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Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 98
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 99
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 100
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 101
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 102
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 103
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 104
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 105
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 106
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 107
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 108
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 109
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 110
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 111
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 112
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 113
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 116
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 117
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 118
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Page 119
Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Suggested Citation:"SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS." National Research Council. 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18562.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

System Requirements LT. COL. CARL W. RULE Ballistic Missile Office (AFSC) Norton Air Force Base, California SUMMARY: Since the President's announcement on October 2, l98l, the Air Force has redirected its efforts toward near-term and long-term basing modes for the MX missile. This briefing addresses the deep basing alternatives and preliminary plans being for- mulated at this time. Main topics include details of the President's announcement, initial guidance from higher headquarters, various concepts under consideration, is- sues to be resolved, the organization of the Ballistic Missile Office, contractual requirements, work in progress, future efforts, and ways in which the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology could help the Air Force. Underground complexes are not new or revolutionary ideas. At least a dozen ma- jor studies have been completed since the late l950s. Various concepts for deep bas- ing have included horizontal tunnels, vertical shafts, and various forms of manned or automated egress. At this time no single concept is preferred by the Air Force; care- ful evaluation over the next year will have to be completed before the Air Force will have an official recommendation to offer. Most of the technology required for a deep basing system exists; however, sev- eral feasibility or "proof of concept" tests may have to be performed in areas such as egress through cratered or ruptured zones, communications through the earth, power generation, and heat dissipation. Another key factor is siting, because site-specific geology affects survivability, cost, schedule, and environmental impact. The deep basing program is in the early stage of definition. The Air Force is very serious about long-term basing programs and knows that extraordinary management skill will be required to meet objectives in the next year or two. The Air Force is evaluating conceptual and location alternatives with the intent of making recommenda- tions to the Secretary of Defense in l984 or sooner. Deep basing is an opportunity for the application of existing, emerging, and new tunneling, shafting, and mining technology. Knowledge gained will contribute to a critical national defense program; in addition, reapplication of the new technology could help civil works throughout the world. I feel very honored to be able to participate in today's program. I am from the Ballistic Missile Office out at San Bernardino, in California. As you might be aware, there are many other people here from California. That is the place where houses periodically change zip codes, and I think it may be partially in response to some of Joe LaComb's activity after looking at those movies here this morning. 97

98 The Air Force is really an exciting career and for me every assign- ment has been interesting. The program that I am now embarked upon, the deep basing program, is perhaps going to be the most interesting of my Air Force career. It is an important job. It has technical challenges that indeed are going to be very large. We do recognize that we need help in order to achieve these goals, and we hope that you share the same enthusiasm that we have and help meet some of the national defense needs, as well as in the process to reapply some of the technology that we come up with to perhaps help civil works. This presentation has been advertised as being a systems requirement type of briefing. What I intend for it to offer is really an Air Force perspective of some of the preliminary planning that we have done with the deep basing program ever since the announcement was made by the Pres- ident on the second of October. Figure l lists some of the key points that I would like to address during this short presentation. Col. Berry has already addressed the President's announcement (Figure 2). Just to recapitulate some of the high points, it was back on the second of Octo- ber. Indeed, one of the three long-term options that we are going to be concerned with is going to be the deep basing mode, and that has not yet been defined very well, as we will find out. We will initiate an intensive program so that the Department of De- fense and the President and Congress can make the decision as to which of those three basing modes—or perhaps a combination of those basing modes—is to go into full-scale development in the l984 time frame (Fig- ure 3) . The deep basing concepts are really nothing new. We see from Figure 4 that when we go back into time, into the late l950s, early l960s, at least one dozen of these different concepts have been looked at. For one reason or another, due to cost uncertainty or evolution of the threat or one or more of these reasons, these have not really been deployed, save for the control centers that we might have at the Cheyenne Mountain complex, or the command and control centers that we have back here on the East Coast. But due to the threat evolution and due to tech- nology that has come about in the past years with the increased yield of Soviet weapons, as well as the accuracy that they are now going to expe- rience or are projected to experience, deep basing is being looked at in a new light and has indeed very much promise to provide us a very surviv- able intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Also in the figure is a conceptual depiction of what that under- ground complex might look like. It need not necessarily be vertical be- cause we have not made that decision at this time. Some of the things following the Presidential announcement: we have received some guidance (Figure 5), none of which has been written up to this point, but we are taking this as basic assumptions for the program, that we will initiate a concept validation program for 50 to l00 MXs or the equivalent. That means that we will be doing parametric studies for different size missiles for a deep basing system. Postattack endurance of at least a year will certainly present some challenges. Other systems have started out with a goal to have survivability of at least a year and have reduced that goal because it was very difficult to achieve. We

