National Academies Press: OpenBook

2003-2004 Assessment of the Army Research Laboratory (2005)

Chapter: 5 Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate

« Previous: 4 Sensors and Electron Devices Directorate
Suggested Citation:"5 Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate." National Research Council. 2005. 2003-2004 Assessment of the Army Research Laboratory. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18595.
×
Page 27
Suggested Citation:"5 Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate." National Research Council. 2005. 2003-2004 Assessment of the Army Research Laboratory. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18595.
×
Page 28
Suggested Citation:"5 Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate." National Research Council. 2005. 2003-2004 Assessment of the Army Research Laboratory. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18595.
×
Page 29
Suggested Citation:"5 Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate." National Research Council. 2005. 2003-2004 Assessment of the Army Research Laboratory. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18595.
×
Page 30

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

5 Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate INTRODUCTION The Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate (SLAD) was reviewed by the Panel on Surviv- ability and Lethality Analysis. SLAD is the U.S. Army’s primary source of survivability, lethality, and vulnerability (SLV) analysis and evaluation support with regard to major Army systems. SLAD’s general objective is to ensure that soldiers and systems can survive and function on the battlefield. Its mission includes the following tasks: provide SLV analysis and evaluation support over the entire life cycle of major Army systems and help acquire systems that will survive and/or be highly lethal in all environments against the full spectrum of battlefield threats; provide advice and consultation on SLV issues to Department of the Army Headquarters, to program executive officers (PEOs) and program managers (PMs), evaluators, combat developers, battle laboratories, for intelligence activities, and other Department of the Army and Department of Defense (DOD) activities; conduct investigations, experi- ments, simulations, and analyses to quantify the SLV of Army and selected foreign weapon systems; provide well-documented, timely technical judgments on complex SLV issues; perform special studies and make recommendations regarding tactics, techniques, or design modifications for reducing vulner- ability and enhancing the survivability and lethality of Army materiel; and develop tools, techniques, and methodologies for improving SLV analysis. Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A respectively characterize the funding profile and the staffing profile for SLAD. CHANGES SINCE THE PREVIOUS REVIEW The major change since the previous ARL biennial assessment report is in the area of system-of- systems vulnerabilities, in which SLAD has made significant advances as described below. Since the previous report, the directorate has also, in response to specific panel recommendations, developed a 27

28 2003–2004 ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY RESEARCH LABORATORY strategic plan, implemented hiring initiatives, developed and implemented data management initiatives, and has been addressing insularity issues. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES Most Significant Advances The quality and understanding of the Systems of Systems Survivability Simulation (S4) software, formerly Decision Related Structures (DRS) software, have improved significantly. The articulation and implementation of the Mission and Means Framework (MMF) software, with its emphasis on mission rather than on platform survivability, are a major step forward. The MUVES-3 (Modular UNIX-based Vulnerability Estimation Suite, formerly the RIVA) is a well-managed, forward-looking approach to integrating important SLAD tools and is progressing nicely. The Target Interaction Lethality Vulner- ability (TILV) software program has been developing physics-based target interaction models to be integrated with MUVES-3. The Electro-Optical Countermeasures Missile Flight Simulation Laboratory is a well-done hardware-in-the-loop simulation of an important survivability question for all (not just military) air assets. Opportunities and Challenges The S4 program provides a major opportunity for SLAD. The Army and the military in general need to develop or acquire appropriate tools for analyzing the vulnerabilities of system-of-systems software. Relatively little is known in this area, and much needs to be done. SLAD’s opportunities are to lead the development of the technologies to do the job and to establish an Army and military-wide leadership position in system-of-systems vulnerability work. Besides being an opportunity, S4 presents a signifi- cant challenge for SLAD that will continue for many years. Monitoring this rapidly expanding area, developing requirements, leading tool development, and hiring new people with the needed skills will all place significant demands on SLAD’s expertise, management, and resources. Information assurance in the areas of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the- shelf (GOTS) products may offer another opportunity for SLAD to take a leadership role in solving an important government and industrial problem. Despite the emergence of new challenges in S4 and related areas, traditional threats are not disap- pearing. The Army will continue to need SLAD’s world-class skills in ballistics survivability and lethality. Therefore, a second major challenge, especially to SLAD’s management, will be to balance growth in the areas of S4 and information warfare (IW), information operations (IO), and electronic warfare (EW) without sacrificing its ballistics capabilities. COTS/GOTS vulnerabilities will remain a significant challenge for the near future. SLAD will continue to have workforce issues as it builds the expertise needed to meet the challenges of information assurance and system-of-systems vulnerabilities while confronting issues surrounding the aging of its workforce. CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARMY NEEDS AND THE BROADER COMMUNITY Contributions to Army Needs SLAD programs and projects are well managed and clearly focused on Army needs. The scientists and engineers and managers at SLAD have a shared, clear understanding of the importance of their work and how it fits into Army plans and meets Army requirements.

