman Panel Discussion on National Policy Objectives, Domestic Considerations, Public Interest and Acceptance, and Long-Term implications of International Fusion Cooperation Joaeph Uendrle, (Panel Chairman), Vincent de Polx, Kelvin Gottlieb. Richard Grant, Charlea Newstead, Jan Roos, Gerald Tape SESSION 6. MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION. H. Muntzing, Session Chairman Harold Bengelsdorf Organization and Implementation of International Cooperative Agreementa Panel Discussion on Government and Industry Roles, Constralnts, and Objectives for Implementing Progra International Cooperation M. Muntzing, (Panel Chairman), Eric of Beckjord, Harold Bengelsdorf, Harvey Brush, Dvain Spencer FIGURE 2 Agenda for second workshop (continued).
88 SKSSIOH 7. SUMMKr. D. Slapaon, S«»«ion Ch«ir»«n Suaaary Conclusions and R«uck« Invited Participants Fusion Laboratory Tour for Invited Participants Coamitt** IMctlng: Kay Conclusion! and Robert Ubrig, Donald ItoBarks. K«rr, Mobert Borchen, Joaaph Handrle, Manning Muntxing Fuslon laboratory Tour for CoaBlttee FIGURE 2 Agenda for second workshop (continued).
89 o The U.S. fusion program and the development of fusion on a worldwide basis have been benefited significantly from the active exchange of information and ideas. International cooperation in fusion research should continue to receive strong emphasis in the U.S. program. o The planning of national fusion facilities and programs has been guided to a considerable extent by a policy of avoiding international duplication and instead addressing complementary technical issues. This policy is both cost-effective and conducive to rapid technical development. It encourages broader coverage of options in the area of alternate concepts and allows larger steps to be taken in the mainline approaches within existing budgetary constraints. o While maximum effective use should be made of research facilities abroad, to supplement U.S. capabilities, the overall priorities of the U.S. program should continue to emphasize the most promising reactor approaches. o The international fusion effort will benefit from increased consultation in program planning and from the initiation of coordinatedâor even jointly supportedâresearch projects. âMagnetic Fusion Advisory Committee, l983 At the time of the workshop TFCX was identified as the critical near-term project in the U.S. program, which should not be delayed for reasons of international cooperation. A representative of the Office of Fusion Energy, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), described the proposed TFCX as the "entry into the age of fusion power" but occurring in the "age of budget deficits." He said that the Secretary of Energy appeared sympathetic to TFCX, but required an answer to the basic question: Should this be a national U.S. project or should it be international? One participant advocated the following direction for the U.S. programs, including major initiatives in both tokamak and mirror fusion: o The United States should position itself to lead an international effort in the l990s by proceeding with TFCX. o The U.S. fusion program should position itself to meet an energy crisis by l990 by proceeding with TFCX and also a mirror device, complementary to TFCX, to test power-system components. o The U.S. fusion programs should not rely on international cooperation now, but should be initiating steps toward expanded international cooperation, principally in technology development projects of moderate scope. A number of workshop panelists emphasized the importance, to U.S. energy needs and technological leadership, of maintaining national control of program scope and direction, with opportunity for international partners to contribute but not to select just the most
90 attractive areas of research and development. No compelling technical reasons foe international cooperation were established, in the sense that competence missing in the United States might be joined with such competence existing elsewhere to accomplish what otherwise could not be done. Nevertheless, technology development takes longer than expected and contributions can come from unexpected sources. Hence, fusion hardware development should be internationally coordinatedâa step beyond past (successful) information and personnel exchange programs. It was suggested that national programs might progress by "half-steps," with successive (national) projects "leapfrogging" their foreign predecessors. It was noted that this course is essentially competitive rather than cooperative in that at any particular moment one group will be "ahead." The following dilemma faces the advocates of specific cooperative projects: on the one hand, the United States should establish its objectives and requirements for an activity before deciding what to offer for international participation; but, on the other hand, potential international partners should be regarded as equals, with full participation in setting cooperative program objectives as well as scope. Because of the long lead time for major fusion facilities and the commitment of resources to them well in advance, it may be hard to influence the upcoming generation of large tokamaks. Thus it may remain to focus joint planning on the generation after next. Examples of International Cooperation in Fusion and Other Technologies A few specific examples of international cooperation in magnetic fusion were described. One, FMIT, was under serious discussion at the time of the workshop but is so far lacking agreement on joint participation. Other projects, already carried out, have been successful. Although these projects encountered difficulties and delays similar to cooperative efforts in other fields, there was general agreement that there were net benefits to the participating partners. Successful international cooperation in other technologies were also reported. Most of these efforts have been of rather specific scope and purpose, and they include large projects as well as small ones. In most examples, the partners contributed specified' tasks and hardware. Some examples, notably CERN, have succeeded when the international partners contributed specified cash payments to the international project. All speakers reported on difficulties and delays in communication and agreement. An international project is more difficult and time-consuming than a purely national effortâone speaker guessed by a factor of two. Although there may be common themes in these prior examples there is no formula that guarantees success. Nevertheless, we can improve