99 mentioned the rapid egress before; there is no firm requirement that has been specified as of this point. Rapid egress is very desirable, but right now we don't have a quantitative requirement against which to mea- sure that. "Milestone II," for those who might not be familiar with the acqui- sition process in the Department of Defense, is the decision point where key leaders within the Department review the program, the cost, the sched- ule, and the performance risk to see if it is worthy to go into full-scale development. This is now scheduled to be in fiscal year l984, and of course that depends on the funding levels that we do obtain. Of course, l984 being an election year, we sense that we would like to have that fis- cal year l984 date moved forward, and this was indeed brought out by the President himself in the announcement. The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) has not been defined. Tra- ditionally we, for ICBM systems, define IOC as having l0 missiles on alert or having that capability. For the deep basing we have not defined that. It could very well be one. It could be just the completion of the command and control center, or it will be perhaps a different definition than that. A detailed program plan is due to the Department of Defense in January l982, and at this time we are busily preparing that. The purpose of Figure 6 is to show that we are concerned not only with the underground complex but also with all the various other elements of a deep basing system. Here we see the underground complex which has been represented. This is very much like the one Jim Wooster presented —Mesa concept—but we also want to keep aware of the transportation net- work, the road network, as well as the main operating base. As we found in the MX multiple protected shelters (MPS) system, the main operating base was, indeed, the thing that caused the most environmental impact. We have already looked a little bit at the deep basing history (Fig- ure 7). I won't belabor this—Dr. Sevin went through that this morning— but it goes back to the Brimstone concept, back in the l970 time frame, and the Strat-X deep tunnel in the l972 time frame, and we did have a briefing by Mr. Parry on the Sand Silo and, of course, the Boeing pre- sentation on the Mesa. None of these has been adopted officially as the system concept per se. We are reviewing all the concepts that have been presented and try- ing to be objective in a system definition. Jim Wooster earlier described the "Mesa" base concept, with a perim- eter tunnel going all the way around the mesa, horizontal tunnels spaced approximately l0 miles apart, and predug egress portals that approach a steep slope ideally, and are approximately 4,000 feet apart. Again, the entire system, as I recall, was approximately 2,600 feet beneath the sur- face. Figure 8 is a cross section of that, and as Jim corrected us this morning, this is not purely a horizontal system, but it is a nearly hori- zontal system. Here you can see the egress portals that are spaced every mile or so apart, again 2,600 feet beneath the surface. These egress portals come very close to the surface, but you still have some distance to tunnel in order to egress when the time comes to launch. Of course, you have a place in the back to handle all the muck when it comes time

l00 to egress, and on the right hand side we show there are some vertical shafts for communication antennas. Tunnel boring machines conceivably would be used for the initial construction of the project. We understand that these take about l,000 horsepower—perhaps 4,600 volts nominally—and the world record rate of tunneling, I recall, is about 400 feet in a day, but we do experience, I guess, in practical application such as Metro or in Chicago, rates much lower than that—perhaps 30 to maybe 70 feet per day—and this is one of the big areas of concern. The cost of being able to construct these tunnels is an uncertainty. Before, at one of the previous subpanel meetings, we heard that depending on geology we could have tunneling costs from on the order of $200 a foot all the way up to maybe as much as $2,500 a foot. With that band of un- certainty it certainly has to be one of the key points of our validation program to find out what those costs indeed would be. The purpose of Figure 9 is to illustrate the fact that we are not locked into any form of egress or tunnel configuration. These are some of the ideas that are available and the ones that we are evaluating at this particular time. In fact, it can be a combination of horizontal, as well as vertical, or we can even have systems, as Mr. Parry had mentioned, like the Pencil Pusher concept (Figure l0), being completely vertical. Now, going deep down in order to achieve survivability, one might say, "How deep do you have to go?" Our understanding of this particular problem is the fact that it depends very much on the medium that you are located in, whether it is igneous rock such as granite or perhaps lime- stone or unsaturated porous rock (Figure ll). Of course, in the latter case—on the right-hand side—this does have better shock attenuating features. Depending on the hardness that we are able to achieve, we have al- ready seen concepts before in tests that were conducted with tunnels to the half-kilobar level. We also heard of some that were to the l-kilobar level, but it shows on Figure ll here these are not exactly the projected threats. What was done is to take the theoretical data that exists and, assuming that it was just going to be a one-time surface burst, for in- stance, the 240-megaton case could be really a combination of 24 l0-mega- ton weapons that go off simultaneously. We have done a rough calculation, and the concepts that we have looked at really fall in the range between 2,000 feet and, in the case of the Pencil Pusher concept, about 5,000 feet, and we can see the func- tion of how deep do we really have to go. The real point is that geology is very, very important to how hard these actual tunnels are going to be, and if we can make them ^ kilobar is a very big question or if we can make them l kilobar in granite. Do they have to be lined? What type of backing material is needed? These are questions that are very pertinent. From the existing literature we were able to review in the past cou- ple of weeks, we located a number of sites that appear to be reasonable for the types of concepts that were discussed this morning (Figure l2). I would caution you to not take this as being an Air Force position that we have narrowed in and that these are the only candidates. That is not the case at all. What we are doing right now is trying to establish a

