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SMarine Traffic Regulation
SUMMARY
Marine traffic regulation following the aviation model often is suggested
as a way to improve navigation safety. There are more similarities between the
marine and aviation operating environments than commonly perceived. Howev-
er, the differences preclude the aviation system from serving as an exact or even
close operational model for marine traffic regulation, although lessons can be
learned and adapted from the aviation experience. Furthermore, although ma-
rine traffic regulation analogous to the aviation model is technologically possible,
it is not operationally feasible as the marine navigation and piloting system is
organized and operated. Extensive changes would be needed nationally and in-
ternationally in system organization, vessel outfitting with navigation equipment,
professional development of mariners and traffic regulation personnel, vessel
crewing, and marine operating practices. Nevertheless, full mission vessel traffic
service (VTS) systems, where in operation, provide an improved organizational
structure for interdependent decision making aboard the vessel and in the water-
way VTS operations also provide safety oversight for vessel transits in the VTS
service area.
Major factors that distinguish the marine environment are the numerous
variables that must be integrated and accommodated in vessel maneuvering.
These variables include frequent hydrodynamic interactions of vessels with other
vessels and with the physical features of channels and other waterways. The port
and waterways operating environment is somewhat more forgiving than that
found in aviation in that even major marine accidents or failures of primary pro
185
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186
MINDING THE HELM
pulsion and steering systems usually do not immediately result in loss of life or
the vessel, but the timing of decision malting and maneuvering can be just as
critical as in aviation. Active traffic direction already is practiced in the marine
sector on a very selective basis in the form of shore-based pilotage, normally
provided by marine pilots in cooperation with a VTS. In addition, traffic is man-
aged in ports and waterways through control of time and space in which vessel
movements occur, usually on a case-by-case basis in the United States but more
systematically in some major foreign ports. Broader application of directed ma-
neuvers and traffic management is constrained by numerous factors including the
complexity of marine operations; the lack of precision navigation capabilities on
most vessels in terms of equipment and related operator skills that would permit
strict adherence to assigned paths; the lack of complete, centralized information
about each vessel, including maneuvering behavior, and about operating condi-
tions both on the vessel and in the waterway; the difficulty in acquiring and
ensuring sufficient breadth and depth of nautical and traffic-control knowledge
and skills among shore-based traffic regulators; and lack of a common language
for navigation communications among bridge personnel, marine pilots, and other
vessels.
The Coast Guard's port-level, nationwide operational infrastructure-
including existing VTS systems, perhaps linked with marine-pilot dispatch offices,
marine exchanges, and port authorities could be adapted to form a national
marine traffic regulation network modeled in concept after the National Air-
space System, with or without traffic management or positive direction of vessel
maneuvers. Alternatively, government- and privately-operated VTS and VTS-like
systems could be expanded to improve waterways management and safety over-
sight.
REGULATION OF MARINE AND AIR TRAFFIC
Marine traffic regulation, in the strict sense modeled by the air traffic con-
trol system, is not practiced anywhere in the world. Whereas all aircraft operat-
ing under instrument flight rules (or visual flight rules in designated airspaces)
are controlled relative to flight plans and monitored to ensure compliance and
clearances by an air traffic controller, there is no overarching system for control-
ling ship movements. Various types and levels of traffic regulation are in place
but not in the same form or to the same degree as in aviation. There is one
notable exception- the occasional practice in Rotterdam of a marine pilot using
the communications capabilities of a vessel traffic center (VTC) to direct the
movements of a ship piloted by a fellow marine pilot under very difficult operat-
ing conditions (Herberger et al., 19911. The possibility of enhancing marine
traffic regulation in other settings often arises, however, and, when it does, refer-
ences to the aviation system closely follow.
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MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
187
In accordance with that theme, this chapter explores the marine traffic regu-
lation concept using the framework of the aviation model. By comparing the
aviation and marine environments, the chapter examines whether some or all of
the operating concepts and practices exhibited by the U.S. national air traffic
control system might be adapted for marine traffic. Marine traffic regulation
concepts and alternatives are presented, including expanded use of government-
and privately operated VTS and VTS-like systems of various scale that have
been established in about 20 U.S. ports and waterways (Figure 5-11.
COMPARISON OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
Overview
The need for an air traffic control (ATC) system that is highly reliable is
driven by the unforgiving operating environment. The requirement for an ATC
system arose because of the demand for flight operations during periods of limit-
ed visibility, where "see and avoid" was no longer effective. The main functions
of ATC are to issue clearances to aircraft based on their desired flight plan and
the existing flight plans of other aircraft and to monitor the air traffic to ensure
compliance and clearance. The consequences of onboard system failure can be
catastrophic, as aircraft and the lives of passengers are totally dependent upon
reliable system performance. Furthermore, the high speeds at which interactions
occur increase the importance of timely and correct decision making. Great pre-
cision is required for safe operations, and there is limited opportunity to recover
from operator error or from failure of aircraft or control systems. In contrast,
while an aircraft and its occupants are in extreme danger if propulsion is lost in
flight, the danger to a ship and persons on board usually develops less quickly. In
a brief time after system loss, the vessel may be able to anchor, obtain external
assistance (such as tugs), restore failed systems, or warn off conflicting traffic.
