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OCR for page 229
10
Team Leadership and
Crew Coordination
Effective leadership and communications among crew members are nec-
essary to ensure optimal team performance during a workload transition. It
is necessary for the tank commander to direct the actions of the crew mem-
bers to form an effective team and to coordinate the actions of his tank with
those of other tanks and combat units. The tank environment is a classic
example of a small work group embedded in a multigroup setting- a situa-
tion demanding effective leadership and crew coordination.
The critical issue is that crew performance must be considered as a
team endeavor. While this statement seems to be belaboring the obvious,
training in many, if not most, team activities focuses on individual tasks,
and evaluation concentrates on individual performance and error. For ex-
ample, operating teams are composed of surgeons, anesthesiologists, and
supporting nurses for each. Medical training, however, concentrates on the
specialty, with the implicit assumption that the subgroups will coordinate
their activities effectively when they come together to deal with a patient.
A growing body of evidence suggests that, when teams face sudden transi-
tions from routine procedures to a medical emergency, coordination can
break down and conflicts can occur (Howard et al., in press). Similarly,
although flying a modern jet transport, patrol aircraft, or bomber is patently
a team endeavor, the formal evaluation and certification of pilots have his-
torically concentrated on individual proficiency. What is characteristically
lacking is attention to processes by which teams as a unit accomplish their
tasks.
Within this context, the key to success in effecting a transition from a
229
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WORKLOAD TRANSITION
standby or vigilance status to an action (combat) posture is in keeping each
crew member alert, fully apprised of the operational situation, and prepared
for coordinated action. Maintaining a cohesive, efficient team is made
more difficult in the tank environment by the fact that communications are
degraded by the physical layout and habitability of the vehicle. As noted
earlier, face-to-face interaction is generally precluded, with intracrew com-
munications taking place over interphones and interunit communications by
radio. Several channels of communications operate simultaneously, creat-
ing a need to monitor and screen communications for relevant information.
Chemical or nuclear alerts require MOPP gear, which further increases dif-
ficulties in communications. Crews transitioning to combat may have spent
several days in cramped, poorly ventilated, readiness conditions in or near
their tank. It is possible that when the sudden need arises for effective,
coordinated communications and action, crew members will be in less than
peak physical and psychological readiness.
Clearly, the success or failure of tank crews (and teams in general) in
workload transition depends to a large extent on the flow of communication
among the team members, how this flow is affected by stress, and how
these effects, in turn, are moderated by personality qualities of the team
leader and by the organizational structure.
Somewhat relevant here is an extensive literature on group decision
making and problem solving (see Davis, 1992, or Hastie, 1986, for a good
synthesis). The vast majority of this research has been involved with fairly
abstract tasks. Nevertheless, certain conclusions from this work are worth
summarizing:
(1) Generally, performance of a group solving a problem or reaching a
decision falls somewhere between the average of the individual competen-
cies of group members and the performance of the most competent mem-
bers. Confidence in decision quality is generally higher than individual
competence.
(2) Where performance ranges between these limits depends on a num-
ber of other factors: performance appears to be a function of (a) how
clearly demonstrable is the correct solution, (b) the length of time the orga-
nization remains constituted (improves), (c) the nature of factions that form
within the group, (d) the size of the group (improves up to five members),
and (e) the persuasiveness and status of more competent (improves) or less
competent (degrades) members.
(3) There is little evidence that different structural techniques, such as
Delphi or brainstorming, systematically improve decision performance (Hastie,
19864.
(4) There is some evidence that face-to-face settings are beneficial. It
also appears that computer-mediated communications allow less dominant
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TEAM LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
231
group members to provide more input. Group decisions reached in this
computer-mediated manner tend to be more extreme but not necessarily of
higher quality (Kiesler and Sproull, 19924.
As noted above, most of the studies have employed fairly abstract tasks
(some of the work on jury verdicts is an exception), using naive subjects, in
nonstressed conditions, and groups that were constituted specifically for the
purposes of the experiment. These characteristics somewhat limit the
generalizability of these conclusions to team performance in crisis, the fo-
cus of this report. To address the latter domain, we turn instead to one
environment the aircraft cockpit in which a substantial amount of rel-
evant research has been conducted. Hence, the cockpit environment is the
primary focus of this chapter.