l0l set of criteria that we can apply to the entire United States, including Alaska, Hawaii, and the possessions, so as not to overlook any reasonable alternative. We have to consider such things as underground railroads. I think that we should also consider the fact that there may be abandoned mines on the East Coast that may be equally suitable. But for right now, using geotechnical criteria that have been established so far, these ap- pear to be some of the reasonable areas. Figure l3 was explained also by Dr. Sevin this morning. I did change one particular word, and that is in the title. We say that most of the required technology exists. I think that in each one of the areas we have demonstrated some form of the technology that would be applicable to the deep basing system. However, there are other things that have to be tailored very carefully for application to the configuration that we come up with. Some of the things on Figures l4 and l5 are very much on our minds. They are not listed in any particular order of priority, but of course we have seen various underground configurations this morning. We, the Air Force, will have to go ahead and consider all these con- figurations and come up with a concept or perhaps several concepts for additional testing and for environmental analysis and costing. Hardness and vulnerability is, indeed, a very important question as to the existing simulations; are they adequate? We are working very care- fully with the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), as well as the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, to find out how hard we can actually make these tun- nels and whether they can withstand the current threat as well as respon- sive threats. Egress. Once you have a buried system that has hardened, how do you get out? In fact, once you are down in the depths, if it does take you a long time to get out, as you approach the surface you may, indeed, become very vulnerable. That is why preservation of location uncertain- ty (PLU) was so very important in the MPS system. It may be very impor- tant, in fact, if we have long egress times for the deep basing system. With quick egress the PLU problem tends to be diminished, but until we can demonstrate that, we have to be very careful with the signatures that we would be giving off as we egress so that we don't make ourselves vul- nerable to a second-wave attack. Power. We would have to look at the potential use of nuclear reac- tors and fuel cells. What type of power are we going to be using for at least one year's endurance? How are we going to power those particular machines when it comes time to egress—perhaps the entire force—in a very short span of time? Crew endurance. Again, we have many problems there, with medical and simple life-support systems. For launch control and communications, how do we communicate with the system that is located 2,600 feet beneath the surface? That, we think, is solvable, but it has yet to be demonstrated. Some work has been done as far as emergency rescue missions with mining operations over the years, but we think that we will need something particularly adapt- able , so that we can communicate with the complex down within the moun- tain to the external world.

l02 Heat dissipation becomes very important with heat gradients that increase as you go beneath the surface, conceivably l0 or l5 degrees higher below the surface than at sea level and during the button-up con- dition—during that one-year time frame—we could have considerable prob- lems, particularly during egress when a lot of heat would be generated. Security, of course. The operational concepts—how do you logistically support this? Manned versus automated types of features, particularly in the egress area. Among the other issues that we have is siting (Figure l5). I think that this is very, very important to determine where we want to conduct our tests. Does it have to be in the type of geology that is actually going to be in the deployment area, or can we just use representative ground? Where, in fact, do we want to deploy the system? I will come back to this on the next chart. Constructibility. By that we mean what types of scenarios; how many men are required to do this; how much do we expect this to cost; how long would it take? Those types of considerations. We know that there are going to be some feasibility demonstrations. The two most likely, of course, would be egress and the attendant prob- lems with egress. Communications comes a very close second there. Power and heat dissipation are also possibilities. The cost is very uncertain, as I mentioned, due to the wide range of possibilities in constructing this system. The environmental impact analysis process. We are currently going through a process to narrow down all the concepts into one that we con- sider to be a baseline and, also, to come down and look at the possible locations for the system, look at these alternatives. Those two in com- bination we would be able to use for environmental impact analysis, as well as the technical feasibility and cost estimates. We have a base comprehensive plan that would be closely related to the environmental impact work. That would be related to the external support facility. Those are very time-consuming efforts, and a little later I will show you the time lines. On siting (Figure l6), I promised that I would come back to this. This is one of the critical factors because the geology does determine how survivable the system may be. The type of geology affects the cost of construction, affects how fast it can be done, and affects what type of environmental impact we experience. Some of these important consider- ations might be considered by the Siting Work Group; we heard about hav- ing steep escarpments as being desirable. We already know that porous, unsaturated rock is desirable. We would like to have water to support the people. However, water could be detrimental as far as construction is concerned. The temperature gradient I mentioned before, as I did the other items, which I think are pretty self-evident. Now for the people that are doing this (Figure l7). I mentioned before that the Ballistic Missile Office does have charge of the deep basing team, and that at Norton we have both the Ballistic Missile Of- fice and the Air Force Regional Civil Engineer. Colonel Berry is locat- ed in the top command section. Beneath him we have Colonel Carl Case,

