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2 Why Do We Go There? 2.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter contains three separate though inter-related pieces of work, responsive to various elements of the charge to this committee. First, it reports on and presents the results of two outreach efforts from the committee to communities interested in space to gather ideas and inputs that could help inform our work: a call for white papers on topics related to the committee’s charge and a day of Twitter conversations on a Twitter hashtag, #HumansInSpace. Second, it elaborates on the considerations that led the committee to formulate the enduring questions presented in Chapter 1. This is then followed by a discussion of the rationales that are, and have historically been, advanced to justify why the United States should engage in a human spaceflight program. Rationales effectively define the goals and aspirations toward which such a program can make contributions. Finally, as requested in the committee’s charge, the combination of these rationales is addressed in the language of a value proposition, which provides an alternate way to express rationales for such a program. 2.2 OUTREACH EFFORTS A difficult but inescapable challenge to the committee’s work was the fact that much of the rationale for human spaceflight is difficult to evaluate using solely quantitative and analytical methods. The cultural significance of human spaceflight resonates in many ways in society. The committee’s examination, therefore, included consideration of insights from a variety of avenues, including insights provided by popular culture. (Elsewhere in the report, the committee observes, for example, the prevalence of human spaceflight themes in movies, advertisements, and other media.) As part of this outreach effort, and in order to cast the net as broadly as possible when examining a question that speaks as much to cultural and philosophical concerns as it does to practical benefits, the committee invited comments via social media. Together with a call for white papers that asked respondents to provide their ideas and thoughts for ensuring a sustainable human spaceflight program, a Twitter campaign was conducted for 1 day, seeking the public’s “best ideas” along the same lines. The intention was not to develop a statistically robust sampling frame, but to “cast a wider net” soliciting ideas, thoughts, and perspectives from individuals and groups engaged enough with the topic that they would take the time to respond. Insights gained from sources such as social media and popular culture are not without utility, and, while not replacing the quantitative investigations of public opinion discussed in Chapter 3, they have a place in this inquiry. In economics, for instance, it is commonly accepted that emotional and psychological factors can weigh as heavily in human aspirations and eventual outcomes as hard calculations of cost and benefit. John Maynard Keynes memorably wrote, “(A) large portion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than material expectations. . . Most probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-1

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probabilities.”1 Keynes was referring to the decisions of investors, but his observation could reasonably be applied to the academic and career choices of young students, the passion of scientists whose work produces technological and economic bounties of utterly unforeseen character, or of explorers who venture to a new frontier. It is important to note that the logic of the call for white papers, tweets, and similar data inputs does not produce results that can be generalized; in other words, they are not representative samples from any group or population. No conclusions may be drawn from them about opinions or perceptions of “the public,” nor can any estimates be made about trends or percentages of people who hold one opinion or another. What can be said is that the opinions, positions, and arguments communicated to the committee through these venues are valuable sources of ideas and perspectives that might not otherwise be captured through more traditional polling and sampling methodologies. As such, they were useful to the committee’s deliberations, helping to ensure that it did not overlook points of view that might otherwise not be visible. The committee primarily reached out to key influencers within the science and technology communities who maintain anywhere between a moderate to high level of attention to space-related topics. Among the social structures that were contacted include science institutions, universities, professional organizations, blogs (e.g., Boing Boing, io9, Wired), and social media (e.g., NASA, Tim O’Reilly, Science Friday). Respondents to the call for white papers were asked the following questions:  What are the important benefits provided to the United States and other countries by human spaceflight endeavors?  What are the greatest challenges to sustaining a U.S. government program in human spaceflight?  What are the ramifications and what would the nation and world lose if the United States terminated NASA’s human spaceflight program? Close to 200 white papers were submitted to the committee answering the call for input.2 Many of them came from individuals deeply engaged with NASA’s work and contributed thoughtful analyses of specific issues that the authors felt the committee needed to be better informed about. All were read by two or more committee members, and the committee devoted time to discuss what they had read and to point out significant papers for the full committee to read. Ideas that made a strong appearance within the white papers included the following: significantly increasing support and recognition of commercial spaceflight efforts, exploiting space for economic benefits, increasing international partnerships, and increasing focus on technology development. Participants in the Twitter campaign were asked to answer the following question: What are your best ideas for creating a NASA human spaceflight program that is sustainable over the next several decades? Over a period of 27 hours, tweets and retweets made using the Twitter hashtag #HumansInSpace were captured and reviewed.3 A total of 3,861 tweets and retweets, made by 1,829 unique users who have a collective 13.75 million followers, were captured during the Twitter campaign. Tweets related to the promotion of the campaign itself, and all retweets were filtered out. An approximate 1,604 original tweets made by 710 unique users directly answered the call for ideas. 1 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Book 4, Chapter 12, Section 7, p. 161, Palgrave Macmillan, 1936. 2 At the time of this writing these can be viewed at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/aseboutreach/publicviewhumanspaceflight.aspx. 3 Access to the public discuss via Twitter was available at the committee’s website at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/DEPS/ASEB/DEPS_085240. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-2

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FIGURE 2.1 Example tweets providing ideas for a sustainable U.S. human spaceflight program. Many of the 1,604 tweets provided unique ideas on how to pioneer a sustainable human spaceflight program (Figure 2.1). Ideas that made a frequent appearance in the tweets included the following: increasing the frequency of crewed missions, making laws that allow for NASA to focus on consistent long-term planning, investing in more R&D directly applicable to prolonged human spaceflight journeys, selecting artists to be astronauts, building more significant partnerships with international and commercial entities, and creating a clear storyline of how robotic and human missions are moving NASA forward to the goal of human settlement. In addition to providing ideas, the tweets and white papers were useful to the committee in reviewing the set of historical rationales presented later in this chapter. All of the rationales mentioned in this report were also mentioned frequently within the tweets and white papers. Notably, the survival rationale made a strong appearance in both the white papers and Twitter campaign. 2.3 ENDURING QUESTIONS One of the charges to the committee was to identify the enduring questions that describe the rationale for and value of human exploration in a national and international context. Implicit in this charge is the thought that identifying such enduring questions can help ensure the continuity and sustainability of choices for the U.S. program in human spaceflight. In order to address this task, the committee concluded that it was necessary to examine and discuss the historical rationales that have been presented as the reasons why such a program is both needed and useful. This chapter therefore addresses both the enduring questions and the rationales. Implied in the committee’s charge was perhaps the expectation that the committee could find questions that would both deepen the rationales for human spaceflight and provide a long-term compass for the work, as perhaps certain deep science questions have done for some areas of science. However, the committee, having examined the historic rationales (discussed below) often given for the program, found no new or deeper rationales, nor questions that would suggest them. The rationales can be divided into five that the committee calls pragmatic, which can be considered as benefits to economic and technological strength, to national security and defense, to national stature and international relations, to education and inspiration of students and the general public, and to scientific exploration and observation. Two rationales are more aspirational in nature, namely human survival and shared human destiny and PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-3

