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Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting (1994)

Chapter: THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM

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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
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Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 37
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 38
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 39
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 40
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 41
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 42
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 43
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 44
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 45
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 46
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 47
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 48
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 49
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 50
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 51
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 52
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 53
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 54
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 55
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 56
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 57
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 58
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 59
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 60
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 61
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 62
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 63
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 64
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 65
Suggested Citation:"THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM." National Research Council. 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2055.
×
Page 66

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1 The Marine Navigation and Piloting System SUMMARY Marine navigation and piloting form a complex operating system consist- ing of vessel and waterway systems; human operators; organizational culture and structure; and a supporting infrastructure for management, pilotage, policy and regulation, and professional development. System effectiveness depends heavily on human performance. Risk varies according to physical factors such as water- way dimensions; vessel factors including size and loading; economic factors; tran- sit considerations; potential consequences of marine accidents; and human fac- tors. Navigation and piloting practices and processes have strong roots in tradition; they evolved to support independent vessel operations and to guide safe interaction between two vessels. The organizational structure for decision making involving more than two vessels or on a port-wide basis is loosely inte- grated and mostly informal. Waterways management functions are spread among various government and commercial organizations. Marine traffic regulation is applied sparingly, but interest in this approach is growing. Technology already exists that could be used to better integrate and improve waterways manage- ment; an example is port-wide marine traffic regulation using vessel traffic servic- es. Some management changes are warranted in part because physical improve- ments to channels are not timely, and few waterways are managed or regulated to conform to their designed capacity. Channels are stressed routinely beyond designed safety margins, usually with only a cursory assessment of risk that does not always include consultation with port safety officials. Operating trends have reduced the opportunities for many masters and deck officers aboard all categories of ocean-going ships to acquire hands-on ma 25

26 MINDING THE HELM neutering experience with their vessels in shallow water conditions. At the same time, navigation and in-port worl<loads have increased the potential for fatigue and stress. Some masters may have limited opportunity to oversee pilot perfor- mance, a command responsibility. English language words are used for maneu- vering commands during the piloting of foreign-flag ships in U.S. ports and water- ways while a marine pilot is aboard. However, the lacic of a universal operating language can impede joint passage planning by the master of a foreign-flag ship and local pilots. Some foreign-flag ships are operating with reduced crew sizes, affecting bridge team support to the pilot. These conditions put additional pro- fessional demands on, and increase the importance of, local pilots as they in- creasingly are being called on to act as a line of defense against substandard ships and crews. International measures to improve commercial vessel safety seek to pro- vide universal results, but they may not be employed fully or in a timely fashion by all maritime countries. The United States is involved in so much maritime trade that actions taken to enforce provisions of international treaties applicable to foreign-flag ships operating in U.S. navigable waters (referred to as port-state control) can be effective in ensuring that applicable technical as well as opera- tional standards are met. Unilateral action by the United States can potentially be used to force international technical as well as operational standards to a higher level. Unilaterally imposed standards (such as double hulls required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 for tankers) would be conditions for the entry of foreign- flag ships to U.S. ports and, as such, would influence that portion of the world fleet trading with the United States. Unilateral measures that impose more rigor- ous requirements than international standards, but remain within their overall context, can potentially encourage similar changes to the standards. However, unilateral action is usually taken solely on behalf of national interests and may or may not receive the necessary international support that would be necessary to raise international standards to higher levels. The current understanding of operational risk is insufficient to guide im- provements in the marine navigation and piloting system. Despite its many short- falls, the system works most of the time. But when marine accidents occur, close examination of navigation and piloting practices is sure to follow. INTRODUCTION The marine navigation and piloting system is a large-scale sociotechnical system comprised of several subsystems: navigation and piloting tasks, technol- ogy, human systems, and organizational cultures and structures. These sub ~Human systems are large-scale systems comprised of people interacting with each other, usually in geographically dispersed settings. Decision making in such systems is highly interdependent, with

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM l l l l Risk (Chapters l & 4) l l l Operating Environment ...... .... .. . Technology (Chapter 6) Organizational Culture and Structure (Chapters l, 2, 3, 5, & 7) 27 id. Pilotage (Chaptersl,2,3, 4&6) Human Systems (Chapters l & 7) ll l l ll Change, (Chapter l ) l Vessel and Waterway Systems (Chapters 1, 5, & 6) l ll I FIGURE 1-1 Main components of the marine navigation and piloting system and report chapters in which they are principally addressed. systems exist and interact within an operating environment supported by vessel and waterway systems, and characterized by substantial risk and recent changes (Figure 1-1~. Problems that can lead to failures in the marine navigation and piloting system can arise in any single element of the system, or in combinations of these elements. Consequently, the system can best be understood by examin- ing not only its individual components, but also their interdependencies and interfaces: for instance, among the people, technology, and the tasks; or among actions and decisions in one subsystem producing effects, intended and unintended, in other sub- systems. In the context oil marine navigation and piloting, subsystems of large-scale human systems include ship bridge-to-shore, bridge team, master-pilot, bridge-to-bridge, and vessel-port control interactions, among others. Of interest in these systems are the decision making, organizational behavior, organizational culture, communications, training, selection, retention, and qualification processes. In contrast, human factors is the area of ergonomics that focuses on human-machine interfaces. . . .

26 thc 1asks, people, and prevaDiDg organizabona1 cultures. By examining the sys- tem's esscutia1 elements and tbeir relationships, tbis approacb reco~nizes tbat a ~5X" iD ODC p~ of tbe system may, iD ~Ct cause di~culhes aDd even dys~nc- hODS iD some of Rs otber pads. E~cOve planniAg, operadons, management, administration, aDd researcb iD the mahne navigadoD and piloting system re- quires such a systemUevel approach. The chapter Arst deschbes pilotage (see Box 1-1 ~r pilotage te~s used iD -` II~I III -~ ~SSSSS~SS~SsSsS~SsS;S~SsSsS~sisS~sisS~SsS: - :...,~sss~s~s s s~sssss~s s s~s~<ss s~sss~s s~sss~s~ss<~sssss s~ ss s s s s s ssss ss~s s s~ ss~s s;<ssss~s;~s s~ssss s s sssssssssssssssss~s s s ss s~ ss~s<~<s~sssss~ss ~1 ~ ~111111_111111111_111111~311111113111111~1111~11111111 1 111~1 I 1 ~ llll+lllllll+llllllllp~lllll~#n~llll~dllll-~-lllll~llll~-llll~lll~llll>#I111111111

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 29 this report), the environment within which the marine navigation and piloting system operates, and the difficulties that changes in this environment have gen- erated. The primary elements of the system then are discussed and assessed: piloting tasks, vessel and waterways systems, technology, and organizational structures and cultures. Developments and trends that are expected to influence marine navigation and piloting over the next decade are identified as is the continuing controversy over pilotage, establishing the context in which this re

30 MINDING THE HELM port's advice will be applied. Building on this foundation, the report discusses the ability of the system to conduct planning, operations, management, adminis- tration, and research activities, and implications of those findings. PILOTAGE Since the early days of marine navigation, vessels entering or leaving port, or navigating other hazardous waters, have been guided by pilots possessing a thorough knowledge of local currents, tides, rocks, shoals, weather, and other conditions. The skill and care of the pilot are vitally important for the safe pas- sage of vessels, for the safety of lives and cargo, and as means to protect the port and the marine environment. Today, as in the past, vessels normally are required by maritime countries to engage independent marine pilots when entering or leaving ports or piloting waters. Piloting demands more than guiding a passage through a particular water- way; it requires a diverse mix of navigation and shiphandling skills (Armstrong, .... Modern car carrier westbound in Chesapeake and Delaware (C & D) Canal. Car carrier superstructures have large wind catch areas. Wind effects must be compensated for dur- ing transits. Additional tug assistance may be required for some maneuvering evolutions in restricted shallow waters. (Wendy Mitman Clarke, Soundings)

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 31 1980; Hofstee, 1991; MacElrevey, 1988; Plummer, 1966~. In practice, a pilot serves as an expert advisor to the vessel's basic navigation complement and performs navigation and piloting functions. The pilot determines when and where to turn, as well as when and how to execute the necessary maneuvers. The pilot also provides a traffic management function by coordinating traffic queues, hor- izontal separation between vessels, and arrangements for meeting and overtaking other traffic. Pilots are also responsible for maneuvering different types of ships with different degrees of maneuverability. Considerable skill is needed to compensate for variations in vessel behavior, even between sister ships. Variations in maneu- verability result from factors such as differences in hull form, propulsion and steering equipment responsiveness, and loading. Pilot skills include the ability to anticipate and respond to the varying intensities of vessel reactions, particularly with regard to the effects of shallow water and small under-keel clearances (Arm- strong, 1980; Gates, 1989; Hooyer, 1983; MacElrevey, 1988; Plummer, 1966; Reid, 1986). Although a ship's captain is always responsible for safe navigation of the vessel (with few exceptions, such as the Panama Canal, where responsibility for navigation devolves to the Panama Canal pilot tMacElrevey, 1988; Parks, 19821), ship navigation in piloting waters depends increasingly on the attentiveness and skills of marine pilots (Armstrong, 1980; Cahill, 1983, 1985; MacElrevey, 1988; Meurn, 1990~. Where pilotage is compulsory, a marine pilot normally has imme- diate charge of a vessel's navigation. In ports where pilotage is not mandated and marine pilots have a reputation for competence and proficiency, similar levels of control normally are exercised (Armstrong, 1980; Cahill, 1985; MacEl- revey, 1988; Meurn, 1990; Nautical Institute, 1991a; Parks, 1982~. Thus, in sim- ple terms, as the vessel nears or operates in a port, navigation decisions rely on the expert knowledge of the pilot. In the absence of an independent marine pilot, a ship's officer would perform the same functions, but would usually lack an equivalent level of familiarity with local operating conditions. Automated pilot- ing expert systems (that is, artificial intelligence decision aids) are under devel- opment, ostensibly to supplement but not to supplant piloting expertise (Grabowski and Sanborn, 1992; Grabowski and Wallace, 1993~. In the United States, responsibility for regulating pilotage for vessels in foreign and coastwise trades is shared between federal and state authorities. Pilotage for vessels operating solely on inland waters is not regulated per se, although some inland passenger vessels are required to have federally licensed pilots under current manning laws (46 U.S.C. 8101) and regulations. Insuring that pilots are competent in their trade is a complex challenge for governing authorities, pilot associations, and operating companies. To compound the challenge, applicants for pilot's licenses arrive with many different levels of nautical experience. They may be graduates of maritime schools, ship masters, ships' officers, ferry operators, tug masters or mates, or veterans of Navy or

