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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 92
Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 93
Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 94
Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 95
Suggested Citation:"DEEP SILO BASING SYSTEMS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Deep Silo Basing Systems FRANK PARRY R & D Associates Marina Del Ray, California SUMMARY: An alternative to the horizontal tunnel basing mode (i.e., the "Mesa" con- cept or any of its derivatives) is the system of deep vertical silos. These are typ- ified by two main types, the "Sand Silo" and the "Pencil Pusher." Unlike the horizontal systems, the vertical systems are unmanned and would tend to be operated very much like current Minuteman silo systems, with the exception that the deep silos might also be for "dormant" missile storage. In this mode the missile would be essentially "turned off" and would not be activated until egress and launch were required. The vertical systems would accommodate similar threats to the hori- zontal systems, but in some conceptions might be based at a greater depth than the horizontal systems with an attendant increase in hardness. One possible disadvantage is that the vertical system must have fixed and known exits, whereas in the horizon- tal concepts the exit points could be unknown until egress. In general, designs have been made to accommodate surface bursts of up to l00 megatons. The "Pencil Pusher" (see Figure 3) was originated by the Lawrence Livermore Na- tional Laboratory in l980. The MX-sized missile canister is placed near the bottom of a 3,000-foot hollow steel tube open at the bottom and terminating at the top in a conical raise borer. The steel tube is the "pencil," and the whole is sited below the water table, which is at a depth of 2,000 feet. Thus, silos containing this sys- tem are some 5,000 feet deep. The required siting is for 2,000 feet of soft overbur- den over 3,000 feet of hard rock with the water table no lower than the interface. A capsule of propellant for egress actuation is stored below the missile canister. In the storage position the pencil is full of water, and the buoyant missile and propel- lant canisters are anchored at the bottom of the pencil. For egress the missile and propellant canisters, both of which are buoyant in water, are released and floated to the top of the pencil and there anchored. The propellant is then ignited. This pro- pellant, possibly hydrazine, is designed to burn slowly in a controlled manner and expels water out of the pencil. This makes the whole pencil assembly very buoyant in the lower water-filled 3,000 feet of the silo, giving an upthrust of several million pounds. This raises the whole assembly to the ground level either by simply forcing it through a prepared upper fill or by using the raise borer. An alternative to the buoyancy concept (see Figure 7) is the hydraulic ram concept (see Figure 8). In the latter case, the lower 3,000-foot silo is pressurized by a reservoir and pump system, thus sliding the pencil through a seal system and forcing it through the upper fill as shown. The ram concept can produce over twice the force of the buoyancy concept. The "Sand Silo" concept (see Figure l3) was originated by Boeing about l974. The MX-sized missile is encapsulated and placed at the bottom of a deep silo some 30 feet in diameter and l,500 feet deep. The silo shaft above the missile capsule is filled with prepared sand. For capsule emplacement or egress the sand is "fluidized" by introducing a fairly uniform water content throughout the sand. The capsule is operated somewhat like a submarine; for emplacement the capsule can be made heavy by 73

