2

Overview

This overview addresses the major themes that arose during the presentations and discussions—sometimes across two or all three of the daily sessions—and were articulated explicitly by the participants during the last session. The thematic summaries include individual views of committee members, speakers, and other participants. Different opinions have been included to both inform particular themes and illustrate the range of views expressed; however, a lack of different opinions in the summaries of particular points does not imply there were none. Additionally, all views from the workshop, including any suggestions for future actions by the Air Force or others, expressed in this workshop summary are solely the views of individual participants as understood and interpreted by the rapporteur. Although the chair and other members of the planning committee participated in the workshop, they did so as individuals, and nothing in this report should be construed as a “committee position.”

THEME 1. PROTOTYPING AND ITS MANY DEFINITIONS

Several workshop participants noted that prototyping has many definitions and involves concept, developmental, and operational definitions at a minimum.

Prototyping was defined very broadly but in different ways by several participants and speakers. For example, prototyping is an important tool to demonstrate the art of the possible, to expand the realm of the possible, to learn by doing, to free up enormous creativity in government, industry, and academia, to “uncover



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2 Overview This overview addresses the major themes that arose during the presentations and discussions—sometimes across two or all three of the daily sessions—and were articulated explicitly by the participants during the last session. The thematic summaries include individual views of committee members, speakers, and other participants. Different opinions have been included to both inform particular themes and illustrate the range of views expressed; however, a lack of different opinions in the summaries of particular points does not imply there were none. Additionally, all views from the workshop, including any suggestions for future ac- tions by the Air Force or others, expressed in this workshop summary are solely the views of individual participants as understood and interpreted by the rapporteur. Although the chair and other members of the planning committee participated in the workshop, they did so as individuals, and nothing in this report should be construed as a “committee position.” THEME 1. PROTOTYPING and its Many definitions Several workshop participants noted that prototyping has many definitions and involves concept, developmental, and operational definitions at a minimum. Prototyping was defined very broadly but in different ways by several partici- pants and speakers. For example, prototyping is an important tool to demonstrate the art of the possible, to expand the realm of the possible, to learn by doing, to free up enormous creativity in government, industry, and academia, to “uncover 3

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4 Enhancing Air Force and D e pa rt m e n t of D efe n s e P r o t o t y p i n g truth;”1 and “a concerted effort to mature…, stabilize…, and define/quantify…”2 Throughout the 3 days presenters and participants established that prototyping has many meanings that range across the full spectrum of defense S&T (science and technology) and major programs of record. At the front end—for example, during applied research—prototyping can mean relatively small and low-cost experiments to prove a concept or demonstrate feasibility. At the other extreme, prototypes can involve very large and expensive demonstrations, perhaps of experimental aircraft or space vehicles, prototype aircraft in competition with each other for acquisition, or the integration of two or more operational or nearly operational systems (e.g., radars, missiles, satellites, and communications). Earl Wyatt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding, associated prototype classifications with various levels of technology maturity—specifically, concept prototypes for the early stages (e.g., feasibility), development prototypes for the middle stages (e.g., advanced concepts and integrated capabilities), and opera- tional/fieldable prototypes that look toward the production and deployment stage and satisfying operational needs. The following collection of descriptors associated by various attendees with prototypes or prototyping illustrates the very broad na- ture of prototyping in the technical community: component prototypes, S&T pro- totypes, acquisition prototypes, production prototypes, total-system prototypes,3 software prototypes, virtual prototypes, program-life-extension prototypes, policy/ procedure prototypes, collaborative prototyping, emerging-capabilities prototyp- ing, competitive prototyping, rapid prototyping, and prototyping on demand. Nevertheless, many attendees believed that the linkage of prototyping to a specific purpose, a strategy, and a strategic process is much more important than the term and its associated modifier; this linkage is addressed under other themes. Such broad use of the term prototype caused one participant to suggest that perhaps the term is too broad because it already occurs as a best practice at lower subsystem levels and all along the S&T process. To some participants, however, the term may primarily suggest a very expensive fly-off between two or more com- panies competing for an aircraft development and production contract. During the workshop, other terms, like experiment, demonstration, or ACTD (advanced concept technology demonstration), which was previously used in DoD, were sug- gested for possible use at various points in the S&T and acquisition process. 1 William Melvin, Director, Sensors and Electromagnetic Applications Laboratory, Georgia Tech Research Institute. 2 Brian Hershberger, Senior Aeronautical Engineer, Advanced Development Programs, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. 3 Total system prototypes could include prototypes both at advanced levels and also at the early- applied level, particularly for distributed systems.