AVIATION RESEARCH FINDINGS ON LEADERSHIP
AND CREW COORDINATION
On preliminary examination, many issues seem common to tank crews
and flight crews. One, of course, is long periods of passive vigilance,
which may be supplanted by a high-workload period with high needs for
effective, coordinated behavior. A second is a high volume of (often de-
graded) multichannel communications and the need to comprehend and act
on critical information embedded in extraneous transmissions. Also com-
mon to many flight as well as tank operations are high levels of fatigue that
may impair individual and group function. Finally, the psychological sense
of danger and the possibility of fatality following an inflight emergency is
certainly common with the tank crew facing battle.
The physical environment of the tank is also clearly less benign and
provides less opportunity for face-to-face interaction than does the aircraft.
It is also possible that the decision-making and information processing tasks
incumbent in tank warfare are less dependent on open communications among
crew members, making the issues cited above less serious in this environ-
ment. It is possible that the military chain of command and organizational
structure may override individual and group idiosyncrasies and result in
effective information transfer, even under highly stressful situations (or,
conversely, may impede effective interaction).
Despite these caveats, examination of crew performance issues in other
military environments, such as shipboard combat information centers, and
demanding civilian settings, such as nuclear power plant control rooms and
hospital emergency rooms, leads to the tentative conclusion that team effec-
tiveness depends heavily on effective resource management; that is, person-
nel within the team share information effectively and are appropriately co-
ordinated in their monitoring and task performance responsibilities. In fact,
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WORKLOAD TRANSITION
a root cause of the majority of accidents involving aircraft with multiperson
crews has proved to be breakdowns in leadership and coordination among
crew members resulting in flawed decision making and improper actions
(e.g., Cooper et al., 1979~.
Analytically we address the role of coordination or resource manage-
ment in transition teams in this chapter by first describing crew resource
management training. We then consider the influences on effective voice
communications. Finally, we focus on the broader implications of research
on coordinated activities within the team, addressing factors related to orga-
nizational climate, leadership, and personality (e.g., Foushee, 1984; Foushee
and Helmreich, 1988; Helmreich et al., in press; Helmreich and Foushee, in
press). Many of the valid conclusions in these domains come directly from
research in aviation; this domain therefore represents the focus of much of
this chapter.
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING
The aviation community has responded to evidence that failures in team
coordination have been implicated in a majority of commercial jet transport
accidents by initiating formal training in communications and group coordi-
nation, known generically as crew resource management (CRM) training.
Early courses grew out of traditional management development training, but
recent programs have evolved to deal with very specific behaviors and
encompass full mission simulation (Line Oriented Flight Training or LOFT)
designed to require high complex decision making and group coordination
under conditions with a high level of time pressure (Butler, in press; Helmreich
and Foushee, in press). This integrated approach to training is augmented
by videotaping the simulator session and an intensive debriefing that allows
crews to observe their own behavior (Butler, in press).
Validation research in commercial aviation has shown highly signifi-
cant changes in crew member attitudes and, more critically, positive changes
in behavior in operational settings following training (Helmreich and Wilhelm,
1991~. Critical elements that determine the success of CRM training in-
clude not only courses that address concrete behaviors rather than abstract,
psychological constructs, but also strong organizational support for con-
cepts taught and recurrent training accompanied by continuing feedback and
reinforcement for the practice of effective teamwork (Chidester, in press;
Helmreich and Foushee, in press).
The success of CRM training in aviation has resulted in the adaptation
of the approach to other settings in which effective teamwork is essential
for mission success. These include operating room teams using simulated
patients and videotaped interactions (Howard et al., in press), aircraft main-
tenance groups (Taggart, 1990), and nuclear power plant control room teams.
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TEAM LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
233
The Federal Aviation Administration is also developing plans to adapt CRM
training for air traffic controllers.
