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APPENDIX C SUMMARY OF TRIP TO JAPAN Five members of the Committee on International Cooperation in Magnetic Fusion, of the Energy Engineering Board of the National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences, visited several magnetic fusion organizations in Japan from April 9-l4, l984. The group consisted of Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., chairman of the committee; Robert R. Borchers, Melvin B. Gottlieb, Weston M. Stacey, Jr., and Robert E. Uhrig, all members of the committee; and Dennis F. Miller and John M. Richardson, of the committee staff. The group met in Tokyo with officials of the Science and Technology Agency; the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture; the Ministry of International Trade and Industry; the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute; the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum; and the Nuclear Fusion Council of the Atomic Energy Commission. The group also conferred with officials at laboratories of the Japan Atomic Energy Reseach Institute at both Tokai and Naka-Machi, the Electrotechnical Laboratory and University of Tsukuba at Tsukuba, and the Institute of Plasma Physics of Nagoya University at Nagoya. Altogether, about 50 individuals participated in the various meetings. The itinerary is shown in Figure l. PURPOSE AND ROLE The purpose of the trip was to exchange preliminary views on the advantages and disadvantages of a greater level of international cooperation in magnetic fusion development. The committee wished to explore the technical needs and opportunities for international cooperation, the benefits that might flow to the cooperating countries, and the broad nature of the arrangements under which cooperation might be conducted. The primary goal was to assess the probability of cooperation on the "next big machine" and to find out how such international cooperation might be brought about. The role of the travelers was to exchange views and to gather information as informally as possible. The committee had no authority to speak or act for the U.S. Government. The function of the committee was purely advisory. 99
l00 INIRCI t<iC[Slt NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMISSION' ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTEMS :iUl Coowtution *.«""« »v»h.n«io<i D C 3MU JAPANESE ITINERARY FOR TRAVELERS FROM COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN MAGNETIC FUSION Monday, April 9 Meeting with Mr. B. 0. Hill and Mr. T. Okubo, Emoassy of the United States, Tokyo Meeting with Mr. H. Amemura, Deputy Director-General, Atomic Energy Bureau, Science and Technology Agency, Tokyo Courtesy call on Mr. T. Fujinaau, President, Japan Atonic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), followed oy discussions with Drs. S. Mori, Y. Iso, and other key fusion officials, at JAERI headquarters, Tokyo Tuesday, April 10 Meeting with Mr. I. Kawano, Director, Research-Aid Division, International Science Bureau, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Tokyo Meeting with Dr. M. Kawata, Director-General, Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, Ministry of International Traoe and Industry, Tokyo Meeting with Members of Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Fusion Committee, representing Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, and Tokyo Electric Power Company, at Tokai University Club, Tokyo Wednesday, April 11 Briefing of JAERI Fusion Activities by Dr. K. Kudo, Deputy Director of Tokai Research Establishment visit to JFT-2M Facilities, Tokai Visit to JAERI Fusion Research Center, Naka-Nachi and briefing of the JT-60 Activities by Dr. Y. Iso, Director General Tour of JT-60 Facilities Reception hosted by JAERI, Mito *n*f MWv 0i !*t WiwijI «. jj*^» -<' >t*r*ttt JtJ ffcf -.â¢i,.--*. «...*.-. -« E*fmrr*if tfrff , 'i "i-r^ i*t Mrntr -:s⢠r> â¢> FIGURE 3 Japanese itinerary.
l0l Thursday, April 12 Meeting with Dr. M. Sugiura, Chief, Energy Division, Electrotechnical Laboratory, Tsukuba Courtesy call on Dr. N. Fukuda, President, University of Tsukuoa, Tsukuba Visit to Plasma Research Center, University of Tsukuba, Dr. S. Miyoshi, Director, Tsukuba Friday, April 13 Meeting with Dr. T. Uchida, Director, Plasma Physics Laooratory, Nagoya University, Nagoya Saturday, April 14 Meeting with Dr. H. Kakihana (Former Director, Plasma Pnysics Laboratory, Nagoya University) and Dr. T. Miyajima, Chairman, Nuclear Fusion Council, Japan Atomic Energy Commission, at JAERI Headquarters, Tokyo FIGURE 3 Japanese itinerary (continued).