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Overview 5 THEME 2. the value of PROTOTYPING Many participants noted that the prototyping ethos can benefit innovation, develop and maintain workforce skills/retention, reduce time to development, improve knowledge management, support a national security strategy, and provide a hedge against technical uncertainty or unanticipated threats. Prototyping was clearly recognized by many workshop participants to be a valuable tool for the Air Force and DoD. Among its many benefits that were discussed are the following: demonstrating new technologies or capabilities, ma- turing technology, reducing risk and increasing confidence, transferring technol- ogy to industry, hedging against possible threats, enabling rapid responses to emerging threats, exploring design trade-space, informing the establishment of requirements,4 testing and understanding concepts of operation, improving or preserving skilled technical workforces and related infrastructure, promoting inno- vation, offering opportunities for collaboration, and creating a sense of excitement to attract young engineers and scientists. Robie Samanta Roy, Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Com- mittee, emphasized the importance of prototyping to keep design and integration teams together as DoD funding declines; he advocated “agile prototyping” as a way of having teams understand what it takes to meet certain requirements and quickly move a capability into the field. At various times other speakers and participants returned to the importance of prototyping as a way of continuing to attract, retain, and exercise perishable skills, such as engineering, to maintain the highly motivated and capable technical workforce needed by the Air Force and DoD. For example, Patricia Falcone, Associate Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, advo- cated enhancing DoD’s prototyping competency by defining targeted prototyping efforts, which will not only deliver value but attract and connect innovators, thereby strengthening talent, competency, and capabilities. In addition, Brian Hershberger, Senior Aeronautical Engineer, Advanced Development Programs, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, proclaimed “Prototypes are high value enablers to grow the workforce experience base.” A substantial number of examples of prototyping successes described during the workshop involved past experiments and demonstrations, such as X-planes, that greatly advanced U.S. technological superiority. Mr. Hershberger provided a graphic illustrating the changing nature of prototyping over the decades (see Figure 2-1). Figure 2-1 shows the early emphasis on platforms, such as the XFs and YFs, shifting toward emphasis on integrated systems. A glimpse into future possibilities 4 A participant suggested that this thought could be more broadly captured as providing strategy inputs covering everything from elucidating needs and opportunities to concepts of operation, among other things.

