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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
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2


Norms in Military Environments

“Norms are cultural phenomena that prescribe and proscribe behavior in specific circumstances” (Hechter and Opp, 2001, p. xi). They are group-level phenomena that guide how people behave, or believe they should behave, in groups (injunctive norms; described in more detail below). Norms also refer to group perceptions about behavior, irrespective of morality or compatibility with social or organizational values or ethics (descriptive norms; described in more detail below). Research questions concerning norms and how they operate in military contexts can address a broad cross-section of topics and issues; for instance:

  • In novel contexts or settings, how do norms emerge within Army units?
  • How do soldiers respond to Army policy that seeks to change norms, as well as how norms change on their own accord?
  • What causes individuals to deviate from sanctioned institutional norms? What causes groups of individuals to subscribe to norms that deviate from institutional values?
  • How do soldiers formally and informally sanction the non-normative or deviant behavior of their peers?
  • How do soldiers successfully negotiate the translation of Army core values into normative behavior?
  • How do norms become disconnected from Army core values?
  • What social norms predict Army unit success?
  • How does the acute and chronic stress that many Army units experience influence the above?
Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

PERSPECTIVES ON NORMS RESEARCH

Although the concept of norms is one of the most common concepts used by social scientists to explain behavior (Sills and Merton, 1968), the definition of norms, how they emerge, how they operate, why people comply with them, and the influence of sanctioning on compliance remain controversial. Complicating these matters, academic disciplines discuss norms using different terminology and constructs (e.g., anthropologists discuss “cultural norms;” economists discuss profit maximization and self-interested behavior in terms of “expected utility” and “Nash equilibrium”) and research them using a variety of methods (e.g., ethnography, survey methods, laboratory experiments, computer simulation). Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that social norms are an essential feature of all human groups.

Through its review of the available research, the committee recognizes the potential to develop a far more detailed and lengthy chapter discussing distinct concepts of norms and their potential relevance to military environments. However, the committee had two specific intentions in authoring this chapter: (1) to introduce the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and other research agencies to the substantial academic work on norms that has been conducted outside the context of military environments, and (2) to suggest key basic research opportunities that have great potential to improve understanding of real soldiers operating in real military environments. The perspectives on norms research offered in this section introduce the complexity of the study of norms. While this section will define and distinguish types of norms that operate through different mechanisms, for the purposes of the research agenda recommended in this report, such differences between norms is of less consequence. The committee assesses that understanding norms in military environments is important, and should be considered for future research without stipulating detail that might otherwise obscure the broad-spectrum importance of norms as a contextual influence on soldiers and small units. In this way the committee supports norms research without specifically directing or shaping that agenda to one type of norms research.

Norms are understood in terms of two distinguishable characteristics that often combine in how group and individual members behave and perceive behavior, according to the norm. On one hand, norms refer to the “oughtness” of behavior (Homans, 1950), highlighting the moral sentiment group members have about what “should” and “should not” happen (Hechter and Opp, 2001). These injunctive norms (Cialdini et al., 1990) reflect group assessment of “approved” and “disapproved” conduct. In this regard, norms signify values or the shared belief system of a group. On the other hand, norms reference behaviors and beliefs held in common by

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

group members regardless of morality, defined as descriptive norms. This “normative” behavior allows members to conform to other members of the group (Cialdini, 1988), as well as providing expectations concerning how other members will behave (Bicchieri, 2006). Descriptive norms are common behaviors or how most people in a group act, or are anticipated to act, in specific situations.

Although many aspects of norms are contested across disciplines, much of the research validates a long-standing hypothesis that norms will emerge to solve collective action problems (Ullman-Margalit, 1977). However, this is not the only condition under which norms form, nor does it assume norms are always positive; for example, they may have disadvantages for some members (Opp, 2001). Furthermore, injunctive norms can emerge through “… the aggregate results of human action with no thought or no intention of bringing about a norm” (Opp, 2001, p. 237).