l02 SOME BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES Japan appeared to have a firmer, more consistent government energy policy deriving from its lack of natural resources. We were told that Japan intends to be successful wtih the light water reactor, the fast breeder reactor, and eventually the fusion reactor. The Japanese approach to the development of fusion contemplates only one device, the Fusion Experimental Reactor (FER), between JT-60 and a fusion power demonstration reactor (DEMO). By contrast, the United States contemplates two steps beyond its Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) before a demonstration reactor. The Japanese seem to have more direct industrial consulation and participation in the fusion program than the United States. Japan's electric utilities are more centralized and appear to be more financially sound than those of the United States. There are also well known basic cultural differencesâlanguage, numbers of people involved in decision making, and differences in security requirements. There is a noteworthy incompatibility between the U.S. and Japanese approaches to large national research programs. The Japanese have an elaborate research coordinating structure within their government that brings to bear all aspects and views of a proposed research program. Decisions are reached by consensus, which involves compromise after all views are expressed. The process is called the "bottom-up" approach to decision making. As a result, there is great difficulty in changing a program, once approved. Rather, the emphasis then shifts to doing the agreed job as well as possible. In contrast, the United States uses a "top-down" approach, in which decisions are made by "top-level advisory committees," government administrators, and Congress with relatively little technical input. The U.S. emphasis is often on diversity of effort with a view to taking advantage of new developments. This difference in approaches, in our opinion, need not be resolved; but it must be taken into account in all efforts to achieve cooperation wtih the Japanese. Both approaches have merit and every effort should be directed towards bringing the best of each approach to bear in the proposed joint efforts. Perhaps some middle ground between U.S. fluidity and Japanese rigidity would be best. Although it is clear that actual cooperation can come only after agreement at the highest levels, such action is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. The program of university research conducted by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (Monbusho, after its Japanese acronym) seems less closely integrated with the program goals of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and the Science and Technology Agency (STA) than the counterpart U.S. programs.
l03 THE FUSION PROGRAM OF JAPAN Large Facilities The current Japanese program is based on a l975 decision to build the tokamak device, JT-60, as a national project carrying the highest priority. This policy was expanded in l98l by a recommendation of the Nuclear Fusion Council, which was adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission in l982. The program called for development work by JAERI under STA, leading toward a tokamak reactor, and basic reseach, including small-scale work on alternate approaches, at the universities and National Laboratories under Monbusho. The dividing lines between the two segments are not entirely clear. The STA-JAERI program is focussed on developing the tokamak concept to the commercial stage in a sequence of experiments (JT-60 to FER to DEMO) and supporting technology development activities. At present, the primary emphasis in the program is on completion of JT-60 (Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, l982). The Naka site of JT-60 will also accommodate the FER. The purpose of FER is not only to demonstrate plasma ignition and burning, but also to provide a facility for testing and demonstrating fusion technology. The current JAERI plan is to construct FER on the Naka site, with a decision in the late l980s, after JT-60 results are evaluated, to initiate construction. Officials at STA and the Science Council expressed a less firm commitment to FER, noting that the plan was made three years ago in a different financial climate. The STA-JAERI program accounted in 198l for over 77 percent of the budget. JT-60 expenditures in l98l constituted 80 percent of the JAERI expenditures. The JT-60 is now at about 85-percent completion, with first plasma expected in about one year and completion of the heating systems about a year later. The total cost will be over $l billion. All components are being thoroughly tested. Expenditures will be high but decreasing during l985 and l986, freeing up some funds for the development work scheduled for FER. The cost of FER is anticipated to be about $2 billion plus about $0.7 billion for development. The general impression of the committee is that the Japanese have a strong and well planned applied research program in nuclear fusionâmuch stronger than many committee members expected to find. The JT-60 is clearly in the same "generation" as the TFTR at Princeton even though it will operate with hydrogen only. The "on time-within specification" construction of JT-60 is impressive. The back-up test and development facilities lend credibility to the optimism of the Japanese regarding their ability to design, build, and operate their next big test facility, FER.