32 MINDING THE HELM Coast Guard service; Some have no prior maritime experience at all. Although the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has published recommendations concerning the minimum knowledge, skills, and procedures that should be re- quired of maritime pilots (Hofstee, 1991; IMO, 1981), there is no national or universal pilotage model for the development and administration of pilotage programs (Herberger et al., 1991; Japanese Pilot's Association, 19901. Pilot train- ing and licensing requirements vary widely. Approaches for developing or assur- ing theoretical knowledge, expert local area knowledge, and shiphandling and piloting skills range from written examinations to on-thejob training to compre- hensive theoretical and practical skill development programs. Training, licens- ing, and regulation of federally and state-licensed pilots are addressed in Chap- ters 2 and 3. VESSEL AND WATERWAY SYSTEMS Vessel and waterway systems are basic elements in the marine navigation and piloting system, without which the system would not function. These sys- tems interact when vessels arrive, depart, or transit a port area. Vessel systems are comprised of steering and propulsion systems, traditional navigation equip- ment (such as charts, magnetic and gyro compasses, and bridge wing gyro re- peaters), radio navigation aids, and collision avoidance aids, and advanced elec- tronic positioning technologies. Such advanced systems may include satellite navigation systems or integrated bridges, which may employ expert system deci- sion aids to integrate navigation, positioning, communications, and vessel opera- tion information. Expert systems may also provide recommendations on vessel steering, operations, or communications. Waterway systems are comprised of natural and man-made navigation chan- nels, as well as aids to navigation which are installed in the channels. Traditional aids to navigation such as lights and buoys, radio navigation systems, and vessel traffic services (VTS) are included, as are newer systems such as interactive electronic lights and buoys, and advanced vessel traffic advisory and manage- ment systems. Port and Waterway Design and Operation Some ports are more constrained than others by channel limitations. Over- all, existing ports and waterways do not always accommodate ships that are most modern in terms of efficiency, safety, and sometimes cargo-handling capabili- ties, even though shipowners and port and waterway managers are under eco- nomic pressure to use large, sophisticated ships at the maximum possible draft. The latest ships maximize the amount of cargo that can be carried; ports that can accommodate them can gain or maintain a competitive advantage. As a result, waterway design limits routinely are challenged by operating practices (Gates,

~:~s~ ~s~s~s~s~s~:::s~:~:s~:t:!s Age: ~s~s~sssssssssss:::ssssss:~:~s ~:~:ss~:~:~:~s~::~s~:~: ~: ~ Tbc evolution of hull size Mom saying ship 1brougb 1950s tanker to modem tankship. lUc ~zc of modem ships omen exceeds me design criteria [bat were used to plan and construct many cxi~ing channels Age. 4~> Iffy ~f8~3 If Offal 1989; NRC, 1983, 1992~7 In such cases, ~ marine pHo1 hequendy plays a chth Cal role for 1be shipowner or operadug company in esOmahug whether a vessel that exceeds design cinema can Pansy the pilotage route sadly. Determining Obeyer vessels meet or exceed design crheha can be accom- plisbed ~itbout ~ of accident using computer-based and physical-scale model shiphandling simulations. For example, tanker transits to Ad Tom Valdez, Alas- ka, were simulated in 1976, before oil shipments began, Ad several times tbere- aher, leading to est~hshment of Tansy lanes and ship-assist tug needs (Jones, 1980; Amps ~ ~ 19821 Ho~, such Mace ~- ~ not s~d~ practice (NRC, 1992a It is much more common to kind that answers to these questions result Tom an initial system that depends on 1be expedence, exper- dse, and judgment of pilots usuaUy with the aid of Elba tugs and under the most Chorale operating conditions. Sap owners and pHots could consul Aim ~owl- edgeable naval architects or waterway designers in assessing a ~aterway's capa- biLty to support saw navigation (Gates, 1989), but there is htHe evidence that such consultations occur. Nonbinding guidelines could be developed to aid the decision-mabug process. Such guidelines could be designed to provide CexibiF by far decision making to accommodate the highly shuadonal nature of each passage and pilot knowledge Ad skids. No Mitten, nonbinding guidelines were Fund, Though there me un~rUten guidelines that me banded down as paw of the pilotage Madison through apprenticeships.

34 MINDING THE HELM Once a port or waterway project is constructed, there are typically no re- quirements for assessing its overall effectiveness, its adequacy for vessels that exceed original design parameters, or effects of changes in bathymetry or geom- etry on vessel behavior beyond that required for maintenance dredging. One exception is the Army Corps of Engineers' practice of applying established study procedures for port and waterway improvements to determine, for example, where channel deepening is justified economically because of changed operating practices (NRC, 1985, 1992a). Except in canals and lock systems operated by the Corps of Engineers, neither federal agencies nor local project sponsors regu- late or manage the passage of vessels that exceed the vessel size and maneuver- ing criteria that were used for channel design (NRC, 1983, 1985, 1992a; US- ACE, 1980~. The Coast Guard occasionally imposes transit restrictions, usually for ships carrying dangerous cargoes in bulk or during periods of heavy commer- cial fishing or recreational activity. But as a general rule, independent marine pilots by default often become the final arbiters of port and waterway design limits, with or without the benefit of engineering information or the results of simulation experiments to help guide decision making. Waterways Management Operation, maintenance, and regulation of the marine navigation and pilot- ing system in the United States, loosely defined as waterways management, is the responsibility of a variety of organizations, each with differing objectives, operating authorities, and resources. There is no single manager or overall au- thority in the United States that integrates all of the elements of the marine navigation and piloting system. Responsibility for coordinating or controlling vessel operations, scheduling, and navigation support activities is distributed among various parties, including the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, port authorities, marine pilots, marine exchanges, port and pilot com- missions, private companies, and other organizations (NAS, 1980; NRC, 1983, 1992a). Waterway system components are not organized into national, regional, or even local networks. Some components may be part of a national program, as is the case with aids to navigation. However, basic responsibility for vessel operations remains aboard the vessel with its master, and individual vessel oper- ations are rarely coordinated across a port area. Responsibility for information acquisition, and interdependent decision mak- ing based on that information, is distributed among individuals dispersed through- out the system, ashore and afloat, in an operating environment that is constantly changing (NRC, 1990a,b). Although coordination of vessel sailing orders and pilot dispatching often is practiced on a company- or association-wide basis, there is no formal organizational structure for decision making to guide the operation of the vessels while in pilotage waters, except where vessel traffic services have been established (described later in this chapter and in Chapter 53.

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 35 A locale-specific, informal structure is typical in interactions between indepen- dent pilots. But, in practice, the independent decisions that are made aboard each vessel have far-reaching implications and effects that are not always filly recognized or accommodated elsewhere within the afire cted port, waterway, or river system. Because no single authority manages or coordinates marine traffic, approach- es to waterways management vary widely across the nation among operating companies, port authorities, and organizations with safety responsibilities. Even the administration of generic components of national programs may vary in the absence or insufficiency of national standards, performance criteria and mea- sures, performance monitoring, and coordinated program upgrades. Substantial technology exists that could be used to improve waterways man- agement, particularly with regard to traffic management and regulation. For ex- ample, automated, computer-based data management and electronic communi- cations systems are in widespread use for cargo; these technologies could also be employed to assist in traffic management. A few VTS systems share vessel information electronically across national boundaries, and use this information with varying degrees of success for queuing traffic. Some VTS systems, marine exchanges, and port authorities collect and distribute vessel arrival and departure data (Herberger et al., 1991~. However, the systematic integration of data about vessel movements, and coordination of that data, remains a primitive practice throughout the United States and in many ports internationally. Marine Traffic Regulation Traffic control, as applied in aviation, is not used in marine transportation. However, extensive traffic regulation authority is available to the U.S. Coast Guard such as Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 6 and the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. Some of these authorities, including anchorage and pilotage regulations, are exercised routinely. Others are used only occasion- ally. Traffic control measures are imposed only in specific situations, such as transits of ships carrying liquified natural gas in bulk, major marine recreational or sporting events, temporary obstructions to navigation, or "dead-ship" move- ments in constricted channels (that is, a vessel being moved within a harbor by tugs while its propulsion system is not functioning). Traffic control measures used in these situations typically consist of specific restrictions on vessel move- ments, such as transits during daylight hours, tug escorts or management of the time and space in which the movements will occur. Vessel Traffic Services (VTSJ Vessel traffic services and VTS-like systems such as ship information ser- vices are operated by either government or private parties in about 20 locations