Given the conceptual similarities, it would appear that the outcomes of
tailoring these training approaches to the tank environment would have a
high probability of success, not only in improving transitions from monitor-
ing to action, but also in improving overall team effectiveness. This ap-
proach would seem to fit naturally into the types of simulations accom-
plished using SIMNET.
VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
Breakdowns in communications between and within aircrews have been
documented as a major source of human error and potential disaster (Hawkins,
1987; Nagel, 1988~. The most salient example is the decision made by a
KLM 747 pilot at the Tenerife Airport in the Canary Islands to proceed with
a takeoff, despite the presence of a second jumbo jet still on the runway
(Hawkins, 19871. The resulting collision led to over 500 fatalities. Three
features of this accident are worthy of analysis because of their similarity to
characteristics of the tank crew environments: (1) the auditory quality of
the message was poor" a degradation that may be caused by high ambient
noise or by electronic "clipping" of radio messages; (2) the communications
were not face-to-face, thereby eliminating many of the nonverbal cues that
have been documented to improve communications, particularly with de-
graded speech (Chapanis et al., 1972; Kryter, 1972~; and (3) the environ-
ment was stressful (although not involving the stress of combat). The flight
crew was on the final leg of a long and fatiguing international flight, weather
conditions (and visibility) were rapidly deteriorating, and there was obvious
time stress to proceed with the decision action (takeoff) as soon as possible.
These potentially degrading characteristics of communications may be
balanced by a list of other factors that can foster good communications.
Restricting vocabulary and standardization reduces the possibility of con-
fusing messages, and introducing redundancy, by repeating key messages or
key words or echoing auditory with visual displays, ensures that ambiguous
or unexpected messages are not interpreted incorrectly. Many short mes-
sages can be better understood by providing a redundant verbal context, like
"your fuel is low," rather than "fuel low." The likelihood of misinterpreta-
tion (and the resulting need for redundancy) is particularly high whenever a
message involves conveying information that is unexpected, or negating a
statement (e.g., do not proceed) as was the case with the KLM flight. In
general, affirmative communications are better understood and more reli-
ably received than negative messages (Wickens, 1992~. Using acknowledg-
ments and read-backs can trap errors before they are executed (Helmreich
and Foushee, 1988~.
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Within many multicrew teams, the issue of confusion of the message
source is also a very real danger. A large research base in experimental
psychology has documented the likelihood of confusion of the source of
verbal and nonverbal auditory messages that may be heard simultaneously
or in close temporal proximity (Hirst, 1986; Treisman, 1984; see Wickens,
1984, for a summary). Within the tank, this confusion could result between
messages intended for any of the four crew members. For the tank com-
mander, this confusion might well be enhanced by the need to monitor both
intratank and intertank (i.e., company and battalian level) communications.
Research data indicate that confusions of this sort will be lessened (but not
necessarily eliminated) if different channels can be made physically dis-
tinct by different voice characteristics, modulation, or apparent spatial lo-
cation (Treisman, 1964) or by some other clearly discriminable (perhaps
visual) cue identifying whom is speaking what.
Flight Deck Communications
Communication patterns among crew members have proven to be the
Rosetta stone for understanding the nature of effective and ineffective flight
crew performance. Because the flight deck is a constrained environment
with well-defined crew roles and well-defined tasks, variations in the qual-
ity, quantity, and nature of communications are relatively easy to isolate and
quantify. Cockpit voice recorders provide a tangible record of communica-
tions in accidents in which crew performance is implicated, and high-fidel-
ity simulators allow experimental manipulation of critical factors and tests
of hypotheses regarding determinants of performance.
Foushee and Manos (1981) pioneered a methodology of coding the
interpersonal interactions of flight crews from audio tapes of cockpit com-
munications. Their seminal work grew out of an experimental simulation
conducted in a Boeing 747 simulator (Ruffle-Smith, 1979~. This study
consisted of a simulated mission flown by volunteer line crews from an
airline's B747 fleet. During the two-segment flight there were several equipment
malfunctions requiring the diversion of a scheduled trans-Atlantic crossing
under deteriorating weather conditions. Foushee and Manos found that
crews with a higher frequency of operational communications and informa-
tion exchanges committed fewer operational errors and had a more even
distribution of workload during critical phases of flight.
