Science Needs for
Microbial Forensics
DEVELOPING INITIAL INTERNATIONAL
RESEARCH PRIORITIES
Committee on Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:
Developing an Initial International Roadmap
Board on Life Sciences
Division on Earth and Life Studies
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
In cooperation with
The Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts
The U.K. Royal Society and
The International Union of Microbiological Societies
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C.
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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This study was supported by Contract No. 10001173 between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Navy, by purchase order SAQMMA13M2120 from the U.S. Department of State to the National Academy of Sciences, and by internal support from the National Academy of Sciences. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.
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International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-30245-5
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE NEEDS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS: DEVELOPING AN INITIAL INTERNATIONAL ROADMAP
Members
JOHN D. CLEMENTS (Chair), Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
MUNIRUL ALAM, International Center for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, Dhaka, Bangladesh
BRUCE BUDOWLE, Institute of Applied Genetics, University of North Texas Health Science Center, Fort Worth
JONGSIK CHUN, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea
RITA R. COLWELL, University of Maryland, College Park
NANCY D. CONNELL, Rutgers New Jersey Medical School, Rutgers University, Newark
PAUL KEIM, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff
JUNCAI MA, WFCC-MIRCEN World Data Center of Microorganisms (WDCM), Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
ALEMKA MARKOTIĆ, University Hospital for Infectious Diseases, Zagreb, Croatia
GEOFFREY SMITH, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
Staff
FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Study Director and Director, Board on Life Sciences
JO L. HUSBANDS, Scholar/Senior Project Director, Board on Life Sciences
CARL ANDERSON, Program Associate, Board on Life Sciences
JENNA OGILVIE, Senior Program Assistant, Board on Life Sciences
BENJAMIN RUSEK, Program Officer, Committee on International Security and Arms Control
KRISTIN WHITE, Consultant Writer
BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES
Members
JAMES P. COLLINS (Chair), Arizona State University, Tempe
ENRIQUETA C. BOND, Burroughs Wellcome Fund (retired), Marshall, Virginia
ROGER D. CONE, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, Tennessee
SEAN EDDY, HHMI Janelia Farm Research Campus, Ashburn, Virginia
SARAH C. R. ELGIN, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri
DAVID R. FRANZ, Former Cdr USAMRIID; Consultant, Frederick, Maryland
LOUIS J. GROSS, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
ELIZABETH HEITMAN, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, Tennessee
JOHN G. HILDEBRAND, University of Arizona, Tucson
RICHARD A. JOHNSON, Arnold & Porter, LLC, Washington, D.C.
JUDITH KIMBLE, University of Wisconsin, Madison
CATO T. LAURENCIN, University of Connecticut Health Center, Farmington
ALAN I. LESHNER, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C.
KAREN E. NELSON, J. Craig Venter Institute, Rockville, Maryland
ROBERT M. NEREM, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta
CAMILLE PARMESAN, University of Texas, Austin
ALISON G. POWER, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
MARGARET RILEY, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
JANIS C. WEEKS, University of Oregon, Eugene
MARY WOOLLEY, Research!America, Alexandria, Virginia
Staff
FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Director
JO L. HUSBANDS, Scholar/Senior Project Director
JAY B. LABOV, Senior Scientist/Program Director for Biology Education
KATHERINE W. BOWMAN, Senior Program Officer
INDIA HOOK-BARNARD, Senior Program Officer
MARILEE K. SHELTON-DAVENPORT, Senior Program Officer
KEEGAN SAWYER, Program Officer
BETHELHEM MEKASHA, Financial Associate
ANGELA KOLESNIKOVA, Administrative Assistant
JENNA OGILVIE, Senior Project Assistant
LAUREN SONI, Senior Project Assistant
Preface
In September 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, someone placed letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores into a mailbox in Trenton, New Jersey. Those letters were addressed to several media outlets, including ABC, NBC, CBS, the New York Post, and American Media, Inc. in Boca Raton, Florida. The recipients of one of the letters, Mr. Robert Stevens, was the first person to die in what has become known as the anthrax letters attack and designated as the “Amerithrax” investigation by the FBI. At first, diagnosis of Mr. Stevens’ illness was complicated by the absence of any suspicion that would make anthrax part of the differential diagnosis for a 63-year-old man in Boca Raton. Once a diagnosis of anthrax was made, health care workers and epidemiologists began trying to understand how an office worker could come in contact with B. anthracis, the causative agent of the disease anthrax. One possible, though unlikely, scenario that was widely touted at the time was that he had come across an infected animal, perhaps a beaver, while on a recent hiking trip. The receipt of an array of letters filled with white powder soon confirmed that this was a bioterrorist attack and not a natural occurrence. In early October, the perpetrator mailed a second set of letters containing a more highly refined preparation of spores, this time addressed to Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. Once it was clear that there was an ongoing threat, extensive efforts were begun to identify the source and characteristics of the material used in the attack. What became immediately clear in the midst of heroic efforts to discern the cause and source of the anthrax mailings
was that we were unprepared to analyze the microbial forensic evidence associated with this attack.