l04 Small Facilities The Monbusho university program in basic research is built around a variety of small- to intermediate-scale experiments at several locations (Uchida, l983). GAMMA-l0 tandem mirror at Tsukuba, Heliotron E stellarator at Kyoto, and JIPPT tokaroak and NBT bumpy torus at Nagoya are the largest. The Institute of Plasma Physics (IPP) at Nagoya has proposed to .build a larger reacting plasma tokomak and is using this proposal as justification for acquiring a new site. Larger tandem mirror, heliotron, and laser fusion experiments have been proposed. It is generally acknowledged that only one of these will be approved because of financial constraints. The Monbusho program on alternative confinement concepts is active and productive. It is anticipated that an intermediate-sized device costing about $200 million will be authorized within the next year or two. Apparently there is a tacit agreement that any new alternate concept magnetic confinement experiment will be located at IPP. The Monbusho program accounted in l98l for 22 percent of the budget, about a third of which was allocated to the inertial confinement program at Osaka University. None of these figures includes personnel costs, which are separately funded. STA also supports a reversed-field pinch experiment at the Electrotechnical Laboratory (ETL). Most of these machines are more recent versions of similar U.S. devices. They benefit signficantly from the U.S. experience, the availability of better instrumentation and computers, and the traditional Japanese attention to detail and quality workmanship. Some of these facilities have supercomputers (Fujitsu Falcom-l00, which is comparable to the Cray-l computer in the United States) available for analysis and data processing. Particularly noteworthy among the development efforts is the work on superconducting coils conducted at JAERI and ETL. Cooperation on research at the university and national-laboratory level (generally charcterized as pure science) with unrestricted publication of results and international exchange of scientific information is a democratic tradition that has served both Japan and the United States well over the years. Exchanges of personnel between laboratories (especially postdoctoral fellows) have enhanced this traditional mode of international cooperation. While smaller-scale cooperation of this sort is useful, it was not the main thrust of our visit to Japan. Key Groups and Attitudes in the Japanese Fusion Effort JAERI clearly has the intiative in Japan's large-scale fusion development. The Nuclear Fusion Council of the Atomic Energy Commission seems supportive of the JAERI program. STA seems to be the government agency with the greatest responsibility for large-scale fusion.
l05 Monbusho is not closely connected to the mainline effort. Its role in fusion is to support basic science and promising alternative fusion concepts in the universities. Officials at Honbusho disclaimed any responsibility for international collaboration in fusion development. No expansion in collaboration with the United States at the university level is foreseen because of flat budgets. As of April l, l984, the Monbusho fusion program was transferred from the Research Aid Division to the Applications Division; this transfer implies that fusion research is firmly established in Monbusho, comparable to other macroseiences, such as space science and high-energy physics. The process by which university fusion research results move toward application and commercialization was not clearly brought out. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is watching fusion development with interest, but does not yet seem to be a dominant force. A generally positive attitude about international cooperation was expressed by ministry officials (STA, Monbusho, and MITI), by fusion program leaders (JAERI, ETL, IPP, and University of Tsukuba) and by influential advisors (Nuclear Fusion Council), albeit with different emphasis: o STA officials seemed to be favorably disposed because of Japanese financial constraints. o Monbusho officials endorsed the principle but were apparently concerned about the impact on their budget. o MITI officials were noncommital. o JAERI leaders were positive, probably because of their awareness of both financial constraints and technical benefits, but emphasized that coooperative activities must fit into their own program. o IPP leaders were noncommital and were apparently concerned that major cooperation together with a contrained Japanese budget might adversely affect their program. o Nuclear Fusion Council members indicated that international cooperation must play a larger role than they had previously thought, presumably because of Japanese financial constraints. The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) represents industry's interests in fusion (Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, l983). Industry is actively involved as supplier of experimental equipment and exhibited great interest in acquiring and protecting fusion "know-how." Industry representatives of JAIF expressed a generally negative attitude on international cooperation, an attitude which seemed to be motivated primarily by their desire to supply the Japanese effort themselves. This group did not appear to be concerned that Japanese financial constraints may reduce the size of that effort or stretch out the period over which it is distributed. These representatives also indicated that Japan should not rely on any other country for the development of any technology that is critical. One