74 filling ballast spaces with water and thus making the capsule sink through the fluid- ized sand, with the latter behaving like quicksand. For egress, the reverse of this process takes place; the capsule is made buoyant by "blowing" the ballast spaces. This method of operation allows ready emplacement and also egress from an undisturbed silo. If, however, the silo has been subject to a nuclear attack the upper silo could be greatly disrupted and no longer have a prepared fill of known characteristics. It is therefore desirable that the capsule carry a raise boring machine so that in this worst-case condition egress can be achieved by boring out the upper portion of the silo. In general, the deep silo systems are capable of more rapid egress than the Mesa systems—perhaps hours instead of days. After attack, where egress requires opera- tion of the raise borer machine, the silo systems would have the advantage of provid- ing a steady force on the rock face by virtue of their inherent upthrusts, whereas the horizontal exit requires use of a conventional tunnel boring machine with a re- petitive "grab and thrust" mechanism. The above is an abbreviated description of the vertical silo deep basing systems. Details of associated system requirements, such as siting; operations and maintenance; command, control, and communications; security; and cost are included in the briefing charts. It has been a long morning, and we are talking about tunnels. I always think of tunnels as horizontal. I am going to talk about something dif- ferent. I am not going to promise you a light at the end of the tunnel, but at least I am going to turn them upside down and talk about vertical systems. I am going to talk briefly about the generic deep basing concepts and then the very pressing question: what are the threat and the envi- ronment that one must design to? I have been involved in designs in a number of these systems, and it is always very difficult getting the nu- clear community to tell me what to design to. Somehow we need some unified threat to compare all these systems by. I am going to talk first about the "Pencil Pusher," a concept originated at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory on which we have done some very prelim- inary engineering work. (As Jim Wooster said, all these things are very, very preliminary.) Then I am going to talk about one of Jim Wooster's systems, the vertical "Sand Silo." Finally, I will address some of the issues at the end. The problem, as has been explained, is to provide a land-based ICBM either as a secure reserve force or as an alternative primary basing mode (Figure l). The potential solutions for the deep underground are the ver- tical, which tend to be unmanned, and the horizontal, which tend to be manned. I am going to talk about, as I said, the Sand Silo and the Pencil Pusher in terms of the system technology issues and survivability; what actually is the threat you want to design to, and what is the environment at depth? Then the big thing we are all talking about here is egress: How feasible is it? How long does it take? What powers does it want? And so on. The endurance and communications, which Jim briefly addressed, but which have not been properly dealt with yet, and siting are some of the other issues. Why vertical deep underground basing? Well, it is said—and let me say here that I am not in a position of advocacy here but am just trying

75 to present some things that have been developed and postulated—vertical egress might require only tens of hours, for the simple reason that the vertical shaft does ease the muck disposal problem provided you make proper preparations for a muck pit underneath. The cost per unit employed (UE) is comparable with those of all the other systems; they all cost around about $l00 to $200 million per mis- sile for acquisition. The MX multiple aim point (MAP) concept had the same estimated costs. Combined concepts are also possible. For example, if you make a vertical deep silo, one could have a quick-response shallow silo at the top. Also, the egress system developed for the vertical silo might be applicable to the Mesa concept, and we believe at this time that these types of concepts should be included in the Air Force deep underground program. Don't throw them out yet. They may have some value. The two things I am going to be talking about, the Sand Silo and the Pencil Pusher, were conceived as responses to different threats (Fig- ure 2). The Sand Silo has a 5-megaton threat, with the shock spectrum as shown. Boeing did a point design. R&D Associates looked at their environment, and sure enough the Boeing points lay within that environ- ment. If you extend the threat to 25 megatons, the chart shows the un- certainty bounds—this is actually the same chart that Dr. Sevin showed you—and for the Pencil Pusher we are using this environment, a soft rock over a hard rock, with basing at 5,000-foot depths. Because I am showing the Pencil Pusher (Figure 3) first does not mean that it is either preferred over the Sand Silo or not. It just hap- pens that I have recently worked on this, so it is a little easier for me to talk about it. The principle of the Pencil Pusher, originated in l980 by Livermore, was that one would dig a deep hole in this layered medium with alluvium on top and competent rock below. In the bottom 3,000 feet, one would have a hollow steel pencil-like object. One would require the water ta- ble to be somewhere at the 2,000-foot level. In the bottom end of the pencil is the missile canister. Below that is the canister containing "propellant," or some material that can be burned to expel the water in the canister. For egress, first of all these two canisters are raised to the top of the pencil, and then the propellant canister is fired—under control, of course—so it can force the water out of the inside of the pencil, and the whole thing then becomes very buoyant and can force its way up through the upper prepared fill. Of course, the problem is that after an attack you may not have prepared fill anymore. Maybe you have 2,000 feet of prepared fill; the top l,000 feet is gone or is badly disrupted. So, in all cases—and this applies to the Sand Silo as well—I think one has to have a raise borer of some sort on top. One advantage of this type of concept, which uses buoyancy for pushing up, is that the raise borer has automatically got its force on the rock face. So you don't have to keep grabbing and pushing, grabbing and pushing. That is the principle. The summary (Figure 4) is that for this lim- ited study, a first-cut summary, it appears feasible with compatible