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aspiration (for exploration). Each rationale can be evoked by one or more questions. However, in the context of the more pragmatic rationales, these questions do not lead to motivation specifically for human programs as opposed to motivations for spaceflight and space exploration more generally, including both robotic and human ventures. Furthermore, while the questions are important, and are questions that will continue to be important, they do not rise to the level that the committee considered was intended by the term "enduring question." Enduring questions, in the committee’s view, are those questions that can serve as motivators of aspiration, scientific endeavors, debate, and critical thinking in the realm of human spaceflight. The questions endure because any answers available today are at best provisional and will change as more exploration is done. Enduring questions should provide a foundation for analyzing choices that is immune to external forces and policy shifts. Enduring questions are intended to not only stand the test of time, but also to continue to drive work forward in the face of technological, societal, and economic constraints. The two more aspirational rationales on the other hand do indeed lead us to ask such questions, questions which require further efforts in human spaceflight if they are to be answered, and which address issues of the future of humankind. As such they suggest an international rather than a national effort context, and indeed given the breadth of the international interest and capability in spaceflight, the progress in answering these questions will not be dependent on the U.S. spaceflight program alone. The committee asserts that the enduring questions motivating human spaceflight are:  How far from Earth can humans go? and  What can humans discover and achieve when we get there? The questions are deceptively simple, however the committee was convinced that, in the context of any national or international effort in human spaceflight, asking whether a program—or even a pathway step—helps advance us toward the ability to give answers to these questions can provide a useful compass in making choices. The possibility of human spaceflight has inspired a great range of questions throughout time, even before it was first accomplished in 1961 with the launch of Yuri Gagarin. Indeed, the task of this committee could be construed as one of answering the ultimate question: Why explore? At its most fundamental level, human spaceflight is a continuation of human exploration; an extension of the human drive to investigate uncharted territory. In the early 17th century, Johannes Kepler wrote Somnium, a work of science-based fiction, detailing human spaceflight to the Moon based on Copernican astronomy. Somnium explored how humans could conduct lunar astronomy as well as how the motions of Earth might be studied from the viewpoint of the Moon. While the achievement of human spaceflight to the Moon was still another three centuries away, Kepler was one of the first to declare that it was scientifically possible to go there and to ask what we might discover and do when we get there. The two enduring questions How far from Earth can humans go? and What can humans discover and achieve when we get there? lead to further more specific questions that have emerged and that are more closely linked to historically stated rationales for the U.S. human spaceflight program, questions such as the following:  Does humanity have a long-term sustainable future beyond Earth?  What are the limits of human adaptability to environments other than Earth?  Can humans exploit off-Earth resources for humankind?  What can human exploration of celestial bodies, such as the martian system, the Moon, and asteroids uniquely teach us about the origin of the solar system and the existence of life?  How can human spaceflight enhance national security, planetary defense, international relations, and other national and global goals? PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-4

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In the world of policy making, where day-to-day pressures and changes in leadership can cause abrupt shifts of direction, enduring questions can help provide a compass to maintain stability over the long timescale needed to achieve challenging goals. Similar questions from other fields include these: What is the cure for cancer? or How did the universe begin?4 Enduring questions can create a reference frame for comparing past, present and future policy, as well as analysis of contemporary applications of it. By asking How far from Earth can humans go? and What can humans discover and achieve when we get there?, the United States can address the fundamental constraints impacting human exploration at any given time and consider what approaches can contribute to open that horizon. Continued focus on whether a project or program helps us to answer these questions, or to change the current conditions that provide limits on the answers to these questions, can also help to prioritize alternatives and to eliminate approaches that offer little or no path toward new or better-defined answers. With these questions in mind, this chapter turns next to a discussion of historically stated rationales and some analysis of these rationales in the current context. 2.4 RATIONALES FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT The committee searched for rationales in various ways. These included reviewing past reports, questioning numerous invited speakers, calling for white papers, reviewing public opinions as described in Chapter 3, and soliciting ideas for a sustainable program via the more novel public input provided by a Twitter event. In essence, the committee found no truly new rationales, although each rationale has been grouped and stated in somewhat different ways by speakers and writers. All of the arguments the committee heard for supporting human spaceflight can be assigned to one or more of the categories discussed below. All of these rationales have been used in various forms and combinations to justify the program for many years. The fact that such justifications typically cite more than one of these rationales leads the committee to suspect that no one finds any one of them in isolation a convincing argument. There are essentially two groups of rationales that the committee finds: the pragmatic rationales, including contributions to the economy, national security, national stature and international relations, science, or education, and the more aspirational rationales, which include contributions to the eventual survival of our species and to supporting the human destiny to explore and aspire to challenging goals. One or both of the aspirational rationales of human destiny and human survival are typically invoked in arguing for the value of the program and then supported by reference to one or more of the more pragmatic rationales. For the pragmatic rationales human spaceflight can be a contributor, but it is not the sole contributor. 2.4.1 Economic and Technology Impacts One of the rationales frequently stated for government spending on spaceflight is that a vibrant space program produces economic benefits. This rationale encompasses a number of diverse impacts at both the sectoral and economy-wide levels. Some earlier studies argue that spaceflight programs have contributed to the overall productive or technological capabilities of the U.S. economy, strengthening national economic growth and competitiveness in the global economy. At the sectoral level, NASA programs have been credited with supporting the development of new technologies and their broader adoption throughout the economy. Although few if any empirical studies have attempted to compare the 4 National Research Council, Connecting Quarks to the Cosmos: Eleven Science Questions for the New Century, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2003, p. 60. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-5

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effects of NASA R&D investments on innovation with those of other federal programs, many studies have argued that NASA programs have contributed significantly to U.S. innovative performance.5 There is now a substantial space-based element of the communications industry and multiple commercial uses of space-based Earth-observing capability. Clearly, these industries would not exist without the original NASA and Department of Defense satellite and rocket development work, but they benefited only modestly if at all from human spaceflight programs. NASA’s more recent efforts to foster new transportation systems for delivering cargo and crew to the International Space Station may serve to support a stronger U.S. share in these industries, for example, by reducing the costs of launch services and increasing competition across the sector relative to foreign launch providers.6,7 While some of the companies offering these services are developing diversified business portfolios including NASA, military, and private customers, the evidence is not yet in to test this hope.8 9 Another manifestation of NASA’s contribution to the national economy is known as “spinoffs” (i.e., specific technologies) rather than macro-economic indicators that are more difficult to measure. The abundance of discrete spinoffs in which NASA can justifiably claim a significant role has been large enough that NASA continues to produce a substantial publication every year that describes the benefits accrued to several consumer fields from space activities.10 These have included the development of scratch-resistant lenses, water purification systems, aircraft anti-icing systems, freeze-drying processes, cryogenic insulation, etc. It is worth noting that NASA’s annual Spinoff publication does not single out benefits from human spaceflight but rather describes benefits from all NASA activities, including 5 Representative comments on the innovation-related consequences of can be found in the Paine Report, 1986; 1990 Advisory commission; and 1991 Stafford Report. The following quotes are taken from each of these studies of NASA’s human spaceflight programs: We are confident…that leadership in pioneering the space frontier will ‘pull through’ technologies critical to future U.S. economic growth, as World War II military developments set the stage for major postwar growth industries. (National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier: An Exciting Vision of our Next Fifty Years in Space, Bantam Books, New York, 1986, p. 189) The space program produces technology that enhances competitiveness; the largest rise and subsequent decline in the nation’s output of much needed science and engineering talent in recent decades coincided with, and some say may have been motivated by [no references provided], the build-up and subsequent phase-down in the civil space program. (Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Human Spaceflight Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Human Spaceflight Program, Executive Summary, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1990) America’s recent history has demonstrated that our space program stimulates a wide range of technological innovations that find abundant applications in the consumer marketplace. Space technology has revolutionized and improved our daily lives in countless ways, and continues to do so. (Synthesis Group on America’s Space Exploration Initiative, America at the Threshold: America’s Space Exploration Initiative, commonly known as the Stafford Report, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991, available at http://history.nasa.gov/staffordrep/exec_sum.pdf, p. 2). An investment in the high technology needed for space exploration maintains and improves America’s share of the global market and enhances our competitiveness and balance of trade. It also directly stimulates the scientific and technical employment bases in our country, sectors whose health is vital to our nation’s economic security. (The Synthesis Group, America at the Threshold, 1991, pp. 2-3) 6 J. Oberg, “Russians face their space crisis: Agency chief worries that country’s aerospace industry is becoming uncompetitive,” NBC News, September 28, 2012, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/49217472/ns/ technology_and_science-space/t/russians-face-their-space-crisis/#.Ue1OtRaOXGI. 7 See http://indrus.in/articles/2012/04/27/the_new_war_for_space_is_a_public-private_one_15428.html. 8 A.J. Aldrin, “Space Economics and Commerce,” pp. 179-200 in Space Strategy in the 21st Century (E. Sadeh, ed.), Routledge (Taylor & Francis), London, U.K., 2013. 9 See, for example, “Low-Cost SpaceX Delays 1st Commercial Launch,” detailing a backlog of 50 launches reflecting $4 billion in orders, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/space-spacex-launch- idUSL2N0JA1XL20131126. 10 NASA, Office of the Chief Technologist, NASA Spinoff, available at http://spinoff.nasa.gov/, last updated August 10, 2011. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-6