36 MINDING THE HELM in the United States (see Chapter 5). The primary VTS role, as presently em- ployed worldwide, is to provide information and advice about vessel movement rather than maneuvering orders, although traffic is managed routinely for certain waters under prescribed conditions by some Coast Guard-operated VTS centers (Ives et al., 1992; Koburger, 1986; Young, 1994~. For example, one-way traffic is prescribed for any tankship of 75,000 deadweight tons or greater transiting Rosario Strait in the state of Washington's San Juan Islands (PSVTS, 19871. One-way traffic also is required for tanker traffic in Valdez Narrows. Addition- ally, some VTS centers intervene selectively under the authority available to and policies of the cognizant Coast Guard Captain of the Port and VTS director to influence the outcome of prospective vessel interactions. There are no definitive national guidelines for such intervention (Ives et al., 19921. By contrast, the Army Corps of Engineers pursues more traffic management that is active. The agency operates and maintains general navigation features along approximately 25,000 miles of shallow and deep-draft waterways and at 235 locks at 191 sites in the continental United States. Scheduled operation and maintenance activities (including dredging) that affect navigation are announced to the public in Notices to Navigation Interests. Emergency closures of water- ways or locks are coordinated with the Coast Guard and the marine industry.2 Lockmasters coordinate traffic through the lock systems, a growing number of which are sharing vessel arrival and departure information through electronic data systems. Authority to control international and interstate commerce is reserved for the federal government, except for marine pilotage of vessels engaged in foreign trade, which has been returned to the states. However, states may impose certain rules on matters not regulated by Congress in order to meet environmental, safe- ty, and other objectives. For example, the state of Washington has imposed escort requirements for large tankers operating in the San Juan Islands area. Tug escorts were mandated by the Governor of Alaska for tanker transits to and from Valdez following the Exxon Valdez accident (escorts had been provided by agree- ment since opening of the pipeline terminal in 1977~. Direction of ship maneuvers is possible from shore. Such direction general- ly has been accomplished by independent marine pilots providing maneuvering instructions from shore stations (referred to as shore-based pilotage). Such ser- vices occasionally are provided in a few foreign ports, principally when adverse 2The term marine indfustry, as used in this report, includes shipping companies, towing industry companies with operations in ports and waterways in which ships operate, companies operating commercial passenger vessels, and the supporting industrial infrastructure including port authorities. The term marine community is used more broadly. It includes the marine industry, marine pilots. pilotage administrators, federal agencies with missions and responsibilities associated with marine transportation, and government-operated ferry services.

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 37 weather does not permit the boarding of a pilot in the normal pilot boarding area and usually in cooperation with a VTS. In Rotterdam, under conditions of re- duced visibility, marine pilots sometimes work with the port's VTS to guide movements of vessels that have marine pilots aboard (Herberger et al., 1991; Ives et al., 1992~. Voluntary traffic management (queue management) services are provided for the Sabine waterways and the Calcasieu Ship Channel by local state pilot associations. Pilot associations also provide small-scale VTS information servic- es for the entrances to the Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay, and Southwest Pass in Louisiana and for Los Angeles and Long Beach harbors. A few vessel traffic centers including those for the Coast Guard VTS in New York, the Canadian Coast Guard VTS in Vancouver, British Columbia, and the pilot-operated VTS in Long Beach routinely provide marine pilots with navigation support for precision anchorage. In the case of VTS New York, such support also is provid- ed to tug operators (Ives et al., 1992~. Beyond these services, however, there is little interest within the maritime community in moving toward an aviation- like traffic control system, although there may be potential benefits in doing so (Chapter 5 J. Tragic Control Issues Government-operated shore-based traffic systems traditionally have been perceived as a challenge to the command responsibility of the vessel master to navigate safely and to the role of marine pilots in providing expert piloting and shiphandling services (Hofstee, 1990a; Ives, 1991; Ives et al., 1992; NAS, 1980~. Furthermore, the capability of shore-based personnel other than licensed pilots to actively control traffic is seriously questioned (Hofstee, 1990a; Ives, 19911. Also questioned is the ability of the Coast Guard to provide qualified VTS per- sonnel, although good performance results are reported for some Coast Guard- operated VTS systems (Ives et al., 1992; Young, 1992, 1994~. However, in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez accident, a more cooperative spirit has emerged within the maritime community. Mariners also are becoming more supportive of wider application of VTS (CCG, 1992~. Many marine pilots express concern about a perceived general decline in bridge team proficiency (and in some cases, the absence of a bridge team altogether), a proliferation of electronic equipment without standardized formats, and inadequate maintenance of critical navigation systems. Each of these conditions increases the pressure on marine pilots. Highly publicized accidents involving tankers and passenger vessels, as well as the trend toward unlimited liability for pollution events, also have helped foster the appar- ent increase in receptivity to safety alternatives such as VTS. Mariners are ada- mant, however, that such alternatives should be used to complement rather than to replace traditional navigation and piloting practices.

38 MINDING THE HELM Port-State Versus Flag-State Control U.S. ports and waterways are vital links in national, regional, and local intermodal transportation and economic systems. About one-third of domestic intercity trade and almost all foreign trade by weight pass through the system each year (NRC, 1992a). The flow of cargoes through U.S. ports reached 2.2 billion tons in 1989 (MARAD, 19911. Considering the shrinking oceangoing U.S.-flag fleet, which now numbers fewer than 400 ships, the heavy traffic indi- cates that the United States is becoming a nation of port operators rather than one of ship operators. Today, the nation's maritime power lies in its status as an economic superpower with a large volume of seaborne trade; its relative impor- tance as a flag state has declined while that as a port state has risen. On one hand, there has been a dissipation in the nation's power to use its merchant fleet to directly influence foreign-flag vessels by setting a standard for them to follow. On the other hand, national action to enforce provisions of international treaties applicable to foreign-flag ships operating in another country's navigable waters (referred to as port-state control) can be effective in ensuring that applicable technical as well as operational standards are met. Port-state control measures can be a very powerful tool if exercised. The United States has had a very active port-state control program for many years, and has extended the inspections to include provisions of various interna- tional treaties such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (referred to as MARPOL). Another example is the current U.S. Control Verification for Passenger Vessels program. All foreign passenger ships operating from U.S. ports must pass stringent quarterly examinations and drills. Furthermore, the IMO is working to expand authorized port-state control measures to include the qualifications of ships' personnel (IMO News, 1993; OSIR, 1993d, 1994). International conventions or treaties, including associated standards and guidelines, are adopted nationally through domestic legislation. A ship failing to comply with national legislation and implementing regulations may be barred from entering port. If in port, such as ship may be barred from sailing, either under the terms of a treaty or convention or by a specific national law or regula- tion. The United States can also apply these measures to U.S.-flag vessels in fulfillment of its responsibilities as a flag state. Because shipping companies respond to profit and loss, imposed delays are a powerful, if indirect, influence on operating practices. Unilateral action is sometimes taken when international, port-state, and flag- state measures do not result in an acceptable level of safety and a country deter- mines that additional measures are necessary for the protection of its marine interests. Unilateral measures that impose more rigorous requirements than in- ternational standards, but remain within their overall context, can potentially encourage similar changes to international standards. However, unilateral action

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 39 is usually taken solely on behalf of national interests and may or may not receive the necessary international support that would be necessary to raise international standards to higher levels. Unilateral action has not been used extensively, but has been used by the United States. Notably, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (P.L. 101-380) which imposes double hull requirements for tankers trading with the United States. Unilateral action by the United States can have far-reaching effects. But legislation and regulations do not always fully consider, or even identify, possi- ble secondary effects or difficulties that might result from implementation of marine safety protocols. The Coast Guard prefers to work through international maritime forums such as the IMO and the International Association of Light- house Authorities (IALA) to seek cooperative improvements (Harrald et al., l991b; Porter, 1994~. However, the Coast Guard has also announced that it will take aggressive port-state action to compensate for weak flag-state performance in providing for safe ships and competent officers and crews (Fairplay, 1992a; Kime, 1992~. The Coast Guard indicated to the committee that its efforts to work through international forums has been complicated by unilateral legislative ac- tions taken by Congress and U.S. coastal states, although state jurisdiction is limited. Professional qualifications of captains and bridge teams are guided by the IMO Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (referred to as the STCW) (IMO, 1978, 1991), but these requirements are the responsibility of national licensing administrations. Some authorities believe the STOW guide- lines were weakened to obtain the concurrence of flag states whose economic interests outweigh concerns for safety. Representatives of the European Commu- nity (EC) and the United States have alleged that certain flag states permit oper- ation of substandard ships and crews (Fairplay, 1992a; Harrald et al., 1991a, l991b; OSIR, 1993d; Peters, 1993; Porter, 1989; Salvarani, 1992; Ugland, 19934. The Coast Guard has stated it will no longer tolerate such ships entering U.S. waters (Fairplay, 1992a; Kime, 1992~. If U.S. safety initiatives become more rigorous than standards elsewhere, then better ships might be dispatched to U.S. ports while substandard vessels are diverted to ports where less-stringent regulations prevail. Thus, universal im- provements would depend on involvement by other port states a factor moti- vating the Coast Guard to work through the IMO, classification societies, and other consultative bodies and associations. Nevertheless, improvements in U.S. standards potentially can lead to corresponding improvements in international standards and operating practices. As a consequence of the Exxon Valdez acci- dent in 1989, and more recently the loss of the Aegean Sea in Spain and the Braer in the Shetland Islands, international support has been growing for in- creased port-state control. In the meantime, marine pilots are being called upon to detect substandard conditions as quasi-public officials responsible to their

40 MINDING THE HELM licensing authorities, the Coast Guard, or state officials, and at the same time, to continue to serve ships under traditional master-pilot relationships. Economic Versus Social Regulation Government regulation of societal activities is of two distinct types: eco- nomic regulation and social regulation. While all regulation is essentially in the public interest in the sense that it affects the overall welfare of society, there are substantial differences between the two types of regulation. The two types con- stantly are mixed together in assessments of pilotage, complicating resolution of important safety and performance issues. Economic regulation is driven by the perceived need to assist the market to achieve optimum allocation of resources. Its focus is on markets, prices, entry and exit conditions, and the legal obligations of suppliers and buyers; in other words, who may charge what prices to whom, for what services, where, and when (Abrahamsson, 1982~. Such regulation in pilotage affects the setting of fees, the formation and operation of pilot associations, and the control of entrants into the profession. Social regulation, on the other hand, is prompted by concerns for safety, health, and environmental protection. As such, it is focused on the conditions under which a service provider, such as the pilot, discharges his or her duties. Examples with respect to pilotage are licensing requirements; training and evalu- ation procedures, including how and to what level pilots are trained and evaluat- ed; prescribed operational procedures such as use of VTS; reporting require- ments; and accountability issues. Social regulation usually involves the regulatory agency in rather detailed facets of operations, thus restricting the service provid- er's freedom to act and make decisions. In this sense, the regulatory agency (or government) becomes a major force in the determination of both service and cost levels that is, social regulation has a substantial economic impact (Abrahams- son, 19829. While this report recognizes economic regulation and impacts, it focuses on issues in the domain of social regulation. HUMAN SYSTEMS The safety performance of the marine navigation and piloting system de- pends on effective human performance. In the maritime sector, the factors that greatly influence human proficiency and performance are organizational cultures and structures, professional development, and applications of technology. This section introduces the human operators and some of the difficulties faced in professional development and performance. Human systems are examined in more detail in Chapter 7. Navigation and shiphandling skills, judgment, and decision-making capabil- ities of individuals involved in piloting a vessel are critical and fundamental. The