Further, even where time is a critical factor in maneuvering (as it often is in
confined pilotage waters) and a collision or grounding occurs, destruction and
loss of life usually are not immediate. On the other hand, the potential for wide
spread consequences, especially to the natural environment, is generally greater
in marine transportation than in aviation due to the carriage of large quantities of
petroleum or other hazardous and dangerous cargoes.
Another key difference between the two environments is that air traffic
control is mainly the product of the latter half of the twentieth century, when
technology has been greatly advanced, whereas marine operations are steeped in
tradition and are highly fragmented from a systems perspective, affecting the
acceptance of technological change. Partly as a result, public policy calls for-
and the general public expects an air traffic control system that maximizes the
potential for safety. Marine traffic regulation has received considerably less at
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88
MINDING THE HELM
I (
\
-
VTS Operating Authority
O U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
~ Other GovernmenVP~vate
O Marine Pilots
7~_ \: i~ ~
l
1
1
Sal
L ~
rat
A\ =
~ \
FIGURE 5-1 Vessel traffic services and similar operations serving U.S. waters.
KEY: VTS locations and, in italics, operating organizations (GAO, 1993b; Ives et al.,
1992). 1 Vancouver VTS Centre (Canadian Coast Guard). Serves U.S. waters of Haro
Strait and Straits of Georgia by bilateral agreement between the United States and Cana-
da; 2 Puget Sound VTS (U.S. Coast Guard). Serves Canadian waters in Straits of Juan
de Fuca by bilateral agreement between the United States and Canada; 3 VTS San
Francisco (U.S. Coast Guard); 4 Ports of Los Angeles (Los Angeles City Pilots) and
Long Beach (Jacobsen Pilot Service). Voluntary private VTS systems. VTS for harbor
approaches has been established by the Marine Exchange and includes joint operation
with U.S. Coast Guard; 5 Aloha Tower (State of Hawaii, Department of Transporta-
tion). Controls access to Honolulu Harbor; 6 VTS Prince William Sound (U.S. Coast
Guard); 7 VTS Houston-Galveston (U.S. Coast Guard); 8 Sabine Waterways (Sabine
Pilots). Voluntary traffic system operated by the pilot association under an agreement
with other organizations in the local maritime community; 9 Lake Charles VTS (Lake
Charles Pilot Association). Voluntary traffic system operated by the pilot association for
the Calcasieu Ship Channel under an agreement with other organizations in the local
maritime community; 10 Marine Safety Office, Morgan City (VTS for Berwick Bay
area)(U.S. Coast Guard); 11 Algiers Point Traffic Light (U.S. Coast Guard). Operated
during high water conditions. VTS New Orleans was disestablished in 1987; 12 South-
west Pass (Associated Branch Pilots). Voluntary, privately-operated VTS-like informa-
tion service; 13 VTS Louisville (U.S. Coast Guard). Operated during high water condi-
tions; 14 Entrance to Chesapeake Bay (Virginia Pilots Association and Association of
Maryland Pilots). Voluntary, privately operated VTS; 15 Entrance to Delaware Bay
(Pilots Association for the Bay and River Delaware). Voluntary, privately operated VTS;
OCR for page 189
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
Operator's console, Vessel Traffic Service New York. Equipment in the vessel traffic
center was upgraded in 1994 to the configuration shown. (Dave Hill, USCG Vessel Traf-
c Service New York).
FIGURE 5-1 continued
16 Chesapeake and Delaware Canal (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). Mandatory traffic
system for transit of the canal; 17 VTS New York i U.S. Coast Guard). Reestablished in
1991; 18 Cape Cod Canal (U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers). Mandatory traffic manage-
ment system for transit of the canal; 19 VTS Massena (Saint Lawrence Seaway Devel-
opment Corporation); 20 VTS Sault St. Marie (U.S. Coast Guard); 21 VTS Sarnia
(Canadian Coast Guard). Serves U.S. waters in the Detroit and St. Clair rivers by interna-
tional agreement between the United States and Canada; A The U.S. Navy operated
naval access control systems for the entrance to certain naval ports including Little Creek,
Virginia, and Pearl Harbor and controls access to naval firing ranges in U.S. waters;
B The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers queues traffic through its locks and dams through-
out the inland waterways system, including the Chittendon (Ballard) Locks in Seattle, the
Columbia and Snake River systems, and the western rivers.
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190
MINDING THE HELM
tension. However, interest is growing nationally and internationally in systematic
local and regional traffic management due to a recent series of noteworthy tanker
accidents with great spillage of oil (CCG, 1992; Corbet, 1992; EC, 1987; Her-
berger et al., 1991; Ives et al., 1992; Maio et al., 1991; Mizuki et al., 1989;
OSIR, 1993a,b,c).
Federal Marine and Aviation Infrastructures
Local port authorities and other port facility owners in the United States
may sponsor local channel improvement projects, provide shoreside infrastruc-
ture, and be involved in vessel scheduling with shipping companies and agents.