SURVIVABILITY AND LETHALITY ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE 29 SLAD continues its outstanding work in ballistics and is a world leader in this area. Overall, numerical and experimental evaluation procedures are sound, and SLAD is doing an excellent job of its conventional mission. SLAD receives high marks in its support of Army programs. One example is its Aircraft Program Support for the live-fire testing of helicopter rotorblades. Another example of outstanding SLAD capability is the Electro-Optical Countermeasures Missile Flight Simulation Laboratory. This is a powerful representation of the strength of SLAD’s mission capabilities in the area of weapons system survivability and lethality. SLAD clearly has a world-class capability in evaluating countermeasures to infrared-seeking missiles and is deeply involved in relevant U.S. programs. SLAD is doing a good job of improving its capabilities. Specifically, it is improving the efficiency of Ballistic Research Laboratory Computer-Aided Design software, developing methodologies for in- cluding fire and blast/shock effects in vulnerability and lethality assessments, improving the MUVES model, and developing techniques for incorporating progressive degradation of weapons systems in simulations. The Ballistics and NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Division struggles in the area of NBC warfare, although not from a lack of expertise or interest. The problem is a lack of resources. However, potential adversaries that either have built or are actively building offensive chemical warfare capabili- ties see these capabilities as an important asymmetric response to U.S. forces. Therefore, the Panel and the Board commend SLAD for keeping its NBC capabilities alive. They recommend that SLAD care- fully document and highlight inadequacies in NBC vulnerability analysis at every opportunity. Such efforts will make sure that Army leadership is aware of this shortcoming and of the consequences of addressing or not addressing these inadequacies. SLAD has struggled in recent years with the emerging and vexing area of system-of-systems vulnerability. The struggles now appear to be paying off. The directorate has developed an agent-based approach to System of Systems Survivability Simulation that it is implementing and testing. Addition- ally, with the Mission and Means Framework approach, SLAD has established a strong scientific basis for analyzing and understanding vulnerabilities. This approach would seem to work for both the ballis- tics and the system-of-systems work, thereby providing a unifying structure for the two major compo- nents of SLAD’s mission. This structure had been lacking in the past. The Information and Electronics Protection Division continues to grapple with the problem of COTS/GOTS vulnerabilities. This will remain a difficult problem, because it appears to require a great deal of vendor cooperation, which has been lacking in the past. Understanding the vulnerabilities of a proprietary off-the-shelf system presents significant challenges. SLAD has taken significant steps to improve its visibility and to increase its effectiveness within the Army. The directorate now has a planned thrust to establish a survivability and lethality assessment role with the Missile Defense Agency. SLAD is also involved in the initial stages of Stryker, Future Combat System, Land Warrior, and Air Warrior development, though resources for this involvement are stretched very thin. Additionally, the directorate has contact with the Training and Doctrine Command related to the improvement of wargaming techniques for evaluating tactics and to the Decision Related Structures modeling work. SLAD also has a number of ongoing intramilitary collaborations, including, for ex- ample, memberships on Source Selection Evaluation Boards and the Nuclear and Chemical Survivabil- ity Committee, participation in symposia, data exchange agreements with foreign partners, and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programs for crew seat protection and blast/shock analysis. Several SLAD projects demonstrate good transition potential. The S4 program addresses a critical Army need to simulate and analyze system-of-systems vulnerabilities. The Electro-Optical Counter- measures Missile Flight Simulation Laboratory addresses an important survivability question for all air

30 2003–2004 ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY RESEARCH LABORATORY assets. MUVES-3, informed by physics-based models generated by TILV, is a central modeling and simulation capability for the Army. TILV is adding critical models, including Shock and Blast, Active Protection Systems, Military Operations in Urban Terrain, and Behind Armor Debris. Data management initiatives undertaken by SLAD will help the directorate deal with the thousands of data requests that it receives and will help leverage precious resources. The improvised explosive device (IED) countermeasure equipment should be in the theater by September 2004. Approximately 500 of the countermeasure devices should be in theater by the end of November 2004. The U.S. Air Force has also ordered IED countermeasure equipment devices, as have several other government agencies. This program appears to be a major success for SLAD and for ARL. SLAD also supported an Information Assurance Network Assessment of three network architec- tures currently deployed in theater. The survivability link cannot as yet be considered operational. However, the Panel and the Board are particularly impressed with the survivability link between SLAD and deployed units that is being established on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRnet). Contributions to the Broader Community Although SLAD is becoming less insular within the academic community, the directorate still has much work to do in this regard, especially in the area of information warfare. In the area of computer and network security, SLAD remains very isolated from the mainstream of academic work in the United States. The Panel sees signs that this is changing, but the Panel and the Board still encourage SLAD to continue deepening its contacts with the academic community and to become more involved with professional activities. There are examples of SLAD involvement in the wider community. SLAD has built good relation- ships with the University of Texas at El Paso, New Mexico State University, and Texas A&M Univer- sity. SLAD staff are involved in professional activities with the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the Society for Industrial Mathemat- ics. SLAD’s professional participation in these societies is one indicator of its growing professional status. SLAD staff have also contributed presentations to the proceedings of technical conferences and symposia. RELEVANCE OF CROSSCUTTING ISSUES TO THIS DIRECTORATE SLAD’s work is critically dependent on the validity of its models and simulations. Many of the models being developed in the TILV program and which then inform the MUVES-3 analyses suffer from a scarcity of actual physical data. Thus, verification and validation become an even more difficult problem for these models. If SLAD is going to continue to move from physical testing to modeling and simulation—and it must—it is of paramount importance that it develop methods for first verifying that codes are working correctly and then for validating that results from modeling and simulation are related to the actual, physical reality, especially when physical data are scarce and reduction to first principles is prohibitive. Information security, especially with COTS/GOTS software, is a problem of critical importance throughout the military and industry. SLAD has an important role to fill in this area with regard to battlefield information assurance, but this is an ARL-wide issue that cannot be solved by SLAD alone.

Next: 6 Vehicle Technology Directorate »
2003-2004 Assessment of the Army Research Laboratory Get This Book
×
 2003-2004 Assessment of the Army Research Laboratory
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

READ FREE ONLINE

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!