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 41 person operating or piloting a vessel is expected to function effectively under all operating conditions and contingencies and be prepared for any emergency. Such expertise traditionally is developed and maintained through formal instruction and training, observation, tutelage, and trial and error. However, insight gained through experience does not appear to be shared systematically among masters, mates, marine pilots, and vessel operators. The nature of marine operations keeps these individuals dispersed throughout the marine navigation and piloting sys- tem and relatively isolated from their colleagues. Furthermore, there are few convenient means to systematically share information and lessons from opera- tional experience. Shiphandling Skills Mariners often assert that shiphandling in narrow channels is more an art form than a science and that something akin to intuition is required to detect and balance the dynamic, yet often subtle, interactive forces acting on a vessel so as to maintain control over its movement (Armstrong, 1980; Gates, 1989; Hooyer, 1983; Plummer, 19663. Modern ships tax even the best shiphandler's skills be cause: · waterway improvements lag years behind changes in ship design and performance (NRC, 1992a); . ship propulsion and steering systems may be designed for at-sea efficien- cy rather than maneuvering performance (Gates, 1989~; · the general maneuvering behavior of ships in narrow channels and shal- low water is known, but actual behavior is uncertain, especially where under- keel clearances are only a few feet (Gates, 1989; Graff, 1993; Plummer, 1966~; · determinations of natural changes in channel geometry are not always timely or conveniently available to vessel operators and pilots (Gates, 19893; and · real-time data on environmental conditions including weather, currents, and tide and river stages are lacking. In addition, opportunities for a ship's officer to develop practical shiphan- dling skills are limited by shipboard organization, manning practices, functional responsibilities of deck officers while in piloting waters, and fatigue (such as might result from a rapid series of port calls to discharge and pick up freight cargoes between transoceanic voyages). In practice, therefore, shiphandling skills are developed principally through observation of pilotage, apprenticeships, on- thejob training, or a combination of these approaches. In this manner, individu- als accumulate the experience needed to handle the variability in vessel behavior as influenced by channel geometry, loading, propulsion and steering systems, vessel traffic, and environmental conditions. Crisis situations requiring instinc- tive decision making and emergency shiphandling are seldom observed aboard ship. Usually, the first occasion for practice arises when the mariner is faced

MINDING THE HELM Shiphandling simulation training using a manned model. Manned-model facilities are located in France (shown in picture), England, and Poland. The U.S. Navy's manned- model facility in Little Creek, Virginia, at which some merchant mariners participated in training during Naval Reserve duty, was closed in 1993 as a budget austerity measure. (SOGREAH Port Revel Centre) with a real-life emergency. There is no evidence that advance preparation for emergency shiphandling is offered on a broad scale. Use of simulators to provide experience in basic and port-specific shiphan- dling is growing but is still far from universal (Crooks and Douwsma, 1989; Guest, 1992a,b; Marine Institute and IMD, 1993~. Emergency scenarios some- times are included in this training. Marine simulation has not evolved into a standard element of piloting apprenticeships, although manned model and com- puter-based shiphandling simulations increasingly are used to support continu- ing professional development in many pilot associations. Both generic and route- specific simulations have been used; in one case, training simulations led to substantial modifications in standard operating practices. In this case, tanker transit speeds in northwestern Washington State waters were reduced in order to improve the potential effectiveness of tug-escort response in the event of loss of a tanker's steering or propulsion (William Bock, Puget Sound Pilots, personal communication, October 7, 1991~. Use of computer-based simulations also is growing slowly in basic training for the towing industry (Sanborn, 1991~. Masters Shipboard organization still maintains its naval form, with the captain the head of the pyramid; this is viewed as necessary for effective command and control in a sometimes hostile operating environment (Cahill, 1985~. The com

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 43 Computer-based ship bridge simulator featuring modern instrumentation, steering con- soles, and conventional and ARPA radars. Ship-bridge simulators with full bridge mock- ups and instrumentation, and a 180 degrees or greater continuous field of view are located at Castine, Maine; Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New London, Connecticut; Kings Point and New York City (2), New York; Linthicum Heights and Piney Point, Maryland; Dania, Florida; Toledo, Ohio; San Diego, California; and Seattle, Washington. (STAR Center Dania, Florida, American Maritime Officers) mend role of the master is well-established in admiralty and pilotage law, which confirm the master's overriding authority while his vessel is under the direction and control of a pilot for navigation (Cahill, 1985; MacElrevey, 1988; Meurn, 1990; Parks, 19821. Traditionally, masters are considered to have the most knowl edge of any individual regarding their own ship's maneuvering behavior. Mas- ters regularly assigned to the same vessel can observe its maneuvering character- istics over a wide range of loading and operating conditions. Some masters also handle their vessels in piloting waters and during docking evolutions. Expert skills for handling the vessel can be developed by masters handling their own vessels in pilotage waters. Masters and sometimes senior mates with such expertise may, in the pilotage jurisdictions of some countries, obtain ex- emptions from the requirement to take an independent pilot. The individual receiving the exemption virtually always must be a citizen of the country in which the ship is registered, and the ship must be operating in that country's waters.3 Not taking an independent pilot may reduce pilotage costs. Thus, ship 3In Europe, the exemption option is applied somewhat more broadly to include ships flying the nag <~r an EC member country and masters and mates licensed by these countries.

44 MINDING THE HELM ping companies may have some interest in continuing this practice. Where such programs exist, qualification criteria are generally rigorous to ensure that the master (or mate) has a level of expert local knowledge equivalent to that of independent pilots insofar as this expertise would be applied to the vessel (or vessels of near identical design and performance characteristics) being piloted. Qualification criteria usually include a prescribed number of round trips on the pilotage route for which the exemption would be granted, a written and practical examination, and certification by the pilotage authorities (Herberger et al., 19911. The United States does not follow the model of pilotage exemptions for masters. However, U.S. federal pilotage requirements principally result in masters and deck officers piloting U.S.-flag ships in coastwise trade, rather than by indepen- dent marine pilots, although the use of marine pilots for even these vessels is growing, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Despite these opportunities for masters to acquire pilotage, there are indica- tions that the capability of masters in general to assure the safety of their ships is being eroded, although a few operating companies have implemented rigorous training programs to counter this trend in their fleets (Beetham, 1989, 1990; Cahill, 1985; Intertanko, 1990; Nautical Institute, l991c; Peters, 1993J. For ex- ample, the opportunity for a master to maneuver his or her vessel is limited by reliance on pilotage services, assignments to different vessels, unfamiliarity with the operating environment, and the few opportunities to engage in coastwise trade with frequent port calls. Master reliance on pilots also tends to increase as a result of personal fatigue from conditions experienced during the voyage, or from in-port workloads. The degree to which safety performance is affected by these factors is not certain. Resolution of these issues and identification of coun- termeasures, if needed, will be important in ensuring marine safety. Although masters of U.S.-flag ships face challenges similar to those con- fronting their international counterparts, shiphandling does not stand out as a problem. Generally, U.S. masters have reputations as good shiphandlers. Most remaining U.S. ship (tanker and freight) operating companies have made sub- stantial efforts to secure masters who are well suited personally and profession- ally for their jobs. Professional development is monitored and special training sometimes is provided. Well-defined operating procedures are available for some companies, and considerable effort also has gone into providing masters with effective bridge teams (Chevron Shipping Company, 1988; S. J. Jones, Ameri- can President Lines, personal communication, November 9, 1993~. Deck Officers Deck officers have little opportunity to gain practical shiphandling skills aboard ship, in the U.S. merchant marine or elsewhere. The same factors that limit master opportunities to gain shiphandling skills also apply to mates. Fur- ther, the shrinking size of the oceangoing U.S. fleet without a corresponding

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM low- ~ 800 - _ o is 0\ 0\ 200 O 45 /,,, "'/"" /,."/ /'/ / A .. . ELI ~ ~ . ~ ~ / "a _ / . ~ Maritime Academies ~ I S. Merchant Marine Academy 3 State University of New York Maritime College 6g Massachusetts Maritime Academy Maine Maritime Academy ~3 California Maritime Academy to Texas A&M ~ Great Lakes Maritime Academy :~_ ,.... ~ ;~ : ~ - ;~ :-~5;::-~;::-~; ;~:35i:1 / / ~ ELF // FIGURE 1-2 Undergraduate enrollment at the federal and state maritime academies, November 1992 (MARAD, unpublished data). decrease in the pool of deck officers limits opportunities for sea service (Phillips and Weintraub, 19931. This also affects the opportunities for practical shiphan- dling training of cadets at the nation's maritime academies, the source of most new deck officers. There are limited opportunities for cadets to receive hands-on shiphandling training, either aboard school ships or while on training assigned aboard merchant ships. These opportunities are augmented to some extent at most of the maritime academies by computer-based shiphandling simulation training. On graduation, a cadet is expected to have a conceptual understanding of shiphandling. The maritime academy infrastructure for developing third mates and assistant engineers (Figure 1-2J was established when the U.S. merchant fleet was larger, and it cannot adjust quickly to swings in demand for junior officers. Today, about 70 percent of maritime academy graduates are placed in afloat positions, albeit not all aboard seagoing ships (Figure 1-3~. There is a reported shortage of skilled mariners internationally, but competitive factors con- strain the opportunities for U.S. mariners to serve aboard foreign-flag ships. Mariners from traditional maritime nations are expensive relative to mariners from lesser developed nations (Intertanko, 1990~. Hands-on opportunities to maneuver a ship, unless serving with a master 1 1 `, . ~. .... . ... ..