But port authorities seldom are involved in managing actual operation of the
waterway systems that provide access to their ports this is principally a federal
responsibility. The lack of consolidated ownership of port facilities and lack of a
single coordinating authority for port operations can be a complicating factor in
vessel traffic management by other than the federal government whose authority
covers the full extent of navigable federal waters.
The federal government provides national infrastructure, with administra-
tive and operational capabilities and enabling authorities for traffic control, for-
both aviation and marine sectors. The Department of Transportation (DOT) ad-
ministers the National Airspace System through the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA). The DOT administers port safety, port security, aids to naviga-
tion, and other activities to keep ports and waterways open and safe through the
U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Department of the
Army is responsible for construction, operation, and maintenance of federal nav-
igation projects for inland waterways, canals, locks and dams (including traffic
queuing functions), and federal channels in coastal ports.
Substantial public resources are committed to traffic systems in both modes
of transportation. Cost recovery by the federal government also is substantial for
both modes, although the exact figures depend on which federal taxes, revenues,
and sponsor cost-shares for construction projects are counted (see CBO, 19923.
The National Airspace System
The U.S. air traffic control system provides virtually universal coverage of
controlled airspace (Illman, 1993; Nolan, 19901. Air traffic control services in-
clude:
· flight service stations that help pilots plan their flights;
· airport traffic control towers (at about 400 airports) for direction of land
ings and takeoffs extending to several miles from the airport, and ground con
trol;
terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities at busy airports
.
OCR for page 191
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
191
(188 nationwide) that monitor aircraft movement within about 30-50 miles of
the airport after handoff from or handoff to enroute control and handoff to or
from the tower controller;
· air route traffic control centers (ARTCC) (22 nationwide) that monitor
and guide aircraft when handed off from or to a local TRACON, towers, or
another ARTCC; and
· a central flow control facility that is responsible for monitoring and man-
aging aviation traffic flows nationwide.
All of these services are operated by the FAA, and all are staffed by specially
trained federal employees. Airport infrastructures generally are not considered
part of the airspace system, as most are operated by state or municipal govern-
ments, but air and surface traffic at airports are part of the FAA system. The
electronics suites supporting the airspace system are generally quite sophisticat-
ed, although not fully adequate under certain conditions, particularly when traf-
fic overloading occurs, and latest-generation equipment is not available at all
locations. Additionally, extensive pre-planning of scheduled air carrier service is
provided by major carriers for their flights. Also provided is real-time enroute
support, referred to as flight control, that complements air traffic control servic-
es. This company-based planning is a principal resource for keeping air carrier
service within air traffic control capacity and includes rescheduling and cancel-
lation of flights if delays develop, such as might occur due to adverse weather
affecting landings and takeoffs.
The air traffic control system provides a highly structured framework within
which precise rules, procedures, and highly reliable communications links allow
for interdependent decision making by highly skilled personnel dispersed across
the entire network. Specific features that, collectively, enable this distributed
decision-making system to control air traffic effectively are shown in Box 5-1.
The system can be characterized as highly coupled. There also is a near-miss
reporting system to facilitate identification, assessment, and correction of specif-
ic and systematic problems. Individual features appear to be matched to current
operational needs and safety objectives, although substantial equipment improve-
ments are needed. The FAA began a major long-term modernization program in
1981 that is still in progress (CBO, 1992; Nolan, 1990~. (Major high-technology
components of the program were cancelled by the FAA in mid-1994, because of
rapid evolution in technology, reported flaws in specialized software, opposition
by traffic controllers to replacement of paper strips by electronic data for flight
tracking, and major schedule delays and cost increases ELi, 1994; Hilzenrath and
Burgess, 1994; Weintraub, 1994; Weintraub and Burgess, 19943.)
iThe Clinton Administration began action in mid-1994 to shift responsibility for operation of the
National Airspace System from the FAA to a government corporation, because of alleged bureau-
cratic inefficiencies in the FAA's administration (Hilzenrath and Burgess 1994).
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
coast guard
7~ ~
1 Lilt IlIlILI~
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
193
to the aircraft (including maneuvering orders), and for both pilots and controllers
to take whatever subsequent actions are appropriate.
Applying the Aviation Model to Marine Transportation
Ensuring traffic safety requires a multidimensional solution. Seventeen fea-
tures associated with the National Airspace System were identified that contrib-
ute to its success (Box 5-1; Braff et al., 1993~. Physical separation, advance
forewarning of danger, and pilot and controller proficiency appear to be espe-
cially important in preventing accidents.
Traffic separation is an essential line of defense against mid-air collisions.
The three-dimensional operating environment once enroute provides great flexi-
bility for multiple and layered flight paths. Although traffic separation for com-
mercial vessels is feasible in open waters, the geographic and hydrographic fea-
tures of most harbors and waterways, as well as the maneuvering requirements,
often preclude two-way separated traffic lanes.