At the time, most diagnostic and epidemiological characterizations of infectious diseases were based on illness, culture, serology, physical characteristics, and metabolic profiles of infectious organisms—processes that take time and require pure cultures of viable microorganisms. There was a nascent field of microbial forensics, which had begun in the United States in the preceding decade with the formation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit. The Unit was created in part to support suspected or known bioterrorism investigations by providing investigative leads and supporting prosecutions or exonerations with scientific evidence. The Unit was a law enforcement operation designed to employ forensic science principles and practices to produce evidence that would be admissible in court according to U.S. legal requirements and standards. The Amerithrax investigation accelerated the development of the field of microbial forensics, resulting in remarkable development and applications of new techniques and approaches for using laboratory tools to pinpoint the identity of a microbial agent. Microbial forensics became an essential part of the scientific investigation, which was combined with physicochemical analyses as well as other nonscientific types of evidence to narrow the search for the source of the B. anthracis used in the attacks.
Today we find ourselves with a complex infrastructure of government agencies, Select Agent registries, regulated research, environmental monitoring in designated cities, federal and state regulations—all resulting from one more or less successful biological attack on the United States. The Amerithrax attack with highly refined material produced by a knowledgeable expert (presumably in a U.S. bioweapons laboratory) resulted in 22 illnesses and 5 deaths. Approximately 4 g of material were used in the Amerithrax attack. At that time, the United States planned and prepared as best it could for an attack involving 50 kg of weaponized anthrax spores released on a city with a population of 500,000, anticipating 125,000 casualties. However, it is unlikely that a nonstate entity would be able to produce that quality or quantity of material undetected. Moreover, aside from B. anthracis, there are few (if any) biological agents that can be grown in quantity, viably maintained, stabilized, processed to the appropriate size, and delivered in an aerosolizable form except by a few specialized bioweapons facilities and certainly not by terrorists in a garage or cave. Most exotic microorganisms are just too difficult to grow and keep alive, even in the most sophisticated facility. In addition, the technology involved in weaponizing biological materials is complex, demanding, and requires substantial expertise. The more likely scenario is someone having access to a small amount of unrefined material that he/she uses to make
a few individuals ill (causing perhaps a few deaths), the consequence of which will be a nation paralyzed with fear, not illness.
In that context, microbial forensics becomes more important than ever. How does one differentiate a natural outbreak from an accidental release from a legitimate laboratory, or the use of biological material to commit a crime, bioterrorism, and all-out biological warfare? How can this be accomplished quickly enough to inform law enforcement, the intelligence community, policy makers, and the public in a timely fashion? The traditional clinical laboratory sciences of culture identification, serology, etc. are inadequate for these purposes. It was with this background that the workshop in Zagreb, Croatia, was held in October 2013 with the intent to identify the scientific challenges that must be met to improve the capability of microbial forensics to investigate suspected outbreaks and to provide evidence of sufficient quality to support responses, legal proceedings, and the development of government policies. The workshop also was designed to increase awareness of microbial forensics among the members of the larger international scientific communities and to engage these communities in the development of a plan on how to address scientific challenges.