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6 Enhancing Air Force and D e pa rt m e n t of D efe n s e P r o t o t y p i n g 60 General Dynamics Future Stealth (Including Convair) Prototypes Demonstrators Early Jet System of Contract Start to First Flight (Months) F-111 48 Fighters Boeing Bird of Prey X-32 Systems (Incl McDonnell Douglas) HTV-2 X-35 Air Space X-51 North Tacit Integration Blue American F-4 A-12 YF-18 Tier II+ 36 Global F-15 Hawk F-102 B-58 Hypersonic Aircraft D-21 Technologies XP-86 F-107 Northrop YF-17 YF-117 24 Polecat Lockheed Specialty XF-92 Have (ADP) Tier III- X-55 Enablers YF-100 Hi Mach Blue Darkstar 12 YF-16 P791 Information XF-90 Recce UAS XF-104 Systems Dominance XP-80 U-2 Lightweight Fighter Specialty Cyber 0 Warfare 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 First Flight Year FIGURE 2-1 Historical development programs, including demonstrators, prototypes, and operational systems. NOTE: The horizontal axis shows the year the labeled vehicle achieved first flight; the vertical axis shows how long it took (each line is 12 months) to achieve first flight from program go-ahead (not counting studies leading up to go-ahead). The histogram lines capture trends and link programs to Figure xx companies that developed the aircraft. The shaded groupings capture like types to draw commonality between the classes of systems. NOTE: LM ADP, Lockheed Martin Advanced Development Programs. SOURCE: Brian Hershberger, Senior Aeronautical Engineer, Advanced Development Programs, Lock- heed Martin Aeronautics. “Lockheed Martin Perspectives,” presentation to the workshop on September 25, 2013. Figure reprinted courtesy of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. emphasizing capabilities like air-space integration and hypersonics is depicted at the right side. Given the value of past prototyping activities, many attendees expressed con- cern that the Air Force and DoD no longer appear to be enthusiastic about pro- totyping. Given this concern, it was interesting that multiple speakers explained how the values of prototyping place it at the root of what is accomplished daily in their S&T projects. But these projects are mostly at levels lower than the expensive high-visibility prototypes associated with recent programs of record (e.g., F-22, F-35). One participant urged the Air Force representatives to “educate” members of Congress on the value of prototyping. Nevertheless, some discussions during the workshop indicated that the benefits of prototyping, such as reduced time to develop, are not always clear because they are outweighed by other key factors that drive programs (e.g., changing requirements).

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Overview 7 THEME 3. Tying PROTOTYPING TO STRATEGY A number of participants pointed out that prototyping is best tied to corporate strategy at the DoD and Service level and resourced appropriately to support the strategy. Although many best practices for prototyping were described during the work- shop, one stood out so strongly that it was a theme of itself. During the workshop many participants agreed strongly with the need for tying prototyping to a clearly understood purpose and linking that purpose to a strategic plan.5 In fact, proto- typing was described by some as both a tool and a strategy. For example, William Melvin, Director, Sensors and Electromagnetic Applications Laboratory, Georgia Tech Research Institute, said “Prototyping is both a tool and a strategy.” Daryl Pelc, Vice President for Engineering, Phantom Works, The Boeing Company, stated his organization’s approach is “Prototype to win.” Jim Shields, President and CEO, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, discussed “Prototyping as a strategy rather than a program.” Dr. Melvin explained it this way: “As a strategy, we use prototyping to further our customer’s objectives, …to build credibility in all we do, to create a culture of excellence in applied R&D [research and development], to create new research opportunities…, to recruit like-minded researchers and engineers.”6 In spite of the rather obvious need to tie prototyping to a strategy, several participants lamented the fact that, as stated in Chapter 1, “…at times, prototyping has been done with little strategic intent or context.” For example, a participant reminded the attendees that F-22 prototyping was done for political, not techni- cal reasons. As a result, he indicated that the expensive F-22 prototyping effort did not examine the fighter’s critical technologies and did not reduce the risk. In this regard, a general discussion topic was the prototyping requirement put in place by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, as amended, which—unless waived—requires competitive prototypes before a major acquisition program can enter system development.7 It was pointed out by some participants that, unfor- tunately, this requirement could make it possible to justify expenditures for some prototyping not on the basis of any technical or strategic purpose but just because the law requires it. 5 One element of the strategic plan could be to develop critical enabling science and technology. 6 Later themes address resources needed to support prototyping. 7 For additional information on the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, see http://thomas. loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.454, accessed October 4, 2013.