As in aviation, the key to preventing marine accidents by outside interven-
tion is to ensure forewarning of danger. The advance notice must be sufficient
that corrective or evasive action can be taken to maintain adequate separation
while also increasing the range of alternative actions available to resolve actual
or potentially dangerous situations. Marine traffic controllers (such as VTS oper-
ators) would have to acquire sufficient professional knowledge and skills to
perform the same functions as an air traffic controller. If this were feasible,
which is an issue of considerable national and international debate (Ives et al.,
1992), then other questions would arise. In particular, how much separation and
time would be needed to interpret that a dangerous situation was developing, to
communicate this information to the involved vessel or vessels, and for the per-
son piloting the vessels to evaluate the information received and take the nec-
essary corrective or evasive action? The professional knowledge, skills, and pro-
ficiency of masters, mates, and pilots, and their abilities to take corrective action
was addressed in the preceding chapters. A human systems perspective on these
abilities is presented in Chapter 7.
Whether the aviation model would work in the marine environment to sup-
port these actions and the underlying traffic control concept depends on:
· whether and to what degree the factors that govern success in the Nation-
al Airspace System are relevant to marine transportation;
· identification and assessment of governing factors peculiar to the marine
environment that cannot be handled by the air traffic control model; and
· an assessment of capabilities to develop and operate a system of marine
traffic regulation that incorporates the features of the air traffic control system.
Adapting the aviation concept to marine transportation is discussed as an alterna-
tive later in this chapter.
194
Comparing the Aviation and Marine Operating Environments
MINDING THE HELM
On cursory observation, the marine operating environment appears to be
substantially different from the aviation environment. Yet, the physical forces
involved are more similar than they might appear. The person piloting an aircraft
or a vessel must understand the craft's behavior relative to the physical forces
present and respond to them. Some of the factors that must be considered by the
person piloting a vessel include aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, environmental
conditions, channel configurations, navigation by all units in a two-dimensional
plane, vessel-loading effects on controlling vessel movement, and traffic conges-
tion. In fact, there are many similarities and some differences between the two
environments. Table 5-1 characterizes these differences and similarities. The
table is derived from Nolan (1990), the principal text on the fundamentals of air
traffic control, and two papers prepared for the Committee on Advances in Nav-
igation and Piloting Braff et al. (1993), which examined each feature and iden-
tified implications for marine traffic regulation, and Ives et al. (1992), a detailed
assessment of vessel traffic services.
Additional Considerations in the Marine Setting
Liability issues have yet to be resolved concerning VTS intervention to
influence operator and vessel behavior, let alone traffic control. The master still
is responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel. Under certain circumstances,
the master may be unable to comply with an order issued by a waterway manag-
er or port-safety official without endangering the vessel. For example, if a Coast
Guard Captain of the Port (COTP' were compelled to suddenly close a channel
due to a breakdown or a marine accident, the person piloting the vessel that has
already committed to a transit may be unable to slow down, stop, anchor, or turn
around.2 In such cases, obeying the order might be more dangerous to the vessel
than proceeding; yet the master or pilot might feel obliged to obey the order,
because it came from the Coast Guard. It can be argued that such decisions, and
the shiphandling judgments required to execute the ensuing actions, should be
left to operators aboard the vessel, because that is where the ultimate responsibil-
ity lies. In any event, these types of cases could demand a continuing exchange
between the vessel and waterway management authorities (perhaps through a
VTS, where present) rather than an absolute decision. The circumstances could
be further complicated by:
2For example a loaded tanker with a strong fair (following) current in a narrow channel might not
be able to stop and hold position even with tug assistance, or to anchor or turn around. An intentional
grounding in soft bottom might be the best alternative but this could subject the master or pilot to
disciplinary proceedings. If the bottom were hard, then the only other option might be to proceed.
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
TABLE 5-1 National Airspace System Features Compared ire the
Aviation and Marine Sectors
195
Aviation
Marine
Governing National Federal Aviation National Coast Guard
authority Administration (FAA) infrastructure; national
infrastructure; national enabling authority for
enabling authority for traffic regulation
traffic control measures. measures
(Shifting responsibility
from FAA to a government
corporation is under
consideration. )
High reliability Available for aircraft and Available on a highly
systems flight control systems. selective basis.
Air traffic control
equipment varies from
older equipment to state
of-the-art computer
hardware and software.
Universal rules Required use for all Use of self-enforcing
and procedures aircraft operating under rules of the road
instrument flight rules required; unit-by-unit
and for entry into application; selective
controlled space by monitoring; enforcement
visual-flight-rule occurs after the fact.
aircraft; active monitoring
for aircraft under
instrument flight rules.
Universal Highly stylized language Stylized language
operating required for aircraft available but not
language and use operating under instrument required or in wide use.
protocols flight rules.
Direct traffic Standard practice for With rare exceptions,
control aircraft operating under not practiced.
instrument flight rules.