One of the more important concepts discussed during the workshop was that the techniques of microbial forensics could aid not only law enforcement and policy makers, but also public health workers, in trying to identify the existence and source of natural outbreaks. Indeed, as we saw in the Amerithrax attack, the public health system will likely be the first to encounter and the first line of defense against a biological attack. Most infectious diseases develop gradually, with individual patients seeking medical care through their local health care providers. People vary in their susceptibility to infectious diseases, and subtle clues may signal an attack, such as an increase in frequency of a naturally occurring infectious disease, unusual seasonality, unexpected resistance to antimicrobials, or unusual age distribution. These features are likely to be recognized first in the public health arena, and the more common the tools and techniques are between law enforcement and public health, the more likely that a true attack will be identified early, perhaps in time to administer prophylactic antibiotics or vaccines or prevent a second release. Moreover, the further we get from an actual attack, the less inclined policy makers are to provide financial support for continuing the research necessary to prepare for an attack. As noted in the 2013 President’s Report for the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013):
Many of the capabilities required for detecting and responding to the whole spectrum of natural, intentional, and man-made events are essentially the same. Systems and networks that might be created for rare
events will atrophy through lack of use, whereas systems created for addressing natural, man-made and accidental outbreaks of infectious disease are likely to be used frequently. Relying on tools and systems that are compatible with both rare and common occurrences means that in an instance of a rare event, detection and response will not be delayed by lack of familiarity with the tools or systems of reporting.
On behalf of the entire committee, I wish to extend our sincere gratitude to the excellent staff at the National Academies. It is because of the dedication and extraordinary efforts of Fran Sharples, Director of the Board on Life Sciences at the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), that we were able to complete this ambitious task in so short a time. The committee also wishes to thank Jo Husbands from the NAS staff and our colleagues at the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Jelena Dukic, the Director of International Cooperation, and Ninja Ivanus from her staff, for their outstanding contributions to the design and organization of the workshop. Our colleagues from the U.K. Royal Society and the International Union of Microbiological Societies provided important support and ideas throughout the process. I also want to thank my fellow committee members for their commitment that made the workshop and writing of this report an enjoyable and rewarding opportunity.
John D. Clements, Chair
Acknowledgments
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Academies’ Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process.
We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Kenneth Berns, University of Florida
Aaron Darling, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
Sean Eddy, HHMI Janelia Farm Research Campus
Jens Kuhn, Integrated Research Facility, Fort Detrick, National Institutes of Health
Ian Lipkin, Columbia University
Stephen Morse, Columbia University
Karen Nelson, J. Craig Venter Institute
Tom Slezak, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Tim Trevan, International Council for the Life Sciences
David Walt, Tufts University
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the committee’s conclusions, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Ronald S. Brookmeyer, University of California, Los Angeles, and Ronald M. Atlas, University of Louisville. Appointed by the National Academies, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.
Contents
1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS MICROBIAL FORENSICS AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
2 MICROBIAL SCIENCE: ECOLOGY, DIVERSITY, AND CHARACTERIZING THE MICROBIAL WORLD
3 MICROBIAL FORENSICS AND CLINICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS: COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES
4 CLINICAL AND FORENSIC APPROACHES TO MICROBIAL IDENTIFICATION
5 SAMPLING AND PRESERVATION METHODS
6 VALIDATION AND REFERENCE MATERIALS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
BOXES
S-1 Priority Categories for Microbial Forensics Needs
1-2 Questions Forensics Can Help Answer
1-3 Forensic Science Methods and System Elements
1-4 Murch’s Scenario 1—Unknown Outbreak, No Indigenous Capability
1-5 Murch’s Scenario 2—Viral Outbreak: Bioattack? Genetic Engineering? Multiple Countries Involved
1-6 Murch’s Scenario 3—Alleged Strategic Attack
1-7 Relevant Articles of the Biological Weapons Convention
3-1 Epidemiological Clues That May Signal a Biological or Chemical Terrorist Attack
3-2 Rapid NGS Diagnostic Applications and Public Health Microbiology
5-1 Sampling and Handling Goals
5-2 Sample Matrices for Evidence Collection