91 the probability of success by adapting some of their best features and avoiding some of their pitfalls. International Cooperation in Nuclear Fission There are three levels where international cooperation in nuclear fission has been undertaken: Information Exchanges Generally, information exchanges were successful if commercial consideration and licensing information were not involved. Overall, the United States has judged that it got less than it gave in dealing wtih other countries; but the exchanges have proceeded anyhow. Small- to Medium-Sized Projects Often small or medium projects are part of a larger project that has been "sold" to other nations. These arrangements usually turn out to be beneficial to both parties in that they make more funds available for more work or they cut costs for the individual participants. Even so, the total cost of the project with multinational involvement is generally greater than if only a single nation is involved because of the time required for coordination. The successful programs have involved a clear program definition as well as a clearly defined scope for all the parties involved. Large Projects Large projects are generally difficult to implement. They need a "lead" country, the classic example being the Super-Phenix, in which France is the lead partner and all other partners play lesser roles. The reason is that consensus management generally does not work in the technical field. The economic impacts on an individual country can be significant. The challenge of such international cooperation on large projects is to develop a strategy that can make the best of opportunities and overcome the difficulties. The U.S.-USSR Apollo-Soyuz Docking Mission There is little direct applicability to the fusion program of the international cooperation between the United States and the USSR in the Apollo-Soyuz spacecraft docking mission. The Apollo-Soyuz mission was a symbolic gesture of scientific cooperation to serve political objectives. Each party paid its own way. The overriding consideration was that both parties wanted the mission to succeed and they found a reason, namely, the potential rescue of astronauts, for proceeding. However, the following programatic details involved in
92 this mission may be useful examples for future international cooperative efforts of a highly specific nature: o The method of operation was documented before the program began. o The project was managed by a technical project director. o Each working group was cochaired by joint chairpersons, one from each country. o Plans for the organization of the project established the documentation standards. o Interacting Equipment Documents documented the technical requirements and were signed by the joint chairpersons as well as the technical directors, and copies were sent to all official files and all groups. o Proposed changes were submitted on appropriate forms; there was no bypassing this procedure. o Material for meetings was sent one month in advance. o Telecommunications were sent between the parties every two weeks. o Translations were reverified after each meeting and differences were reconciled. o The parties agreed to use a common system of units, namely the International System of Units (commonly known by its French acronym SI), with only a couple of specific agreed-upon exceptions. European Organization for Nuclear Research The European Organization for Nuclear Research is a successful cooperative scientific organization, but its experience may not be relevant to fusion power development. The sole objective of CERN is the advancement of pure knowledge. There are few patent rights involved, there is no potential military or commercial application, and the transfer of "sensitive" technology usually is not a problem. Even so, along the way CERN has developed a number of tools that have been of economic value. Probably because of its success, CERN has eroded its original "base of the pyramid" concept for high-energy physics in Europe, in which each country was to provide its own "base" program with CERN functioning only as the apex of the pyramid. Instead, CERN attracted the best West European scientists and attracted most of the available money for large accelerator projects in the individual Member States. As a result, CERN's research tools are second to none in the world. CERN is governed by its Council, which has two representatives from each countryâone an administrative or political representative and the other a scientific specialist. The financing of the organization is through a percentage of gross national product of each country, with a cap of 25 percent of CERN's budget on the contributions of any country. The Council gives a stability to the organization, but it constitutes an inertia that is hard to overcome to take advantage of
93 dynamic developing situations. One especially important matter is that there are no preestablished "national rights" for members; that is, no country is guaranteed any particular position for its representative, any specified share of procurements, or any priority as to its projects within CERN. The programs of CERN, the United States, and the USSR in high-energy physics have generally been complementary, or at least confirmatory in nature. Nevertheless, systematic international planning might have avoided some of the parallelisms, such as the similarity between the Brookhaven and the CERN Alternating Gradient Synchrotrons and the electron-positron storage rings of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and the German Electron Synchrotron, DESY. The International Committee on Future Accelerators tends to deal with the "generation-after-next" accelerators because the selection of the next accelerator is too sensitive to deal with in an international committee. In particular, the 20 teraelectronvolt x 20 teraelectronvolt proton-proton collider proposed by the United States may have to become an international project if it is to attract firm commitment. International Energy Agency Another example of international cooperation, the International Energy Agency, was formed in l974 after the oil crisis of that period. The overriding purpose of IEA was to deal with oil shortages through allocations to the various nations. The cooperative research and development program of IEA in energy was initiated to make some of the other activities palatable for the nations involved. At the present time, IEA is spending about $500 million per year on 40 projects, down from a peak of 50 projects a couple of years ago. The governing board is made up of representatives at the ministerial level from the member countries. The U.S. representative is the Secretary of Energy. The management board is made up of representatives from the research and development establishments of the various member countries. For the United States this representative is the Director of the international Division of the Department of Energy. The Research and Development Committee of IEA, composed mostly of government research and development leaders from the participating nations, decides what research and development projects will be funded. IEA specifically excludes any research and development in nuclear energy because that is covered by the Nuclear Energy Agency. Projects are carried out by various member countries and often involve bilateral or multilateral agreements among them. IEA serves the role of a research and development broker through the implementation of the IEA agreement. IEA is often involved in topical studies and technological assessment.