l03 who recently became the Director of Advanced Strategic Missile Systems (ASMS). This would be me (pointing to Deputy Director for Deep Basing), and then of course we have the entire BMO organization and the Air Force Regional Civil Engineer (AFRCE) associated with the Corps of Engineers to support us with construction plans, costs, the environmental impact analysis process, the siting work and the base comprehensive plans. In order to address the issues that I mentioned before, these are the types of contracts (Figure l8) that we are considering very, very strongly for fiscal years l982 through l984. System support would deal with the integration of all the technology, such as the power, the life support, the heat sink, the communications, and egress. But egress we broke out as a separate item of that system support that is especially important. We think that a system definition as well as a demonstration will be called for. Construction validation is principally an effort to go ahead and identify the cost in the scenarios, as I mentioned. The site screening is a narrowing process to, again, do a literature survey followed up by a site characterization study that would actually go out and do core borings to find out if Mother Nature is exactly as predicted in the literature. Of course, the environmental impact and base compre- hensive plans would, also, be under contract. This is how it looks when you put it together (Figure l9). We have got our direction. We are currently undergoing a concept screening, looking at all the viable concepts, trying to take the best features of all of those. We are developing the program plan that is due to the Secretary of Defense. We are developing our screening criteria, with TRW doing an awful lot of that work. We plan to have a contract that would start later, possibly next spring to summer, on the site character- ization. We have recently put out Commerce Business Daily (CBD) announce- ments for sources sought in each of three critical areas: system support, egress, and construction validation. About 47 different agencies or com- panies have responded, including 30 in the system support. We have 30 companies in egress, and we have l9 in construction validation. With re- spect to survivability, we are working with the Air Force Weapons Lab- oratory, as well as the Defense Nuclear Agency. Of course, we have to have all of our cost data before the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) II meeting that I mentioned, which would be toward the end of l984. Once we have the concept evaluated and we have the tenta- tive locations, those two items combined go into a description of the proposed action and the alternatives. That is the real kickoff point or a key item in the environmental analysis process. That process takes l8 to 20 months, and the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) is re- quired by law to be prepared before a decision is made. Figure 20 lists the work in progress. This includes looking at the organization. We are also very busily engaged in program acquisition, mostly contract work, getting our strategy approved, getting our state- ments of work written, and preparing to review those particular proposals when they come back and to award those contracts. The POM, or Program Objective Memorandum, is an Air Force programming document that we have to use to justify the outyear funding. As for the public affairs pack- age, on the second of November you may have seen the Aviation Week article

l04 by Clarence Robinson, which has an awful lot on deep basing. Of course, we expect to receive an awful lot of input and questions from the public, and therefore we have to have a public affairs package. We are working very carefully with DNA and AFWL for the survivability program, working on that program management draft (PMD) with Headquarters USAF and the program plan. Figure 2l lists some of the upcoming events that we see. Of course, first on the list is our meeting here today. Next week we expect to have a briefing at Norton Air Force Base for potential bidders, those that responded to the Commerce Business Daily (CBD), as well as other invited contractors. We expect to have our strategy briefed to our Headquarters on the l7th, and if they approve that strategy, our plans would call for release of the request for proposal (RFP) at the end of this month. We have some survivability management steering groups (SMSG) that are planned here. I think they are in error. Right now these dates are now going to be toward the end of the month. Our program plan for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is another thing that we cannot forget. The contract awards, if our strategy is approved, would be in the springtime, April or (hopefully) sooner. Of course, you know that, with the govern- ment procurement process, normally that takes about l0 months to do. We are working very diligently to reduce that and take as little time as possible. As Figure 22 says, we are in the very early stage of development of this project. The Air Force is, indeed, as serious as can be about this particular program. Our schedule is very, very compressed. We are look- ing at various concepts, as we saw today, and location alternatives. This we view as a very golden opportunity for the application of the existing technologies as well as those that are emerging and new. Figure 23 is to say that your help, I think, is not only helpful; I think that it is going to be essential. Any feedback that we can get on our preliminary program plans to see if we have emphasized the right things or if we have neglected some things would be very, very useful. Your thoughts on contract approaches, as to how the industry as well as government can share the risk, would be useful, and I know that there are some thoughts within the community regarding this matter. Cost esti- mating is also very much on our mind. We have to have a good handle on that before we get to DSARC II. The siting criteria, again, is in my judgment one of the most im- portant of all. In that regard I mentioned the fact that we would like to look at the use of existing underground spaces, to see if they would be applicable to our purposes. Egress keeps coming up on everybody's list of things that have to be done; the mechanized mining, whether we have machines that can deal not only with construction but with egress through rubble. The construction validation. Some of these thoughts as to what can be done as far as the future involvement. We don't see this as being the end. We see this as really the beginning. We know that there are newsletters that are put out by the community. There are magazine articles that we can use to help keep everybody informed. There is a possibility that this group can serve as an advisory group or perhaps it would be better to go with specialized