5-3 Potential Food and Agriculture Targets
5-4 Plants Are Vulnerable and Efficacious Targets for Agroterrorism
5-6 Comprehensive Plan for Sampling and Collection
6-1 Validation for the Analysis Stage
6-3 Challenges for Any Target: Source Exclusion, Association, and Attribution
6-4 Microbial Forensics Questions: Genetics
6-5 A Bioinformatics Toolbox for Microbial Forensics
6-6 Inference and Error Issues
6-7 Gaps in Standard Reference Materials (SRMs)
6-9 Databases and Resources: The World Data Centre for Microorganisms (WDCM)
6-10 Proposed Global Catalogue for Microbial Forensics
FIGURES
1-1 Spectrum of risks due to biological agents
2-1 Variants of representative colonies of each of the morphotypes of B. anthracis Ames
2-2 Worldwide distribution of B. anthracis clonal lineages
2-3 Three classifications of bacterial pathogens
2-5 Red lineages represent HIV sequences from the suspected perpetrator
3-1 The microbial forensic process
3-2 Events timeline of enterohemorrhagic E. coli O104:H4 outbreak
3-3 A ranking of the discriminatory power of microbial typing approaches
3-4 Four approaches to using whole-genome sequencing
3-5 Differences from the Index Case in the NS5B region
3-6 Maximum likelihood tree for cloned sequences in the E1-E2 region
6-1 Process of implementing a test for diagnostic use
6-2 Performance characteristics, error types, and measurement metrics
List of Acronyms and Initialisms
AAM |
American Academy of Microbiology |
ABC |
American Broadcasting Company |
ABC |
Analyzer of Bio-resource Citations |
ACD |
Advisory Committee to the Director |
AMD |
advanced molecular detection |
ANI |
Average Nucleotide Identity |
ASM |
American Society for Microbiology |
ASPR |
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response |
ATCC |
American Type Culture Collection |
ATM |
atomic force microscopy |
AWS |
Amazon Web Services |
BEAST |
Bayesian evolutionary analysis by sampling trees |
BfR |
Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung (Federal Institute of Risk Assessment, Germany) |
BGI |
Beijing Genomics Institute (People’s Republic of China) |
BLAST |
Basic Local Alignment Search Tool |
BSL |
biosafety level |
BWC |
Biological Weapons Convention |
canSNP |
canonical single-nucleotide polymorphism |
CAP |
College of American Pathologists |
CAP |
Certified Authorization Professional |
CBRND |
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense |
CBS |
Columbia Broadcasting System (now operating as CBS Broadcasting, Inc.) |
CCINFO |
World Directory of Culture Collections |
CDC |
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |
CEO |
chief executive officer |
CLIA |
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments |
CODATA |
Committee on Data for Science and Technology |
CODIS |
Combined DNA Index System |
COMCOFs |
committees, commissions, and federations |
CPU |
central processing unit |
DGA |
French Ministry of Defense |
DHHS |
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services |
DNA |
deoxyribonucleic acid |
dNTP |
deoxynucleotide triphosphates |
DOE |
U.S. Department of Energy |
DTRA |
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (part of the U.S. Department of Defense) |
EAEC |
enteroaggregative Escherichia coli |
EBI |
European Bioinformatics Institute |
ECL |
electrochemiluminescence |
EDA |
Economic Development Administration |
EDC |
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (Sweden) |
EHEC |
enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli |
ELISA |
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay |
EM |
electron microscopy |
ENCODE |
Encyclopedia of DNA Elements |
env |
HIV retrovirus envelope gene |
EPA |
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency |
ESI |
electrospray ionization |
EU |
European Union |
FAO |
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization |
FAZD |
National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense |
FBI |
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation |
FCA |
Fellow of the Croatian Academy |
FDA |
U.S. Food and Drug Administration |
FEMA |
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency |
FOI |
Swedish Defense Research Agency |
GAO |
U.S. Government Accountability Office |
GCM |
Global Catalogue of Microorganisms |
GHDP |
genomically highly diversified pathogen |
GIDP |
genomically intermediately diversified pathogen |
GISAID |
Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data |
GLEWS |
Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases, Including Zoonoses |
GMMP |
genomically monomorphic pathogen |
GOARN |
Global Alert and Response Network |
GPHIN |
Global Public Health Intelligence Network |
GPU |
graphics processing unit |
HAZMAT |
hazardous materials and items |
HCV |
hepatitis C virus |
HFRS |
hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome |
HHMI |
Howard Hughes Medical Institute |
HIV-1 |
human immunodeficiency virus 1 |
HMM |
Hidden Markov Model |
HMRU |
Hazardous Materials Response Unit |
HPA |
Health Protection Agency (United Kingdom) |
HPS |
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome |
HSPD |
Homeland Security Presidential Directive |
HUS |
hemolytic uremic syndrome |
HVAC |
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning |
HVR |
hypervariable region |
IAEA |