76 costs and possible egress advantages, but a number of issues require clarification. However, we did not uncover any obvious showstoppers. Now, as a matter of interest, we normally draw it exaggerated like the left-hand diagram so you can see it; a true perspective view is more like the right-hand diagram. General system considerations are shown in Figure 5. The sure kill/ sure safe limits are untestable. That is a common deep underground (DUG) problem, but for a l00-megaton burst in a layered medium and 2,000 feet of porous overburden where we have the equipment below in the 3,000 feet of the Pencil Pusher, the environment is benign compared to that of the MX shelter MAP system. The size we used for preliminary engineering based on that type of environment was, for block motion, l meter at 2,000 feet (which gave us a l3.5-foot lower shaft) and 3 meters at l,000 feet, with a 20-foot upper shaft and rubblizing to a 500-foot depth. Siting would require 2,000 feet of soft overburden, 3,000 feet of competent lower medium, and a water table that would enable us to keep the bottom silo filled. There are quite a number of areas that satisfy these conditions. The egress uncertainties (until determined otherwise, and I am sure it is always going to be the case) require some kind of raise borer cut- ters on the pencil top, to get through the material you are not sure about. If you have a fill that you know about, I am sure you can get out very quickly. When we started this we were using the buoyancy concept (Figure 6), but this troubled us, largely because of the control. If you fire the propellant, how do you control it after you have fired all of the pro- pellant? However, this is the type of force we can generate for such a system if we measure the tip depth. If the tip is 2,000 feet down to start with, it comes up, and it will go about 500 feet above. The fig- ure shows the sorts of forces we can get by buoyancy, depending on the initial water table depth. We are talking of 5 to l0 million pounds of upthrust in such a system. It occurred to us that if we could do this hydraulically we would have more control over it; as we changed pump speed and so forth we could change pressure. So, we looked at a system whereby we pump water into this lower cavity and force this whole thing up, filled with water again. Everything else is the same as before. So, if we forced this up through a set of seals (a unique problem in itself), we can then talk about as much as 20 million pounds or even for moderate pressure we can keep l0 to l5 million pounds upthrust all through egress, and that, of course, we can control. We can work anywhere on the force diagram at any particular depth. There are pumps, not of this capacity, but I point out that in the North Sea some of the pumps are at l0,000-foot depths, and they have as many as 200 stages, pumping water and oil up from that depth. Figures 7 and 8 depict some of the features of the two concepts. In the hard copies there are a number of detailed designs. I have not time to go through all those, but let us have a look at the energy required in this system for egress (Figure 9). Before attack, all of the energy needed would be supplied by land line or an on-site powerhouse. There is no need to worry about that;

77 that is straightforward. For after attack, we just looked at a case in which we stored all of the energy in lithium sulfur batteries. These batteries were sized and priced on the basis of some work that Boeing did some five or six years ago, when it was looking at a semidormant system that could be stored for a long time. We based our sizes and costs on that study, updating it, of course, for inflation. The digout penetration, we assume, requires about l0 megawatt-hours. That is assuming a worst case, in which we have to dig through soft allu- vium. If we go through our filler medium—a formed concrete something like Jay Merritt talked about in those shafts that were lined—which we believe we can dig through fairly quickly, we could get through very quickly. However, we cannot allow ourselves that luxury. The whole shaft may shift over, and we may have to dig through straight alluvium. So, 20 megawatt-hours has a safety factor of two in it. The lifting energy is also of interest. In one case it is by buoy- ancy, and here we have to fire a gas generator with 840 kilopounds of hydrazine in it. In the other case we have pumps which have to keep this pencil pressing up by pumping a large volume of water under high pressure. For that we want about 20 megawatt-hours, and we double that for safety and allow for 40 megawatt-hours. For postattack egress, we believe we can get up in 40 hours if it were all alluvium; 20 hours if we had l,000 feet of undisturbed foam- type or vermiculite concrete—something of that nature—plus l,000 feet of earth destructive crater; and l0 hours if it were all undisturbed. Again, there is great uncertainty here. That is a guess, extrapolating data from smaller sizes and so forth. We estimated the cost of both systems (Figure l0). The buoyancy concept would cost about $86 million per missile. Now, this is acquisi- tion only, no O& M (operation and maintenance), none of the outside fa- cilities. This is just the shaft, the digging machines, the casings, the bottom tunnel lined with quarter-inch steel, the pencil, the missile and all those sorts of things, and the power systems. Of that $86 mil- lion, the civil engineering (the digging of the tunnels, etc.) is about $50 million (Figure ll). For the hydraulic concept the cost of the shaft is about the same— a little bit more because you have to dig cavities for pumps and so forth—but the mechanical systems cost much more (Figure l2). You have to provide all those pumps and you also have to provide a much thicker- walled pencil, because you are talking about a 3,000-psi pressure differ- ential; much higher than in the buoyancy concept. In the buoyancy case we are talking about l.5-inch walls on the pen- cil, as compared with the hydraulic ram case of 3- or 4-inch walls. So, it is a lot of steel, and that comes out to about $l20 million. The costs of MX turned out to be about $70 or $80 million per missile. That is the 23 shelters and all the associated costs. Now, for the Sand Silo (Figure l3). This was originated by Boeing around about l974, and most of these are Boeing charts with some charts from a critique that R&D Associates did at that time. This was planned at that time to be about l,500 feet deep. It had a wide shaft filled with sand, and the idea behind this concept is that