l05 consultants that you may know of. Your thoughts on how the NRC (National Research Council) could be involved in the future would be appreciated. ***** SPEAKER: In terms of construction validation, what are your thoughts in that area? LT. COL. RULE: Construction validation, I think, is one of the initial activities that the Air Force Regional Civil Engineer and the Corps of Engineers will be involved in. This would be an opportunity to review the scenario as to what type of machines are available; how many people are required; what are the types of shift requirements that would be needed; and how much would it cost. The latter is probably the most im- portant thing. It is like an independent assessment of cost estimates. There may be an option within the contract, if needed, if there is con- siderable uncertainty in the costs. We may have to conduct an actual construction demonstration, but that at this point appears to be an op- tion. We have made no final decision along those lines. SPEAKER: You had on your last illustration contract approaches, and we heard a lot about this technology and the different approaches being con- templated. What do you contemplate on contracting approaches? LT. COL. RULE: Do you refer to the type of contract, whether it is cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) or fixed price or— SPEAKER: That would be an issue, also, if you have systems as opposed to breaking out contract approaches. You have the question of whether you are going to do things in house or contract them out. You have ques- tions about phasing from concept R&D to construction, and so forth. What are your present initial thoughts? LT. COL. RULE: We are going to do a little bit of everything. TRW is our systems engineering and technical advice contractor. They will be there to help in all facets of the program, but there may be opportuni- ties for an extension of that staff where we might have to get other Systems Engineering-Technical Advisor types of contractors to augment TRW. As far as the contracting is concerned, we would like to make it competi- tive. In fact, that is our goal. We view system support as being a ma- jor type of an effort to coordinate all the technologies that go into system definition and for the costing of that particular thing. We are looking at, providing that the funding levels are sufficiently high, having multiple types of contracts for the key areas, such as system support, such as egress—those two in particular. Construction valida- tion is a third example. Those key things have been advertised in Com- merce Business Daily.

l06 With these contracts we would envision that there would be opportunities —after the first year or two after the system is defined and we start to go into a feasibility demonstration—for option points where the multiple contracts might reduce down to just one in each of those re- spective areas, but right now we are planning to have a minimum of one in each of those key areas. As far as being a research and development and having the uncertainties involved with the program, I think that most of the contracts would, in- deed, in the early phases have to be cost plus, but this is a strategy that really has not been officially approved—that is my own personal judgment. We would have to work that up the line and get approval, as I mentioned. The l7th of November is when we will get guidance as to which contracting method, what will be basic and what will be options. I am maybe just nibbling around your question. SPEAKER: What about beyond that point, after you get beyond the R&D phase and start talking about constructing these facilities? LT. COL. RULE: That would be another series. You are jumping to con- struction. There would actually be a full-scale development phase. That would come after l984. SPEAKER: Would that involve a prototype tunnel or tunnels? LT. COL. RULE: Those types of things—yes, sir—flight testing just as we have with the MX. You actually build things to full scale to iron out all the bugs that you can during the full-scale development and to prepare yourself for construction. Construction would conceivably be in the mid-l980s, perhaps in the l984- 85 time frame, but even that schedule has not been defined. The initial operational capability date of l989 will give you some measure as to when we have to begin the construction. Some of these concepts that we have looked at take on the order of maybe six or seven years to con- struct, normally. SPEAKER: Has the Air Force ruled out the use of Titan II and Minuteman for the first l00 MXs? LT. COL. RULE: In the President's guidelines we were told that we would produce l00 and that they would be placed in existing silos, not being specific as to whether they would be Minuteman or Titan, but I would presume that they would be one or possibly a combination of both. The likelihood of actually deploying l00 in silos is really not very great. It would probably be some lower number, perhaps half that many before we eventually deploy the deep basing system or start to deploy it. SPEAKER: Deep basing would come after that?

