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of market access or agricultural concessions to gain the acceptance of stronger IPRs by LDCs. The improbability of such concessions leaves open the prospect of losing all of the gains made toward agreement during the IPR negotiations.

A member of the academic community suggested that because the TRIPS proposal is based on the straightforward imposition of uniform standards, rather than on principles or stage-of-development considerations, its rigidity may be its weakest aspect. During the conference discussion, Paul David added that although there are theoretical arguments in favor of standardization, the creation of standards based on consensus alone may result in a regime that is inflexible and unadaptive to changes in technology and in international business relations. Moreover, he added, "the same laws in different cultural and economic environments do not imply the economic effects will be the same in all of those countries." He suggested that James Armstrong's assessment of the situation between the United States and Japan was a case in point, that is, similar laws have a different effect. As a possible alternative solution, he proposed a more flexible, constitution-like framework, which could be interpreted by the courts. Another option suggested was the adoption of a convention of "adequate and effective protection" for those issues not agreed to thus far in the TRIPS negotiations. The boundaries of what constitutes adequate and effective protection would be decided for each country by a special GATT committee, which would take into account stages of economic development.

The ambiguity that these various alternatives imply, however, may not be acceptable to the industrialized countries, whose principal goal is the assurance of stronger protection for IPRs internationally. To craft an agreement without the provisions of strong standards is, as Jacques Gorlin commented, "to put structure above substance."

The "fast-track" authority for U.S. congressional ratification of a GATT agreement will expire in 1993. If the GATT negotiations fail to produce a satisfactory TRIPS agreement, the United States will return to its plan of bilateral pressure, a method it has found successful but slow, and one that raises international resentments that may fuel further resistance to broad, multilateral solutions.

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