46 500 A: ~ 400 a) Cal CL 300- a) Cal 200- ct o 1 00 O- MINDING THE HELM 73 U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Texas A&M, Galveston SU NY Maritime College Massachusetts Maritime Academy Maine Maritime Academy · Great Lakes Maritime Academy California Maritime Academy /~ / . ~ / it// Maritime-Related Ashore; Military ~ Afloat Non-Maritime Ashore Other Where Employed FIGURE 1-3 Employment data for Class of 1991 graduates of the federal and state maritime academies (MARAD, unpublished data).

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 47 ARCO Independence, a U.S.-flag very large crude carrier (VLCC), underway at sea. (Vince Streano, ARCO Marine) interested in the professional development of mates, usually occurs late in a career, many years after any classroom instruction in theory (Box 1-2~. Manning practices also limit opportunities to gain maneuvering experience. Pre-arrival, cargo and docking duties, and deck watch schedules on arrival and departure reduce the opportunities for chief and second mates to observe or participate in shiphandling and piloting evolutions from the ship's bridge. These duties also are a source of fatigue and stress that can affect performance of navigation tasks. Mates typically function as members of a bridge team aboard l5.S.-flag ships, and the mate on watch can observe maneuvers in piloting waters. However, mates rarely, if ever, have an opportunity to handle the ship in confined waters. Similar manning and operating practices prevail for foreign-flag ships. Ad- ditionally, for vessels with reduced manning, there may be no flag-state require- ment for a full watch team, although unilateral requirements might be imposed by a port state as a condition of entry. Manning practices for junior deck officers usually mean little continuity with individual vessels, so it is difficult to establish a consistent frame of reference for building shiphandling knowledge.

48 Bridge Team Support MINDING THE HELM Concern has been expressed internationally over a possible shortage of qual- ified deck officers by the next decade (Herberger et al., 1991; Irvine, 1993; Ugland, 1993~. There is already a trend toward drawing on nonmaritime labor pools to reduce labor costs. Data are not available to confirm or refute reports by marine pilots that this trend is fueling a general decline in the overall level of qualifications among deck officers. Marine pilots also report that, aboard many ships in international trade, there is no such thing as a fully functioning bridge team: only the master and a helmsman4 may be present. Sometimes the master of a foreign-flag ship cannot lend full support to passage planning or safe navigation, due either to fatigue or to difficulty in communicating with the pilot because of the lack of a common language. This is in stark contrast to conditions in years past when, according to many marine pilots, someone on the bridge usually had good command of English, often a deck officer. Now pilots report greater difficulty in communicating with bridge personnel because of language problems. The evidence suggests that marine pilots are capable of conning a ship safely using commands that traditionally consist of English language words; however, considerable effort is sometimes required to guard against misunderstanding and alternative wording must some- times be used. Difficulties can arise when it becomes necessary to communicate in greater detail than can be accommodated through basic conning commands and the limited and variable vocabulary of English language words of some masters and mates. No common language has been adopted, either for communi- cations among the pilot and the bridge team or for communications between a foreign-flag vessel and a vessel traffic service. "Sea Speak," a special purpose, stylized vocabulary based on English is available but is neither mandatory nor in universal use (IMO, 1985b; Weeks, 1988, 1989; Weeks et al., 1979, 1984~. However, there are indications that marine education and training programs of some countries are moving toward greater emphasis than before on instruction in English (see Kelly, 19901.. Again, no organization, including marine pilot associations, was found to be collecting data that could be used to validate these observations or gauge the scope of these problems. Nevertheless, the aforementioned anecdotal reports and the operational experience of committee members suggest that, at least for some ships, limits on the knowledge of the master and deck officers regarding a ves 4A qualified helmsman is essential when manual steering is required. Helmsmen are generally taught on the job, although there are exceptions. For example, helmsman training is provided by the Seafarers International Union for its members using computer-based simulation and training vessels at a union-operated facility. Also, ARCO Marine has implemented a computer-based simulation training program in which each tanker's full bridge team, including helmsmen, is scheduled to participate.

THE MARINE NA VIGA TION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 49 sel's behavior, and on their shiphandling and piloting proficiency, may signifi- cantly restrict the support they can provide to the pilot. TECHNOLOGY Navigation technology has advanced spectacularly over the past several de- cades. Bridge-to-bridge radio communication capabilities and radar are in near- universal application aboard commercial vessels and ferries. These features, along with gyroscopic and magnetic compasses, constitute the basic suite of navigation equipment aboard virtually every ship calling at U.S. ports. Many tugboats also are equipped with gyro compasses. Electronic positioning equip- ment is available on most oceangoing ships and many tugs. Most ships are also required to have automatic radar-based collision avoidance systems. These are referred to as automatic radar plotting aids (ARPA). The advent of "bright face" (that is, daylight) digital radar displays has eliminated the need for the hood that was essential for daylight use of analog radar; thus, a pilot or bridge team mem- ber can refer to the radar picture without losing visual bearing. Integrated electronic bridge systems are being introduced, incorporating electronic charting systems, radar, Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) capabilities, autopilots, collision-avoidance software, and propulsion and steering system monitors. Expert systems (that is, artificial intelligence systems) for piloting are under development as are international performance standards for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS'. The ECDIS designation will be applied to electronic charting systems that meet these stan- dards, which will establish legal equivalency to paper charts. Despite the availability of advanced technology, basic technology domi- nates aboard the world's merchant fleets (see Box 1-3~. Furthermore, marine navigation and piloting remain heavily dependent on effective performance by human operators masters; vessel officers and bridge teams; marine pilots; and in some port complexes, shore-based navigation support personnel. This con- tinuing reliance on human performance is significant, because marine safety authorities and many safety reports and studies have attributed up to 80 percent or more of marine casualties to human error in some form. Understanding why human error occurs is essential in determining the potential of technology to improve human performance (Lucas, 1992; Moore et al., 1993; NAS, 1981; Reason, l99O, 19921. The degree to which human performance can be supple- mented, or human operators replaced by technology, especially in navigation and piloting, is controversial. The introduction of technology can alleviate some problems while creating others (NRC, 1990b, 1991a). For example, one ship with a fully integrated bridge system and an advanced steering system, while on its first transit of an East coast pilot route, took a sheer across the channel in good weather and grounded. The vessel's automated helmsman feature was in use. The actual cause of the ground

MINDING THE HELM ing is not certain, but the use of automated features on an initial transit of a channel raises some interesting issues. Because the ship was relatively new, on its maiden voyage to the area, and equipped with innovative navigation and steering technology, the marine pilots that provided piloting services were not familiar with the ship's specific maneuvering behavior in narrow channels and shallow water, and with the capabilities and effectiveness of its automated sys- tems. The ship's specific behavior relative to the channel's hydrography and prevailing operating conditions had not been observed previously. The incident illustrates the importance of proving a system's effectiveness and building operator familiarity, trust, and confidence in system performance through operational experience (see Chapter 61. This approach was taken in the introduction of integrated bridge technology aboard large passenger ferries oper- ating in the Baltic Sea. Use of computers to conduct maneuvers automatically was not attempted until there had been extensive operational experience; deci- sions on when to begin maneuvers remained with the master or a suitably quali- fied mate until the system was proven and trust in its performance established (Herberger et al., 1991~.

111111 1 11111111111~1111 11 (-llll- {#I#Ii#1~I 1111111111111111~ llllll~lllll~lllll~#Ib111111111~11111111 ~7 ~betber me stoic of 1bc ~ of maDcuvchng systems teas advanced to the point labors coDEdcDcc and Must can be applied uDiVCrS8HyiD actual operadoDs iS8D Open qucs~oD. Custody, cacb DC~ iDtcCrated bUd~c system must be prov- CD aboard ship. Wbilc rcpul~ly assigned masters and navigation teams may become ~mihar With this cquipmcut tbroupb As use, indepcDdcut Marc pilots who rely OF OpCrOdOD8lCKpC~CDCC and strict rotation aSSigDmCDt practices to build misty With varying cquipmcut types and conAgurabons could be placed at ~ severe disadv~ta~c. Famih~ty limb bigb technology could be built tbroupb madDc Emulsion, as demonstrated by the aviation modes abboupb this is not common practice (Curse 1992a,b). Sbip-b~dgc simulation ~ciLtics may have actual or simulated ARPA units far ~11 mission simulation. A number of mistime schools and gaining ~ciDtics have radar simulators that arc used far radar observer cc~iEca- doD courses required by Tic Coast Ou~d far mahuc 1iccuscs. Fc~ training Acid Tics, if any, have Tic 1atosL~cDcrabon electronic Fabling systems and thus, the facilities arc not able to odor trOiDiDgiD their use. EVCD if the equipment Acre

52 MINDING THE HELM available, assumptions about long-term retention and transfer of knowledge and skills developed during full mission and part-task marine simulation training are based primarily on preliminary research (D'Amico et al., 1985; Hammell et al., 1985; O'Hara and Saxe, 1985) and on anecdotal reports. Performance of individ- uals following simulation training has not been tracked. Furthermore, lessons from human performance research in other sectors have not been routinely ap- plied (see Elkind et al., 1990; NRC, 1988, l991b, 1992b, 1993), although bridge resources management training has recently been adapted by a consortium of marine and aviation interest in Europe (Koning, 1993; Wahren, 19931. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES AND STRUCTURES FOR DECISION MAKING The organizational structure for decision making that affects vessel move- ments ranges from a well-defined, traditional naval command structure aboard the bridge of a ship (Box 1-4) to informal, loosely organized, and sometimes ad . e ..... · .... . . .. ..... ............ .. ... .... ..... ....... _ ......................................... ........................................ '...'.'.'...'....... .......................... . ~'""' Hi" '''' ' I'" A"' '"''' "'''i A''"' ...... _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , _ _ pr ~, ~ ~ _ _ ............ === =_ ..... . = . . . .. = ..... .... .... . . . ~:~:fc~, ,,,~,~j,~, ~ Of ............................................... = , ..~= ~ ... = .............. .... ~: :: : ~1~6 ~ ..~:.:.- : ~ ::::::: ~:~::~::: ~:::: A: :~ : .... ~ :- ~ Ad: Ad:= ::~ i:::: ::: ::: ::~: : - ~ :::: = : A: ~::~: : ~:: i i