International Atomic Energy Agency |
IBD-BIOM |
Inflammatory Bowel Disease Biomarkers Program |
iBOL |
International Barcode of Life Project |
ICDDRB |
International Center for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, Bangladesh |
ICFMH-WPCM |
Working Party on Culture Media of the International Committee on Food Microbiology and Hygiene |
ICRC |
International Committee for the Red Cross |
ICSU |
International Council of Science |
IDA |
Institute for Defense Analyses |
IHR |
International Health Regulations |
IMCAS |
Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences |
IMG |
Integrated Microbial Genomes |
INTERPOL |
International Criminal Police Organization |
IOM |
Institute of Medicine |
ISABS |
International Society of Applied Biological Sciences |
ISO |
International Organization for Standardization |
IT |
information technology |
IUBS |
International Union of Biological Sciences |
IUMS |
International Union of Microbiological Societies |
IV |
intravenous |
JAMA |
Journal of the American Medical Association |
JGI |
Joint Genome Institute (U.S. Department of Energy) |
LPSN |
List of Prokaryotic Names with Standing in Nomenclature |
LRN |
Laboratory Response Network |
LT |
Life Technologies Group |
MALDI-TOF |
matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight |
Mb |
megabyte |
MDS |
minimum datasets |
MERS |
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome |
MGIT |
mycobacterial growth indicator tube |
MG-RAST |
Metagenomics Rapid Annotations using Subsystems Technology |
MiSeq |
benchtop NGS instrument manufactured by Illumina |
MLST |
multilocus sequence typing |
MLST+ |
core-genome MLST |
MLVA |
multilocus VNTR analysis |
MPS |
massively parallel sequencing |
MRCA |
most recent common ancestor |
MRSA |
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus |
NAS |
U.S. National Academy of Sciences |
NATO |
North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
NAU |
Northern Arizona University |
NBACC |
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center |
NBAS |
National Biosurveillance Advisory Committee |
NBC |
National Broadcasting Company |
NBFAC |
National BioForensic Analysis Center |
NBTCC |
National Biological Threat Characterization Center |
NCBI |
National Center for Biotechnology Information |
NeCTAR |
National eResearch Tools and Resources |
NGO |
nongovernmental organization |
NGS |
next-generation gene sequencing |
NIAID |
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, NIH |
NIH |
National Institutes of Health |
NIST |
National Institute of Standards and Technology |
NRC |
National Research Council |
NSTC |
National Science and Technology Council |
OIE |
World Organization for Animal Health |
OPCW |
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons |
PATH |
Program for Appropriate Technology in Health |
PC |
personal computer |
PCR |
polymerase chain reaction |
PFGE |
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis |
PGM |
Ion Torrent Personal Genome Machine™ |
PHEIC |
Public Health Emergency of International Concern |
PI |
principal investigator |
PIXE |
particle-induced X-ray emission |
PLOS |
Public Library of Science |
PNAS |
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences |
Pol |
HIV retrovirus polymerase gene |
PPE |
personal protective equipment |
PS |
presumed source |
PUUV |
Puumala virus |
QA/QC |
quality assurance and quality control |
qPCR |
quantitative PCR |
RAPD |
random amplified polymorphic DNA |
RDS |
recommended datasets |
RFLP |
restriction fragment length polymorphism |
RIPL |
Rare and Imported Pathogens Laboratory |
RIVM |
Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment |
RKI |
Robert Koch Institute (Germany) |
rMLST |
ribosomal MLST |
RNA |
ribonucleic acid |
RNJMS |
Rutgers New Jersey Medical School |
rRNA |
ribosomal RNA |
R&D |
research and development |
SARS |
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome |
SEM |
scanning electron microscope |
SIMS |
secondary ion mass spectroscopy |
SMRT |
single-molecule real time |
SNP |
single-nucleotide polymorphism |
SOAP |
Short Oligonucleotide Analysis Package |
SOP |
standard operating protocols (or procedures) |
SRM |
Standard Reference Materials |
SSD |
solid-state disk |
S&T |
science and technology |
TB |
terabyte |
TEM |
transmission electron microscope |
TGen |
Translational Genomics Research Institute |
TIGR |
The Institute for Genomic Research |
TTP |
thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura |
UHID |
University Hospital for Infectious Diseases |
U.K. |
United Kingdom |
UKM |
University Hospital Muenster (Germany) |
U.N. |
United Nations |
UNESCO |
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
UNICRI |
U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute |
UNIDIR |
U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research |
U.S. |
United States of America |
USAMRIID |
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases |
USDA |
U.S. Department of Agriculture |
VNTR |
variable number tandem repeat |
WDCM |
World Data Center of Microorganisms |
WFCC-MIRCEN |
World Federation for Culture Collections—Microbial Resources Centers Network |
WGS |
whole-genome sequencing |
WHO |
World Health Organization |
WIPO |
World Intellectual Property Organization |
WMD |
weapons of mass destruction |