94 The IEA agreements specify the lead organization, and the countries involved in the reports provide a basis for overall management of the projects. The whole organization has fewer than l00 people, and it draws about one third of it support from the United States. IEA has been in operation for a number of years and has a good research and development record. However, the unfortunate experience with the Synthetic Refined Coal-2 project (commonly known as SRC-2) seriously hurt the image of the United States as a reliable partner in IEA work. International Industrial Cooperation There are a number of private companies operating internationally with experience that may be relevant as industry becomes more involved in fusion and as fusion ultimately approaches commercialization. International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) is such a company, and some of its policies were explained. IBM has manufacturing facilities and laboratories in l8 countries; each foreign laboratory is under the control of a counterpart U.S. laboratory. The corporation markets and services equipment in most countries of the world and tries to manufacture equipment in the region where it is used. IBM owns patents and leases the rights to these patents to the subsidiary laboratory (for instance, IBM-Japan). The firm also licenses patents to others under certain restricted circumstances. The corporation shares technology at the laboratory level and through publications, but it takes the necessary steps to protect its intellectual property rights. The corporation uses marketing agents (both governmental and nongovernmental) in foreign countries but it retains control of the technology. IBM will withdraw from any country that demands equity in a subsidiary or access to technology as a condition for operation. Policy Considerations There was a general acknowledgment that international cooperation in the development of magnetic fusion is certainly desirable and probably necessary. This view arose from a balancing of the probable gains and losses related to the policy considerations brought out in the workshop. However, there was a wide dispersion of views as to how extensive cooperation should be and to what extent it should influence U.S. programs as well as policies. This divergence clearly reflected different evaluations of the balance of gains and losses. For example, one person argued for international cooperation on the smaller steps, although reserving U.S. leadership for TFCX. Another argued that the United States should concentrate on only U.S.-funded projects until a decision point around l990, when international projects would again be considered. The experts should do more homework and conduct more discussion on specific alternative research
95 and development plans in order to establish a clear strategy and objectives for international cooperation. One cannot make decisions until these points are resolved. It was proposed that an implementation plan, more specific than the CPMP, is needed to guide the U.S. program. Such a plan would identify the goals and milestones needed to satisfy the national interest. The plan would guide the development of the industrial base for a magnetic fusion power program and would provide the means of evaluating the best opportunities for international cooperation. The plan should have a sound technological basis and should provide a clear statement of U.S. policies in some detail. Questions such as when we should aim to have a viable fusion power capability, what it will replace, and at what cost it is likely to be economical should be covered to the extent practical. One view was that there is no urgency for fusion power plants or fusion-fission hybrid facilities in the early 2lst century. Thus, the appropriate research and development pace is consistent with emphasis on an international cooperative programs. Workshop participants thought that some key decisions on budget and program direction would have to be made soon. For example, at the time of the workshop, proposals for TFCX were being formed. Accordingly, it seemed that decisions were needed on the technical scope of the machine and whether it is to be proposed solely a U.S. project or as a joint venture with others. Then, it seemed necessary to face hard questions of how to accommodate another major fusion machine within prospective budgets. It seemed unlikely that all of the current U.S. work can be continued if TFCX were to be built by the United States alone. Even with some of the costs shared by others, the U.S. part would be a major project. International cooperation should enlarge the potential benefits; consequently, barriers and difficulties may diminish. Cooperative programs should be developed from open discussions of options for accomplishing mutual objectives. The cooperating parties need to have real contributions to offer and real benefits to obtain. International collaboration, in the sense of working actively together as approximately equal partners in sizeable enterprises, as distinct from cooperation, in the sense of acting with others for mutual benefit on a small scale, is already vital to some U.S. industry. International cooperation in fusion should continue, with assurance of benefits to U.S. industry. Component and equipment industries should be close to the program because ultimately, the best developed industry will dominate. Program planning should consider how to hold industry attention for the long term. The policy panel of the workshop thought that national industrial policy issues, in connection with both national security and the capture of economic benefits, and technology transfer issues would become increasingly difficult as magnetic fusion development moves toward engineering tests and utilization technology development. U.S. magnetic fusion research, carried out in national laboratories, is as open to foreign businesses as to U.S. firms. This openness does not exist abroad,