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 53 hoc procedures. The latter is common within most port and waterway complexes and river systems supporting ship traffic. Each self-propelled commercial vessel is a self-contained platform that is designed to operate independently of all other vessels. On each ship's bridge, the captain is always in command, and the person piloting the vessel is subordinate to command authority. While maneuvering orders are typically given by the pilot directly to a helmsman (or less commonly, given through the master or mate to a helmsman), a well-defined traditional role, the orders are made under the master's command authority. The master may countermand these orders or pilot the vessel (referred to as "taking the cone") even if a pilot required by a pilotage authority for the waters traversed is aboard. Exercise of the command prerogative to countermand a pilot's orders rarely occurs and then only for cause; masters are expected to be capable of identifying obvious errors in piloting but often lack sufficient local knowledge to determine subtle deficiencies that may contribute to more serious maneuvering problems during a transit. A similar decision-making structure ex- ists aboard smaller vessels such as tugboats, although the number of individuals in the pilothouse is usually less than aboard a large ship; pilots may or may not be required by regulation, but independent marine pilots are usually not taken. The framework for interactions between two vessels meeting, crossing, or overtaking in a harbor or narrow channel is well defined. The International Rules for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) the nautical rules of the road provide very precise rules that guide decision making in these situations, even specifying whistle signals keyed to these rules. However, now that bridge-to- bridge radio communications are available aboard virtually all ships, towing industry vessels, and passenger vessels, any necessary arrangements for safe interactions normally are coordinated by radio. Whistle signals are still some- times used in conjunction with radio calls, as a primary means of indicating intentions if radio communications have not been established, and to signal dan- ger during emergency maneuvering situations. Interactions involving more than two vessels, a typical scenario for harbors or waterways, are more complicated; maneuvering arrangements are most easily coordinated by radio. In such cases, considered a special circumstance by the COLREGS, the precise rules give way to prudent seamanship and are followed only as is practical and prudent. Broad coordination or management of vessel traffic is not addressed in the COLREGS, although VTS participation requirements are addressed. The rules also provide general guidance on the use of traffic lanes and traffic separation schemes. Beyond rules for the aforementioned interactions, there is little formal struc- ture in most of the nation's port and waterway complexes and river systems to guide or assist in decision making. Decisions made on one vessel may have implications not only for that vessel's transit but also for those of other vessels met minutes or hours later. A decision to speed up or slow down may result in an untimely meeting, such as between a large ocean-going ship and a tug with a 1,000-foot long barge flotilla at a difficult bend in the lower Mississippi River.

54 MINDING THE HELM In another case that could affect a safe passage, a vessel may depart from a visually obstructed berth in a constricted waterway without knowledge of other vessel traffic already in the system. The decision-making process for these situations is largely ad hoc. Although bridge-to-bridge radio communications have provided a much improved capabil- ity for communicating arrangements for interactions between vessels (USCG, 1972), the lack of a formalized organizational structure for interdependent deci- sion making in ports and waterways creates opportunities for human error. For example, vessels may make radio broadcasts "in the blind" as a general form of alert to other vessels. Whether the pilot or bridge team aboard vessels needing this information actually hear the call is left to chance. In other cases, the process is more structured. Through their dispatch service, pilots are generally aware of the movements of other vessels with pilots aboard. By the same means, operators of harbor craft may have general knowledge of their company's fleet move- ments. However, the decision-making structure is, in general, so informal in most ports that a casual observer might wonder whether the system works. That it works most of the time is attributed to the skills and abilities of most commer- cial mariners coupled with a port operating environment that is somewhat for- giving in comparison to aviation; the combined effect generally provides the margin necessary to recognize problems in time to take corrective action. How- ever, some maneuvers in confined waterways require precision timing in their execution and have little or no margin of safety if an error is made (see Chapters 4 and 5~. The safe passage of ships in ports and waterways is aided by the use of local experts, the marine pilots. Marine pilots are the first representatives of port-state interests to board an inbound vessel. As such, they have the first opportunity to observe some aspects of the fitness of the vessel and its bridge team for entry into local waters. Although decision making affecting vessel transits is mostly informal and independent, there is an interdependent aspect to the process. Ma- rine pilots generally operate in one of the most structured subsystems within the marine navigation and piloting system. Most work in a tightly knit community of professionals providing like services. They become familiar with the capabilities and piloting strategies of their colleagues through continued service on their pilotage routes. By either advance notice from pilot dispatchers, or through voice recognition from radio transmissions, they often know which colleagues are pi- loting other ships, and they generally know how their fellow pilots will respond in multiple-vessel maneuvering situations. Such knowledge becomes critical, for example, when ship interactions in close quarters can be accomplished safely only by causing the hydrodynamic forces generated by the movement of each vessel to interact, as in meetings in the Houston Ship Channel (see Chapter 4; Gates, 1989; Graff, 1993; NTSB, 1989a; Plummer, 1966~. Preparation for this particular interaction is rigorous so that the pilots can precisely coordinate their maneuvering orders.

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 55 Sometimes, however, the professional capabilities, judgment, responsibility, accountability, and organizational or working relationships of captains, marine pilots, mates, and docking and mooring masters have been inadequate, as dem- onstrated by the nature and frequency of human error in marine accidents. Fail- ures in performance are not entirely the fault of the mariners, but are inherent in the informal organizational structure and decision-making processes of the over- all system (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1992~. For this reason, there is growing inter- est, nationally and internationally, in ways to boost human performance through improvements in waterways management, as well as in professional develop- ment and oversight. RISK AND CHANGE IN THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM Assessing Risk Modern risk-assessment methodologies calculate risk as the algebraic prod- uct of the probability of an adverse event occurring during a defined period and the cost that would be incurred if the event took place. For economic risk, cost equals the economic cost. For other types of risk, other cost measures can be used; for example, environmental risk assessments use environmental cost. The resulting product serves as a measure that can be compared numerically with risk in other sectors to gauge whether the level of risk is acceptable. This form of risk assessment is rarely applied to guide commercial marine operations. Assessments that have been conducted are generally proprietary and are related to operating company liability and insurance; such assessments are not available to safety authorities for use in planning waterway improvements or for performing marine safety assessments. Even if they were, no guidelines exist for what level of risk is acceptable for use in planning waterway improvements (NRC, 1992a). Similarly, the regulation of marine traffic by port-level marine safety authorities has not been guided by statistically valid risk assessments although the Coast Guard has applied statistical measures in assessing the need for VTS systems (Maio et al., 19913. Safety evaluations have been conducted, but limited attention has been paid to the overall system or organization (in the waterway and on the vessel) in which decision making occurs. Attention usually is directed at subsystems or results; as a result, symptoms of problems are addressed; whether root problems are addressed through corrective measures directed at these symptoms is largely left to chance (Lucas, 1992; Mackenbach, 1992; NRC, 19831. Misdirected em- phasis (for example, on symptom-based safety improvement measures' can re- sult in overconfidence in the safety measures and hardware reliability, or in complacency, lack of attention to underlying causes of accidents (Lucas, 1992), and ineffective allocation of resources.

56 MINDING THE HELM Assessments of risk factors that affect vessel operations (Box 1-5) most often are made informally by mariners while they are navigating or maneuvering their vessels. Risk in ports and port approaches, waterways, and river systems supporting ship navigation varies according to channel and waterway dimen- sions, configurations, and length; hydrodynamics; commodity types and flows; vessel types, hull forms, sizes, propulsion and steering systems; vessel loading; traffic types, patterns, density, times of movement; tides and river stages; and the presence of port and waterway structures. As all of these factors vary among ports and waterways, so too does the probability that an accident may occur. The interactive effect of these risk factors must be understood and effectively ad- dressed in determining what opportunities exist for improving safety perfor- mance. These effects are examined in Chapter 4. Changes in the Marine Navigation and Piloting System Over the past several decades, marine transportation has been transformed in form and character. Ships and barges have become bigger and more unwieldy, but improvements in navigation channels to ensure adequate margins of safety for maneuvering lag years behind these changes in vessel design and operating characteristics (NRC, 1985, 1992a). Shiphandl~ng is complicated by modern ship- propulsion systems that sacrifice maneuverability in favor of fuel economy. Yet, some of the latest-generation ships have positioning and control systems that make it possible to navigate more precisely than ever before, given the advanced human skills needed to operate them successfully. The scale of potential harm has also expanded greatly with vessel size. Petroleum, chemical, and liquified gas cargoes are transported in such quantities that a single-ship disaster can have catastrophic consequences for port facilities, population centers, and to local and regional environments. In the busiest ports and waterways, marine traffic has become more dense and diverse. The implications and effects of all these chang- es are not always readily apparent nor are they well understood from a systems perspective. These changes must be recognized and their effects understood so that enhancements to human systems and advances in technology can be applied effectively to improve navigation safety in a competitive economic environment. However, implementation of improvements is complicated by misconceptions regarding the structure and performance of the marine navigation and piloting system. Further, there is a public perception that preventing tanker accidents is the major marine transportation issue. Although understanding the causes, con- sequences, and implications of marine accidents that result in major pollution incidents is important, an understanding of the navigation and piloting of all categories of merchant vessels is needed in order to identify and correct systemic problems. The continuing, polarized debate over pilot roles, performance, and licen- sure, for example, lacks precision. Although much has been written about pilot