l06 form of collaboration proposed by JAIF was to let Japanese vendors supply components for U.S. fusion experiments. A concern about the reliability of the United States as a partner in international collaborative ventures was forcefully expressed by almost all groups. Volatility and instability in U.S. policy and inadequate planning and erratic changes in direction at the fusion program management level were cited as major concerns, under the polite term of "flexibility." It was made clear that the strongest possible implementing agreement, perhaps a treaty, would be necessary if the Japanese were to undertake a major collaboration with the United States. In discussions with the JAERI program leaders a distinction was drawn between collaboration and cooperation. JAERI officials defined collaboration as each partner contributing about 50 percent (in a bilateral undertaking) and having a proportional voice in the decisions about objectives, design features, and so forth. Alternatively, cooperation was defined as one partner contributing about l0 percent towards the cost of the other partner's experiment in return for the opportunity to make some input to these decisions. Under this view, collaboration on a major project must start with joint formulation of the objectives, schedule, design features, and so forth. Under the other view, one country may appropriately ask another country to cooperate in a project which the former has defined, provided that the latter country is given the opportunity to make input to the final project definition. The Japanese emphasized that a decision to cooperate on a particular activity must be developed "from the bottom up" in their system. This practice means that the activity must make technical and programmatic sense to everyone involved. As if to illustrate the point, our discussions about international collaboration went much better at the level of working scientists, who knew each other and were comfortable in mutual discussion, than at the level of ministry administrators, who were generally noncommittal. If nuclear fusion were anywhere near the application stage, we doubt that there would be any Japanese interest at all in cooperating with the United States or anyone else. However, the practical or commercial application of nuclear fusion is decades away, and the total development costs may run into tens of billions of dollars. Under these circumstances it is hard for anyone to be against international cooperation in fusion research, especially since federal funding of nuclear fusion research seems to have stabilized in both the United States and Japan. Program administrators see international cooperation as a means of conserving scarce resources. Scientists see cooperation as a means of expanding or accelerating their program. In the real world, international cooperation may actually slow down a project and increase the total cost beyound what it would have been for one country. All groups with which we spoke endorsed international collaboration in principle as desirable or necessary for technical progress, risk
l07 sharing, and cost sharing. International collaboration is more important to Japan now than it was three years ago. Japan and the United States should think seriously about how to cause collaboration to come about. However, there may be a perception that the United States is interested in collaboration only because it cannot raise the needed funds alone. The converse perception may also be true about Japan. Specific proposals must be examined before specific commitments to international collaboration can be made. There was general agreement among the Japanese that it would be useful to start discussions in the near future regarding possible major cooperative efforts. Achieving international collaboration will take time. Ideally, discussions would begin in l985, after JT-60 operating results are available and when a better idea of the post-JT-60 machine has been formulated. The ultimate commercialization goal need not preclude collaboration at the research and development level. There seemed to be no explicit indication of any national "race" to develop fusion, or strategies to run the race, or concern for the benefits of winning and the penalties of losing. There seemed to be a preference for bilateral collaboration over multilateral because of the added complexity of the latter. Multilateral collaboration was thought to be harder on a big machine than on a technology test project. However, a case-by-case determination was thought necessary. There is reasonable possibility of planning a big (bilateral) effort with a satisfactory division of tasks. However, careful planning is needed because mistakes will be costly. It will be hard to include the Soviet Union. COLLABORATION ON MAJOR FUSION PROJECTS International cooperation must not impair the national programs. Extensive collaborative projects will have to satisfy the national programmatic objectives of the participating nations. Less extensive cooperative programs can be conducted at the margins of the national programs. For purposes of discussing a specific possibility of collaboration, committee members introduced the subject of the Tokamak Fusion Core Experiment (TFCX), which, at the time of the trip, had been proposed in the United States. There seemed to be more real interest in collaborating on major fusion projects (like TFCX and FER) than on technological test facilities (like large coils, blankets, and tritium processing). The Japanese have set up cooperative programs with both the European Community and the United States that form important components of the Japanese planning. Japanese officials would certainly like to continue and to expand such activities, although there are some problems of implementation. An important area of discussion was whether this cooperation could be extended to collaboration on large devices, a particular example being TFCX. The
l08 JAERI leaders believe that, even at a constant budget level, it might be possible to build FER on a unilateral basis. The FER would be a considerably more ambitious project than TFCX. The Japanese technical leaders have a uniformly negative view about an experiment with only plasma physics objectives, such as some TFCX options, as an appropriate next-step experiment. They believe that engineering and technology objectives must have a major role in their next-step experiment. The view was expressed by JAERI program leaders that TFCX is seen as a U.S. solution to a U.S. situationâTFTR is operating and there is a need to move ahead towards the next step to maintain momentum, but the budget is constrained. Hence, TFCX, with the promise of early results, was seen as a good U.S. tactic. The Japanese believe that an experiment with more ambitious engineering and technology objectives would be appropriate for international collaboration. The JAERI program leaders made it clear that it would be inappropriate for the United States to ask Japan to collaborate on TFCX in the large-scale sense defined in the preceding section. They left open the possibility of cooperation, implying a more modest undertaking. A possible joint TFCX-FER program emerged from discussions with JAERI leaders: o Japan would cooperate with the United States on TFCX by accepting U.S. design and contributing