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8 Enhancing Air Force and D e pa rt m e n t of D efe n s e P r o t o t y p i n g THEME 4. prototyping as an agent for change Many participants noted that prototyping is a change agent involving technol- ogy, culture, people, concepts, and processes; it is best managed actively to enable change and promote an entrepreneurial attitude. This theme has two elements: change agent and management. Much of the workshop consisted of various speakers providing examples of the change-agent nature of prototyping, both in the past and in their current work. Past examples typically emphasized the tremendous U.S. technological advances brought about by one or more particular prototype programs, such as X-planes, missiles, missile- guidance systems, and stealth. When it came to discussing management of such programs to enable change and promote innovation and risk taking, numerous best practices were described.8 The X-planes of the 1940s and 1960s (e.g., the X-1 broke the sound barrier in 1947; the X-15 was flown in 1959 and became the world’s first space-plane in the early 1960s) illustrate proven approaches for innovation in aeronautics.9 The Titan family of missiles, originally part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, also lifted other military and civil payloads into space.10 Marvelous advances in ballistic missile guidance systems resulted from prototype inertial systems first designed at MIT’s Draper Laboratory in the 1950s.11 The HAVE BLUE conceptual and program suc- cesses of the 1970s led to a 1979 decision to implement stealth by building the F-117A fighter. These stealth advances, which were truly game-changing, foreshad- owed the B-2 bomber and other stealth developments.12 In addition to demonstrating new technological capabilities and U.S. tech- nological prowess, ventures like these created excitement with their spectacular achievements and novel designs—excitement for engineers and scientists as well as for an admiring population when the results were made public. These prototyping efforts helped nurture a culture of technological innovation and developed pro- cesses for later programs. Current prototype programs, though not as newsworthy, are developing improved processes for technical advancement. One example is strategic teaming, which Sonya Sepahban, Senior Vice President, Engineering and 8 A participant noted that active management could also mean enabling flexibility in program development, stalwartly blocking requirements creep, and concertedly minimizing expensive and unnecessary documentation. 9 Innovations in aeronautics were discussed during presentations by Brian Hershberger and Jaiwon Shin. 10 The Titan IIIC launch in 1965 was described by news media as “a triumph for the Air Force” http:// archive.org/details/1965-06-21_Missile_Passes_Test, accessed October 4, 2013. Titan developments were discussed during the presentation by Robert Whalen. 11 Advances in guidance systems were discussed during the presentation by Jim Shields. 12 Stealth advances were discussed during the presentations by Brian Hershberger and Richard Van Atta.

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Overview 9 Technology, General Dynamics Land Systems, described as a way to design, build, and test a fully integrated prototype in record time. This process is enabled by collaboration across a broad spectrum of stakeholders—engineers, warfighters, academia, suppliers, customers, and industry—to focus on challenges and develop consensus. Another process improvement discussed by the workshop participants is called Sidecar, which consists of pluggable interfaces where different experimental algorithms can be fed into a real system to check their capabilities and enable other contractors to experiment with the prototype system. A somewhat unique push for conceptual change was tabled when Robert Whalen, President and CEO, International Systems, LLC, concerned that the United States needs a “numbers response” to possible adversaries, recommended a pro- gram focused on “cost technology.” He believed “the most ‘Disruptive Technology’ would be the one that provides system(s) with current/improved effectiveness, at 1/2 to 1/10 current costs.” Prototyping cost-reduction technologies with the same functional capabilities could be a central element of that kind of program. To manage such change, various prototyping approaches and best practices were discussed by the participants at length. For example, Earl Wyatt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding, indicated movement from a “responsive model” of prototyping driven mostly by user pull toward more of an “emerging capabilities” model, which reflects a desire to return to more forward- leaning prototypes of the past. This approach would develop options for future threats and anticipated capability shortfalls; it would also consider increased needs to reduce sustainment costs. Some key management best practices offered by various participants included (1) willingness to identify new game-changing tech- nologies; (2) a leadership champion; (3) ensuring that the right people are at all levels of the effort—”right people” meaning “those who are educated, trained, and have the mentored experience to do the work;” (4) use of the Air Force Institute of Technology to instill a prototyping culture; (5) collaboration among industry, government, and academia; (6) good social interaction in the contracting process; and (7) learning how to ask the “Otis question” (referring to a speaker’s story that the Otis Elevator Company, looking to improve elevators, broke 110 years of tradition and assembled a diverse team that led to a flat and thin cable design, which enabled elimination of the large wheel room and increased usable space for building owners).13 13 Jaiwon Shin, Associate Administrator for Aeronautics, Headquarters, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