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SY.STEM

58 MINDING THE HELM age issues, no consensus has developed to guide decision making relative to the effects of change on the marine navigation and piloting system. Distinctions often are blurred between federally and state-licensed pilots, the various types of pilots (such as coastal, bar, river, and harbor pilots and docking and mooring masters), their roles (advisory or directive), and their legal status (voluntary or compulsory). All these characteristics typically are blended into a confusing pool of subjects and issues that confounds informed assessment. This report presents a comprehensive description of piloting practices (Chapter 2), pilotage administration (Chapter 3), and features of a complete pilotage system (Appen- dix E) to guide informed decision making regarding pilotage issues. The degree to which marine safety may be threatened by changes in the character of marine transportation or current responses to them is a difficult question. There is nevertheless a widespread perception among professional mar- iners worldwide, national marine safety authorities, and the public that these changes could prove detrimental to safety. Some trends of particular concern are reduced crew sizes, employment of lowest-cost crews, and fatigue and stress caused by economic pressure for rapid port turnaround times (Chadwin and Tal- ley, 1992; Intertanko, 1990; Knudson and Mathiesen, 1987; Motor Ship, 1992a,b; NRC, 1990a; Peters, 1993; Safety at Sea, 1990~. There is sufficient reason to closely follow all developments in shipping practices and safety performance. So far, safety data and assessment methodologies have not been adequate for this task. Moreover, mariners, including pilots, are reluctant to be specific about their observations of substandard performance and maintenance, and they are known not to keep extensive or detailed supporting records. The following sections present various perspectives on the changes affecting marine transportation, along with a summary of the debate over pilotage. Marine Industry Issues Rapid developments are taking place in technology, competition, and public concern, accompanied by increases in operating costs and, especially for tankers, in the costs of marine accidents. All this is occurring during a period of contrac- tion in the U.S.-flag fleet. These factors limit the ability of domestic operators to respond to change. The costs of accidents, especially those that result in environ- mental damage, have risen dramatically, and it is not yet clear whether preven- tive measures will reduce the probability that accidents will occur. Thus, there is a relationship between economic, operational, and environmental risks, and to the degree that human health may be threatened, health risks as well. To the extent that operational risk can be reduced, corresponding reductions in econom- ic, environmental, and health risks will follow. Determining how to reduce oper- ational risk without creating unwarranted economic burdens on operating com- panies, public resources, or the economy is a substantial challenge. The most obvious change affecting the marine industry is in the standard of

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 59 care that must be exercised to safeguard the environment. Great public outrage and calls for corrective and punitive action following several major marine casu- alties and oil spills during 1989 clearly signaled a dramatic increase in public expectations for marine safety. Legislative and regulatory actions by the states and federal government following these events served to greatly increase the liability of operators of vessels involved in a marine accident. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 greatly increased the limits of liability of shipowners for damages resulting from oil spills. It also required that they pro- vide evidence of financial responsibility to ensure the financial resources that would be needed to pay for cleanup. The act also left the states free to pass laws setting even higher liability limits for oil spills in their waters. These develop- ments have heightened safety awareness within the marine industry. They have also increased the incentives for improving navigation and pilotage to reduce the economic risk for oil spills resulting from marine accidents (NRC, 1990a, l991c; OSIR, 1993e,k). During this period of change, marine transportation of persistent (heavy) oils has continued at unchanged levels, although there appears to have been a change in which companies are providing the service. The increased financial responsibilities have had a number of effects. A small number of U.S. and for- eign operators ceased to use their own vessels to transport persistent oil to U.S. ports (or to ports in a few states, including Maine and Maryland). A few others discontinued or reduced investment in improvements in existing vessels nearing the end of their useful life, because of the phase-out schedule for single-hulled tank vessels imposed by OPA 90. These companies instead may employ vessels owned by others that meet the financial responsibility and other requirements of U.S. law but for which they have a reduced degree of operational control (Lloyd's List, 1990a,b,c; Maritrans, 1989, 1993; OSIR, 1990; Plume, 1991; Trench, 1992~. The safety implications of such a shift depend on operating practices (including manning and outfitting) and maintenance of the vessels that are used. Since the enactment of OPA 90, the quality of tankers chartered for service to U.S. ports appears to have improved (Arthur McKenzie, Tanker Advisory Center, personal communication, January 15, 1993~. Maintaining this trend is an objective of the act's implementation. Available data are insufficient to monitor fully the safety performance of not only tankers but also a far greater number of other cargo ships with regard to the existing broad range of marine safety requirements. The potential for involve- ment of vessels other than tankers in marine accidents, including multiple-vessel accidents involving tank vessels, remains a concern but is difficult to quantify. Only a small percentage of foreign commerce is shipped on U.S.-flag ves- sels. The ability to control change through local regulation has been reduced, because declining numbers of vessels and crews are under direct U.S. influence with regard to vessel registry or operator licensure. Unilateral action by the United States to dictate the design of the world's fleets and rules for vessel

60 MINDING THE HELM crowing (at least for operations to and from U.S. ports) is possible, because trade with the United States is essential for many ship operators. However, unilateral action has not in the past been viewed favorably by the international community. However, recent tanker accidents have motivated some European countries to consider unilateral action to protect their waters from oil spills. Although such action is a potentially powerful means to improve safety, it must be implemented very carefully to avoid economic conflict with other countries. Regardless, inter- national shipping companies, if they wish to trade with the United States, must meet international standards enforced by the United States as well as any unilat- eral standards that are imposed. Technological development of navigation systems is another area of rapid change. Several new technologies have been developed recently that potentially could be employed to reduce the probability of accidents, and thus to reduce risk. These technological developments, discussed more fully in Chapter 6, can pro- vide dramatic improvements in position fixing, steering, information display, and hazard avoidance. Most will require significant changes to operating practic- es and operational procedures to realize fully their potential. Retrofitting some existing vessels will be difficult and expensive. There are, nevertheless, incen- tives for operators to consider using advanced technologies. Beyond risk reduc- tion, some technologies offer improved operational efficiency. Any positive mea- sures that are taken also have potential benefits in the form of public acceptance and goodwill for the industry. However, powerful impediments complicate the implementation of changes that might improve navigation and piloting. The first barrier is the economic condition of the industry. Because of a worldwide oversupply of most types of vessels, freight rates are low. The shipping industry argues that the capital neces- sary to improve the fleet is scarce. On the other hand, tanker operators trading with the United States are required by OPA 90 to phase out their existing single- hull ships from this trade by the year 2015. Thus, incentives to replace the world fleet with high-technology ships are countered by economic forces (Peters, 19931. Retrofitting new technology might be attractive for many operators if they could derive operational efficiencies. Current U.S. laws and regulations many of which were enacted before the new technologies emerged make it difficult to alter crew manning and operating practices as needed to achieve these effi- ciencies. Past labor agreements have had similar effect, although there is strong movement in U.S. shipping towards permanent assignment of masters, mates, and licensed engineers. In some cases, these same laws and regulations could even impede the changes in operations that could reduce risk (see related discus- sion in Chapter 61. Liability considerations also inhibit adoption of new technologies and prac- tices. Centuries of court decisions with respect to prudent seamanship could not take into account these new technologies and practices. Operators that adopt high-technology navigation systems risk running afoul of legal requirements and

THE MARINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 61 precedents that institutionalize practices and procedures based on the use of traditional navigation equipment (now including radar and very-high-frequency EVHF] radio). As an example, some operators have been reluctant to install electronic charting systems until the legal equivalence of electronic charts to paper charts has been firmly established. Other operators have made these instal- lations, and their bridge personnel are using electronic charting systems for nav- igation, while retaining older equipment and paper charts to satisfy legal require- ments. What many shipowners perceive to be a lack of coherent national maritime policy seems to be at the root of most of the uncertainty among operators as to the direction that they should take in addressing the new, higher levels of risk. They see little encouragement from the federal government for expanding or even maintaining the U.S.-flag fleet. Shipping laws and regulations are not seen as supporting the changes that shipowners believe are needed (Phillips and Wein traub, 19933. Seeing no effective central management of maritime affairs, opera- tors are concerned that independent action by U.S. coastal states will complicate or adversely affect the U.S. position in international marine safety policy setting. Change is needed to meet the new challenges of public expectations and increased risk. But changes in operating practices and adoption of high-technol- ogy navigation systems are unlikely to be timely or fully effective without a substantial reduction in the uncertainty facing the maritime industry and without the removal of impediments that constrain their implementation and use. Public Safety Issues Modern operating and manning practices have increased performance de- mands on shipboard personnel in pilotage waters-usually the most difficult and demanding portion of modern voyages (see Chapter 4~. Adding to this load are the difficulties associated with substandard ships and crews, identified by anec- dotal reports (Armstrong, 1980; Cahill, 1983, 1985; Fairplay, 1992a). Substan- dard performance is alleged for ships of a dozen nations (OSIR, 1993d; Peters, 1993; Salvarani, 1992~. Substantial material deficiencies have been detected by Coast Guard inspections of some foreign-flag merchant ships of all types and by pre-charter inspections. Both the Coast Guard and the IMO have alleged sub- standard oversight by some classification societies that inspect and certify vessel seaworthiness (Bangsberg, 1992; Fairplay, 1992a; Irvine, 1993; Kime, 1992; OSIR, 1993d; Porter, 19941. For example, according to pre-charter inspections by one oil company, up to 20 percent of tankers in 1992 that it considered chartering did not fully meet international and applicable company chartering standards (Irvine, 1993~. Further, a very large number of vessel owners or inves- tors own only one or two ships. There are about 3,250 ocean-going tankers, but the average tanker fleet consists of only about 1.7 ships (Irvine, 19931. The general manning practice of single-ship owners and management companies is