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aeronautics.11 The committee has not found any reliable analysis that separates these elements, but it is clear that a significant fraction of the entries appear to be related to the development of technologies to support human spaceflight. While discrete examples of technology transfer can be compelling in fostering public interest and support for space activities, they do not provide the foundation for a systematic understanding of the relationship between human spaceflight and economic benefit. Over the past few decades, there have been a number of studies that have attempted to establish correlation (if not causation) between space activities (both human and robotic) and economy-wide benefits, including the effects on U.S. industrial or technological capabilities. These studies have usually adopted one of three methods: using a macroeconomic production function model to estimate the impact of technological change resulting from R&D spending expressed as a rate of return on a given investment; assessing the returns on specific technologies through cost-benefit ratios; and evaluating the evidence of the direct transfer of technology from federal space programs to the private sector.12 A brief summary of some of the key studies illustrates the kinds of evidence that have historically been used to argue that a vibrant space program leads to significant economic benefits at both the micro and macro levels. A number of studies on the impact of NASA on specific and/or broad economic indicators were undertaken in the late 1960s. Not all of them were commissioned by NASA, and almost all of them focused on local area impacts.13 A Stanford Research Institute study from 1968 found that “NASA activities have had a positive and consequential influence on the localities in the South in which it has established research and development centers and production, testing, and launch facilities.”14 More substantial studies were performed in the 1970s, some of them directly commissioned by NASA at a time that the agency’s budget was shrinking and the agency was seeking to understand arguments in support of increased investments. In 1971, the Midwest Research Institute issued the results of its analysis of a comprehensive national estimate of the returns from federal R&D expenditures, including those for NASA. It is important to note that the study estimated the national returns from all federal R&D spending, based on an analytic framework pioneered by Moses Abramovitz (1956) and Robert Solow (1957), and applied these estimates to NASA R&D spending. In other words, the study assumed that the rate of return to NASA R&D was similar to that of other federal R&D programs, rather than significantly higher (or lower). The Midwest study estimated a seven-to-one return on NASA expenditures and projected a 33 percent discounted rate of return that began with the establishment of NASA in 1958 and projected through to 1987.15 Although the methodology and results of the study were 11 A recent paper, partly authored by NASA representatives, focused on spinoffs from all NASA activities and proposed a set of discrete and quantitative measures for assessing the agency’s impact. These measures included jobs created, revenue generated, productivity and efficiency improvements, lives saved, and lives improved. The early results of a survey suggested favorable numbers for some but not all of these categories. See D. Comstock, D. Lockney, and C. Glass, “A Structure for Capturing Quantitative Benefits from the Transfer of Space and Aeronautics Technology,” (pp. 7-10) paper presented at the International Astronautical Congress, Cape Town, South Africa, October 3-7, 2010, International Astronautical Federation, Paris, France. 12 These approaches are summarized in H.R. Hertzfeld, “Space as an Investment in Economic Growth,” pp. 385-400 in Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume III: Using Space (J.M. Logsdon with R.D. Launius, D.H. Onkst, and S.J. Garber, eds.), NASA, Washington, D.C., 1998. 13 See for example W. Isard, Regional Input-Output Study: Recollections, Reflections, and Diverse Notes on the Philadelphia Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971; W.H. Miernyk, Impact of the Space Program on a Local Economy: An Input-Output Analysis, West Virginia University Press, Morgantown, West Va., 1967. 14 R.W. Hough, “Some Major Impacts of the National Space Program,” Stanford Research Institute, Contract NASW-1722, June 1968, reproduced in Exploring the Unknown, Volume III, 1998, pp. 402-407. 15 Midwest Research Institute, “Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity,” Final Report, Contract NASW-2030, October 15, 1971, reproduced in Exploring the Unknown, Vol. III, 408-414. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-7

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criticized by many,16,17 its conclusions were cited by NASA and NASA supporters for many years in arguing for the beneficial effects of NASA R&D.18 Perhaps the most important studies that NASA commissioned in the 1970s were those undertaken by Chase Econometrics (in 1976 and 1980). These studies were early attempts to measure overall returns to NASA in terms of measures at the level of the national economy (i.e., gross national product (GNP), employment, and productivity). The 1976 study showed that “the historical rate of return from NASA R&D spending is 43 percent.” Chase found that “a sustained increase in NASA spending of $1 billion (1958 dollars) for the 1975-1984 period would” increase the GNP by $23 billion by 1984 (i.e., “a 2% increase over the ‘baseline’”).19 Yet, both the Chase Econometrics studies, as well as a follow-on study by the Midwest Research Institute in 1988 that came to somewhat similar conclusions, were again criticized by the General Accounting Office (GAO; now the Government Accountability Office).20 Further studies in the 1970s focused on NASA’s contributions to specific fields. The most well- known of these was the study performed by Mathematica in 1976 that drew attention to NASA’s contribution to four specific technologies: gas turbines, cryogenics, integrated circuits, and a software program widely used for modeling of physical structures (NASTRAN).21 Three of these four innovations benefited from NASA R&D associated with human spaceflight. The Mathematica study defined the economy-wide benefit stream that is attributable to NASA as benefits associated with reductions in the cost of the technologies and acceleration in their development (e.g., What is the economic value of being able to utilize the integrated circuit in non-NASA applications 1 or 2 years earlier than might otherwise have been the case?). The study’s analytic approach thus attempted to address one of the most difficult questions in any evaluation of the benefits associated with government R&D investment: What would have happened had the investment not been made? The Mathematica study concluded that the economy-wide benefits attributable to NASA’s investment in the development of these four innovations amounted to $7 billion, $5 billion of which was associated with the development of integrated circuits. Inasmuch as this estimated total benefit exceeded NASA’s total 1974 budget, the study concluded that the benefits from NASA were primarily in accelerating the process of bringing technologies into the market place, not necessarily in developing the technologies themselves. Henry R. Hertzfield notes that “[b]ecause this was a study of four cases and used the more traditional consumer surplus theory of microeconomics, the results were more readily accepted by the economics community than the results of the macroeconomic studies of that era.”22 Further studies in the 1980s were generally geared to justifying large programs such as a space station program rather than a broader approach that focused on R&D as a whole. The Midwest Research Institute issued a study commissioned by the National Academy of Public Administration in 1988, 16 A summary of the challenges in employing the methodology of the Midwest Research Institute study that includes a critique of other studies of the economic benefits of NASA spaceflight programs can be found in H. Hertzfeld, Measuring returns to space research and development, pp. 155-170 in Space Economics (J. Greenberg and H. Hertzfeld, eds.), Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics, AIAA, Washington, D.C., 1992. 17 Congressional Budget Office criticisms of the Midwest Research Institute study can be found at Reinventing NASA, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4893/doc20.pdf, p. 4. 18 An example of NASA advocates citing the study uncritically may be found at http://www.penny4nasa.org/category/fight-for-space/. 19 M.K. Evans, “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending,” Executive Summary, Chase Econometric Associates, Inc., Bala Cynwyd, Penn., Contract NASW-2741, April 1976, reproduced in Exploring the Unknown, Volume III, 1998, pp. 414-426. 20 U.S. General Accounting Office, “NASA Report May Overstate the Economic Benefits of Research and Development Spending,” Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 6-11. 21 Mathematica, Inc., “Quantifying the Benefits to the National Economy from Secondary Applications of NASA Technology—Executive Summary,” NASA CR-2674, March 1976, reproduced in Exploring the Unknown, Volume III, 1998, pp. 445-449. 22 H.R. Hertzfeld, “Space as an Investment in Economic Growth,” p. 391. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-8