l07 LT. COL. RULE: ' Yes, sir. The interim solution to the strategic problem happens to be putting MX missiles into existing silos. The long-term solution—for l989 and beyond—is going to be deep basing, the ballistic missile defense, the continuous-patrol aircraft, or in some mixture. It could be one or the other. I don't know what combination. It is un- likely that all three would be selected to go into full-scale develop- ment, due to the sheer cost of each of the programs. SPEAKER: One thing I think the Air Force needs to look at is the con- tracting procedures of your contract. They just don't work out. The risks and liabilities are not shared properly. We have all been look- ing at this; it is something you need to start now because it is going to take many years to straighten it out. LT. COL. RULE: Yes, sir. SPEAKER: And in something like this, with the magnitude of tax money being spent, I think it is about time we straighten it out. LT. COL. RULE: It is a golden opportunity, sir, and we would look to your thoughts, and I know that various members—and I hesitate to point anybody out, but I recognize Mr. A. A. Mathews as being one of the fore- most people that has thoughts along these lines, and we would be very anxious to get those thoughts. SPEAKER: I just gather that it is implied and it is almost policy there will be an egress after attack, vertical, horizontal, or sloping, but— LT. COL. RULE: We have to have the capability to egress after an attack. Yes, sir. Whether it is actually a requirement that we will do it in order to make the system survive has yet to be defined, but once you do egress we have problems of how do you button it back up again, you know, to protect the equipment and people that are within the complex. But we must look at that given the fact that we egress: How do we protect the remaining portion of the system and keep it survivable?

l08 D»»p Basing • PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT • CONCEPTS • ISSUES • ORGANIZATION • CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS/SCHEDULE • WORK IN PROGRESS • UPCOMING EVENTS FIGURE 1 Pr*»idttnt R*agan'» Announcement 2 OCT 1981 • DEVELOP AND PRODUCE 100 MX MISSILES • DEPLOY SOME MISSILES INITIALLY IN SILOS • PURSUE LONG-TERM OPTIONS • AIR MOBILE • BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE • DEEP UNDERGROUND BASING • SELECT LONG-TERM BASING MODE ISI IN 1984 FIGURE 2

l09 UJ 1 i 2 A^ -5 r / >-03 5= <r i ' j£S | z>-f * !*oS¥ 5 •i ° I' 2 /i 'iE» a . O en UJ ac C9

ll0 Planned Installations - Never Constructed FIGURE 4 DATES: FROM TO /Vyv^o ct A 22 /v /9«: /f y-y r*j /<a M M 66 67 67 M 66 M 70 M 66 67 68 71 74 n 16 7t PRIMARY FUNCTION C3 72 « 74 7t 77 n 7* ICBM C'I « « • « « • • • . • ROCK TYPE HARD $OFT VARIED EXIST. MINES 3 • • • • R • 8 • *- FACILITY TYP€ ARSENAL DI$TRIBUTED COMMPOST DEEP $ILO COMM SY$ • « • • « • • (SHALL R « • • « COMMENTS NATIONAL NEED FOR ADDITIONAL (TO NOHAD & SITE Rl DEEP BASED FACILITIES NOT YET ESTABLISHED TECHNOLOGY NOSV AVAILABLE FOR LARGE UNDER- GROUND FACILITY CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION COST AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS SIGNIFICANT ost- Initial OSD Guidance • INITIATE CONCEPT DEFINITION/VALIDATION • SIZE FOR 50 -100 MX OR EQUIVALENT • POST ATTACK ENDURANCE OF AT LEAST ONE YEAR • RAPID EGRESS DESIRABLE BUT NOT MANDATORY • MILESTONE II FY 84 • IOC 1989 • PROGRAM PLAN JAN 82 FIGURE 5

Ill A Deep • ing Conceptual Configuration —,\ • ' TRANSPORTATION NETWORK MAIN PROTECTIVE TUNNEL (2600 FT DEPTH) PARTIALLY COMPLETED EXIT PORTALS RAILROAD FIGURE 6 p Basing "History" (BRIMSTONE | • EXTEND EXISTING HARD ROCK MINES • ~3SOO FT DEEP • - JO PORTALS PER SITE • VULNERABILITY • CITADEL (-200 EMTI • PORTALS [SAND SILO] • ~ 1500 FT DEEP SILO (SURVIVE & MT HITI •SATURATED SAND • FLUIDIZE AND FLOAT TO SURFACE FOR LAUNCH • VULNERABILITY/COST •PORTALS • CONNECTING TUNNEL [STRAT-X DEEP TUNNEL | • HARD ROCK TUNNEL NETWORK • ~ 300 FT DEEP • - 800 PORTALS PER WING OF 144 MISSILES • EGRESS UNCERTAINTY •CRATER • SHAFT (COLLAPSE/LATERAL SHIFTSI • FLUIOIZATION • PERIMITER TUNNELS IN SUITABLE MESAS • ~ 2100 FT DEEP • - FEW HUNDRED MILES • SELF CONTAINED DIGOUT • HORIZONTAL • FEW DAYS REACTION TIME FIGURE 7