Controlled space Strict rules govern entry Space management by the
by all aircraft in Coast Guard on an
controlled airspace infrequent and selective
basis for federal
waters; queuing of
traffic by Army Corps of
Engineers for transits
of certain canals and
continued on next page
206
MINDING THE HELM
broadcast "in the blind" with no intended target. Vessels with a need for the
information may or may not overhear the transmission. Vessel traffic services, in
effect if not by design, lay a decision-making framework over the service area,
using modern technology to link and improve decision making aboard participat-
ing vessels. A VTS establishes a domain in which communications are conduct-
ed; reporting formats, content, and times are established; and use of circuit disci-
pline in transmissions on prescribed frequencies is encouraged or enforced. Such
developments suggest at least the possibility of vastly improved marine safety
performance. This potential is reduced somewhat by limitations in existing oper-
ating practices and technologies for vessel-VTS interactions, particularly the
reliance on voice radio communications and continuous monitoring as the pri-
mary means for traffic data transfer (see Box 5-2; Chapter 6; Young, 1992,
1994).
It is important to note that, as new operating conditions are established, old
practices are altered or replaced. Such changes can enhance or degrade system
performance, depending on how they are formed and implemented (NRC,
1990b). For example, after the Coast Guard-operated VTS in the Port of New
York and New Jersey was shut down in 1988, mariners who had grown depen-
dent on the disciplined information flow from the VTS had to return to informal,
less-precise traditional methods for broadcasting information about their transits
(Ives et al., 1992; Young, 1994~.
The Marine Community's VTS Advisory Role
Expertise from throughout the marine community has been used to guide
constructive changes in marine traffic regulation. Such advice has been provided
concerning the development and refinement of VTS operational concepts and
the general monitoring of VTS performance. For example, in some U.S. ports,
such as the Port of New York and New Jersey, New Orleans, and Houston,
public advisory committees chartered by the DOT and administered by the Coast
Guard provide advice on traffic management and harbor safety to local Coast
Guard officials. In some other ports, including the Port of New York and New
Jersey, and the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, locally or regionally
sponsored organizations work toward similar objectives. In still other ports, such
advice is obtained through established working relationships between Coast
Guard regulators and those regulated.
Some foreign ports employ similar formal advisory committees to improve
communications, planning, and performance of VTS systems. For example, one
forum for discussing NITS matters is the Thames Marine Consultative Commit-
tee, which consists of port authority officers and representatives of user groups,
lighthouse authorities, the Department of Transport (United Kingdom), marine
pilots, shipowners, shipping agents, and others (I. M. H. Slater, personal com-
munication, July 27, 1993~.
amp
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IllllllllllllllllllllllllllllSi~llll~llll<~llll~i~l~lllld~llll~llll~llll~sll~llllll#I~Sll~llllll~llllllll
I ~
IMPROVING IS ~A~E~1
PorLby-Port Expansion of V1S
207
Addihonal VTS systems could be instaNed in the United States, but ~ v~i-
ety of issues would need to be resolved hrsL Federal resources ~e limited, There
~e concems about tbe Coast Ou~d's Sta~Dg prachces: its capabiDties to build
and maintain tbe necessary pro~ssional experdse; and, in tbe past its lack of
long-te~ commitment to operahug VTS systems. Tbere is also concem about
tbe national commitment ~r conOnuing operation of ~TS systems (C4O, 1988;
208
MINDING THE HELM
Ives et al., 19923. Further, the VTS potential to reduce operational risk may be
such that installation of a full-mission VTS in some ports would not be cost-
effective, although potential improvements in economic efficiency might justify
such an investment. Therefore, it is useful to consider alternatives to federally
operated systems and to a full-mission VTS system. Regardless of the operating
authority, VTS systems require standards and consistency in operations and pro-
cedures and compatibility in equipment, especially when these standards and
consistency of their application involve vessels participating in the VTS. Other-
wise, the overall effectiveness of a system is reduced, particularly for users from
outside the local port region.
The General Accounting Office, in a 1975 review of the Coast Guard VTS
program, recommended that the agency provide limited-scale VTS systems in
many ports rather than full-mission systems in a few ports (GAO, 1975~. The
Coast Guard instead chose full-mission systems to provide more complete navi-
gation support in ports that were served. With the limitations of the technologies
prevailing in VTS operations (voice radio communications and radar), extensive
data collection and processing is required of VTS operators. Now, however,
VTS technology has advanced to the point where automated systems can greatly
improve the efficiency of data collection, presentation, and transfer, permitting
human operators to focus on data interpretation and use. It is also technological-
ly possible to provide electronic position monitoring for ports with low traffic
volumes and reduced information-sharing needs through means other than voice
radio or radar (see Chapter 6~. This development could permit the establishment
of VTS systems with modest human-resource requirements. Such an approach
would require expert understanding of specific navigation and piloting needs
within targeted port and waterway systems to ensure that a mini-system would
satisfy these needs.
Cost reductions might make it possible for local sponsors to operate small-
scale VTS or VTS-like systems. If the potential major benefits of a VTS could
be attributed to information sharing rather than intervention, for example, then a
modest installation with perhaps one or two operators on watch, depending on
workload, might be sufficient and within the resource capabilities of local spon-
sors. However, if interventions were an operating objective, requirements for
professional expertise and supporting equipment would be substantially greater,
and exposure to liability would increase as well. The overall liability of VTS
facility operators (and watch personnel) and whether limits on liability should be
instituted are implementation issues that would require further assessment.