78 you can get out very quickly if you make that sand fluid. In other words, you make it quicksand, and buoyancy gets you up rather than your weight pushing it down. That is what it really is, quicksand. To do that you have to have a manifold with survivable water, and you have to pump that into the sand, and then the canister being buoyant will rise up, and we made a few models of this. We did not use water. We used air, and indeed, you put a canister in there and without putting air in you could not drag it out. So, you pumped air into the sand and out it came. The problems, of course, are somewhat different at depth. How do you get the water uniformly dispersed in the sand? In any case, I think the same problem occurs for all these concepts. What do you do about disruption (Figure l4)? It is all right if nothing is disturbed and you have a nice, straight silo, but the sort of thing that happens is that the earth gets shifted and you may get 250 feet for a 5-megaton blast, or for a l00-megaton blast even more. So, it is our feeling that for all these vertical concepts you must have a digger at the top. The ground rules that were used for Boeing's design of the Sand Silo prescribed an objective mission the same as the Minuteman's. The mis- siles were to be sited in hardened and dispersed facilities deep under- ground, colocated with Minutemen so that they could use Minuteman facil- ities. The numbers assumed to be used were l50 to 300 MX missiles. The facilities were expected to be able to survive direct hits by 5-megaton surface bursts. Operation and maintenance were to be roughly the same as for the Minuteman missile. The question of command, control, and com- munications (C~) has not been addressed in detail, as Jim pointed out. Now, there is one big advantage the Sand Silo has over the Pencil Pusher, and that is maintenance (Figure l5). With the Sand Silo, main- tenance, if required, will be before any disruption so you can fluidize that sand and get the missile out fairly quickly for maintenance. In the Pencil Pusher, especially if you have a fill at the top of foamed concrete, it is more difficult to get through that stuff if you have to dig it out. So, in all our Pencil Pusher costing, we assumed an auxiliary shaft going down with side drifts so that one could get to the guidance and the interstages for maintenance if you wanted. That complicated the design, but the cost of those shafts was included in that overall cost. However, as I said before, maybe this sort of a system is unmanned, and egress is the only problem. Maintenance may be a problem, but it may be also an opportunity to get the Air Force to go fully dormant on these systems. If they cannot get out in a hurry, why not go fully dormant? Then maintenance costs should go way down. That is something to think about. I am not advocating it particularly. For the Sand Silo, here is an active egress concept (Figure l6). You can see how complicated it gets to dig out of something like this. There are a number of arms which grab the side and gradually telescope this thing out. None of this was costed in the Boeing study, which is probably why we get a slightly different answer in cost. Jim was asked questions about tunnel costs; Figure l7 is his old curve of what the costs of tunnels were. This was done in l974, and one has to double these, roughly, for l98l costs.