Research on social norms typically emphasizes the interrelated process of compliance and sanctioning. It is implicit in the concept of norms that in most instances people comply with them (Cialdini et al., 1988). Similarly, if group members disobey an injunctive norm, members may sanction one another, i.e., the majority may engage in efforts to “correct” the behaviors of minority group members (Heckathorn, 1990). However, when the majority of group members disobey injunctive norms, deviating group members may not sanction the majority (Cialdini, 1988); in these cases, descriptive norms outweigh injunctive norms. While this generic understanding of social norms is relatively undisputed, theoretical explanations concerning their importance, as well as how they operate, remain controversial topics (see Keizer et al., 2008, for an example of a study of behavioral effects when descriptive and injunctive norms are in conflict).

Theories of the formation of norms and the effectiveness of norms have been developed by many researchers, including anthropologists, sociologists, economists, historians, and psychologists, and these theories often have somewhat different focus and different implications for addressing deviant behavior. Several theories have been influential in sociology. Parsons’ (1951) theory of the socialized actor argues that self-interested individuals voluntarily conform to social norms because these norms become part of the personality of the individual. Parsons does not provide a theory of how norms are formed but rather views norms as exogenous. They are internally enforced by feelings of shame or guilt, are primarily taught by parents, and so become part of the preferences of individuals. In this way, norms become values. The implications of the theory of the socialized actor are that norms will change only slowly and that norms predict behavior.

Yet, there are many examples of an individual’s norms changing rapidly, such as when an individual decides to join a new group (such as the Army) and wants to be accepted as part of that group. Moreover, some

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

research suggests that injunctive norms often do not predict behavior unless the individual believes that others will behave in accordance with a particular norm (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1977, 1975). In other words, contrary to Parsons’ theory, compliance with norms is not unconditional. Rather, people often comply with norms because of what that compliance implies about their group membership and consequent self-image. For example, social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Turner et al., 1987) notes that by choosing to join a particular group, the individual redefines his or her self-image in ways that are congruent with the roles, beliefs, values, and actions of the group. This could be particularly relevant for soldiers as they join specialty branches of the Army (e.g., infantry or intelligence) or divisions with well-known distinguished histories (e.g., 10th Mountain Division or 82nd Airborne Division). In essence, by joining a group, an individual internalizes a self-image that is consistent with any stereotypic image of, or scripted behavior associated with, the group.

Rational Choice and the Effectiveness of Norms

There are three mechanisms through which norms can be enforced, thereby making them effective at influencing group behavior. First, a rational self-interested individual will conform to a norm if the expected sanctions are sufficient (Axelrod, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Bendor and Swistak, 2001). In this case, compliance with social norms can be analyzed in terms of the formal game theory construct called a “repeated prisoner’s dilemma.”

A second mechanism is the internalization of norms (i.e., self-discipline): for example, an individual might not litter, even if no one else sees, because the individual will feel guilty for behaving in an “immoral” manner (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). For an internalized norm, external enforcement through mechanisms such as fines is unnecessary; the norm has become part of the individual’s preferences. The example of littering illustrates one economic role of social norms: to improve efficiency by removing externalities. However, the real question is whether and how norms can evolve without sanctions (e.g., fines for littering) or internalization (e.g., respect for the environment).

In a third mechanism, norms develop based on the expectations of how others will behave (Bicchieri, 2006), which implies conditional conformity if it becomes in the self-interest of all or most participants to conform (i.e., a stable Nash equilibrium). For example, should one decide to drive on the right or left side of the road (Young, 1996)? Applying this third mechanism, the answer depends on the individual’s expectation of what others will do. In this example, the norm is enforced by the desire to prevent accidents (a coordination motive). Coordination games that evolve an efficient, stable social norm as an equilibrium (from possible multiple equilibria, e.g., either

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
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driving on the left or driving on the right side of the road) provide a clear theory of the formation of a social norm.

Decision Making as a Dual Process

Both to explain deviant behavior and to suggest research avenues for correcting or preventing such behavior, it is useful to review a commonly invoked framework from cognitive psychology for how people make decisions as a dual process (see, for example, Epstein, 1990; Evans, 2007, 2008, 2010; Kahneman and Frederick, 2005; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999; Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Dual process theories propose that people have two information processing systems that work together to produce judgments and hence behavior: (1) the deliberative reasoning brain and (2) the intuitive and emotional brain, which is often subconscious. Although this framework may be an oversimplification of complex decision making, and there is debate as to whether people harbor two different parallel processing architectures (Evans, 2010, 2012; Sloman, 1996) or merely two different cognitive modes (Kahneman and Frederick, 2005; Stanovich, 1999), many people find the framework useful for explaining behavior. Kahneman has recently summarized much of the extant research in Thinking Fast and Slow (2012).