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repeating the study originally done in 1971.23 They estimated a nine-to-one return on the space program, but the study was subjected to the same types of critiques (methodology and problems with data) that plagued earlier studies such as the Chase Econometric study in 197624 and the earlier Midwest study.25 Besides studies at the macroeconomic level, in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of studies looked at technology transfer. Commissioned by NASA, these studies examined arguments that the positive impacts of NASA activities went beyond abstract scientific benefits to the everyday life of the average American. In a similar vein, NASA expanded a program to showcase particular technologies with its annual Spinoff publication (first published in 1976) that highlighted the many different areas of life that have been affected by NASA-related innovations. One common criticism of NASA’s attempts to showcase spinoffs as important to the average American was that “most of the reported technological successes in Spinoff [were] either demonstration projects (that is, not fully commercialized) or [were] public-sector uses of space technology.”26 However, while this may lower their value as a public relations tool, it does not diminish their economic impacts, where these were calculated based on actual rather than projected uses. A more recent study by Henry R. Hertzfeld examined the economic benefits associated with 15 private companies’ successful commercialization of innovations derived from NASA life sciences R&D programs, most of which are associated with NASA’s human spaceflight activities.27 According to the study, NASA invested roughly $3.7 billion in life sciences R&D during 1958-1998. The NASA-related R&D investment in the 15 technologies that were the subject of the study amounted to $64 million, and these firms spent approximately $200 million in private funds in further development and commercialization activities. The results show that the 15 firms contributed $1.5 billion in value added to the U.S. economy during the 1975-1998 period. Thus the study highlights the economic benefits associated with successful commercialization of technologies based on NASA life sciences R&D and further suggests that the benefits associated with commercial success are significant, relative to the magnitude of the total NASA R&D investment in these fields. A comparison of the benefits from NASA life sciences R&D associated with human spaceflight and those of other federal biomedical R&D programs is, however, beyond the scope of Hertzfeld’s study. 2.4.1.1 Evaluation of Economic and Technological Rationales Although most economic studies conclude that the federal investments in NASA’s space activities have benefited the U.S. economy, they also agree that precise measurements of these benefits are difficult to impossible to measure or quantify. The results are particularly inconclusive on the degree to which NASA’s human spaceflight programs contribute to economic growth. No systematic attempt has been made by NASA or other analysts to compare the economic benefits from NASA human spaceflight programs with those from other federal R&D programs.28 At heart here is a counterfactual issue: even if NASA’s human spaceflight activities have had a significant positive effect on U.S. technical, industrial, and innovative capabilities, it is difficult if not 23 Midwest Research Institute, “Economic Impact and Technological Progress of NASA Research and Development Expenditures,” Executive Summary, for the National Academy of Public Administration, September 20, 1988, reproduced in Exploring the Unknown, Volume III, 1998, pp. 427-430. 24 M.K. Evans, “The Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending,” 1976. 25 Midwest Research Institute, “Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity,” 1971. 26 H.R. Hertzfeld, “Space as an Investment in Economic Growth,” p. 391. 27 H.R. Hertzfeld, Measuring the economic returns from successful NASA life sciences technology transfers, Journal of Technology Transfer 27.4:311-320, 2002. 28 An early study that focused on human spaceflight was M.A. Holman, The Political Economy of the Space Program, Pacific Books, Palo Alto, Calif., 1974. See also M.A. Holman and R.M. Konkel, Manned space flight and employment, Monthly Labor Review 91(3):30, 1968; R.M. Konkel and M. Holman, Economic Impact of the Manned Space Flight Program, NASA, Washington, D.C., January 1967. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-9

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impossible to ascertain whether similar effects could have resulted from similarly large R&D investments by other federal agencies. Besides this analytical problem, most of the older substantive studies have limited use for the current study for two other reasons: they do not distinguish between robotic and human spaceflight, and they tend to focus on data from the 1960s.29 The latter is an important issue because of the vast disparity between the high levels of funding in the 1960s and those of the 21st century. For example, in FY1967, NASA accounted for nearly 30% of total federal R&D spending and almost 35% of all federally funded development spending.30 By 2009, these shares stood at roughly 4.5% and 6%, respectively. In addition, reported NASA R&D spending in FY2009 included a much larger share devoted to robotic space exploration, suggesting that NASA human spaceflight R&D may account for as little as 3-4% of total federal R&D spending, and perhaps even less. Such data indicate that it is hazardous at best to use even the imperfect and often inconclusive results of studies based on NASA data from the 1960s to project the effects on U.S. innovative performance of the far smaller NASA human spaceflight budgets that are likely to characterize the program for the near future. A more recent review could substantially revise the current understanding of likely economic benefits, given the very different budgetary footprint of the human spaceflight program of the past 20 years, relative to its peak of the 1960s, as well as the high probability that future human spaceflight budgets will more closely resemble those of the post-2000 period than the 1960-1970 period. As this report notes below, the complexities of the channels through which the economic benefits of federal R&D investments are realized means that analytically defensible evaluations are rare. Nevertheless, a more recent evaluation could be of significant value to policymakers seeking to better understand the economic impact of NASA programs. In summary, the economic rationale for a sustainable human spaceflight program is an oft- repeated one that rests on a generally accepted notion that these programs have generated significant benefits to the U.S. economy. There are plenty of individual examples of technological spinoffs arising from space activities—especially those involving robotic spaceflight.31 Nonetheless, although the economic and technological benefits from human spaceflight are anecdotally impressive, these benefits are extremely difficult to measure, and the uncertainty in such results makes it impossible to compare with other possible sources of federal investment in R&D that might have achieved the same if not better economic results. Moreover, there is little basis to anticipate that future NASA human spaceflight programs will exercise anything like the influence on U.S. technological innovation or on the education of scientists and engineers that these programs arguably had during the 1960s, simply because future NASA programs will account for a much smaller share of overall federal R&D and procurement spending. The absence of evidence suggesting that the economic return on investment in NASA human spaceflight is either more or less than that of other R&D investments made by the federal government, all of which are generally thought to positively impact the economy, of course, should not be taken to imply that there is no economic benefit from such investment. More recently, there has been an emphasis on commercial exploitation of space, either for low Earth orbit (LEO) travel or for going beyond LEO, with eventual ideas of commercial exploitation of space resources. NASA has supported private companies to enter the market as cargo and/or crew transportation providers in early-stage development roles that were previously the territory of NASA centers, for example, designing and developing vehicles to transport goods, and eventually astronauts, to the ISS. These investments have encouraged a small number of individuals and companies to invest their own resources in addition to the NASA funding they have received. The hope is that by transferring 29 R.A. Bauer, Second-order Consequences: A Methodological Essay on the Impact of Technology, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969; F.I. Ordway III, C.C. Adams, and M.R. Sharpe, Dividends from Space, Crowell, New York, 1971. 30 See National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Research and Development, Fiscal Years 1951-2002, NSF 03-325, August 14, 2003, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/fedfunds/; NSF, “Federal Funds for Research and Development, Fiscal Years 2009-2011,” http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf12318/content.cfm?pub_id=4177&id=2; accessed January 21, 2014. 31 For a useful summary of such itemized benefits, see M. Bijlefeld, It Came from Outer Space: Everyday Products and Ideas from the Space Program, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 2003. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-10

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development risk to a commercial sector, which expects to have a broader customer base and income stream than NASA alone, NASA will eventually realize significant cost savings and at the same time stimulate new industries. It remains to be seen whether any of these ventures will become self-sustaining and be profitable without NASA, although at least one has a significant backlog in non-NASA orders. A number of investors have placed large bets in favor of some of these efforts eventually being an ongoing business opportunity, and investor interest in the sector is not limited to orbital flights. Wealthy individuals also have invested in suborbital flight opportunities either by starting new companies or by booking seats for planned future suborbital trips and beyond. The prospect of economic return from mining space resources is even more remote; it may exist at some future time, but with current costs and values of resources, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that it is highly unlikely to become viable within the term of this study, even if the uncertain legal status of off-Earth mining claims is resolved. Public-private partnerships similar to those involved in development of new transportation systems for the ISS are also under consideration by NASA for broader commercial use of the ISS itself, as well as to encourage other private activity in LEO— for example, to develop commercial space platforms that could lease services or facilities to the government as well as to other users32. At the same time, NASA is soliciting inputs from commercial entities interested in developing capabilities for beyond LEO exploration efforts. Increased activity in cislunar space may create new opportunities for private interests to enter into partnerships with the agency. Recently NASA has entered into agreements with three firms to develop commercially-sourced capabilities for a robotic lunar lander, and at least one commercial company has been founded with the goal of commercial exploitation of the Moon, including the development of tourism. Other companies have expressed interest in the development of “infrastructure” supporting cislunar activity including development of communications networks and habitats. A recent area of commercial interest is focused on opportunity for exploitation of space resources beyond Earth orbit which can be achieved robotically. The committee considers even robotic exploitation of space resources for on-Earth use to be a highly speculative idea because the cost-benefit equation would need to change substantially in order to make such exploitation commercially viable. Exploitation that requires HSF as an element of the work would be significantly more costly, and hence even less commercially viable. It is currently impossible to assess whether commercial capabilities will develop to the point that they can create significant cost savings (on the order of tens of billions of dollars) for NASA human space exploration efforts beyond LEO. In addition, investments to foster new commercial partners may create a tension in NASA as the goal of facilitation of new commercial ventures can compete with that of exploration (that is, the goal of answering the enduring questions) in making decisions about program priorities. While there exists no widely accepted, robust quantitative methodology to support comparative assessments of the returns to federal R&D programs in different economic sectors and areas of research, it is clear that NASA human spaceflight-related research and development activity, like other government R&D programs, has stimulated economic activity and has advanced development of new products and technologies that have had or may in the future generate significant economic impacts. It is impossible, however, to develop a reliable comparison of return from spaceflight versus other government R&D investments. 32 NASA, “Evolving ISS into a LEO Commercial Market”, released April 28, 2014, https://prod.nais.nasa.gov/cgibin/eps/synopsis.cgi?acqid=160471. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-11