96 where much research is considered proprietary. As magnetic fusion work leads toward commercial utilization, foreign firms are likely to have more government support in terms of sales assistance and financing terms than U.S. business, to judge by present practices in the nuclear, electronic, and military equipment fields. Pressures to collaborate internationally on fusion matters are growing. The key motivating factor concerns finances resulting in cost-sharing concepts being pursued. Such international cooperation should not be deemed a threat to domestic programs but rather a reinforcement of national efforts. It was acknowledged, however, that it is often hard to get commitments for international activities for more than three to four years; but, even if so limited, international cooperation can be helpful to all participants. The meetings following the Summit of Industrialized Nations at Versailles in l982 and Williamsburg in l983 offer an opportunity for international cooperation in magnetic fusion development that may not easily be created again. These meetings, under the thrust of the political initiative from the Heads of State, have determined that the IEA would provide the institutional basis for cooperative fusion program efforts. Specific programs have not yet been discussed, so the time is ripe for presenting initial proposals for cooperation, including joint projects. There was concern in the workshop that uncertainty and argument, in the U.S. fusion community, over the proper next steps might make it difficult to seize the opportunity offered by the Summit initiative. One speaker held a pessimistic view of fusion as an electric power source. He suggested that the threshold for utility acceptance and use of fusion for power production would be much greater than was the threshold for fission power. Therefore, a much more complete scientific and engineering basis would be necessary to convince utilities to use fusion power. However, this objective could be achieved through international cooperation in science, engineering, safety reviews, and concept selection. Although the speaker thought there was no urgency for fusion power, he concluded that international cooperation would, when the time comes, greatly assist in the process of convincing electric utilities to adopt fusion power. The workshop was also reminded of the need for the eventual public acceptance of fusion and the role of public information about it. From the point of view of national security, major fusion projects with the USSR are not considered feasible; a joint U.S.-EC-Japan framework may be best. It was thought not constructive to negotiate too cleverly, to the disadvantage of a partner; such a policy will create a powerful competitor in time. Implementation and Management Considerations Various approaches to international cooperation are possible including bilateral, multinational, and international agreements. One
97 possibility is to use the IEA, which is established and has experience behind it, although some of its management concepts may be difficult to work with. Regardless of which approach is used, an essential ingredient is to have strong political support from the nation's leaders to set the tone for international cooperation. This solidarity is hard to achieve in the United States because of different points of view between the Administration and Congress. International cooperation involving the United States must take into account these difficulties and accommodate them so that the United States is not deemed to be an unreliable partner. Technological developments usually take longer than projected and opinions change as to when major achievements have been reached. Therefore, it is difficult to hold the attention of industry for three to four decades, which may be the time required for fusion technology. This fact makes international cooperation difficult. Nevertheless, the participation of industry is an important aspect of fusion development, both as a matter of policy and in implementation of policy. Industry must determine how it can learn the technology as well as contribute it to the long time frames that are expected. The relationships between an international board of directors and the project manager are crucial to the success of a project. If both are weak, then the international effort will be a disaster. A strong project manager and a weak board can work together successfully in good times. A strong board and a strong project manager may produce a success but at the same time have conflict potential. In the case of a strong board and a weak manager, the manager will have to go, and quickly. In any case the cooperative project must be managed at the technical level, although policies may be set at the political level. Overall, the workshop panel members concluded that international cooperation in fusion can work and, in fact, has worked. Panel members encouraged further cooperative efforts. However, it is important to understand the views of potential partners so that agreement is reached through mutual understanding and discussions. For management and implementation of the program to be effective, there are several significant essentials: o The political process must be reliable and perceived to be so. o The national scientific community must have something to offer, and it will expect to get something in return. o Industry must be brought into the process at an early date, and problems such as the current utility structure must be considered from the beginning. On the assumption that the United States will undertake more international cooperation in fusion, the fusion community should develop some basic priciples for negotiating the agreements. Four points come to mind from the workshop discussions:
98 o The basic motive is national self-interest, providing and receiving scientific and technical resources in order to achieve an earlier return on the resource expenditure than would otherwise be possible. o The agreements should provide for a workable system of management and decision making to get the project done on time. o The effort should call on U.S. industry as well as the fusion research community to the greatest extent possible. o The agreements should provide for licensing and technology transfer between the partners, such that U.S. industry will have access at a reasonable price to elements of technology provided by partners but not duplicated by U.S. industry under the agreements. The formulation of a set of negotiating principles would be an appropriate task for a group of key people representing industry, laboratories, and universities to advise the Secretary of Energy. The work of this group should also be made available to the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, officials of the Department of State, and others who will have a voice in what international cooperation is actually proposed and undertaken. The subject is important enough to receive top level attention.