Fast thinking comes from what psychologists call System 1, which influences decisions through immediate feelings that arise in response to a situation or stimulus. These reactions are partly instinctual, partly learned, and often emotional. Slow thinking takes place in System 2, which behaves much like the rational choice or expected utility model of economic theory. Dual process theory holds that decisions typically result from a mix of influences from these two systems. Sometimes System 1 dominates, as when an instant and instinctual response is required in swerving a Humvee to avoid a possible improvised explosive device. At other times, System 2 dominates; for example, when an individual decides between alternative routes to travel to a distant village by taking time to reflect on the relative risks of each possible route.

One of the interesting things about System 1 is that probabilities seem to be ignored in these automated, reflexive, responses that are based on instinct or past learning. System 1 is also activated by change or deviation from a reference point (what is normal or expected), so it is relative and reacts to changes, as opposed to System 2, which considers absolutes. Kahneman (2012) argues that the nervous system is very sensitive to changes from reference points and codes changes as positive (pleasure) or negative (pain). Many studies have shown that losses from a reference point seem to be valued about twice as much as gains and that people generally prefer to avoid losses than to acquire gains; they are typically risk-seeking

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

in losses (e.g., prefer a 50-50 percent risk of no loss or a $2,500 loss rather than to accept a certain $1,000 loss) and risk-averse in gains (e.g., prefer to receive a certain $1,000 than a 50-50 percent chance of gaining $2,500 or gaining nothing), features that have their origin in System 1 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Understanding the role of System 1 in decisions made by soldiers, who may generally be more risk-seeking individuals than the typical populations used for such studies, may have important implications for understanding how norms develop in small units.

When System 1 and System 2 are in conflict, context is thought to determine which system dominates. For example, fatigue, stress, or other forms of cognitive load reduce the influence of System 2 (which is the source of rational decision making and self-control) and increase the influence of System 1, leading to more instinctive, habitual, or “mindless” (not consciously reflective) behavior (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). For example, in a study examining the role of dual process in moral decision making, cognitive load was shown to interfere with utilitarian moral judgment, leading subjects to make less deliberative and more emotion-based moral judgments (Greene et al., 2008). An example of this type of decision might occur when soldiers on an infiltration mission come across civilians on the way to their target. Their leader might consider several options in order to accomplish the mission and follow the Law of Land Warfare which prohibits the deliberate killing or wounding of civilians. The existence of clear policy reinforced through training is intended to relieve leaders of having to make deliberative decisions because they are trained to have the correct response. In other words the correct response becomes a reference point in System 1, rather than having to rely on the slower, easily overloaded System 2.

Similarly, in another series of psychology experiments, student subjects placed under cognitive load were much more likely to violate social norms than those who were not (Gailliot et al., 2012). The results suggest that some individuals possess more self-control as an inherent trait and that self-control can be depleted if participants are put under cognitive load. In six experiments, social norms that were either implicit (e.g., do not use curse words) or explicit (e.g., a stated rule of no talking) were consistently more likely to be violated by those participants with low self-control as a trait (measured by a self-report survey) or by participants subjected to self-control depletion by a lengthy, boring task such as crossing out specified letters in written text. These experiments suggest that problem behaviors are more likely to occur when individuals are put under stress. For soldiers, stress could be induced from many sources: combat exposure, personal issues, frequent contact with family at home during deployment, or other sources including too much free time. However, the committee cautions against inferring too much from studies conducted in settings outside mili-

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

tary environments which do not properly account for the circumstances experienced by soldiers.