79 We are talking about 20- or 30-foot tunnels, which at that time had costs of around a thousand dollars a foot. In our digging for the Pen- cil Pusher I used four thousand dollars a foot for the upper shaft and five thousand dollars a foot for the lower shaft, just for digging. That does not include the linings. So, I tried to make that cost fairly con- servative. For the Sand Silo cost summary, I doubled the Boeing estimate (l974) to get l98l dollars, and that came out to be about $26 billion for 300 units employed (including R&D, acquisition, military construction, and O&M). Acquisition plus construction costs (to compare it with the Pen- cil Pusher, which was $80 million in one case and $ll6 million in the other case) came out to be $54 million. It wasn't as deep, and there was no digging machinery included in that. Now, I would like to finish up by addressing some of the issues listed in Figure l8. Again, as somebody who gets into designing concepts for some of these things, I think ground motions versus depth really want defining so that these systems can be truly compared. For egress—espe- cially for the vertical systems—the question is what is the disruption zone and what are its characteristics. How do you design your machines to get through it? We did not have a lot of time or a lot of money to do very deep studies of egress and upper filler trade-offs, but we lighted on vermic- ulite concrete, which is kind of a foam concrete, as a suitable medium for the upper fill. There are lots of other things one could do there. You could fill it with water. You could fill it with air, and add blast doors. That would make maintenance very easy, but somehow it seems like you really want to seal it off for other reasons and it seemed to us at the time that the vermiculite concrete was pretty good. Egress mechanics (forces, times, and control) are also issues. The raise borer design that goes along with these systems needs to be defined. The water systems are obviously vital; both Pencil Pusher and Sand Silo have water systems. The Pencil Pusher needs seals, pumps, and a water supply. It would be deep enough to be well below the water table, so maybe supply is not a problem, but at least it should be looked at. When you are pumping this water, how do you make sure that you keep your pump supplied? For the Sand Silo, fluidization is a peculiar prob- lem. How do you make sure that the sand doesn't go into a slugging mode, so that you get slugs of sand and slugs of water and things like that? As Jim said, the auxiliary disciplines have not been defined, and yet they have a very important effect on the system as a whole and on its acceptability, maintenance, C , and security. Then for this system there are some perturbations and options. One of the things that we have addressed is an MX system, but one option which may be suitable, say, to secure reserve forces is a small missile. Does going to a small missile, or a missile with a single reentry vehicle (RV) make any difference to these systems? Probably not, but it has not been addressed.

80 Then I talked about the dual missile, the shallow silo plus the deep silo, and multimissile. If these systems are so good, why can't you put several missiles in one silo, if you could do the mechanics? Now, a few words about some of the advantages of all deep under- ground systems. We lost the MX MAP system for three basic reasons. One, it cost too much. I am not putting them in any particular order, but the final cost of the MX system was about $3.7, say, $4 million per shelter times 23 shelters per missile. It was not accepted by the public with all those shelters all over the place, and I think that deep underground basing removes that public interface. It really is just like the ordi- nary silos, which are accepted. SWhether it is Mesa or anything else, it is out of view, so from that point of view it is acceptable. The other thing that happened to the MX MAP system was that the argument was made that if shelters cost $3 to $4 million each you get threated to death. It is easier for the enemy to put one more RV on his big missile than it is for you to build one more shelter. This does not apply to deep bas- ing, which requires the enemy to go the other way. It requires him to put very large-yield weapons on his missiles, which is very difficult to do. In other words, if he has started fractionating, he has to go back again. So there are three thoughts, I think, which are worth bearing in mind in considering these things, and one of the primary ones is cost. If it costs too much, it will never be funded. ***** SPEAKER: Mr. Parry, you used the term "dormant." I am not familiar with that. MR. PARRY: Missiles like the Minuteman are called "active." In other words, their guidance is turned on, and they are running all the time. So, they are ready to go as soon as the button is pushed. It takes guidance and things time to warm up. Something like an MX missile would require l0 to l5 kilowatts to keep it running. That is a lot of power. But there are systems which are not quite here, but on the horizon, whereby one could have missiles shut down and get them started up fairly quickly, and people are beginning to talk about that as a way to go dor- mant. That is dormant. Partially dormant is where you keep something warm and when required get it fully running quickly. However, in these underground systems it is going to take you hours to get out. So, what is the point of keeping the missile running down be- low? You really have a good opportunity to go truly dormant. In fact, you really have no choice. So it is not a problem; it is an opportunity. SPEAKER: I did not quite understand the egress problem. You were going to have a shaft in the upper 2,000 feet of alluvium? MR. PARRY: Yes.