certain Japanese-made components. Japanese interest here is limited to component technologies relevant to FER. JAERI leaders would consider this work as part of their own technology development program. Although the magnitude of the Japanese contribution was not explicitly discussed, there was a distinct impression that a figure of l0 percent or less was meant. o The United States would reciprocate by cooperating, in the above sense, on FER. o Japan and the United States would cooperate on their respective technology development programs in support of FER. The JAERI leaders feel that it would be possible for either side to obtain technical benefit from a collaborative project located in another country, but not without inconvenience. Experience in fabrication could be equitably shared by a balanced procurement program. Construction and operating experience could be obtained by long-term assignment of personnel. A number of problem areas that would be associated with a collaborative project were identifiedâpatents, different budget mechanisms and fiscal years, difficulty in controlling delays, personnel policies, and so forth. Cost-sharing on TFCX at any appreciable level might impede the FER and thus delay Japanese progress toward a tokamak reactor unless there were some high-level agreement between Japan and the United States that would increase Japan's budget by the amount needed for its work on TFCX. It was also suggested at one point that international
l09 collaboration on TFCX could well convert it to a more ambitious (and more expensive) project. The idea put forth by the Japanese that their cooperation might take the form of delivering components for the next big U.S. fusion machine, provided that the experience gained would enhance their ability to manufacture components for their next big machine, is a clear advantage for them (and a potential disadvantage for the United States in the long run). This arrangement would allow the Japanese to develop the manufacturing capability that assures that they alone would posess the ability to advance the next generation of machines. In exchange, they would expect to receive the tritium-handling and other technology we have developed. Given the poor U.S. performance on the Large Coil Test Facility (LCTF), this proposal may be the best we can hope for in cooperative efforts. Officials at MITI noted that collaboration can occur on smaller projects as well. Small-scale collaboration can be a precursor to large-scale. COOPERATION ON BASIC RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY, AND ALTERNATIVE CONFINEMENT CONCEPTS The U.S.-Japan joint agreement for cooperation in fusion appears to be an adequate mechanism for establishing further cooperative activities in basic science and technology and in research on alternative confinement concepts. One university group would appreciate a recommendation from the committee to increase collaboration at the university level. Cooperation under the joint agreement over the past few years appears, on the whole, to be viewed by the Japanese as successful. However, several complaints arose in the discussions: o The U.S. centers for some of the activities are located in areas that are difficult to reach and difficult of access because of security requirements (for example, Sandia National Laboratory at Albuquerque and Oak Ridge National Laboratory). o The United States did not make use of the Japanese bumpy-torus results in its evaulation of the concept. Japan is engaged in research on a wide range of alternative confinement concepts (tandem mirror, heliotron-stellarator, reversed-field pinch, compact toroid, bumpy torus, and so forth). Cooperative planning of research and evaluation of results seems appropr iate. The Japanese scientists appear to have achieved a significant advance in superconducting magnets. Their progress in the LCTF program, sponsored by the International Energy Agency and administered by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, is impressive. Of the six participants, only the Japanese delivered their superconducting
ll0 magnet on schedule and thoroughly tested, thereby demonstrating its ability to meet specifications. As of the time of the trip, the German and Swiss coils were just being delivered almost a year late; and the three U.S.-manufactured coils have been a "disaster." The General Electric Company delivered its coil as its "best effort" and then recommended that it be scrapped. The Westinghouse and General Dynamics coils are delayed and are having manufacturing difficulties. With this kind of track record, one wonders that the Japanese would consider cooperating with the United States. Clearly U.S. industry has done an outstanding job on building equipment for the space programâone wonders why it cannot do equally well in the nuclear fusion program. PROBABLE CONDITIONS ON COLLABORATION There are several desirable principles for international collaboration: o No erosion of the strong national programs. o Mutual benefit. o Participating on an equal footing. o Assurance of continuity in the collaboration. o Acceleration of the national programs of the partners. o Overlap of program interest. o Achievement together of what is not achievable separately. o Full participation in planning right from the beginning; unilateral planning is not acceptable. o Full access to the technology that is developed. Cost sharing alone is not a sufficient reason to collaborate. It is not clear what level of cost for a large machine would trigger collaboration, but $l billion was mentioned. Japan must acquire fusion technology for its own use. The Japanese investment in collaboration must come back for the benefit of Japanese industry. Patents and know-how must be protected. JOINT PLANNING There seemed to be a dilemma in the Japanese position in that one could not discuss near-term candidates for cooperation or collaboration because that planning was already fixed. On the other hand, one could not discuss future candidates because that planning had not yet been done. The attitude was that no joint planning had really been done to date, but that there existed a possibility in the l985-1988 time period for useful joint planning. No existing organization, such as the International Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, is really suitable to manage international collaboration. A, new mechanism is needed, which may come out of the Versailles Summit process.