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10 Enhancing Air Force and D e pa rt m e n t of D efe n s e P r o t o t y p i n g THEME 5. prototyping as a versatile tool Several participants noted that prototyping is a tool and is best leveraged in all areas, at all levels, and in all phases of the enterprise. Near the end of the workshop, and after many examples illustrating extensive use of prototyping, Gen Lyles emphasized that prototyping is a valuable tool and worth almost a mandate to require every program director across the board to consider.14 In other words, directors should be told to either use it or state why they are not using it. Many participants agreed. But the Air Force representative was concerned that some in DoD believe prototyping should not occur until it is part of a program of record. Interestingly, Jim Shields, President and CEO, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, made the point that “requirements-based acquisition is often too reactive to embrace prototyping,” suggesting there is also opposition to prototyping in the program-of-record phase. Opposing prototyping before or after a program of record is contrary to Mr. Wyatt’s presentation, which clearly showed prototyping across the board and covering at least TRL 4 to TRLs 7 or 8 (technology readiness levels, a widely used gauge of nine levels of technological maturity starting at TRL 1, which applies to principles observed and reported in basic research).15 The Air Force representative’s issue was that, to transition technologies from S&T efforts into programs of record, normally a TRL of 6 is necessary. However, it is hard to fund prototypes in the S&T phase to get them to TRL 6; thus, it is difficult to move promising technologies beyond the S&T phase. More is said about this Air Force dilemma later, but it did bring to mind Mr. Whalen’s earlier admonition to not let TRLs determine where you want to go; he believed that some old, successful programs would not have gone forward under the current TRL regimen. He urged “No TRL gate;” allow “high- risk/high-payoff ” technologies to proceed; for risk, use “engineering ‘bottoms up’/ margin analysis versus TRL.” THEME 6. prototyping as a means to empower people A number of participants noted that people could be empowered to accomplish prototyping with knowledge, skills, resources, and incentives. 14 At least one participant interpreted this suggestion to be quite broad, with prototyping accepted at all levels of the ecosystem, scientists and engineers empowered to use prototyping, and processes established to take advantage of prototyping outcomes. 15 Definitions of all nine TRLs can be found in DoD’s Technology Readiness Assessment Guidance, April 2011. For example, TRL 4 means component or breadboard validation in laboratory environ- ment, TRL 6 means system/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in relevant environment, and TRL 7 means system prototype demonstration in operational environment.

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Overview 11 Many participants pointed out that the many values of prototyping cannot be fully realized unless people are empowered. Best practices for empowering that arose during the workshop include those listed below. First of all, state-of-the-art facilities, laboratories as well as associated equipment, design tools, and modeling and simulation capabilities are required. Next, repeating from an earlier theme, would be encouraging collaboration across a broad spectrum of stakeholders, not only technical people but the contract specialists and other necessary administra- tive personnel; the infrastructures affiliated with various types of “centers” to facili- tate such collaboration are vital.16 Independent R&D and modernization resources should be invested wisely with the above needs in mind. The right knowledge and skills are critical, especially those gleaned from les- sons learned and skills transferred after past successes and failures; more than one speaker emphasized this point. For example, one speaker touted “leveraging a history of developing prototypes,”17 and another speaker used the phrase “that looks about right (TLAR)” to indicate the type of knowledge and skill sets that are so important (TLAR means the judgment to estimate, based on experience, whether what is happening is approximately correct;18 prototyping gives scientists and engineers that ability). The ability to say “TLAR” is further enabled when management allows—in fact, offers incentives for—people to use time and re- sources to increase their knowledge and skills (e.g., benefit from schools; training; cross-discipline assignments to form a mobile science, technology, engineering, and math workforce; mentoring). One participant mentioned prizes and “grand challenges” as possibilities. THEME 7. fundS and incentives for prototyping Several participants noted that prototyping programs appear to work best when they include adequate funds. They also asserted that such actions could incentivize the DoD, industry, and academia to take risk and collaborate to meet the enterprise’s strategy. Gen Lyles was concerned that the Air Force no longer seems to be opening the aperture for program managers to realize the richness and value offered by prototyping tools, and he welcomed suggested ways to get the Air Force back to what it used to be with respect to prototyping. What funding it would take to do that was discussed in the context of possible approaches to permit the Air Force to 16 A participant believed this approach would be particularly true for disruptive technologies that need disruptive methods of insertion. 17 Daryl Pelc, Vice President for Engineering, Phantom Works, The Boeing Company. 18 Brian Hershberger, Senior Aeronautical Engineer, Advanced Development Programs, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics.