To illustrate the relevance of the dual process typology for understanding norm violation, consider a soldier who is mentally exhausted from combat, inebriated, or troubled by events at home. These cognitive loads may compromise System 2 to the point that if the soldier experiences a severe loss in System 1 (e.g., from an unexpected event), the soldier may not make rationally correct choices and may become angry or risk-seeking. Social norms establish reference points that are learned and are consistent with the concept of gist, fuzzy memory representations of the meaning of a past event (Brainerd and Reyna, 1990; Reyna, 2004). Complex information is reduced to simplified rules when learned and encoded in System 1. The advantage of the gist of social norms, if they are sufficiently strongly ingrained, is that they can guide behavior without invoking System 2 in cases where System 2 is compromised. Creating such strong norms in a military situation requires extensive learning from training, such as the training soldiers receive on the Seven Core Army Values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage).1 For example, behavioral problems “behind the wire” may arise if soldiers are extensively trained and have the correct gist for behavior outside of the wire (e.g., protocols for combat engagement with civilians present), but do not receive enough training to develop the correct gist for behavior inside the wire (e.g., treatment of detainees).

An example of reference point formation by System 1 is learning to drive a car. One reference point that needs to be developed is keeping the car in the middle of the lane. If the car drifts left or right, when one is learning to drive, the driver consciously has to think to turn the wheel to the right or left. However this process becomes subconscious and automatic for experienced drivers—unless they fail to pay attention and hear the rumble of the Botts’ dots at the side of the road, which evokes an upsetting or fear response and immediate correction (Schulze et al., 2013; see also Martens and Fox, 2007). Reference points can thus be viewed as “automating” behavior or creating habits so that System 2 can be freed to think of more important things. However, reference points can also lead to decision errors.

Norms guide behavior as internalized standards that operate at both the conscious (System 2) and subconscious (System 1) levels. Norm violation can occur when System 2 is compromised (through stress or fatigue), and the System 1 response is counternormative. Some (descriptive) norms are useful for coordinating action; other (injunctive) norms are useful

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1Descriptions of the Seven Core Army Values are available at http://www.army.mil/values/ [April 2014].

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

because they instantiate values and reinforce people’s self-identity. Given these functions, norms are critical for understanding Army behavior, particularly in small unit settings and when formal rules may be less evident or difficult for soldiers to interpret given the context of the military environment and mission.

CHARACTERISTICS OF NORMS IN ARMY CONTEXTS

Norms concern how a social group patterns its behavior relative to situations (i.e., contexts) its members encounter. As a result, understanding social norms in the Army requires considering the real-world contexts soldiers experience. The following examples demonstrate how norms, or features of them, influence or may potentially influence the behaviors and beliefs of soldiers.

  1. 1. When norms of a group change, the change influences what current, former, or future members of the group think about themselves.

Policies concerning women in the Army have changed; the new norm allows women to take a greater role in combat operations. Across the “total institution” (Goffman, 1961), Army leadership can change norms, but such changes often encounter resistance. This can be understood in terms of norms as they may follow or precede formal changes to rules or laws. For example, moving from all-male combat units to units that include men and women influences norms soldiers may resent or resist. In this instance, a wide range of previously normative behavior might be affected. As the military is already beginning to recognize, behaviors that would be considered normative within all-male units, such as teasing, insults, or sexual joking or talk, take on new meaning when they occur within mixed-gender units (Wong, 2014). These behaviors, which the group may have previously associated with group bonding, must now be reevaluated for acceptability. Changes (or lack of change) in this regard may also complicate how women soldiers perceive their membership in these units, as well as how they are perceived by others (see Chapter 5). Understanding how soldiers learn acceptable behavior when what “acceptable” means is changing or still being determined (or contested) by the group is a critical research question. Mixed in with this norm are laws regarding “sexual harassment.” However, what is legally prohibited and what is socially acceptable (i.e., the norm) are often different, and the line here can be fuzzy. How new norms associated with women in the Army are communicated and negotiated among unit group members—and the larger Army—is critical to consider. The evolving norms associated with women are also particularly meaningful to the Army’s effort to recruit women. It should be noted that resisting the

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

norm in this instance is a byproduct of the groups’ perceptions and does not have to be based on fact. Furthermore, it was clear to the committee through discussions with military service members that norms are already developing within the military absent official policy, for example in regards to fitness requirements for female soldiers in combat units.