Ill For managing a large facility, a "lead country" is needed. Putting decisions to "middle-level" bueaucrats is to be avoided; they are reluctant to take initiative. Our final meeting, with representatives of the Nuclear Fusion Council of the Atomic Energy Commission, was particularly useful. That group was much more positive about fusion than we had been led to expect. The group also seemed positive about cooperation with the United States. In particular, it was said that starting some joint discussion now on TFCX would be good. One working group would be needed to discuss the best concept for TFCX. Another working group would be needed to discuss how to implement collaboration. it was suggested that the TFCX concept be addressed at the forthcoming May l984 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Joint Coordinating Committee. Japan would participate in the early TFCX planning without any prior commitment to collaborate on construction. U.S. ideas on TFCX would be disclosed by preparing a report available to Japanese scientists. An intention was expressed to convey an interest in Japanese participation in early TFCX planning to an appropriate U.S. program leader. There was a general consensus that discussions of options should continue on a long-term basis and that any large-scale collaboration would require considerable joint discussions and planning at a technical level as well as a firm commitment at a high level. Certainly at the subministerial level of the agencies with which we spoke (STA, Monbusho, and MITI) there was an obvious (and well-prepared) reluctance to discuss any alternative that extended beyond the explicit policies expressed in the Atomic Energy Commission planning document of l982. SUMMARY IMPRESSIONS The visiting members of the committee greatly impressed with the Japanese research efforts in nuclear fusion. The committee believes the United States has much to gain from cooperation with Japan. It seems timely to launch a serious well-organized joint planning effort. It is unlikely that any agreement toward future joint effort on a billion-dollar scale will result without such a base. It is necessary to deal separately with the STA-JAERI complex and the Monbusho-university complex on cooperative or collaborative programs. Major next-step tokamak experiments and technology development are within the purview of the former agencies, while basic research and alternative confinement concept experiments come under the jurisdiction of the latter. The existing U.S.-Japan cooperative agreement machinery is an adequate mechanism for definition and implementation of cooperation with the Monbusho-university programs. A new mechanism is needed for definition and implementation of large-scale collaboration on next-step tokamak experiments and the
ll2 supporting technology development. A workshop, on the model of the International Tokamak Reactor (commonly known as INTOR), might meet periodically to define questions to be answered by each country in the interim between meetings, to discuss these answers, and to draft tentative agreements. Such a workshop could formulate a cooperative or collaborative program, guide its implementation, and monitor its progress. Participants in this workshop should be permanent, so as to establish continuity, and should have the stature and background to address the technical and administrative aspects. A cooperative and collaborative program of the type suggested by the JAERI leaders would work to the long-term disadvantage of the United States because the Japanese would gain a disproportionate share of the valuable industrial experience relevant to a next-generation machine. However, the suggestion provides a starting point for working out a more favorable program, perhaps involving a collaboration (in the sense defined above) on an engineering test reactor (FER in the case of Japan). There were indications from the JAERI leaders that subsequent U.S. cooperation on a Japanese FER need not be an essential element of the collaboration. Some attention must be paid to reconciling the Japanese "bottom-up" and the U.S. "top-down" decision-making processes. U.S. fusion program leaders might benefit by adopting, for their own programs, some aspects of the Japanese procedure of developing a consensus among the technical people involved. Such an approach would not only lead to better thought-out programs, but would also lead to a greater compatibility between the U.S. and Japanese technical program objectives. On the other hand, a necessary prerequisite to useful cooperation is agreement between the governments at the very top, which embraces cooperation as national policy.