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ll4 bJ o =! UJ ^ ui O a^ o c 0 0 uiO2 z "• o l-a• -J z o zz 1,1 LJ O UI* j Q. -i a.*-* 5! • • • <n a O o UI 8 o UI z at 3 a. <x < •* ui ui Q.05Q.Q. 5 o Q . 3 o c 3 i a K < < Pwi! UlTr- 13 <UIO Ot-t- UI K a * 5 I- « L. ,« JbJjS Z^UJ ?-!« <Ulfc >•"— >-Q.i! x-\/-» -y ^ UJ. ?-!« ^UIS- i«i Q&5 ga3 ggaS Of. Z3 CO

ll5 »p Basing REQUIRED DEPTH FOR SURVIVABILITY VS VARIOUS THREAT LEVELS DEPTH IFTI DEPTH a. ooo HARD ROCK a. 000 e.g. GRANITEI (FTI UNSA TURATED POROUS ROCK 400 e.g. LIMESTONE) MT 6,000 W MT 6.000 Ml ) lw T 60 MT W 120 MT r ,*/ 4.000 M M r V 4.000 60 MT T^ ;, 12 MT 'f- r— ' S 30 MT ; 2.000 4 I.5MT M r 2.000 12 4.4 MT M r •^ -: ',, • 0.5 MT F/7 !-•"--• !//i .5 f~ P ", •/- • I •V; — i r .0 -_, 1 ''•' 1 l.* 'V ' ' t RR- ''E \ \\ r0 , '; ; / •'', ,A teS\ tv, •/ .•; - ; , ' 1 HARDENED 1.0KBAR (=14.000 PSII FIGURE 11 F*3 LINED TUNNEL ^O.SKBAR (« 7000 PSII [~| UNLINED TUNNEL "—'0.25KBAR |» 3500 PSII al 0»olofllcally Sultabl* Area» COlUMtIA PLATEAU NORTl COlUMSIA PLATEAU-SOUTH NOHtH-CENTRAL HOMTANA SAWTOOTH MOUNTAINS SNAKE RIVER PLAIN DENVER BASIN WASATCH ' TAVAPUTS PLATfAU SAN JUAN RANGE KIAPAROWUS PLATEAU PECOS NATANESPtATEAU AQUARIUS MOUNTAINS MOUNTAIN HOME RANGE SOUTH CENTRAL NEVADA WfST CENTRAL NEVADA PYRAMID LAKE / CARSON SINK rW ~j ' FIGURE 12

ll6 M 5 K 0 c c 0 _j ui >- 3 — 1/1 2 E O <A > O 5 Q 0 EXPERIENCE ES. CIVIL/CO NELING 'EPRI/CON E DEMO IN NY ERGROUND LEAR TESTS ERGROUND LEAH TESTS JTEMAN. SH MARINES x>- 5 jf 5 uj < O * O z z OI (J Q u Q 0 Z m z < ^ *•- 5 ^ D O j— Z D 2 3 - 3 S >- D D Z 32 2 in U 01 Z O u. X 8 0 I Z Z z M REQUIREME MUCK HANDL £ DISPOSAL MEGAWATT S FUEL CELLS DEFINITION C ATTACK F.NV SURVIV^BLE F.OCKOFSMN SHOCK (SOLA THROUGH EA COMMUNICAT t K 0 I x SSS X M EXPERIENCE MINES. SUBWAYS; AQUEDUCTS. HWYS £ RAIL TUNNELS. HYDRO POWER PLANTS NTS UGT COMPLEXES CHICAGO STORM WATE SYS; NORAD CMCC. SIT MINES. SUBMARINES. HYDRO POWER PLANTJ UNDERGROUND OFFIC £ FACTORIES* WARE HOUSES. NORAD. SITE SUBMARINES. SPACE VEHICLES MINES; SUBMARINES. SPACE VEHICLES NORAD CMCCS SITE R. SAFEGUARD Q C _, Z M K O 2 ^ 2 2^ Z X at UI OJ sSi ui % 5^ o5 O «" 5 S Q £ S* :! UJ 0 < t- C REOU- °> 01 «; NTROL ( NTAMIN ^a> ll 01 r §si ?3> UJ -1 0, I- < X O S ul o 0 0 £ o z n O X O XO 0. U C O U U X x o < CD