A study of sexual harassment norms in the military, conducted via a cross-sectional survey of 681 active duty soldiers, found harassment-tolerant norms emanating from the soldiers’ unit and immediate supervisors but not from senior officers (Murdoch et al., 2009). Several features of military microclimates were suggested to explain these findings. First, because of the hierarchical structure of the military, interactions between senior officers and lower ranks (to include junior officers and enlisted ranks) are limited (Hoffman, 1995). Therefore, norms accepted or promulgated from above may not diffuse to all levels of the military. Second, intra-unit cohesion might influence individual behaviors more than organizational policy. In other words, soldiers feel more loyalty and accountability to other members of their units than to outsiders. From this kind of evidence, the committee judges that results from nonmilitary research, which concludes that management shapes norms more than peer coworkers (Wimbush and Shepard, 1994), may not apply to military small units, where the platoon leader and noncommissioned officers within the platoon have more effect on group norms than do commissioned officers at higher echelons. Although more research needs to be done in this area within military environments, the laboratory-based norms research suggests that norms in small units are not always the product of formal leadership processes.

In game theory and experimental studies of norms, metanorms are defined as mechanisms associated with the enforcement of norms (Axelrod, 1986). In her presentation of a relational theory of norm enforcement, Horne (2009) describes compelling experimental and case study evidence concerning how relationships between group members promote metanorms. Simply stated, this theory holds that the more group members are interdependent, the more they will sanction behavior; “their dependence on others can lead them to enforce norms they do not prefer and in which they do not believe” (Horne, 2009, pp. 27-28).

  1. 2. Norms define the expectations that others have of one’s behavior as a member of the group.

Soldiers in the Army “follow orders,” but through discussions with military service members, the committee learned that even this most fundamental edict can challenge social norms. For instance, in operations “outside the wire” a squad leader on combat missions has enormous responsibility; as the leader, he or she must make many tactical decisions

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

independently, based on his or her understanding of commander’s intent, and these decisions could have strategic implications for the mission and mortality implications for the leader and the unit. However, in garrison, expectations change dramatically; the same squad leader may feel like just another soldier who must follow orders (whatever they may be), adhere to rules, and follow a strict chain of command under centralized leadership.

These shifts in expectations influence norms. Namely, the norms in the former context support values of autonomy, responsibility, independent situational decision making, innovation, and trust, while the norm expectation in the latter context (in garrison) supports values of conformity, rule following, deference, and obedience. Instances in which a change in context exposes contrasting expectations of the group (i.e., “outside the wire you have to be an independent tactical decision maker, inside the wire you have to follow the rules”) are important to understanding norm development and conflicts (see also Chapter 3). This example does not imply that rules do not apply “outside the wire.” Rather, it is the contrast in expectations guiding the soldiers’ behavior (that is, different norms being applied) that complicates matters and makes researching normative processes critical.

  1. 3. What is normative in one social context is deviant in another.

To a soldier, killing the enemy is normative and conforms to the primary strategic mission of the military. Of course, killing in other contexts (i.e., civilian society) is deviant. But killing may also occur in less clearly defined contexts such as a noncombat operation or when the mission objective is complicated, multidimensional, or insufficiently or inaccurately understood. In these contexts, killing may be considered deviant, in violation of the rules of engagement, or illegal, but its effect on small unit norms can be unpredictable. For whatever reason, members of the unit may believe the act was necessary, warranted, or acceptable. In such instances norms associated with killing can potentially change to accommodate a new context (e.g., a noncombat operation), especially if its ultimate outcome supports values that the group holds (e.g., protecting their peers). These behaviors may, in turn, act to modify the “values” of the unit, or shift unit norms. Although killing is an extreme example, other deviant behaviors may emerge as a function of shifting norms. In this way, systematic norms research in the context of small military units can make important contributions to the understanding of conditional factors and qualities of norms. For instance, in the 2003-2004 Abu Ghraib Detention Facility detainee abuse incidents, norms adopted by a unit (military police) shifted to a point where the treatment of detainees manifested the antithesis of Army core values (see Willer et al., 2009, for a discussion of norms that people compel each other to do but that the group members disapprove of privately). Here again, although

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

norms may be only part of the larger historical context associated with Abu Ghraib, a better understanding of norms can inform developing measures that prevent such deviance. As intense stress can elicit deviant behaviors that may be perceived by groups as normal, understanding norm formation processes is critical to the mission of the Army.

  1. 4. Norms align how people within a social group act toward people in other social groups.