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FIGURE 2.5 Benefits of various destinations along the Flexible Path. SOURCE: Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee (2009), Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, p. 41, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalReport.pdf. Organizations should be aligned to deliver value – that is to say, the valued outputs created by the organization should be clearly traceable to responsibilities, processes, and incentives within the organization. Recognizing that these outputs constitute the totality of the organization’s impact on its environment highlights their importance. Given that these are the products by which an organization will be judged, responsibilities should be clearly delineated and monitored over time. This conclusion was echoed in 2010 by the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee in its report Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation. In order to fulfill its charge to conduct an independent review of the ongoing U.S. human spaceflight plans, the review committee developed evaluation criteria for equitable assessment of all of the programmatic alternatives under consideration. These criteria clustered around three major dimensions, one of which rested on a value proposition assessment and sought to characterize benefits to stakeholders of various exploration pathways and program options. Some of the benefits identified by that committee for various exploration destinations are presented in Figure 2.5. Many of these destinations are included in the exploration pathways assessed in Chapter 4. The review committee developed a list of stakeholder groups based on previous research, review of relevant policy documents and public opinion polls. Stakeholders for NASA human spaceflight programs included “the U.S. government, the American public; the scientific and education communities; the industrial base and commercial business interests; and human civilization as a whole.” Benefits delivered to stakeholders were “the capability for exploration; the opportunity for technology innovation; the opportunity to increase scientific knowledge; the opportunity to expand U.S. prosperity and economic competitiveness; the opportunity to enhance global partnership; and the potential to increase the engagement of the public in human spaceflight.” The stakeholders and benefits accruing to them as a PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-34

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result of each option were considered along with “risk” and “budget realities” as the three major dimensions driving evaluation of program options. No formal value propositions or stakeholder analysis were presented at the conclusion of the study.126 The following year the MIT team elaborated on their 2008 work, conducting a quantitative analysis of NASA’s space exploration stakeholder network based upon the secondary data sources used in earlier papers. This analysis suggested that the activities of highest stakeholder value in future space exploration programs would be the opportunity for science returns, and opportunities for the public to be virtually present during mission operations, by means of the internet, during exploration activities conducted under NASA’s Constellation Program.127,128 In 2012, MIT’s value network analysis methodology was applied to data obtained directly by means of questionnaires from representative stakeholders of the NASA/NOAA Earth Observation Program. The value flows and stakeholder prioritization from that analysis were validated by means of comparison and assessment with other external stakeholders and proxy data sources such as public opinion polls and literature reviews. The results included recommendations to NASA and NOAA that the Earth Observation program prioritize its objectives in such a way as to maximize product delivery to scientists, international partners, commercial companies, and the public.129 No information is available regarding whether any of these recommendations have been implemented or to what effect. A final example of a value proposition analysis of programs related to NASA activities is a 2012 study for the National Geospatial Advisory Committee, “The Value Proposition for Ten Landsat Applications.”130 This study calculates the “productivity savings” associated with 10 applications of the Landsat technology by examining ten “decision processes that would be significantly more expensive without an operational Landsat-like program. Many of these processes are associated with the U.S. government and save significant amounts of money compared to other methods of accomplishing the same objective” (2012, p. 1). Despite the study’s title as a “value proposition” analysis, however, it focuses exclusively on the financial savings associated with these Landsat applications, ranging from monitoring of coastal change to fire management. The study’s methodology and estimates seem credible, although the assessment provides no estimates of the costs associated with achieving these savings—in essence, the study utilizes a cost-benefit framework that focuses exclusively on benefits. Nor does this study consider the costs or potential efficiency gains associated with alternative monitoring technologies or related public investments. Most importantly, however, this value proposition analysis does not present an integrated assessment of multiple objectives and other features of the Landsat program and, thus, seems to represent a narrow approach to value proposition analysis, by comparison with Moore’s 2013 discussion of Commissioner Bratton and the New York City Police Department. Similarly, the evolving methodology of the MIT stakeholder value network analysis, the efforts of the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, and the efforts of other researchers focused on development and integration of large- scale systems in government programs are focused on providing inputs about stakeholder value to systems engineering and program design. These methods have as their goal the development of program objectives guiding design decisions that can then be translated into value propositions delivered by the 126 Additional benefits related to innovation, inspiration, and new means to address global challenges, are described in a publication of the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (2013), “Benefits Stemming from Space Exploration”, accessed February 20, 2014 at http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Benefits- Stemming-from-Space-Exploration-2013-TAGGED.pdf 127 The Constellation program was cancelled in 2010. 128 Cameron, B. G., Seher, T., & Crawley, E. F. (2011). Acta Astronautica, 68, 2088-2097. 129 Sutherland, T. A., Cameron, B.G., & Crawley, E. F. (2012) Program Goals for the NASA/NOAA Earth Observation Program derived from a stakeholder value network analysis. Space Policy, 28, 259-269. 130 National Geospatial Advisory Committee, Landsat Advisory Group, “The Value Proposition for 10 Landsat Applications,” 2012, http://www.fgdc.gov/ngac/meetings/september-2012/ngac-landsat-economic-value-paper- FINAL.pdf. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-35