ll7 c 0 0 uj a hi * — ui 0 7 I S T a Ul Ul a « hi »- _J < 3 o u X hi ct a u < CO u a. LT) 03 M I j_ < >• cc H 3 j 0 CD U. < K Ul Z ^ a ^J FINETIOf 0G0OUNE N0SS/VU 3 _J a > in w Ul Q Ul 5 a a: 5 2 u D < Z hi in * * V) , § i s C Q - isE I si 1 e g 2 S0 «o wi O a o o _j oe CO

ll8 de*p Basing - Siting • CRITICAL FACTOR • SURVIVABILITY • COST • SCHEDULE • ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT • IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS • GEOLOGICAL/TOPOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS • WATER • TEMPERATURE GRADIENT • MUCK DISPOSAL • DEPTH REQUIREMENTS • PUBLIC VS PRIVATE LAND • PROXIMITY TO MILITARY BASES • ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT • LEGAL, POLICY CONSTRAINTS FIGURE 16 >p Basing Team BMO/CC DIRECTOR ASMS BMO/SY DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR DEEP BASING BMO SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROGRAM INTEGRATION AFRCE CONSTRUCTION PLANS/COST EIAP/SITING BCP HQ USAF HQ AFSC DNA -- AFWL -- SAC -- AFLC - - OTHER PARTICIPANTS & INPUTS POLICY GUIDANCE/DIRECTION POLICY GUIDANCE/DIRECTION NUCLEAR EFFECTS A SURVIVABILITY SITING REQUIREMENTS. HARDNESS OPERATIONAL CONCEPT LOGISTICS FIGURE 17

ll9 Deep Ba •ing - Preliminary ••timali CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS FY82 - FY84 • SYSTEM SUPPORT • POWER • HEAT SINK • COMMUNICATIONS • EGRESS STUDY A DEMO • CONSTRUCTION VALIDATION • SITE SCREENING • SITE CHARACTERIZATION • ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT • BASE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FIGURE 18 Advanced Development Program MAJOR MILESTONE SCHEDULE FY 82 FY 83 FY 84 PROGRAM DIRECTION CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING PROGRAM PLAN DEVELOPMENT SITING CONTRACTS SCREENING SITE CHARACTERIZATION SYSTEM SUPPORT CONTRACT (SI EGRESS TECHNOLOGY CONTRACTS (SI CONSTRUCTION VALIDATION CONTRACT SURVIVABILITY PROGRAM COST EFFECTIVENESS MODEL ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSES DSARC II FIGURE 19 CBD CBD CBD •o •O FEJS

l20 Work In Progres« • ORGANIZATION • PROGRAM ACQUISITION • CONTRACT STRATEGY PAPERS • SOURCE SELECTION PLAN • BUSINESS STRATEGY PANEL • BIDDERS CONFERENCE • STATEMENTS OF WORK •RFP'S/TECH REQUIREMENTS DOC • PROPOSA L REVIEW TEAMS • ACQUISITION PLAN MODS • D&F • FY84- 88 POMIMPUT • PUBLIC AFFAIRS PACKAGE • LIAISON WITH DNA & AFWL • PMD DRAFT • PROGRAM PLAN FIGURE 20 Upcoming Event* • 5-6 NOV U.S. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON TUNNELING TECHNOLOGY • 12 NOV BRIEFING TO POTENTIAL BIDDERS • 17 NOV BUSINESS STRATEGY PANEL • 30 NOV RFP RELEASE • 23-25 NOV SMSG WORKING GROUPS • 30 JAN 82 PROGRAM PLAN DUE TO OSD • APRIL 82 COMPETITIVE CONTRACT AWARD FIGURE 21

l2l >p Basing - Summary • EARLY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT • SERIOUS PROGRAM • COMPRESSED SCHEDULE • AIR FORCE NOW EVALUATING CONCEPT AND LOCATION ALTERNATIVES • OPPORTUNITY FOR APPLICATION OF EXISTING. EMERGING AND NEW TUNNELING/MINING TECHNOLOGY FIGURE 22 Deep Basing - What N*xt 7 • YOUR THOUGHTS WOULD BE HELPFUL • PRELIMINARY PROGRAM PLAN • CONTRACT APPROACHES • COST ESTIMATES • SITING CRITERIA/SCREENING • USE OF EXISTING UNDERGROUND SPACE • EGRESS • MECHANIZED MINING • CONSTRUCTION VALIDATION • FUTURE INVOLVEMENT POSSIBILITIES • NEWSLETTER • MAGAZINE • ADVISORY GROUP • SPECIALIZED CONSULT ING FIGURE 23

Next: SUMMARY OF ISSUES FROM TUCWG MEETING »
Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council. Get This Book
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