81 SPEAKER: Is that shaft going to actually be filled by vermiculite? MR. PARRY: Yes. Vermiculite concrete. SPEAKER: And so you have to drill through that even if there is no destruction? MR. PARRY: Yes, but that is very easy to drill through. In fact, some calculations that we did, which I have got here, suggest that you could almost push your way through that. It disintegrates, especially if you put a fairly fine point on the front and push. It will disintegrate and powder, and you can push your way through. Now, clearly some trade-offs have to be done there. How survivable is it? In the nuclear environ- ment how much of it will survive? I did not say there were no problems. There are a lot of problems. SPEAKER: You have not addressed shock mounting of any of this equipment. What is the reliability of this equipment sitting out there dormant year after year and day after day? MR. PARRY: It is shock mounted. SPEAKER: Everything is shock mounted? MR. PARRY: Oh, yes. The missile has to be. It is really fairly fragile. Most of the missiles cannot take more than about 5 g, and that is a good missile. Shelf life more than anything else is the critical dormancy problem.

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88 QS LLJ Q A '* I / * { | / § / J / * 4 1! LJ- s ^ I !i J s J i li 00 LU o: 03

89 EGRESS - ENERGY AND TIMELINES • PREATTACK (INCLUDING MAINTENANCEI - ALL ENERGY SUPPLIED BV LANDLINE AND/OR ON-SITE POWERHOUSE • POSTATTACK - ALL ENERGY STORED IN LiSO2 BATTERIES REQUIREMENTS BUOYANCY CONCEPT HYDRAULIC RAM CONCEPT MWH FT3 MLB MWH FT3 MLB C3 AND WINDING ENGINE 1 150 0S01 1 ISO 0.01 DIG OUT (PENETRATIONI 20 3000 0S2 20 3000 0.2 LIFTING ENERGY • 19,800 1S1 40 6000 0S4 •GAS GENERATOR CANISTER CONTAINING -840 KLB OF HYDRAZINE [TIMELINE] •PREATTACK • MOST MAINTENANCE DOWN HOLE (SERVICE SHAFTI •MISSILE CHANGEOUT (10-20 HOURS DRILL OUT. $3 MI • POST ATTACK EGRESS • 40 HOURS ALL ALLUVIUM •20 HOURS (1000 FT UNDISTURBED PLUS 1000 FT DISRUPTED/CRATERI • 10 HOURS (2000 FT UNDISTURBEDI FIGURE 9 COST SUMMARY •COSTS PER US ES ($M 1961I • NO O AND M INCLUDED BUOYANCY CONCEPT HYDRAULIC RAM CONCEPT CIVIL ENGINEERING 50 55 MECHANICAL 17 42 DIG OUT SYSTEM 4 4 MISSILE 15 15 86 116 NOTE: 100 USES ASSUMED FOR DEEP SILO FIGURE 10

90 CIVIL ENGINEERING COST ESTIMATE 1981 $M • FOR BOTH BUOYANCY AND HYDRAULIC RAM CONCEPTS SITE SELECTION. 5000 FT x 3 IN TEST BORE 05 SURFACE PREPARATION 03 ASSOCIATED ROADS (4 Ml AT $250 K/MII 1.0 EXCAVATION (SEE NOTED: UPPER HOLE (2000 FT x 20FTI SOFT ROCKI 10S0 LOWER HOLE (3000 FT x 13 1/2 FT HARD ROCKI 18S0 BOTTOM CAVITY (20 FT x 30 FT DIAI 2.0 POWER VAULT (20 FT x 40 FT x 15 FTI 2S0 ELEVATOR SHAFT (5000 FT x 5 FT AT SIOOO/FT! 5S0 INSPECTION GALLERY (7 FT x 20 FT DIAI 05 ACCESS TUNNEL (8 FT DIA x 3 FT LONGI 02 LINING (SEE NOTE 2I: UPPER HOLE (GUNNITE AT $2S5/FT2I 0S3 LOWER HOLE (640 T x 1/4 IN STEEL PLATEI 1.5 ELEVATOR SHAFT (60 T x 1/8 IN STEEL PLATEI 0.2 BOTTOM CAVITY (125 CY R.CS. 1 FT THICKI 0S1 POWER VAULT (125 CY R.C.. 1 FT THICKI 0S1 INSPECTION GALLERY! ACCESS TUNNEL } <'» CY R.C.. 1 FT TH.CK, _M 41.8 VERMICULITE CONCRETE FILLING AT J100/CY (30.000 CYI 3S0 SURFACE BUILDINGS 1S0 CONTINGENCY l~ 10%I 4.2 50.0 ADDITIONAL PUMP HOUSE. CAVITIES AND SPILL WAYS FOR HYDRAULIC RAM 50 NOTE 1: EXCAVATION COSTS PER JS SPERRY. MINING AND DRILLING ENGINEERS UPPER SOFT ROCK $5000/FT. LOWER HARD ROCK $6000/FT NOTE 2: STEEL PLATE SI/IB (USSS STEEL EQUIVALENT ~ $0S65/LB FOR MX SHELTERI CONCRETE (REINFORCED REBAR AND ROCK BOLTSI $800/CY INSTALLED FIGURE 11