Measures to cover costs of full-mission systems could include federally or
state-funded operation, public subsidies of private operations, increased port
charges, imposition of user fees, or perhaps allocation of customs fees collected
as duties on international marine cargoes moved through U.S. ports. It also may
be possible to develop cooperatively operated systems. This could be accom-
plished through joint funding, joint staffing, or co-location of VTS systems with
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
209
organizations providing essential functions (such as the COTP, pilot dispatch
office, marine exchange, or port authority operations offices). Such approaches
could facilitate information sharing and professional consultation. However, in-
terorganizational relationships would require careful examination, and appropri-
ate protocols would need to be established. For example, typical COTP law
enforcement, port security, and marine pollution response activities might re-
quire some degree of confidentiality, thereby imposing constraints on partici-
pants in a jointly operated or co-located system. Cost sharing also would need to
be addressed.
Whether VTS or VTS-like systems should be run privately or by a federal
agency is unresolved. Both forms exist in the United States; however, only VTS
systems operated by the Coast Guard and the Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop-
ment Corporation are addressed in the 1992 Federal Radionavigation Plan (DOT
and DOD, 1993J. The plan is silent with regard to non-federal VTS or VTS-like
operations or marine traffic regulation conducted by other federal agencies, such
as that performed by the Army Corps of Engineers for transits of the Cape Cod
Canal (USAGE, 19801.
The Coast Guard has a national infrastructure for administering a nation-
wide program as well as experience in operating VTS, but the agency lacks the
resources for a major expansion. Additional federal funding would have to be
provided (GAO, 1993b,c), or resources reallocated from other programs. Fur-
ther, national professional development standards have not been established for
VTS watchstanders nor is national-level generic training available (Ives et al.,
19921. Although international VTS operating guidelines are available (IALA,
1990; IMO, 1985a; F. Weeks, 1992), private VTS and VTS-like installations are
not required by the Coast Guard to follow such standards. There are no accredi-
tation or approval programs for private VTS or VTS-like operations, no certifi-
cation programs or licensing requirements for individuals performing VTS func-
tions, and no official oversight (Ives et al., 19929. Whether private operations
could assume proactive, full-mission VTS operations is unclear.
At the port level, organizations such as marine exchanges and pilot associa-
tions have demonstrated the capability to operate small-scale VTS or VTS-like
systems. However, most pilot associations are not organized to provide VTS
services, although some may have reserve capacity that could be applied to this
purpose. Further, not all individuals are well suited to coordinate a systemwide
VTS operation or serve as a VTS watchstander.3
Whether Coast Guard personnel are sufficient in number to provide man-
ning for a major VTS expansion in the near term is not certain. However, staff-
ing needs could be reduced by the adoption of technology that would reduce the
3A watchstander position in a full-mission VTS system imparts less professional stature (and
financial compensation) than does the traditional marine pilot's position, but the comparison is not
direct because watchstanding typically requires different technical expertise.
210
MINDING THE HELM
Cape Henry pilot tower operated jointly by the Association of Maryland Pilots and the
Virginia Pilots as a pilot dispatch and small-scale, information-oriented VTS system.
(William F. X. Band, Association of Maryland Pilots)
need for extensive manual collection and processing of traffic information. In
the long term, technology that permits electronic rather than voice radio trans-
mission of general traffic information could potentially reduce manning require-
ments while also reducing the potential for human error. Increased use of civil-
ian employees as watchstanders also may be feasible at some locations.
In assessing requirements for large-scale NITS operations, a long-term staff-
ing commitment by the entity that operates or supports operations is a major
issue. Manpower needs include provisions for communicating with foreign-flag
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
........ ~ _
~ _ _
2~..''.'. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~
~.~.~' '"''"' ~: ~"". ': i :
~~
211
Pilot dispatcher, Cape Henry pilot tower. (William F. X. Band, Association of Maryland
Pilots)
ships prior to boarding a marine pilot, an important factor in ensuring that ships
make it safely into the pilot boarding area. Stress and burnout also merit atten-
tion if personnel assignments are extended to VTS watch duties. These factors
typically are not addressed in comparisons between vessel and VTS operations
and professional requirements.
Adapting the Aviation Model to Marine Transportation
Another option is to develop a marine traffic regulation system that mirrors
the air traffic control system in concept if not in function, using and expanding
existing VTS systems as the centerpiece. Many segments of a nationwide system
already exist. Coast Guard field offices (which already have access and contrib-
ute to the agency's marine safety information system) might provide an organi-
zational framework that could link vessel movement information. Vessel move-
ments would not necessarily have to be monitored in real time at all locations,
depending on factors such as traffic volume. Existing VTS systems could pro-
vide the structure, rules, and procedures for coordinated decision making
throughout the VTS service area. The system also could be linked with state and
local pilot associations, which are not organized at present to provide national
services. A linked system could provide for improvements in pre-arrival reports,
vessel performance tracking, and near-miss reporting, while also obligating ves-
sels to use standard protocols and procedures.