Subsequent work has resulted in the development of coding schemata
that allow precise delineation of the group processes involved in normal and
emergency situations. These have been applied both to experimental simu-
lations and to the cockpit voice recorder tapes and transcripts from aircraft
accidents and incidents (Kanki and Foushee, 1989; Kanki et al., 1989~.
These schemata allow specification of the content of information exchange,
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TEAM LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
235
sequences of communications among crew members, and shifts in commu-
nication patterns during periods of high stress and/or workload. Work in
progress by Predmore (1991) further categorizes communications in terms
of action decision sequences (ADS), interactions dealing with particular
tasks or decisions that face crews in normal and abnormal circumstances.
Using data from accidents and from an experimental simulation flown by
three-person crews in a NASA B727 simulator, he is exploring the patterns
that emerge when crews have to deal with multiple ADSs requiring immedi-
ate action. The data from all of these investigations indicate that there is
great variability in communications among crews faced with the same stressful
flight scenario and that effective crews exchange information and utilize
available resources better.
Systematic Observational Studies of Crew Performance
A methodology has also been developed for the collection of reliable
data on flight crew performance in both normal line operations and full
mission training in flight simulators (LOFT: Line Oriented Flight Training;
Butler, in press). In this methodology, expert raters observe crews and
make real-time assessments of crew behavior and performance. Data are
collected on a rating form, the NASA/UT Line/LOS (Line Operational Simulation)
Checklist (Helmreich et al., 1990a, 1990b, 1991) that elicits Likert-scaled
ratings of elements of communications practices that have been identified
as critical determinants of team performance. Also recorded are comments
on special circumstances and unusual reactions. In addition to global rat-
ings of technical proficiency and crew effectiveness, nine human factors
components are assessed: (1) conduct and quality of pre-event briefings;
(2) effectiveness and openness of communications and processes of deci-
sion making; (3) inquiry/assertion/advocacy the willingness of crew mem-
bers to question proposed actions and decisions and to propose alternatives;
(4) crew self-critique of decisions and actions; (5) leadership/followership;
(6) interpersonal relations and group climate; (7) preparation/planning/vigi-
lance; (8) workload distribution and avoidance of distractions; and (9) con-
flict resolution (when occurring).
Training in the use of the form centers on the concept of specifically
defined behaviors (called behavioral markers) that represent effective enact-
ment of the components of each of the nine elements. Data from more than
10,000 actual or simulated flight segments have been collected in several
airlines and military units. Of particular concern is isolating the factors that
trigger superior and poor overall performance. Comparable data from two
airlines show similarities, but also organizational differences, in the deter-
minants of performance. In one organization, the most frequent causes
of poor ratings were (1) poor critique, (2) poor inquiry/assertion/advocacy,
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WORKLOAD TRANSITION
(3) ineffective conflict resolution, and (4) poor management of distractions.
In a second airline, poor performance was associated with (1) poor inquiry/
assertion/advocacy; (2) poor management of distractions; (3) inadequate
briefings; and (4) ineffective conflict resolution. In the first airline, supe-
rior performance ratings were triggered by excellence in (1) preparation/
planningivigilance; (2) establishing a positive group climate; (3) briefings;
and (4j conflict resolution. In the second airline, the most frequent causes
were (1) group climate; (2) briefings; (3) conflict resolution; and (4) leader-
ship/followership.
Flight operations, particularly long flights involving extended periods
of cruise at high altitude, are characterized by periods of low activity and
system monitoring followed by transition to high workloads during terminal
approach and landing. Inflight mechanical emergencies and changing weather
conditions also lead to abrupt workload transitions. The factors cited above,
as they determine overall crew performance, also determine readiness for
workload transitions and the effectiveness of such transitions.
Leader Behavior
A common element in the observational data on crew performance and
in analyses of the causes of accidents is the actions of the designated leader.