On the modern battlefield, members of an Army unit are under unique stress because the “others” they encounter may be friend one day and foe the next (see also Chapter 3). Modern warfare requires soldiers to fight enemies who hide among noncombatants, making the rules of engagement, and the legal actions they incur when violated, complex to interpret (Puckett and Atwood, 2012). Confusion is further compounded by the diversity of groups with which the Army collaborates. Here the expectation (i.e., norm) is caution: if it is unclear whether the “others” are allies, then it is best to treat them as a potential enemy to ensure self- and collective force protection. But ironically, behaviors that support this norm may work against its ultimate purpose. Treating a noncombatant as a potential enemy is not a functional way to enlist or maintain that noncombatant as an ally. This context can, in turn, undermine and disrupt mission-related objectives because, in the mind of the soldier, behaviors are associated with different norms. Here, as in the case of sexual harassment, actions can blur the line between normative, deviant, and criminal behavior.

An important objective of the Army is to promote small unit cohesion and other forms of teamwork. But as in the civilian justice system, within military justice the culpability for any collective battlefield crime (e.g., crimes committed by a group of soldiers) falls on the individual soldiers, the soldiers’ immediate supervisor, and commanding junior officers (Puckett and Atwood, 2012). Current theories used to understand such crime are very limited, the most notable being “groupthink,” which postulates that faulty decisions occur though premature consensus that subverts normal processes (Janis, 1972). Although the groupthink hypothesis, when subjected to experimental tests, has not consistently produced the predicted results (Moorhead, 1982; Baron, 2005), research on its basic premise that overconformity undermines good judgment (Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Paulus, 1998; Turner and Pratkanis, 1998; Whyte, 1998) suggests that understanding how norm processes operate within small units can have important consequences, especially when considering culpability for legal violations. Expanding research on battlefield crime to emphasize unit behavior “… may reveal a better means of structuring military justice and achieving accountability on the battlefield without what seems to be a

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

lopsided emphasis on the individual, and (in several recent military justice cases), on the junior military members involved in the incident” (Puckett and Attwood, 2012, p. 84).

  1. 5. In novel situations, the values (and attitudes) of a social group guide but do not necessarily predict normative behavior.

Army operations are dynamic, and as a result it is not uncommon for soldiers to encounter novel situations in which previous experience may not be particularly useful in guiding action. In these instances, there is no normative behavior and the military relies on formal “leadership” in unit decision-making processes; a leader makes decisions that set the standard for normative behavior (see Chapter 4). However, in reality, norm development is much more egalitarian and decentralized (e.g., everyone is a leader; everyone is a follower) (Tuckman, 1965; Fine, 2001). It is important to consider the development of a norm as a group process. An important body of research in this regard highlights how social groups “negotiate” norms by continuously defining the “meaning” of member behaviors relative to the group’s values and ideals (Fine, 2001).

Although values are different from norms, understanding the relationship between the two in norm formation is important. All Army personnel are expected to uphold the Seven Core Army Values; therefore, in novel situations these values are supposed to guide norm assessments negotiated among group members. The group determines how behaviors associated with a task are to be accomplished in ways that conform to its core values. But values are not behaviors, and norms require effective communication to group members. As a component of how norms form (i.e., how they are communicated among group members) it is equally relevant to consider dissemination and diffusion. Without understanding the relationship between values and norm development, as well as the dissemination of norms, it becomes difficult to predict the norms that might emerge from novel situations.

THEMES FOR RESEARCH ON NORMS

A number of features about the Army have implications for researching social norms. First, the Army is also an “all volunteer” force with a self-selection process of members joining a professional organization with a strong sense of established organizational values. Second, the military is a “total institution” (Goffman, 1961), meaning all elements of a soldier’s life are under military control. To direct the social norms of its members, the Army has its own laws, rules, policy, doctrine, ethics, and values, as well as codes of conduct. Everyone in the Army is formally indoctrinated in this

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

lifestyle. Furthermore, these expectations apply whether a soldier is on or off duty, and they distinguish a military versus civilian career. A soldier is always expected to behave in a manner that upholds military honor (e.g., behaviors such as adultery are punishable through military courts).