212
MINDING THE HELM
Because existing facilities would be used, such a system could be imple-
mented relatively quickly and at modest cost. However, system changes would
also result in modified operating behavior among system users. Therefore, chang-
es of this magnitude must not be approached casually. A long-term commitment
to system operation and maintenance from the Coast Guard, the DOT, and the
Congress would be essential to system continuity and effectiveness. Conceiv-
ably, such a system also could provide real-time vessel performance informa-
tion, which could be developed into a national reporting system for near misses.
This application would help overcome current data limitations for identification
and analysis of safety performance of individual vessels, operating companies,
and the navigation and piloting system.
An alternative would be to establish more VTS systems without linking
them together. This option could lead to improved safety within the ports and
waterways served, but it would not provide the added value possible by linking
the systems together on a broader scale.
A major obstacle to creating a marine traffic regulation network is the fact
that, nationally and internationally, VTS systems don't cover all ports. More-
over, even where VTS systems are present, they differ in operating procedures
and levels of service. These variables, and indeed the very existence of a VTS,
add to the range of knowledge and expertise required on vessel bridges and in
pilot houses for safe navigation. While local operators appear able to adjust to a
local VTS, individuals from other regions have more difficulty learning system
practices, particularly where trade routes expose bridge-team personnel to multi-
ple VTS systems or where vessels call on the same ports infrequently. These
problems are compounded by the great diversity in manning and operating prac-
tices associated with the merchant vessels that trade with the United States. All
these factors suggest a need for VTS procedural standardization and for marine
pilots to provide local procedural knowledge in addition to navigation and ship-
handling knowledge and skills. VTS standards and guidelines published by IMO
and IALA could serve as a foundation for developing national VTS standards.
However, some local flexibility would likely be necessary to accommodate
unique local operating conditions.
Shore-based Pilotage
Vessel maneuvering can be directed and controlled by individuals not aboard
the vessel to some extent. This practice occurs on a limited basis in the form of
shore-based pilotage (also called "assisted passage" transits or "remote pilot-
age"~. Those providing shore-based pilotage today do not purport to con a vessel
into or out of port. Rather, the objective is to provide information to a vessel's
master or pilot (if aboard) that will supplement available bridge-team informa-
tion and ensure the safest possible passage. Information that is typically provid-
ed includes positional information, traffic data, navigation information on the
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
213
course to make good (that is, the course adjusted to compensate for physical
forces needed to adhere to a trackline), vectors and distances, identifiers of nav-
igation marks, and other information normally used by a pilot. Directed maneu-
vering by shore-based personnel analogous to aviation practice is considered
beyond the capabilities of existing navigation equipment. Nevertheless, individ-
uals and organizations providing shore-based pilotage expect that the person
piloting the vessel will adhere to whatever instructions are provided in order to
receive this service (Herberger et al., 1991; Ives et al., 1992; I. M. H. Slater,
1993, personal communication, July 27, 19911.
Shore-based pilotage generally is provided on an exception basis, such as
when it is needed to guide vessels to a position where a pilot can board during
adverse weather conditions. This form of service is provided by marine pilots in
a few ports (including Rotterdam and Vlissingen "Western Scheldt River ap-
proaches], the Netherlands, and Kent, England [Themes River estuary]) under
very select criteria (Herberger et al., l991J. Conceptually, shore-based pilotage
also could be used to ensure that vessels unable to enter a port remain out of
dangerous waters while awaiting more favorable conditions.
Marine pilots providing shore-based pilotage usually use VTS communica-
tions and informational resources, but the pilotage is usually not formally pro-
vided by the VTS (Herberger et al., 1991; Ives et al., 1992~. An exception is the
Port of London, where pilot and VTS services are both provided by the Thames
Navigation Service (I. M. H. Slater, personal communication, June 29, 19933.
Shore-based pilotage normally is limited to small and moderately sized vessels,
which generally are more maneuverable than, for example, large tankers.
Some VTS systems provide limited and selective navigation support to ma-
rine pilots and masters similar to that provided by a member of the bridge team
dedicated to providing navigation support. This is not shore-based pilotage in the
strictest sense. Typically, navigation support services aid in positioning in an-
chorages. Services of this form are provided to marine pilots by Jacobsen Pilot
Service in Long Beach Harbor, by the Vancouver VTS Center in Canada, and by
VTS New York, which also has assisted tugmasters in positioning barges (Ives
et al., 1992J. Emergency pilotage-like services also are sometimes provided. In
one worst-case scenario in the Thames estuary during the 1970s, the assigned
marine pilot died during the vessel's inbound passage. A watchstander at the
London VTS, under the supervision of an experienced VTS controller, effective-
ly directed the foreign-flag vessel (despite severe language difficulties) into an
anchorage to await arrival of a replacement pilot (Herberger et al., 1991~.