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12 Enhancing Air Force and D e pa rt m e n t of D efe n s e P r o t o t y p i n g do prototyping during the S&T advanced development phase. Several participants offered various opinions of how much funding would be needed to handle two or three prototypes, which could help the Air Force transition useful technologies into programs of record. The immediate issue raised, of course, was where the funds would come from.19 A couple of participants suggested that these dollars could come from finding ef- ficiencies in the acquisition programs—some efficiencies could result because of the prototyping, which would make the prototyping costs well worthwhile. An alternative approach suggested by some participants for the Air Force would be to just cancel advanced development funding under the assumption there is no need for what the advanced developments are producing. The Air Force representative said these issues applied mostly to the aircraft side, however, because the space side does a pretty good job of transitioning technology. There were many related comments by individual participants: (1) the Navy has ways of accommodating both technology push and requirements pull in its activities; (2) the Air Force problem may be one of labeling technology demon- strations as prototypes, conjuring up a big competition between companies to win a production contract; (3) if industry can see a funding line, then the Air Force and DoD may get back more because industry will put in its own funds; (4) the Air Force and DoD could rely on Congress to fund the really big ideas, but that requires a zealot to really push such things; (5) prototyping occurs at all levels and will continue regardless of what may occur at the top levels of the Air Force and DoD, so why not just stick with that model; and (6) the Air Force and DoD should examine some creative contracting processes with some sort of payback to invigorate industry’s participation in a prototyping activity. With respect to risk, a sub-theme that recurred during discussions at the work- shop was that some prototyping is no longer done because failure has become unac- ceptable. At early levels in the technology maturation process, where expenses are relatively small, some participants acknowledged that failures are expected as part of the learning process. But when one considers big, expensive, possibly spectacular prototypes that could have high payoff, it is just too risky in today’s budget-cutting environment to fail; thus, some high-payoff technologies will not get prototyped. Discussions like these led to many suggestions from various participants. For ex- ample, (1) failure should be expected during prototyping, particularly in the S&T phases; (2) prototypes must be allowed to fail without repercussions; (3) tolerance for technical risk is needed, although there is significant difference between pre- acquisition technical failures that can be beneficial and technical failures during acquisition, which should not occur; (4) failing early should be recognized as an 19 Also, see current lack of systems advanced development (6.3B) funding, which is addressed under Theme 8.