The captain of an aircraft bears ultimate responsibility for the management
of the flight deck, the provision of briefings, planning, management of
workload, resolution of conflicts, and the climate of the group. Recogniz-
ing that successful performance is a group endeavor requiring the coordi-
nated activities of all members, the leader remains the most important single
component. Two patterns of leader behavior have been isolated as causal
elements in many accidents and sources of poor performance in experimen-
tal simulations (see, e.g., Chidester and Foushee, 1988~. One pattern is
characterized by autocratic behaviors that inhibit communication from sub-
ordinates and result in a hostile group climate, leading subordinates to with-
hold critical information, even when it is needed to avoid catastrophe. An-
other reflects a leadership vacuum and failure to coordinate and guide the
actions of group members. An important study by Ginnett (1987) examined
leader behaviors surrounding initial crew briefings as they relate to crew
performance. Ginnett observed airline crews from initial briefings through
a three-day scheduled trip. The crews he followed were classified into two
groups by independent expert observers. One group had captains who were
rated as outstanding in terms of observed leadership and crew coordination.
The second had captains who were rated as deficient on these dimensions.
Ginnett found that he could predict the overall performance of the crews
from behaviors manifested during the initial briefing. Effective captains
consistently established a positive group climate and bases for open com
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TEAM LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
237
munications during the briefing. They also expanded the definition of the
crew to include cabin personnel and stressed role definitions. Leaders of
ineffective crews showed a variety of behaviors but failed to establish the
crew as an integrated team.
Leader Personality
Attempts to isolate personality traits associated with effective leader-
ship have resulted in a large literature with many conflicting findings (Hol-
lander, 1985~. Part of the difficulty in isolating global factors stems from
the fact that requirements for leadership are not common to all groups and
are contingent on the group's structure and the nature of task to be accom-
plished (Fiedler, 1964~.
Efforts to use personality traits to select pilots (who ultimately become
leaders of their flight crews) have similarly had mixed outcomes (e.g., Dolgin
and Gibb, 1988~. Problems with the predictive validity of personality mea-
sures in aviation may stem from the nature of the performance criterion
employed. The overwhelming majority of the research on pilot selection
utilized either performance in initial training or success or failure in com-
pleting training as the criterion measure. Research by Helmreich et al.
(1986b) found personality to be a poor predictor of job performance imme-
diately after completion of training but to have significant relationships
with objective performance measures after six and eight months on the job.
This phenomenon has been labeled "the honeymoon effect," and it is inter-
preted as reflecting the fact that initial motivation to obtain a desired posi-
tion may initially overcome the influence of personality on performance.
With the passage of time and familiarity with the work role, however, the
underlying relationships between personality and performance emerge. This
implies that, if the criterion is the operational performance of experienced
pilots, personality may be a valid predictor of leader and crew effective-
ness. Recent research supports this view. A set of traits reflecting positive
and negative manifestation of two broad, orthogonal dimensions has been
used in research with flight crews (Spence and Helmreich, 1978; Helmreich
and Spence, 1978~. The first dimension consists of traits associated with
achievement motivation and instrumental goals (with the negative compo-
nent reflecting an autocratic, dictatorial orientation). The second consists
of traits defining expressivity and interpersonal sensitivity (with the nega-
tive components reflecting either subservience and passivity or verbal ag-
gression).
To reduce the personality battery to a smaller set of categorical factors
and to reflect the distribution of component variables in the research popu-
lation, cluster analytic techniques were employed to isolate frequently oc-
curring constellations of traits (Chidester et al., 1991~. In a validation of
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WORKLOAD TRANSITION
these personality constellations and their relationships with flight crew per-
formance, Chidester and Foushee (1988) conducted a two-day experimental
simulation in a Boeing 727 simulator using line airmen assigned to this
aircraft. Three experimental groups were formed based on the personality
cluster assignment of the captain. The first consisted of crews led by a
captain with high levels of positive, instrumental traits and high levels of
positive, expressive traits (a group labeled as having the "right stuffy. The
second group had captains from a cluster characterized by high scores on
negative instrumental traits (e.g., domineering, autocratic) and low levels
of positive expressivity (labeled as having the "wrong stuff''). The third
group of captains were low on both positive instrumental and positive ex-
pressive dimensions (labeled by default as having "no stuff".