With the exception of the Puget Sound VTS, U.S. Coast Guard-operated
VTS systems do not provide maneuvering orders. Puget Sound VTS has done so
on a few occasions, usually involving a foreign-flag ship that missed the Port
Angeles pilot station and was standing in dangerous waters of the eastern Straits
of Juan de Fuca. The maneuvering instructions were designed to move the ship
out of danger and to permit boarding of a marine pilot. As with navigation
214
MINDING THE HELM
support, such emergency actions mirror shore-based pilotage but do not reflect
the full meaning of the term. For one thing, such interventions are based on
policies and procedures established by the unit commanding officer (VTS direc-
tor) and the Coast Guard's tradition of emergency response, rather than on spe-
cific policy. Further, although interventions are sometimes feasible using only
communications systems, the potential for error is increased in the absence of
appropriate surveillance coverage.
Establishing a national, comprehensive system of shore-based pilotage
would be no simple matter. There are philosophical, organizational, technical,
staffing, and liability issues. The national and international marine communities
have not supported issuance of maneuvering orders to a vessel from a shore-
based facility, except where this is a noncompulsory service offered by marine
pilots. Even if a broader shore-based pilotage system were mandated for some or
all ports, the implementation issues would be formidable (Herberger et al., 1991;
Ives et al., 19923. To achieve maneuvering results comparable to those of an
accomplished marine pilot, the controller would have to acquire, filter, process,
and integrate dynamic and complex information affecting each ship and then
translate it into positioning, continuous maneuvering control, and trajectory main-
tenance. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for VTS watchstanders who are
not already skilled in marine navigation and piloting to acquire sufficient skills
to undertake such a role. (In contrast, an air traffic controller is not asked to fly
the planes or to integrate the many cues that must be considered in deciding
something as simple as when and where to turn.) Even if the VTS were able to
acquire the necessary data, the information still would have to be integrated,
decisions made, orders fed back to the vessel under control, and timely and
correct action taken by the vessel operator.
Because navigation and shiphandling require constant attention in piloting
waters and appear to demand substantial analysis and interpretation of all avail-
able cues, it is not clear that more than one vessel could be controlled at once by
a single individual ashore. Implementation of this option, beyond highly selec-
tive scenarios using existing pilotage infrastructures, could raise the costs and
professional requirements for providing these services. Liability issues also
would need to be resolved. Decisions would have to be made regarding personal
or corporate liability for faulty provision of VTS service (or perhaps VTS inac-
tion) leading to a casualty with resulting damages to vessels, cargoes, or the
environment or with loss of life.
If policy makers insisted on developing a marine navigation and piloting
system using shore-based pilotage, and if the complexities of vessel maneuver-
ing required that controllers had the skills associated with marine pilots, then
building the requisite work force would present additional challenges. The exist-
ing marine infrastructure is not organized to train sufficient numbers of individu-
als with pilot-like expertise.
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
215
IMPLEMENTING MORE RIGOROUS
MARINE TRAFFIC REGULATION
Establishment of more rigorous waterways management through marine traf-
fic regulation of any form would not be easy. Considerable cooperation would
be needed among the Coast Guard, the marine community, and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (with respect to its federal navigation projects, to effectively
respond to the many issues identified in this chapter. Any expansion in VTS
systems would require assurance of broad-based confidence in their effective
manning, operation, and maintenance. Clearly, the Coast Guard has developed
considerable experience in operating VTS systems at selected locations, and
considerable local support for them has evolved (Ives et al., 19921. Yet, there is
scant quantifiable data to prove VTS effectiveness in improving marine safety
(Ives et al., 1992; Young, 1992~. Additional doubts exist in the marine communi-
ty concerning the agency's past history of wavering in its commitment to VTS
(Ives et al., 1992~. Given these concerns, agency involvement in regulating pri-
vate VTS or VTS-like operations to ensure consistency and integrity emulating
the aviation model would stimulate considerable debate. All the same, safe-
guarding ports and waterways is a Coast Guard statutory responsibility under
Title 14 of the U.S. Code.
Expanded marine traffic regulation could benefit from increased consulta-
tive relationships between the Coast Guard and the marine community at the
national and port levels. Such arrangements could enable the Coast Guard to
gain access to the specialized expertise needed to guide planning and decision
making and to build mariner and industry "ownership" in whatever approaches
are selected. Expansion of marine traffic regulation beyond basic VTS concepts
would entail a major change in national policy and direction that would greatly
exceed the resources presently applied to this purpose.
An alternative means for ensuring the availability of essential expertise,
strengthening professional credibility, and building mariner and industry "owner-
ship" of more rigorous marine traffic regulation would be to form a national com
m~ssion to guide improvements. The commission could set criteria for the use of
VTS and qualifications for organizations and personnel that operate them. If the
membership of such a commission included representatives from the marine com-
munity, the public, and the Coast Guard, this balance would provide the expertise
necessary to guide implementation while also establishing broad-based profession-
al credibility. In the concept envisioned here, the Coast Guard would be responsible
for regulatory oversight, administration, and interagency coordination to ensure
adherence to and implementation of these standards; these activities would draw on
the agency's existing enabling authorities, administrative capabilities, and national
port-level infrastructure. Also envisioned is Coast Guard coordination with the Saint
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation and the Army Corps of Engineers to
promote consistent application of national VTS standards in marine traffic regula-
tion activities conducted by these organizations.