62 MINDING THE HELM to obtain crews as needed on the world maritime labor market; competitive fac- tors are such that there is little incentive for owners or management companies operating in this fashion or charterers to invest in professional development programs (Peters, 1993~. Such practices are not only a concern to marine safety authorities, but also to the operators of larger tanker fleets (Intertanko, 1990~. Over the past several decades, the operational safety of ships, measured in terms of marine casualties, has improved overall (Knudsen and Mathiesen, 1987; Marine Log, 1993; NRC, 1990a, l991c; USCG, 1987~. Since 1989, the number of ship losses, ship losses in tonnage, volume of oil spilled by vessels in U.S. waters, and number of vessel spills in U.S. waters and worldwide have decreased steadily (Marine Log, 1993; OSIR, 1991, 1992, 1993i). Yet a number of factors, including the increasing age of commercial fleets and an associated increase in maintenance problems, suggest that this trend may have reached a limit and could be reversing. After steady reductions in the numbers of ships lost over a 10-year period, total losses jumped sharply by 27 percent in 1991. Losses of life and gross tonnage surged as well. In 1992, two large oil spills from tankers accounted for nearly 27 percent of the total number of gallons spilled worldwide, an increase in volume spilled over the two preceding years (OSIR, 1992, 1993i; Porter, 1992b'. This was followed in early 1993 by several major oil spills involving tanker accidents off the coasts of Europe and Southeast Asia (OSIR, 1993e,f,g,i,j; Welch, 19941. Possible explanations for the observed increases include aging of the world's merchant fleets and alleged deterioration in the quality of ships' crews (Bangsberg, 1992; Peters, 1993; Porter, 1992a; Tecnitas, 1992~. Compre- hensive data to support these hypotheses were not available; previous National Research Council studies have identified gaps in marine safety data and called for research to fill them (NRC, 1990a, 1991a). However, the Coast Guard reports that too many deficiencies are being detected in foreign-flag tankers through its boarding program and that "alarming discrepancies" are being found with regard to the International Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention and U.S. regula- tions (Kime, 19923. The Marine Accident Record In general, the marine accident record indicates that the marine navigation and piloting system is a safe system. Apparent reasons for this performance level include: · the slow speed at which most action occurs, usually but not always- providing time for human operators to recognize and recover from mistakes; · an operating environment that usually does not lead immediately to cata- strophic results such as total loss of a vessel; the more extreme consequences

THE MaRINE NAVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 63 often occur well after the initial event, especially in unprotected waters, as the vessel is exposed to various environmental conditions (Cahill, 1983, 1985; NTSB, 1990~; · the nautical rules of the road, which if used correctly provide adequate procedures for preventing collisions in interactions between two vessels (Cahill, 1983; NTSB, 1972, 1981, 1984, 1988a, 1991a); and · the conscientious performance of operating personnel, even when mis- takes are made (Paramore et al., 1979; Reason, 19921. Particular credit is due the independent marine pilots who play a distinct role in providing expert navigation and piloting services for vessel masters and bridge teams unfamiliar with local ports (Armstrong, 1980; MacElrevey, 1988; Nauti- cal Institute, 1991a; Plummer, 1966; Ramaswamy and Grabowski, 1992; Reid, 1986~. Yet, despite the considerable care and sound judgment exercised by the many reputable mariners and operating companies, a substantial number of ma- rine accidents occur nationwide. Most are neither newsworthy nor catastrophic. But a select few have been sufficient to erode public confidence in the safety performance of the industry at large and in navigation and piloting practices. The grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska, with a major spillage of crude oil (Alaska Oil Spill Commission, 1990; Davidson, 1990; NTSB, 1990), was followed within a year and a half by other major tank vessel accidents in or near U.S. coastal waters (NTSB, 1991 a,b; OSIR 1989a,b,c; USCG, 1990a). Problems with navigation and shiphandling in these and other marine casualties were identified as key causal factors. It is intriguing that most marine accidents involving commercial vessels also involved seasoned rather than inexperienced personnel, pointing to the importance of continuing profes- sional development and evaluation. Many accidents also occurred during moder- ate or better weather (AWO, 1992b; Cahill, 1983, 1985; NTSB, 1980, 1988a, 1989a, 1990, 1991a; Paramore et al., 1979; TBS, 19853. In the public debate leading to passage of OPA 90, questions were raised about the professional qualifications of merchant mariners and marine pilots, the programs that lead to their qualification, and professional oversight and disci- pline. These concerns have not abated. Concerns have been expressed by many interested parties including Congress, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 1989a,b, 1990, l991a,c), state legislatures and regulatory agencies (Jour- nal of Commerce, 1992b; OSP1l, 1993, 1994; Wastler, 1993b), federal regulato- ry agencies (USCG, 1989), and the public (Abrams, 1992a,b; Crowley, 1991; Davidson, 1990; Journal of Commerce, 1992a; Nalder, 1989a,b; Seattle Times Company, 1989~. The qualifications and performance of pilots, and the benefits of federal versus state pilotage systems, are highly controversial, polarized, po- liticized, and intensely debated issues.

64 MINDING THE HELM THE PILOTAGE CONTROVERSY Examinations of pilotage by the marine industry, government authorities, and the public have focused on three basic issues: safety (including environmen- tal safety), administration, and economics. Safety issues are sometimes intermin- gled with and overshadowed by underlying economic interests. The merits of the federal and state systems of pilotage have been debated for more than a century. The modern debate is often characterized by an incomplete understanding or representation of piloting practices and professional development and assertions about safety performance and data based on specific points of view. Recent examinations of pilotage have targeted pilot safety performance in specific accidents. Disciplinary processes following marine accidents also have been emphasized. Some interested parties and observers advocate making the federal pilot license superior to state licenses to improve this form of discipline (Ashe, 1984: NTSB, 1988a). Others endorse the state pilot system as superior in effectiveness and discipline (Crowley, 1991; Leis, 1989, 19923. At the same time, many mariners express concern about the expertise available in the Coast Guard for the establishment of pilotage qualification requirements. Some ex- press a belief that Coast Guard personnel have limited piloting expertise or that their expertise is not comparable to that required to pilot commercial vessels. On the other hand, the Coast Guard considers that the credentials of personnel as- signed to pilotage administration are generally adequate to the task (see Chapter 31. No acceptable performance measure has been developed for gathering and normalizing safety data to allow comparative assessment of pilot performance in different ports or for different categories of vessels (even those operating in the same locale). Operating risks vary greatly by service area, as do piloting tasks, for example, crossing the bar versus docking a ship in a confined waterway (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 19913. The available data provide only a limited sense of the causal relationship of pilotage to marine casualties; moreover, the data typically focus on individual vessels rather than on ship, shore-based, or human systems. The Coast Guard is developing a prototype exposure database for multidimensional risk analysis of causal relationships in marine accidents (Abkowitz et al., 1985; Hantzes and Ponce, 1991; USCG, 1993c). In-depth ma- rine accident investigations conducted by the NTSB and the Coast Guard pro- vide useful insight on specific events but are less helpful in expanding under- standing of individual pilot performance or in explaining how this knowledge might relate to decision making, pilot professional development, the use of nav igation technology, or a system-wide perspective on safety. Differences in pilot training and licensing standards and oversight also have been cause for considerable controversy. Pilots appear to be held to more rigor- ous standards in some jurisdictions than in others. Moreover, some mariners who provide pilot, docking, or mooring services to U.S.-flag and foreign-flag ships in

THE MARINE NaVIGATION AND PILOTING SYSTEM 65 foreign trade are not presently required to be licensed. In some cases, as in Kill Van Kull and Newark Bay in the Port of New York and New Jersey, docking masters possessing but not serving under the terms of a Federal First Class Pilot's License or endorsement direct and control vessel maneuvering during transits of up to 19 miles, although shorter distances are more common (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 1991; Cahill, 1985~.5 Some marine transportation compa nies contend that the extensive experience of the docking masters and vessel operator concerns about operational safety and costs of marine accidents work to provide comparable levels of safety performance even where official governance does not fully cover licensure. Whether or to what degree this is correct is an issue. Debate continues over whether and to what extent state pilots are subject to more rigorous training and evaluation than are federally licensed pilots and whether discipline is applied more consistently nationwide by the Coast Guard than by state governing authorities (Ashe, 1984; Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 1991; Cantwell, 1992; Crowley, 1991; Deane and Peterson, 1992; Journal of Commerce, 1989, 1992a; Leis, 1989, 1992; Mongelluzzo, 1994; Nadeau, 1992; Neely, 1992; Ramaswamy and Grabowski, 1992; Sankovitch, 19933. Whether the differences between federal and state pilotage have translated into unequal safety records also is debated; study results are mixed and are open to question because of the lack of standard methodologies for gathering and assessing safety data. Two analyses of the Coast Guard's casualty data indicate that safety levels of federal pilots are equal to or better than those of various state groups (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 1991; USCG, 1993c). But other examinations claim much higher losses for federal pilots when they are performing the same tasks as state- licensed pilots (Lets, 1989, 1992~. The differences in results are related to study methodologies and the safety data chosen for analysis (see Appendix D). Some comparisons between the federal and state pilotage systems are inevi- table, because federal pilot licenses are required or used in various ways within each state system. However, comparisons of safety performance are not mean- ingful without a standard or benchmark. Instead of directly comparing the feder- al and state pilotage systems in its analysis, this report compares each form of pilotage regulation with the features that the committee considers central to a complete pilotage system (Appendix E). In the absence of definitive safety data, comparisons of each form of pilotage oversight to the central features of a com- plete pilotage system can serve as the basis for informed decision making as to how marine pilotage might be improved to assist in reducing operational risk. SThe Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rule making in July 1993 that would fill some existing gaps in state pilotage coverage by requiring a federally licensed pilot to direct and control the navigation vessels in foreign trade that operate in certain designated waters of California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey (FR 58[130]:36914-36918).

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Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting Get This Book
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Large ships transporting hazardous cargoes, notorious marine accidents, and damage to marine ecosystems from tanker spills have heightened public concern for the safe navigation of ships.

This new volume offers a complete, highly readable assessment of marine navigation and piloting. It addresses the application of new technology to reduce the probability of accidents, controversies over the effectiveness of waterways management and marine pilotage, and navigational decisionmaking. The book also explores the way pilots of ships and tugs are trained, licensed, and held accountable.

Minding the Helm approaches navigational safety from the perspectives of risk assessment and the integration of human, technological, and organizational systems. Air and marine traffic regulation methods are compared, including the use of vessel traffic services.

With a store of current information and examples, this document will be indispensable to federal and state pilotage and licensing authorities and marine traffic regulators, the Coast Guard, pilot associations, and the shipping and towing industries. It will also interest individuals involved in waterway design, marine education, and the marine environment.

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