Each crew flew a two-day simulation involving five flight segments
with two having high workloads, adverse weather, and mechanical prob-
lems. Significant differences in performance (based on expert ratings and
objective measures of errors) were found as a function of the leader's per-
sonality. Crews led by "right stuff" captains performed best across all flight
segments; those led by "no stuff,' leaders performed worst under all condi-
tions. Crews led by "wrong stuff'' captains performed badly on initial
segments but showed much improvement in performance by the second-day
segment involving high workload and mechanical abnormalities. A theo-
retical explanation for the latter finding is that crew members became able,
over time, to cope with the domineering leader who had strong achievement
motivation although he was lacking in interpersonal skills. No interper-
sonal strategies appear to have allowed crews to overcome the problems
caused by captains lacking in both achievement motivation and interper-
sonal skills.
These personality dimensions have also been shown to relate signifi-
cantly to the acceptance of training in crew coordination concepts as mea-
sured by changes in attitudes regarding appropriate leadership and interper-
sonal communications (Chidester et al., 1991; Helmreich and Wilhelm, 19893.
Those high on both instrumental and expressive dimensions ("right stuff")
show the strongest positive, attitude change. Those in the other two clusters
showed much less change, and there was evidence that training actually had
a regression effect for those low on both dimensions ("no stuffy. A theo-
retical explanation for the latter finding is that those lacking in attributes
whose importance is stressed in leadership and crew coordination training
are threatened and respond defensively by changing their attitudes away
from the direction advocated.
It is obvious that the personalities of junior crew members also play a
role in determining the overall effectiveness of work groups. The multiplic-
ity of combinations possible even in very small groups has had limited
empirical investigations and the research base remains sparse.
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TEAM LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
Automation, Leadership, and Crew Coordination
239
The introduction of more automated flight management systems has
created major changes in flight operations. This has resulted in a reduction
in crew complement from three to two, even in widebody aircraft involved
in long transoceanic flight. Empirical data are just beginning to accumulate
regarding the impact of automation on leadership and crew interaction (Wiener,
1988, in press). One finding is clear: automation, especially with a re-
duced crew complement, results in a redistribution of workload and may
lead to higher levels of workload, especially when reprogramming of flight
management computers is required during critical phases of flight such as
airport approaches (see also Chapter 3~. On a theoretical level, automation
of the flight deck may shift the balance of authority away from the captain.
In many instances, the copilot may be assigned primary responsibility for
programming the flight management system. This can have the unintended
effect of shifting information control and, hence, de facto control of the
flight to the more junior crew member.
Another outcome of automation is a tendency, implicated as causal
factor in several accidents involving automated flight systems, to allow the
computer to retain control even in situations in which reversion to manual
flight is indicated by evidence of computer malfunction or excessive repro-
gramming requirements. In some ways this phenomenon, which has been
labeled "automation complacency," is another form of erosion of leader-
ship.
Systematic studies of crew behavior in automated aircraft are just be-
ginning. A recent NASA study contrasted the performance of crews flying
the same scenario during an experimental simulation flown either in a con-
ventional DC-9 or an automated MD-88 (Wiener et al., 1991~. The results
provide some justification for concern over the impact of high levels of
automation. Although there were generally few differences in performance
of the highly automated (MD-88) and less automated (DC-9) crews in their
effectiveness in dealing with simulated inflight crisis situations, those dif-
ferences that were observed tended to favor the DC-9 crews. It is clear that
prior to finalizing the design of automated systems either for aircraft or for
tanks, simulations that examine the dynamics of crew interaction and per-
for~ance should be conducted and the results of such investigations should
guide hardware development and crew training practices.
