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National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine Workshop on Behavioral Research and the Secret Service: Problems in Assessing and Managing Dangerous Behavior MARCH 8 - 10, 1981 Invitational Conference Participants W. Walter Menninger, M.D., Chair (P) * Senior Staff Psychiatrist Division of Law & Psychiatry Menninger Foundation Topeka, KS Elissa P. Benedek, M.D. (P) Director Center for Forensic Psychiatry Ann Arbor, MI James H. Billings, Ph.D., M.P.H. Director Institute of Epidemiology and Behavioral Medicine San Francisco, CA Alfred Blumstein, Ph.D. Professor School of Urban and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA Sara Eddy, Ed.D. Assistant Medical Director McLean/Bridgewater Program McLean Hospital Belmont, MA Hillel Einhorn, Ph.D. Professor of Behavioral Science Director Center for Decision Research Graduate School of Business University of Chicago Chicago, IL (P) = Planning Committee Member (*) - Member, Institute of Medicine Joseph T. English, M.D. (P) * Director of Psychiatry St. Vincent's Hospital New York, NY Robert A. Fein, Ph.D. Assistant Psychologist Program Director McLean/Bridgewater Program McLean Hospital Belmont, MA Shervert H. Frazier, M.D. (P) Psychiatrist-in-Chief McLean Hospital Belmont, MA R. Kirkland Gable, Ph.D., J.D. Associate Professor Department of Psychology California Lutheran College Thousand Oaks, CA Don M.. Gottfredson, Ph.D. Dean School of Criminal Justice Rutgers University Newark, NJ 185
follow-up period. Further, this kind of follow-up study can provide associations between objective factors, known at the point of initial investigation, and subsequent overt behavior. Certain factors obviously related to risk, such as whether the individual is at large or under; restraint, would have to be controlled in the comparison. And the findings would be far from definitive. But the above study seems like the "least worst" way to approximate a validity study of Service predictions. (2) Determinants of the volume of threats. Little is known about what determines the volume of different kinds of threats against political figures over time. Since the Service does not control its own "in box," there may be value in modest explorations of variations in different types of jurisdictional threat over time, seasonal variations, and the extent to which publicized events precipitate increases or decreases in the volume of particular types of threatening gestures. Unlike the proxy validation study suggested above, preliminary soundings on variations over time or with events on the volume of jurisdictional threats could begin as a low cost, in-house activity of the Service. Indeed, some of the basic data may have already been collected for housekeeping or analytic purposes. Exposing social and behavioral science consultants to these preliminary soundings could then lead to more sophisticated designs for collaborative research. (3) A "stress interview" experiment. Questions about the stress interview occurred early in Secret Service request for technical assistance. Here there might be room for a random assignment experiment. Given the large numbers of new cases, the question is really how to determine to what extent increasing the "temperature" of an interview increases its informational yield. Randomly assigning all or some classes of Secret Service interviews between stress and non-stress modes might help answer the question. It is possible to find put whether stress interviews increase the initial confidence of the agent. Further, the five year follow-up might tell the Service whether this particular device improves prediction of dangerousness. 184