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Overview 13 affordable path to later success;20 and (5) capturing and documenting both failures and successes , in a collaborative way across many S&T entities, is key. How to incentivize the S&T community at large to take risks and not fear fail- ure was another matter. For example, one participant believed that Congressional flexibility will be required to better enable innovative prototyping by the military laboratories, which should have the ability to fail. Stated another way, S&T proto- typing of the kind described during this workshop could lead Congress to accept failures more readily than in a program of record. Finally, with respect to incentivizing collaboration, which many participants praised during the workshop, a participant suggested that one possible approach could be a program, perhaps led by DR&E and using appropriate funding mecha- nisms, to compete non-profit institutions to establish prototyping teams (with representation from government, industry, and academia). These teams would address difficult defense technical areas, such as hypersonics or electronic warfare. Winning teams, incentivized by prizes, would conduct prototyping activities to ad- dress challenges and develop products for use by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the military services. THEME 8. A technology development strategy Some participants suggested that the Air Force and the DoD could benefit from a technology development strategy that balances technology push and require- ments pull to support the grand strategy. Theme 4 identified Mr. Wyatt’s proposed strategy, which is to shift to the new model called emerging capabilities prototyping—thereby achieving better balance between technology push and requirements pull by engaging prototypes across the TRL spectrum. Funding suggestions for adding dollars to the Air Force advanced technology line were discussed under Theme 7 as a way to increase the ability to transition promising technologies into programs of record. A workshop participant volunteered an approach with some elements similar to DoD’s plan. His strategy would have prototypes, where appropriate, all along the S&T and acquisition line. Specifically, a prototype related to definition of needs; an- other related to refinement of needs and requirements; another—this time a com- petitive prototype—at the beginning of acquisition; a pre-production prototype; and, although not explicit, maybe even more—perhaps to examine sustainment issues in depth or improvements to operational or yet-to-be-produced systems. The overall goal would be to enable the application of prototyping to a diverse range of opportunities that would benefit from prototyping. In summary, the design, imple- 20 To add quantification, a participant noted that when approximately 10 percent of a program’s budget is spent, almost all of the engineering decisions have been made.

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14 Enhancing Air Force and D e pa rt m e n t of D efe n s e P r o t o t y p i n g mentation, practices, and funding would take account of the many prototyping values and best practices discussed during this workshop, with emphasis on diverse and agile application of this tool. For implementation, a government-sponsored, open, virtual, scalable, and adaptable environment was suggested, with utilization of government data bases and collaboration space for government, industry, other laboratories, and academia. Flexible contracting mechanisms would be among necessary policy changes. The prior discussion can next be elevated to the “Grand Strategy” level, ele- ments of which were in Mr. Wyatt’s presentation. He noted that Frank Kendall, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, said the following: I expect that the Department will be stretched significantly as we attempt to retain the force structure needed to execute our national security strategy while simultaneously maintaining readiness, sustaining infrastructure, recapitalizing or modernizing aging equipment, intro- ducing innovative technologies, preserving our industrial base, and ensuring the continuing technological superiority that our forces have every right to expect.21 Mr. Wyatt’s presentation ended with the statement “Prototyping offers the potential to assist the Department in addressing those expectations . . .” Figure 2-2 depicts the essence of the new operating model for prototyping and shows the direct linkage between the new approach and DoD’s overarching guidance. On the last day of the workshop, Richard Van Atta, Institute for Defense Analyses, closed his talk with the phrase “prototyping must be seen in the context of an overall innovation strategy.” DoD’s top-level strategy document (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012) lays out several key principles for the Joint Force of 2020. The final principle, which encourages and provides a framework for innovation as well as a culture of change, appears below. Finally, in adjusting our strategy and attendant force size, the Department will make every effort to maintain an adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technol- ogy. We will also encourage innovation in concepts of operation. Over the past ten years, the United States and its coalition allies and partners have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counter terrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance arenas, most often operating in uncontested sea and air environments. Accord- ingly, similar work needs to be done to ensure the United States, its allies, and partners are capable of operating in A2/AD, cyber, and other contested operating environments. To that end, the Department will both encourage a culture of change and be prudent with its “seed corn,” balancing reductions necessitated by resource pressures with the imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term payoffs. 21 Frank Kendall, USD(AT&L), Defense AT&L Magazine, Jan-Feb 2013.