Organizational Cultures and Subcultures
Another factor that has been implicated in crew coordination is the
culture of the organizations or subunit within organizations in which crews
operate (Hackman, 1987~. Embedded in the larger study of crew perfor
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WORKLOAD TRANSITION
mance have been surveys designed to measure crew members' attitudes
regarding optimal crew management (Cockpit Management Attitudes Ques-
tionnaire (CMAQ): Helmreich, 1984; Gregorich et al., 1990~. Data have
now been collected from more than 20,000 crew members in military and
civilian organizations in the United States and Europe. The data indicate
that, even in a highly regulated environment, organizations and units within
them (for example, particular aircraft fleets or bases) show highly signifi-
cant differences in attitudes indicating the presence of unique norms regard-
ing appropriate behavior that may or may not have formal sanctions. These
attitudes have operational significance and have been validated as predic-
tors of crew performance in line operations (Helmreich et al., 1986a). In
addition, systematic observational research confirms significant differences
in crew performance between aircraft fleets within particular organizations
(Helmreich and Wilhelm, 1989; Helmreich and Foushee, in press; Clothier,
1991~.
Ethnographic research into organizational cultures and their develop-
ment and manifestations in crew behavior is under way under a cooperative
agreement between J. Richard Hackman (of Harvard University) and NASA.
One ultimate outcome of this research should be a better understanding of
how to change such norms in order to optimize crew performance. The
issues involved are clearly relevant to the tank corps of the Army as evi-
denced by a review of culture and military performance by Tamir and Kunda
(1987).
ENGINEERING MODELS OF COORDINATION
One promising avenue of research, addressing organizational factors in
a nonaviation team performance environment, has been the program of re-
search on distributed decision making carried out by Kleinman and his
colleagues at the University of Connecticut (Kleinman et al., 1992; Miao et
al., in press). Their approach departs from much of the research on group
processes by adopting an engineering-oriented quantitative modeling per-
spective. Examining teams of operators who may be in different physical
locations (i.e., not in face-to-face contact) and must solve a common prob-
lem with different amounts of information available, they have formed a
number of tentative conclusions with direct relevance to the current issues.
For example, they find that human operators within a team tend to
overvalue their own information and tasks relative to others (Kleinman et
al., 19921; they observe the particular value of a coordinating leader in
times of stress induced by information overload (Miao et al., in press); they
document substantial differences in team performance induced by differing
perceptions of team goals that may be held by members at different vertical
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TEAM LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
241
levels of the hierarchy; and they note the particularly debilitating effects of
uncertainty on team performance.
These effects are complex, and the conclusions, being recent, await
further replication. The approach, however, represents a much-needed di-
rection of research, modeling performance limits of mission-oriented teams.
Such research, with its controlled, laboratory-based approach, can be used
to provide convergence with the more observational techniques employed
by Helmreich and his colleagues in the air crew domain.
CREW PERFORMANCE RESEARCH
The preceding discussion reveals that a series of related actions to as-
sess the need for formal training in leadership and crew coordination are
recommended. Additional areas for action include assessment of the social
psychological impact of automation and reduced crew complement and in-
vestigation of the role of personality factors as determinants of crew perfor-
mance. First, an evaluation of the extent and nature of leadership and crew
coordination problems in tank crews is needed. A number of methodologi-
cal approaches can be used to obtain a valid representation of leadership
and crew coordination issues in current battle tanks. These include:
(a) An examination of archival operational records from a social psy-
chological perspective to determine the extent of leadership, communica-
tions, and crew coordination problems. Especially important is the isolation
of instances of extremely effective and ineffective crew performance, simi-
lar to that which has been undertaken with aircrews (see Ruffle-Smith,
1979).
(b) A survey of crew members to determine normative attitudes regard-
ing leadership, crew coordination, and personal capabilities under stressful
. .
cone ltlons.
(c) An assessment of communications patterns and their operational
implications for tank operations using the research paradigms employed in
aviation. A useful research strategy would be to obtain recordings of crew
communications (intra- and interunit) from a sample of tanks in both field
operations and simulations. Using adaptations of coding schemata em-
ployed in flight crew research, it should be possible to analyze communica-
tions to evaluate leadership behaviors, gaps in communication, failures in
information transfer, and situation analysis and awareness and decision pro-
cesses and to relate these to indices of unit performance. Comparative
analyses of communications protocols from differing organizations (e.g.,
European-based versus continental United States-based units) should pro-
vide some information on the possible existence of different organizational
cultures. In particular, protocols should be analyzed to determine the exist
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242
WORKLOAD TRANSITION
ence of performance, communications, and crew coordination problems during
workload transition situations.