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originating organization back to the stakeholders131,132 While this represents a multiuser, multiobjective approach that is an improvement to the Landsat effort, it does not provide for definition of the wider range of outcome-related objectives, value delivery, and generation of sustainable stakeholder support for agency missions and leadership. When applied to NASA human spaceflight, the value proposition framework that this committee has developed begins with the set of rationales discussed above, which highlight a range of hypothesized desirable effects of NASA human spaceflight (innovation and economic return, U.S. national security, national stature and international relations, inspiration of younger citizens to pursue STEM study), all of which might be used to define a set of outcome objectives or “values” for a NASA human spaceflight value proposition. As in most public programs, however, measuring these effects is difficult. Moreover, the effects of NASA human spaceflight on outcomes like innovation may be even more difficult to measure than those of many other public sector programs because of the long lags with which innovation- related effects may be realized. Beyond measuring these effects, attributing changes in outcomes such as public inspiration, innovative performance, or U.S. national security and prestige to NASA human spaceflight programs is even more difficult. Other rationales discussed above, such as supporting the establishment of human habitation on other planets, the enhanced exploration capabilities associated with space missions involving astronauts as well as robotic equipment, and the link between space exploration and human destiny, represent motivations for human spaceflight that arguably are unique to NASA. But even defining these rationales, let alone assessing the success of current and planned NASA missions to achieve objectives associated with them, or the trade-offs among these rationales in terms of mission priorities or public opinion, is extremely difficult, not least because they require decades (if not centuries, as in the case of permanent off-Earth habitats) to be realized. Many or most of the challenges of developing and applying value proposition analysis at the agency level are not unique to NASA. Indeed, these challenges may be one reason for the absence of any value proposition analysis of other federal science and technology (S&T) programs. None of the various NRC studies of the analysis of federal R&D programs have attempted to develop a value proposition analysis of these programs, nor does the 2001 study by the National Science Board of federal R&D programs or the 1991 study by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment include such an analysis.133 The committee unsuccessfully sought to find examples of other publicly available value proposition analyses of NASA programs, as well as examples of the use of this framework by senior 131 Sutherland, op cit. 132 Brooks, J.M., Carroll, J. S., & Beard, J. W. (2011). Dueling Stakeholders and Dual-Hatted Systems Engineers: Engineering Challenges, Capabilities, and Skills in Government Infrastructure Technology Projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 58 (3), 589-601. 133 See NRC, Measuring the Impacts of Federal Investments in Research (NRC, 2011); NRC, Allocating Federal Funds for Science and Technology (NRC, 1995); NRC, Evaluating Federal Research Programs (NRC, 1999); NRC, A Strategy for Assessing Science (NRC, 2007); National Science Board, Federal Research Resources: A Process for Setting Priorities (USGPO, 2001); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade (USGPO, 1991). It is important to note that these studies do not agree on any alternative analytic framework for evaluating the effects of federal R&D investments, for reasons stated in the National Science Board report: “In many ways, federal research presents greater problems for measurement and benchmarking than does private R&D. A great deal of federally funded research is directed to areas where the market is limited at best. Further, given the types of data available, the returns that result from most calculations must be interpreted as average rather than marginal rates. From a policy perspective, this means that we cannot be certain from this aggregate analysis what the effect of an additional dollar of research expenditure might be. The cost/benefit framework itself may be too restrictive, failing to capture the many benefits that may be derived from publicly-funded basic research. The true effect of such outlays may well be indirect, affecting productivity through changing the returns to private research and development rather than directly as a result of the specific research project.” (2001, pp. 78-79). PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-36

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NASA administrators in public statements or by congressional appropriators in decision making on NASA budgets. 2.6.2 Stakeholder Value and the Impacts of Ending Human Spaceflight For the reasons described above, a rigorous analysis of the value propositions for NASA human spaceflight at the national level is beyond the capacity of this report, and possibly of any report. An alternative way to examine the value proposition of NASA human spaceflight is to consider the impacts to various stakeholder groups if the program is terminated. The Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee (2010) characterized benefits to stakeholders for various exploration programs and pathway options in terms of opportunities for value creation, discovery, and potential. A unique perspective on the value proposition for NASA human spaceflight asks, “What would happen—and to whom—if those opportunities and potentials were no longer available?” NASA human spaceflight stakeholder groups that might benefit from human space exploration have been defined within the statement of task for the committee, which calls for a description of value taking into account “the needs of government, industry, the economy, and the public good—and in the context of the priorities and programs of current and potential international partners in the spaceflight program.” In terms of the rationales discussed above one can divide government and public good rationales into further distinct interests with different stakeholder groups, namely national security, international relations, science, and education and inspiration, as well as the general public interest. The committee notes that a fully responsive answer to this request would require a value proposition analysis that goes well beyond any known methodology, applying the concept of value propositions to the human spaceflight enterprise as a whole rather than to individual program designs as described above. What follows is an effort to address the task statement by focusing on losses stemming from human spaceflight termination and the resulting impact on some stakeholder groups. It should be clearly noted that the committee is not recommending termination. Thinking about that eventuality is just another way to recognize what is valued about the program(s) from the various perspectives. Clearly any potential benefit to any of these stakeholder groups, as previously covered in this chapter’s rationales discussions, will be lost if the program is terminated. To avoid duplication the report does not restate each of these here, rather the subsequent discussion highlights those areas where the committee felt that the lens of “what would be lost” adds a distinct perspective not captured in the discussion of rationales that precedes this section. In a theoretical sense, one should consider that some of the possible losses accruing as a result of termination of the exploration program may be interrelated. The methodology used to evaluate rationales in this report was necessarily unitary, meaning that each rationale was considered separately from the others. An alternative model is that some of the benefits associated with various rationales are related to each other and that the “value flow” described by those relationships is irreducible. In the language of the MIT studies, this means that breaking one “value loop” in the network of value delivery may have downstream or corollary effects that are impossible to capture in a discussion of losses and impacts to individual stakeholder groups. Additionally, loss of opportunity to create value – usually referred to as “opportunity cost” - is particularly difficult to address because the nature of the value to be created in the future may not be foreseeable.134 This observation is bolstered by the fact that there is a temporal element to the committee’s deliberations: We face a future that is unpredictable. In an enterprise such as human space exploration with a decades-long horizon, loss of value or loss of the opportunity to create value may have a greater 134 The discussion in this section of losses absent human spaceflight and the resulting implications for stakeholders has broad similarity to Regret Theory, which rests on the assumption that, under conditions of uncertainty, individuals facing a choice may anticipate regret of their decision. In such cases a desire to avoid regret may be taken into account in the decision-making process. See Loomes, G & Sugden, R. (1982) Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. The Economic Journal (92) 805-824. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-37

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impact in the future than current assessments may indicate. In order for human spaceflight to progress, continuing research on risk reduction approaches is necessary, including development of new environmental systems and new launch and transportation technologies—all of which are long-lead items—in order to have technology available to humans at appropriate phases of exploration. Such development is expensive and creates opportunities for pushing the envelope in science, engineering, and operations—with benefits not always identifiable in advance, but that would not otherwise be pursued should the program end.135 In examining the possible costs of termination of the exploration program, one must consider the timelines and eventual future of the program for LEO human spaceflight separately from that for beyond Earth exploration. Termination of one does not imply termination of the other, and each is quite different from the others, demonstrating the complexity of the issues under consideration. In the discussion that follows, this issue is considered from three perspectives, each one addressing one or more of the stakeholder groups the committee was asked to consider.  Termination of all human spaceflight activities (LEO and beyond LEO) —whenever such termination might occur—is considered with regard to potential impacts to the government (national security and international relations) and to the public (national pride and identity.)  Termination of NASA human spaceflight in LEO is considered with regard to science, economics (commerce), and industry.  Termination of beyond LEO exploration is discussed with emphasis on international partnerships and with regard to the enduring questions. 2.6.2.1 Ending LEO and Beyond LEO HSF: Impacts to the Public Good and National Interest (Government) As described in the earlier discussion of rationales, human spaceflight has contributed to national pride and stature (Section 2.4.3.1). As difficult as it is to characterize other benefits of human spaceflight, the cultural “value” of human spaceflight and the role it plays in national pride and identity is even more difficult to assess. National identity has been defined as “the cohesive force that holds nation states together and shapes their relationships with the family of nations.” National pride is “the positive effect that the public feels toward their country as a result of their national identity….it is both the pride or sense of esteem that a person has for one’s nation and the pride or self-esteem that a person drives from one’s national identity.” 136 Collective experience is represented in and reinforced by national pride and can be reflected through symbols of national experience or achievement, with which national pride is strongly correlated.137 A strong indicator of national pride as reflected in the public’s connection to NASA’s human spaceflight program surfaced after termination of the Space Shuttle Program in 2011. As described in Chapter 3, public opinion polls done at the time showed that Americans responded to the losses of Challenger and Columbia and their crews with increased support for NASA’s human spaceflight programs. This could be attributed to a collective response to tragedy, but as space shuttles were flown to museums beginning in 2012, thousands of people left businesses and homes and got out of their cars, stopping traffic on freeways to watch the space shuttles as they circled Washington, D.C, New York, and 135 Johnson-Freese, J. (2007). Space as a Strategic Asset (p. 54). Columbia University Press. 136 Smith, T. W. & Kim, S., (2006). National Pride in Cross-National and Temporal Perspective. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18, 127-136. 137 Smith, T. W., Rasinski, K. A., & Toce, M. (2001). American Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks,” NORC Report, University of Chicago. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-38