91 BUOYANCY CONCEPT ESTIMATE MECHANICAL (LESS MISSILE AND DIG OUT EQUIPMENTI STEEL PENCIL (3000 FT x 126 IN OO x 1S2 IN MEAN T. 47 x 106 LB AT tt/LBI 94 PROPELLANT (837 KLB TOTAL AT $1JO/LB AVERAGEI , „ PHOPELLANT CANISTER (280 KLB STEEL AT «3/LB. 38 KLB EPOXV/GLASS AT $2/LBI 09 MISSILE CANISTER (140 KLB STEEL AT 13/LBI a« OSE (50 KLB - PER MXI WINDING ENGINE AND CABLE C3 AND ANTENNA SUBSURFACE POWER (10 MWH. 0S10 MLB. 100 C.F.I a) SUMP PUMP AND PLUMBING SURFACE EQUIPMENT (POWER. CRANES. ELEVATOR, tic.I M SURFACE C3 15S8 CONTINGENCY (*8%I 170 HYDRAULIC RAM CONCEPT ESTIMATE MECHANICAL (LESS MISSILE AND DIG OUT EQUIPMENTI STEEL PENCIL (3000 FT x 128 IN OO x 3.5 IN MEAN T. 15 x 10« LB AT $2/LBI 300 CANISTER/MISSILE (140 KLB STEEL AT $3/LBI 04 OSE (50 KLB - PER MXI WINDING ENGINE AND CABLE Q3 C3 AND ANTENNA Q3 SUBSURFACE POWER (40 MWH. 0S40 MLB. 6000 C.FSI 35 PENCIL SEAL SYSTEM 04 SUMP PUMP/PLUMBING a, SURFACE EQUIPMENT (POWER. CRANES. ELEVATOR. «lcSl 2.S SURFACE C3 „, »3 CONTINGENCY (*8%l ~^j 42S0 FIGURE 12

92 SAND SILO CONCEPT • ORIGINATED BY BOEING (1974I SOFT SUPPORT FACILITIES SAND SATURATED , WITH WATER COMMUNICATIONS CABLE TO HARDENED SURFACE ANTENNA BURIED HARDENED FACILITIES • EGRESS CAPSULE (STEELI • 11 FT DIA. 140 FT LONG •MISSILE • OGE INCLUDING SURVIVABLE POWER • FLUIDIZATION MANIFOLD • SURVIVABLE WATER FIGURE 13

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95 ACTIVE EGRESS CONCEPT PILOT DRILL CONICAL BORER EJECTABLE HYDRAULIC MOTOR COMPARTMENT STABILIZER MISSILE INNERMOST TELESCOPING STAGE SECOND TELESCOPING STAGE THIRD TELESCOPING STAGE SATURATED SAND EGRESS SHAFT EJECT MECHANISM (GAS GEN) TELESCOPING STAGE POWER SYSTEM (TYPl BULKHEAD FORWARD OUTRIGGER - VERTICAL THRUST REACTION ARM OGE AFT OUTRIGGER - VERTICAL THRUST REACTION ARM FIGURE 16

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