(d) Experimental simulations investigating leadership and crew coordi-
nation. An investigation of the effects of tank automation and complement
reduction on crew communications and performance is required. In addi-
tion to more traditional human factors analyses of crew task performance in
more automated units, it is vital to determine how crew interactions change
as a function of complement reduction. It is becoming increasingly clear
that this area was not sufficiently investigated with the introduction of so-
phisticated automation on the flight deck. The most viable approach would
be to conduct full mission simulations (including interunit communications)
focusing on the crew interactions, vigilance, decision making, and task per-
formance, using as subjects crew members with experience levels represen-
tative of the tank force. The simulations should be of sufficient duration to
allow assessment of behavior during workload transition periods. Refine-
ment of coding schemata for analysis of intracrew and interunit communi-
cations should allow evaluation of the impact of hardware and staffing
changes on group processes and performance.
It is important to note that the fourth crew member in current opera-
tional tanks may fill a number of critical roles affecting operational effec-
tiveness outside combat (e.g., watch standing, maintenance, etc.~. In as-
sessing the operational significance of complement changes, it is critical to
examine all the operational implications of such changes. In particular, the
additional crew member could be more beneficial in workload transition
situations.
Second, an evaluation of the utility of formal training in leadership and
crew coordination should be conducted. Should the existence of significant
problems in crew coordination and communications be confirmed through
this research paradigm, the next logical step would be the adaptation of
existing training approaches in crew coordination to the tank environment
and experimental investigation of whether such training influences commu-
nications processes and, most critically, crew performance criteria. (It should
be noted that the Army is implementing this type of training for rotorcraft
crews at the present time.) The training should focus on the particular
behavioral skills required for effective team functioning and should provide
clear exemplars of positive and negative leadership and interactions.
Tests of the efficacy of such training should include opportunities for
crew members receiving formal instruction, to practice the concepts learned,
and to receive feedback on their behavior. A conceptual analog to LOFT in
aviation is needed with operational scenarios designed to require effective
communications and coordination for mission accomplishment. While cur-
rent simulation training may serve some of these functions, experiences
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TEAM LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
243
drawn from the incorporation of LOFT into flight training indicate that, to
be effective, the simulation scenarios must be designed to exercise the par-
ticular skills stressed in the formal training programs. Those charged with
administering the simulation training should be given special training in
evaluating and debriefing crew coordination and leadership. Utilizing video
or audio tapes of crew interaction for both research and crew feedback can
greatly enhance the impact of the experience.
Finally, the role of personality as a determinant of tank commander and
crew member performance should be investigated. Recent evidence from
civil and military aviation suggests the importance of personality, especially
that of the leader, as a determinant of crew performance. It is recommended
that the operational significance of personality be investigated, first at the
level of the tank commander. Assessment of personality constellations of a
sample of tank commanders using validated measures in a nojeopardy situ-
ation should be followed by exploration of the relationships between these
factors and leadership behaviors and crew interaction patterns. This evalua-
tion could be conducted both in field operations and experimental simula-
tions. Should it be determined that personality accounts for a significant
component of performance variance, the utility of several alternative strate-
gies can be evaluated. One strategy involves designing procedures to select
in for optimal characteristics. This strategy works well when there is a
substantial pool of qualified candidates. The alternative strategy, more fea-
sible when there is a limited pool of candidates, is to screen out those with
personality constellations associated with poor leadership and ineffective
crew performance.
Logical follow-on research would investigate the importance of the per-
sonalities of junior crew members as determinants of the crew's perfor-
mance. This leads into investigation of the importance of the mix of per-
sonalities comprising effective and less effective crews. As noted, investigations
in this area are much more exploratory as the research base is limited.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
crew performance