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San Francisco.138,139 Press reports described “hundreds of thousands” who lined streets in Los Angeles as the Endeavor was towed to the California Science Museum prep site.140 National pride is linked to achievements in cultural, non-political areas of life, including achievements in science and technology.141 Marketing firms and political campaigns have long made use of symbols evoking national pride to “brand” products, services, or candidates. Marketing campaigns reflect investment of capital for the purposes of generating revenue. Icons or symbols with high recognition value across a number of demographic segments denote the “branding power” of the icon. Icons with significant power are used frequently, reflecting the belief of marketing campaign managers that their product or service will be viewed as an attractive as a result of the association with the icon. An indirect indicator of the pervasiveness of NASA human spaceflight in American culture thus may be found in the use of NASA human spaceflight “brand icons” in advertising campaigns. The Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) “space suit”—a direct reference to the “human” in human spaceflight—is used regularly in national marketing campaigns.142 In 2013, space suit use by major brands surfaced in advertisements for soft drinks (Coca-Cola), personal fragrance (Unilever ), and automobiles (Kia), as well as for the Make a Wish Foundation (Figure 2.6). 143,144,145 These glimpses of persistent connection and awareness of NASA’s human spaceflight programs raise a difficult question, “What is the actual value of NASA human spaceflight to national self-image?” The committee has heard that the answer may be deeply ingrained in American identity and is a source of national pride (Section 2.2.3), consistent with previous research146,147,148 In addition, the stakeholder survey conducted for this study found that “U.S. prestige”—a concept linked to national pride and identity—would be the greatest loss if human spaceflight activities in LEO and beyond LEO were terminated (see Table 3.12). Such a loss could be greatest for future generations. Permission Pending FIGURE 2.6 “Make A Wish Foundation” promotion display featuring an astronaut as the focus of a child’s wish for his future (the Foundation grants wishes for critically ill children). SOURCE: Make-A-Wish® Foundation. 138 http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/space-shuttle-discovery-wows-washington-in-45-minute- flyover/2012/04/17/gIQAKkgFOT_story.html. 139 http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/09/21/huge-bay-area-crowds-await-shuttle-endeavour/. 140 Space shuttle Endeavour rolls into new home as crowds cheer http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/14/us/shuttle- endeavour/. 141 T.W. Smith and L. Jarkko, National Pride: A Cross-National Analysis, NORC Report, University of Chicago, http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/documents/CNRT/CNR19%20National%20Pride%20- %20A%20cross-national%20analysis.pdf, 1998. 142 http://mashable.com/2013/08/20/nasa-spacesuit-smithsonian/. 143 http://www.coca-colacompany.com/videos/bro-blows-wad-in-space-suit-ytgd_3qonzxue 144 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/business/media/for-axes-apollo-line-a-campaign-found-in- space.html?_r=0. 145 http://www.trendhunter.com/trends/super-bowl-kia-commercial. 146 Betty Sue Flowers, Panel Discussion, January 18, 2013. 147 Neil deGrasse Tyson, presentation to the Committee, October 23, 2013. 148 Smith (1998) op cit. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-39

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NASA human spaceflight’s direct contributions to national security are limited; however, indirect contributions to national security interests have benefit for the government (see Section 2.4.2.3). Indirect evidence of the potential impact to the defense industrial base of the loss of the NASA human spaceflight workforce may be found in a stakeholder survey of 536 companies commissioned by NASA and conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security/Office of Technology Evaluation in 2012. The study examined the impact of space shuttle and Constellation termination on the NASA industrial base as well as on other U.S. government customers. Eighty-six suppliers reported that their customers would be impacted in some way, primarily via loss of experienced personnel, increased cost of equipment, potential loss of software and manufactured products, and reduction in R&D expenditures. Twenty-eight companies indicated that their business with the Missile Defense Agency would be impacted, primarily in workforce and R&D. Twenty-seven companies indicated that business with the U.S. Air Force/Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) would experience cost increases and collateral impacts to workforce and innovation. The small number of suppliers impacted were largely small and medium-sized businesses and vulnerable to disruption.149 Previous research by the National Security Space Office (NSSO), the Air Force, and the Commerce Department indicated that most space-related R&D spending and innovation is done by companies in these categories.150 Erosion of the industrial base is an area of concern for the DOD, which perceives it as a threat to national security.151 Loss of NASA human spaceflight would likely have a small impact given the modest scope of prospective NASA procurement activities related to human spaceflight, although its precise effect is impossible to assess. NASA human spaceflight also has been used to promote U.S. geopolitical objectives and as a means to exercise soft power (Section 2.4.3.2). Both from a geopolitical perspective, and from the perspective of possible future commercial exploitation of space resources, this influence is an important element in the value proposition for human spaceflight. Once lost, this influence may not be readily recovered. 2.6.2.2 Ending LEO Human Spaceflight: Commercial and Scientific Impacts In examining the possible costs of termination of the exploration program, one must consider the timelines and eventual future of the program for LEO human spaceflight separately from that for beyond Earth exploration. Currently, there is an agreement among all the international partners to operate the ISS until 2020. The administration has announced its intention to extend ISS operations until at least 2024; however, differing national objectives, funding profiles, and space policy make continuation of the ISS with all of the original partners to that date less certain.152 Termination (and deorbit) of the ISS at 2020 will impact NASA’s Human Research Program (HRP), which is necessary for continued exploration. The role of the HRP is to “buy down risk” by identifying causal and mitigating factors related to the impacts of the space environment on human behavior, performance, and health. Research programs do not generate results on a prescribed timeline, so NASA has identified a prioritized set of risks including radiation, bone and muscle loss, increased intracranial pressure, and other physiological and psychological responses to the space environment. The studies addressing these issues require sufficient 149 Department of Commerce (2012). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Human Space Flight Industrial Base in the Post-Space Shuttle/Constellation Environment (pp. 124-128). 150 2007 Defense Industrial Base report. 151 O’Hanlon, M. (2012). The National Security Industrial Base: A Crucial Asset of the United States, Whose Future May Be In Jeopardy (21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper). The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/2/defense%20ohanlon/ 02_defense_ohanlon.pdf. 152 Krasnov, A. Perspectives on the Future of Human Spaceflight. Presentation and remarks to the Committee on Human Spaceflight, April 23, 2013. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-40

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time to unfold in order to characterize risk and determine which of them may create the most significant impacts to human beings operating in the space environment—and how (and if) such risks can be addressed. Although no one knows a date by which the HRP will be able to generate results that build confidence about risks and risk mitigation, termination of the ISS earlier rather than later will increase the probability of lower confidence and poorer characterization of impacts to human health and behavior than termination at a later date. As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.1, NASA’s LEO human spaceflight program has recently put in place new mechanisms to acquire space transportation from commercial suppliers under fixed price contracts. Small and medium-sized suppliers and service providers are emerging to support the new transportation systems and prepare for anticipated growth in related economic activities in LEO over the next several decades. These new commercial space companies are offering diverse services such as spaceflight training, spacesuit design, and vehicle mockups.153,154,155 For the near future, these companies are largely dependent on activities between Earth and LEO, centered on utilization of the ISS. 156 Termination of the ISS in 2020 would result in a relatively short period of time during which NASA would serve as the principal or only customer for those companies, resulting in a very limited opportunity for them to recoup their investment in those systems.157 Government funding outside of NASA could be substituted in order to continue development of these systems should they be determined to be in the national interest (for example to diversify the launch industry), but without the ISS as a driver for U.S. investment in this sector, it is unclear if the competitive advantages and cost savings justify ongoing investment on behalf of the country. 158 At least one company is currently making use of the ISS as a launch platform for commercial small satellites, and others are exploring commercial R&D, commercial services, and product development pathways under the auspices of the ISS National Laboratory. Other commercial entities have plans in development for LEO, but at present these are plans only. It also should be noted that these possibilities rely on models for commercial market development in LEO that are early in development and speculative in nature. 159,160 Scientific benefits of the ISS are reviewed in Section 2.4.5.1. Terrestrial benefits from the ISS National Laboratory, if any, are probably some years away. Termination of the NASA human spaceflight program in LEO by 2020 would cut short the research and development process the ISS National Laboratory is counting on, with the potential (and unknowable) associated loss of value to science and to 153 The National AeroSpace Training and Research Center (NASTAR). Accessed on December 21, 2013 at http://www.nastarcenter.com/about-us/etc-and-the-nastar-center. 154 WayPoint2Space. Accessed on December 21, 2013 at http://waypoint2space.com. 155 Orbital Outfitters: Space Suits, Space Mockups, and Space Diving. Accessed December 21, 2013 at http://orbitaloutfitters.com/what-we-do/. 156 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2011). Commercial Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems Pursuant to Section 403 of the 2010 NASA Authorization Act. Report issued March 12. http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Section403(b)CommercialMarketAssessmentReportFinal.pdf. 157 Recently, NASA and the White House announced their intention to continue the ISS until 2024, in part to enable commercial development in LEO to continue to mature, as well as to maximize science returns. 158 A recent study commissioned by the FAA and conducted by the Futron Corporation documents competitive advantage of the U.S. in human spaceflight markets (relative to other nations) as a result of NASA’s Commercial Crew Development program. See Autry, G., Huang, L. & Foust, J. (2014) An Analysis of the Competitive Advantage of the United States of America in Commercial Human Orbital Spaceflight Markets. Available at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/US_HOM_compet_adv_analysis-Final_1- 7.pdf 159 See Davidian, K., Christensen, I., Kaiser, D., & Foust, J. (2011) Disruptive Innovation Theory Applied to Cargo and Crew Space Transporation. Paper # IAC-11-E6.3.4 presented at the International Astronautical Congress, Capetown, South Africa, October. 160 Aprea, J., Block, U., & David, E. (2013). Industrial Innovation Cycle Analysis of the Orbital Launch Vehicle Industry. Paper #IAC-E6.2.6 x19035 presented at the International Astronautical Congress, Beijing, China, Spetember. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-41

