Summary of Panel Discussion
David Mowery's presentation directed attention to the need for coordination between technology and trade policies. Just as trade policy cannot be a substitute for technology policy, an exclusive focus on technology policy obscures some large, international challenges that must be addressed. To develop an effective national technology policy, it is important to take into account the growing importance of technology from foreign sources, the need for expanded access to foreign markets by U.S.-based companies, the comparative openness of the U.S. research system, and the increasing dependence of the defense industry on civilian markets. Pointing to a trend apparent in both Europe and the United States to "emulate" Japanese technology policy of the 1960s and 1970s, Mowery warned that a poorly formulated U.S. technology policy could produce adverse results—a closing off of foreign access to, as well as foreign contributions to, the U.S. research system, and a neglect of policies oriented toward technology diffusion. The lack of consensus about U.S. technology policy, Mowery suggested, hinders effective U.S. trade policy. Witness the absence of a strong U.S. consensus position on R&D subsidies in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks.
Craig Fields and Hajime Karatsu focused on technology as a process of making marketable goods. Fields called attention to the need to bridge the gap between the laboratory and the production line. The primary problem for the United States is not R&D investment, but using technology effec-
The Panel on Trade Challenges to Technology Policy was chaired by David Mowery. Other panelists were Craig Fields, Hajime Karatsu, and Margaret Sharp.
tively in manufacturing. Briding the gap means paying attention to the quality of the work force, investment decisions, and building an "information infrastructure" needed to support the U.S. economy.
While Karatsu emphasized the key role of the entrepreneur in the technology process, the examples he chose provided insights into ways in which the government can play a constructive role. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry's program to encourage manufacturing engineers is one example. Another is the Fifth Generation Computer Project, important primarily for building networks among scientists and engineers from competing companies. Karatsu emphasized the importance of "keeping technology in your own hands" even when production is moved offshore. His major message was that American industry should stop complaining and start competing. This means keeping the market constantly in mind. Karatsu emphasized the point that any idea, however innovative, is not technology but "merely knowledge" if we fail to produce marketable goods.
Margaret Sharp brought a European perspective to the panel, reminding the audience that there is no grand strategy in Europe, but rather a search for new approaches. In Britain there is disillusionment with industrial policies developed in years past to support national champion firms. Cooperation and competition are the twin tracks of new policy initiatives in Europe today. ESPRIT embodies the first track—a new model for industrial cooperation, a new confidence in European industry. Through cooperative R&D, the European governments are providing a catalyst for change. The second policy track is reflected in the Single European Act and the role of the Commission in revising public procurement policies that favor national companies. Echoing Mowery's comments, Sharp advocated approaches that "swim with the tide of internationalism, not against it."
A major theme in the discussion was the question of whether the new paradigms provide an adequate basis for action, particularly by the U.S. government. Robert Stern pointed to the lists of critical technologies that have been produced and wondered out loud whether these lists help to set priorities for action. Fields noted that the lists do embody priorities, in view of the fact that many technologies are not included. We do not, however, have quantitative data or accepted methodologies for deciding which technologies are most important or for moving technology from the laboratory to production. Many of these judgments must be intuitive.
Laura Tyson called attention to the fundamental differences in thinking between the American and Japanese speakers. Japanese spokesmen are not afraid to say that some industries are important—those that employ highly skilled people, involve mass production, and have developed strategies for using technology to compete globally. In contrast, some U.S. participants criticized the "new paradigms" as incapable of providing a strong analytical base to choose among technologies. According to this view, the U.S. policy
process is fundamentally unable to deal with the competing claims of "critical technologies." This deep lack of faith in the government's ability to make effective technology policies contrasts with a perspective from Japan (and Europe): The government does make mistakes, but it can also play a constructive role.
Joseph Gavin and John Odell both called attention to the need for political leadership. Odell asked which industries would be willing to invest the necessary resources to help create a "domestic coalition" for new policy approaches. Mowery responded that much of the U.S. technology policy debate is "distributive politics," the essence of which is competition among industries for shares. Gerald Dinneen pointed to Sematech and MCC as evidence that U.S. industry is ready to act.
The contributions of participants from Europe and Japan helped to bring different perspectives to debates over U.S. policy. The symposium high-lighted significant changes in global competition among high-technology industries and systems. These changes present new challenges to U.S. policymakers in government and industry to bring more coherence between the domestic and international dimensions of economic policy. This will be a difficult task, in view of the ad hoc approach that the United States has taken to technology policy and uncertainties about the future of the multinational trading system under the GATT.