Second, Army units are idiosyncratic social groups. Members often live together; operate in an extensive variety of contexts; collaborate with different groups (see Chapter 6); deploy for extended periods of time; work under the duress of potential trauma, injury, or death; and may use lethal force. Complicating matters, soldiers rely on one another for their survival, yet units frequently and regularly rotate membership and leadership personnel (see Chapter 4). Soldiers are also required to accomplish missions that may have contradictory objectives (e.g., one day performing a peacekeeping mission to protect civilians, the next day killing enemy combatants).

Finally, due to the hierarchical structure of the military, social groups are nested. This implies that social norms may also be nested (i.e., squad within a company within a battalion) such that small units from different higher-level units potentially may express slightly different norms.

Although studies of social norms within the Army have been limited, case study research in this area has investigated the context of small units in combat (Stouffer, 1949; Marshall, 1947; Gabriel and Savage, 1979) as well as social norms associated with life on military installations (Hawkins, 2005; MacLeish, 2013). Here the committee emphasizes again, as noted in the report’s first recommendation, that the most effective way to research norms within Army units is to conduct research activities with active duty Army personnel.

FUTURE RESEARCH ON NORMS

With a scientifically informed understanding of social norms, the roles they play in individual and group behavior, and the processes through which they form and change, the Army will be much better equipped to resolve norm-based conflicts and ensure that the Seven Core Army Values are sustained in units’ social norms. The center of a soldier’s universe is the squad and platoon. Group bonding occurs or fails at this level, group norms are defined and evolve, and standards of behavior are set. It is at this level that relationships are formed and that much of the Army’s mission effectiveness is determined.

Conclusion 2

The committee concludes that norms are an important dimension of the social context within small units. Due to the unique conditions of military contexts, the committee further concludes that participants in

Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

research studies on military norms must be active duty soldiers, if the results are to be meaningful in real military environments.

Recommendation 2

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) and other relevant U.S. military funding agencies should fund basic research that:

  1. identifies the content of norms; the values, attitudes, and behaviors that express norms; formal and informal incentives and sanctions that maintain norms; conditions that moderate norm-relevant behavior; and the development of norms over time;
  2. examines the relationship between norms and the performance of soldiers and the attitudes and behaviors of their leaders; and
  3. identifies approaches for changing norms to produce more effective soldiers and units.

To facilitate the research program on norms, the committee recommends that ARI establish a multidisciplinary task force charged with development of a program of research studying norms in military contexts.

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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×

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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 Norms in Military Environments." National Research Council. 2014. The Context of Military Environments: An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18825.
×
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The United States Army faces a variety of challenges to maintain a ready and capable force into the future. Missions are increasingly diverse, ranging from combat and counterinsurgency to negotiation, reconstruction, and stability operations, and require a variety of personnel and skill sets to execute. Missions often demand rapid decision-making and coordination with others in novel ways, so that personnel are not simply following a specific set of tactical orders but rather need to understand broader strategic goals and choose among courses of action. Like any workforce, the Army is diverse in terms of demographic characteristics such as gender and race, with increasing pressure to ensure equal opportunities across all demographic parties. With these challenges comes the urgent need to better understand how contextual factors influence soldier and small unit behavior and mission performance.

Recognizing the need to develop a portfolio of research to better understand the influence of social and organizational factors on the behavior of individuals and small units, the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) requested the National Research Council's Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences to outline a productive and innovative collection of future basic science research projects to improve Amy mission performance for immediate implementation and lasting over the next 10-20 years. This report presents recommendations for a program of basic scientific research on the roles of social and organizational contextual factors, such as organizational institutions, culture, and norms, as determinants and moderators of the performance of individual soldiers and small units.

The Context of Military Environments: Basic Research Opportunities on Social and Organizational Factors synthesizes and assesses basic research opportunities in the behavioral and social sciences related to social and organizational factors that comprise the context of individual and small unit behavior in military environments. This report focuses on tactical operations of small units and their leaders, to include the full spectrum of unique military environments including: major combat operations, stability/support operations, peacekeeping, and military observer missions, as well as headquarters support units. This report identifies key contextual factors that shape individual and small unit behavior and assesses the state of the science regarding these factors. The Context of Military Environments recommends an agenda for ARI's future research in order to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. Army personnel policies and practices of selection, recruitment, and assignment as well as career development in training and leadership. The report also specifies the basic research funding level needed to implement the recommended agenda for future ARI research.

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