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commercial entities. Research programs conducted by the international partners there would also be severely impacted or terminated unless a new partner or partners could be found to make up the operational funding losses created by U.S. withdrawal. Within a month of this report going into NRC review, NASA and the administration announced their intention to continue the U.S. commitment to the ISS until at least 2024. Under those circumstances, the impacts of termination at 2020 discussed above would be reduced, with additional time to generate returns from exploration science, the ISS National Laboratory, and commercial activities and operations. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, continuing to operate the ISS beyond 2020 in a flat-budget environment will undercut beyond-LEO activities. Weighing the potential value proposition of ISS-based science against exploration beyond Earth orbit is further discussed in Chapter 4. 2.6.2.3 Ending Beyond LEO Exploration: Partnerships and the Enduring Questions The statement of task charges the committee to consider the value of the U.S. human spaceflight program for current and potential international partners. The committee has found that U.S. near-term goals for human exploration beyond LEO are not aligned with those of our international partners (see Chapter 1), which are focused on Mars, with the Moon as an intermediate goal. Notwithstanding this, the Global Exploration Roadmap (GER) developed by the ISECG is loosely organized around U.S. intentions and contributions, the latter of which far outweigh the total contributions of the other International Partners. Should the U.S. terminate all government involvement in NASA beyond-LEO exploration— including an asteroid redirect mission, the Moon, and Mars—human space exploration beyond LEO would likely slow by decades, placing Mars out of reach until late in the century or early in the next, and only when other entities emerge with significant investment to take the place of U.S. contributions. With regard to the Moon, the situation is less clear because it is possible that intense commercial development or substantial investment by another country could facilitate lunar exploration, although there is no way to predict such an eventuality. Termination of U.S. involvement would, in any case, have deleterious effects upon the human spaceflight programs and ambitions of many U.S international partners and could complicate future relationships and plans in other areas of joint activity. The current international partners on the ISS Program are not the only nations participating in the ISECG. India, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom are also engaged, and China attends the ISECG meetings. All of these countries have expressed interest in working with NASA on future opportunities.161 The largest and most active of these programs are resident in India and China. India has collaborated with the United States for many years in space and has expressed interest in continuing to do so.162 At the end of 2011, China released a white paper detailing its philosophy and programs, updating progress since 2006, and laying out goals for the next 5 years . As described in Chapter 1, China’s plans reflect a clear vision, goals, and methodical program development that builds on what has come before, with an active robotic program, development of a space station, and study of expeditions to the Moon. Although China wants to engage cooperatively with the United States in human spaceflight, participation in a joint program is unlikely in the near future due to security concerns and political resistance within the United States.163 164 161 Logsdon (2010) op cit. 162 Sachdeva, G. S. (2013). Space policy and strategy of India. In E. Sadeh (Ed)., Space Strategy in the 21st Century (pp. 303-321). London: Routledge (Taylor & Francis). 163 Chen, S. (2013). U.S and China partner on small-scale space projects. South China Morning Post, September 30. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1321102/us-and-china-partner-small-scale-space-projects. 164 David, L. (2013). Security fears impede U.S. space cooperation with a rising China. Space News, December 2; Chen, S. (2013). U.S and China partner on small-scale space projects. South China Morning Post, September 30. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1321102/us-and-china-partner-small-scale-space-projects. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-42

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Termination of human space exploration beyond Earth orbit could shift the momentum of space exploration to the Asia-Pacific region, and specifically to China, which is already creating opportunities for cooperative engagement with other nations, including Russia and other Western powers such as Germany and France.165 Any potential geopolitical shift among spacefaring nations away from the United States and toward the Asia-Pacific region could bring with it unknown strategic and practical consequences for the United States. Finally, termination of the NASA human spaceflight program would render the enduring questions unanswerable by the United States—except for provisional information that can be developed via robotic exploration. The questions How far from Earth can humans go? and What can humans discover and achieve when we get there? are intended to create a framework for guiding human space exploration program development and execution leading toward Mars, within the pathways and decision rules outlined in Chapter 4. Termination of the human spaceflight program before that time would render pursuit of answers to the enduring questions beyond the reach of this nation until such time as the country might decide to return humans to space, leaving it to other countries to engage in and manage the activities required to answer them. The committee believes that such an eventuality is not in the best interests of the United States. 2.7 CONCLUSIONS ON THE BENEFITS OF HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT The current practical benefits of human spaceflight, while they have meaning to specific stakeholder groups, do not rise to the level of compelling justification for human spaceflight. Aspirational/inspirational rationales and value propositions, however, are most closely aligned with the enduring questions, and when “added” to the practical benefits do, in the committee’s judgment, argue for continuation of NASA human spaceflight programs, provided that the pathways approach and decision rules described in Chapter 1 are applied. The NRC report American’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program with National Needs (2009), while noting that “the U.S. civil space program has long demonstrated a capacity to effectively serve U.S. national interests,” recommends future alignment of space program capabilities and plans with “high-priority national imperatives, including those where space is not traditionally considered,”166 including climate monitoring and change, development of advanced technologies, and international relations. Of these, the Committee for Rationale and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program noted that international relations is most closely aligned with human spaceflight and can serve the interests of the United States by “inviting emerging economic powers to join with us in human spaceflight adventures.”167 That report also noted that human spaceflight activities “should be prioritized by their potential for and likelihood of producing a transformative cultural, scientific, commercial, or technical outcome,” although it cautions that such activities require many years and a “long-term commitment to come to fruition.”168 Such outcomes, while they may be possible, represent future objectives for human spaceflight, requiring not only commitment but investment, planning, and management designed to realize them in alignment with the pathways and decision rules developed in this report. At present, the analytical and other challenges (defining and measuring objectives, attributing effects to NASA programs, evaluating trade-offs among the various elements of the NASA value proposition and rationales associated with value proposition analysis) mean that a definitive assessment of the “NASA human spaceflight value proposition” is beyond the capability of this committee, and, in the 165 David, L. (2013). China Invites Foreign Astronauts to Fly on Future Space Station. September 28, Space.com. http://www.space.com/22984-china-space-station-foreign-astronauts.html. 166 Committee on the Rationale and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program (2009), National Research Council. “America’s Future in Space: Aligning The Civil Space Program With National Needs” (p. 59). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 167 Committee on the Rationale and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program (2009), p. 63. 168 Ibid. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-43

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committee’s judgment, that of most other objective observers. These programs include an array of activities whose outcomes are difficult to monitor, that are affected by multiple other federal programs, and monitoring of which requires detailed data on outcomes that may span decades. Finally, the question What would be lost?, while it offers a different perspective through which to view the benefits of human spaceflight among various stakeholders, does not lead to any change in the conclusions the committee has developed based on its analysis of the rationales. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2-44