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Overview 15 Overarching Guidance Sustaining US Global Leadership • Leaner, agile, flexible force, capable of operating effectively in all domains Defense Budget Priorities and Choices Focus Areas • Strategic driven shifts in force R&E Imperatives structure and modernization • Counter Anti- Measures • Mitigate current & Access/Area Denial • Reduce the cost of operations emerging threats • Increased resilience • Strengthen Partner in contested CJCSI Joint Capabilities Integration & • Enable new & Security Capacity environments Development System extend existing • Hybrid Warfare • Lifecycle affordability • Revised requirement process, with capability affordably (CVEO, counter Illicit • Shorten Delivery streamlined documentation & • Develop technology trafficking) Cycle Time timelines surprise • Lower Cost, Small Technology Planning Guidance Footprint Operations • Emphasizing Autonomy, EW/EP, D2D, ERS, CWMD, Human Systems, and Cyber Ops Better Buying Power • Increase small business opportunities Emerging Capability Prototyping Model - More strategic in nature with an increased emphasis on anticipating capability needs - Building on past prototyping studies and lessons learned FIGURE 2-2 A new operating model for prototyping in the Department of Defense. SOURCE: Earl Wyatt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding, “OSD Perspective,” presentation to the workshop on September 24, 2013. NOTE: CJCSI, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc- tion; CWMD; counter weapons of mass destruction; D2D, data to decisions; ERS, engineered resilient systems; EW/EP, electronic warfare/electronic protection. The themes of this workshop, which reflect the views of many participants, acknowledge prototyping as a powerful tool for the Air Force and DoD to use in complying with the above principle. Another element of grand strategy came from Patricia Falcone, Associate Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy. Her presentation referred to an action plan for the national security S&T enterprise. The plan, which offers a strategy for American innovation, involves people and the workforce, facilities and infrastructure, and roles and responsibilities.22,23 The DoD is a part of this plan in several contexts, such as developing breakthroughs in space capabilities and applications; innovation clusters for robotics, energy, light-weight materials, 22 Seehttp://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/InnovationStrategy.pdf. 23 A participant offered the following additional thoughts: “prototyping is broadly important for STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), and we cannot have a healthy democracy if citizens are not able to make S&T decisions.”

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16 Enhancing Air Force and D e pa rt m e n t of D efe n s e P r o t o t y p i n g and cyber-security; and advanced learning technologies. She ended with a call for enhanced prototyping competency in the DoD. The first challenge was to expand the definition of prototyping to include software, integration, and other “soft power” elements. The other challenge to DoD was “Resources must be identified.” Dr. Falcone’s final statement about resources was accompanied by the factual comment that, “Until 1998, the DoD budget included ‘6.3B’ for systems advanced development that supported rapid prototyping programs; this no longer exists.”24,25 Dr. Falcone’s factual comment and related discussions during the workshop sug- gested to many participants that returning to the past, a funded program element in S&T for prototyping, offers a way to enhance Air Force and DoD prototyping for the new defense strategy. 24 AirForce advanced development formerly contained two program elements known as 6.3A and 6.3B, the latter for technology demonstration and validation. Now there is just one program element, 6.3, advanced technology development. In this regard, and reflecting key elements of this workshop, the following recommendations on prototyping were in the Packard Commission’s report: “A high priority should be given to building and testing prototype systems and subsystems before proceeding with full-scale development. This early phase of R&D should employ extensive informal competition and use streamlined procurement processes. It should demonstrate that the new technology under test can substantially improve military capability, and should as well provide a basis for making realistic cost estimates prior to a full-scale development decision. This increased emphasis on prototyping should allow us to ‘fly and know how much it will cost before we buy.’ The proper use of operational testing is critical to improving the operations performance of new weapons. We recommend that operational testing begin early in advanced development and continue through full-scale development, using prototype hardware. . . .” See President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, June 30, 1986. pp. XXV-XXVI. 25 Funds for prototyping and the Air Force’s inability to transition promising technologies were addressed under Theme 7.